Smokeless War: China's Quest for Geopolitical Dominance

By Manoj Kewalramani

In January 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak in China was viewed as a black swan event, threatening the Communist Party's rule. Two short months later, however, China appeared to have controlled the virus, while the rest of the world struggled to respond.

As country after country imposed lockdowns of varying strictness and the human cost began to rise, geopolitical frictions flared up over the origins of the virus, along with Beijing's early failures, diplomacy and discourse.

Smokeless War: China's Quest for Geopolitical Dominance offers a gripping account of the Communist Party of China's political, diplomatic and narrative responses during the pandemic. Drawing on the latest academic research and Chinese language sources, it discusses the Party–State's efforts to achieve greater discourse power and political primacy, as it sought to convert a potentially existential crisis into a historic opportunity.

In doing so, the author provides an insightful account of the Communist Party of China's approaches to cultivating sources of strength and exercise of power.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
• Release date: Jun 28, 2021
• ISBN: 9789354350962

Book preview

In Smokeless War, Manoj Kewalramani gives us a granular analysis of China’s response to the 2020 COVID-19 crisis, using her available power, integrated across domains from ‘discourse power’ to diplomacy to economics. Going beyond the headlines or just the first draft of history, the book draws broader conclusions about China’s trajectory and workings, including the ideological aspects which outsiders often find unclear. This is a book well worth reading by all those concerned about the behaviour of one of the world’s most powerful and unique countries, China.

—Amb. Shivshankar Menon

Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India

Smokeless War, Manoj Kewalramani’s insightful new book, details how China crafted its political and diplomatic narrative when responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Kewalramani, a fellow at the Takshashila Institution, unfolds the CCP’s multiple levels of engagement with the pandemic and, in doing so, delves into the questions of Chinese power that will define the global foreign-policy debate for years to come.

—Dr. Shashi Tharoor

Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha

Is it a smokeless war or rather a gunless war waged behind a smokescreen? For the Chinese leadership, the fight against the pandemic is highly political. In the line of fire are nothing less than the ruling party’s legitimacy and China’s position as a great power second to none. In this engaging and thoroughly researched book, Manoj Kewalramani recalls the past year’s course of events and artfully exposes Beijing’s strategy and tactics to win the contest for narrative dominance and geopolitical primacy.

—Nadège Rolland

Senior Fellow Political and Security Affairs,

The National Bureau of Asian Research

In a gripping narrative on the COVID-19 pandemic that has turned the world upside down, Manoj Kewalramani offers deep insights into China’s decisive handling of the crisis, the Chinese Communist Party’s changed worldview under Xi Jinping, the nature of Beijing’s ideological hubris, the sources of its geopolitical assertiveness and the implications for the rest of the world. Based on a close reading of Mandarin sources and rooted in a sensible analytical framework, Smokeless War is an important and accessible account of the meaning of China’s rise.

—C. Raja Mohan

Director, Institute of South Asian Studies,

National University of Singapore

Manoj Kewalramani, with his usual insight, brings a riveting account of what happened in China during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. You feel that impending sense of gloom as you look back. You wonder, could things have been different? This is a must-read if we are to make sense of what happened in 2020.

—Indrani Bagchi

Diplomatic Editor,

The Times of India

SMOKELESS WAR

SMOKELESS WAR

China’s Quest for

Geopolitical Dominance

Manoj Kewalramani

BLOOMSBURY INDIA

Bloomsbury Publishing India Pvt. Ltd

Second Floor, LSC Building No. 4, DDA Complex, Pocket C – 6 & 7,

Vasant Kunj, New Delhi 110070

BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY INDIA and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in India 2021

This edition published 2021

Copyright © Manoj Kewalramani, 2021

Manoj Kewalramani has asserted his right under the Indian Copyright Act to be identified as the author of this work

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior permission in writing from the publishers

This book is solely the responsibility of the author and the publisher has had no role in the creation of the content and does not have responsibility for anything defamatory or libellous or objectionable

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes

ISBN: HB: 978-93-54350-94-8; e-Book: 978-93-54350-96-2

Created by Manipal Digital

To find out more about our authors and books, visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters

To Megha & Kabir

For keeping me together Smokeless

CONTENTS

Preface

1In Search of Discourse Power

2Heroes and Martyrs

3Imposing Amnesia

4The Only Way

5Driving the Blade Inward

6Victim, Culprit and Wolf Warriors

7A Major Power

8A New Contest

Notes

About the Author

PREFACE

The genesis of this book lies in a question that was asked on the cover of The Economist magazine’s issue of 18 April 2020. ‘Is China Winning?’ the editors had then wondered. This came mere days after Wuhan had reopened with much fanfare. In contrast, cities around the world were instituting lockdowns to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. In just under three months since Wuhan first went into lockdown, the Chinese government had seemingly managed to contain the virus’ spread across the country. Moreover, what had once seemed to be an existential threat to the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) authority was rapidly turning into a propaganda coup. By late February, Chinese officials and Party-state media had shifted from being on the defensive to projecting their success. At home, they paid tribute to ‘martyrs’ and ‘warriors’ while praising the superiority of the CCP-led governance model. Internationally, they brushed aside criticism and hailed China’s arrival as a major power.

The piece accompanying the headline in The Economist touched upon the potential geopolitical fallout of these events. What had the pandemic told us about the durability of CCP rule in China? Are we destined for a superpower jostle between Washington and Beijing? Does the Xi Jinping-led CCP desire to supplant US global primacy? If so, what is the model that it draws upon; does this have global purchase, and to what effect? Also, what about economic globalisation—does the pandemic signal the beginning of its end? More fundamentally, what does winning entail? And victory for whom?

The chapters that follow are an attempt to unpack and address each of these questions. In order to do so, I have drawn on the research of and analytical frameworks developed by scholars and practitioners whose works have been critical in furthering our understanding of political life in China. In addition, when discussing Beijing’s policies, along with diplomatic and narrative approaches, I have prioritised Chinese government documents, official statements, Party-state media reportage and other Chinese language sources rather than rely on second-hand reportage. For all the intrigue and secrecy, there is much that the Chinese government and media puts out in the public domain that often remains unexplored or lost in translation in mainstream media discourse. Of course, this process of identifying, translating and verifying the content has been challenging to say the least. For their assistance in this process, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Ms Shraddha Prabhu Kumar from the Yellow River Chinese Academy in Bangalore and Ms Una Chen. In addition, I would like to thank Ms Urshita Pandit for her feedback on the early draft of the manuscript and assistance in meticulously sorting and arranging the maze of references. I would also be remiss if I did not acknowledge my colleagues at the Takshashila Institution. Many of the arguments found in the chapters that follow have been discussed, debated and fine-tuned in conversations with many of them through the year. Finally, none of this would have been possible without the untiring support and encouragement of my family. To their kindness and love, I am forever indebted.

Before you proceed, however, there are a few thoughts that I would like to request you to keep in mind. These are certain meta themes and ideas that resonate through the chapters but are not the primary subjects of inquiry.

First, this book is an attempt at capturing contemporary history as it evolved and continues to evolve. Doing so is an exciting and dynamic process. Yet, it is limited by the vagaries of time and unfolding events. As I write this, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to claim lives, and in large parts of the world, vaccination is yet to begin. The last word on the origins of the virus, its spread, the long-term healthcare implications for humanity and the geopolitical fallout of all of this is a long way from being written. However, certain trends that will shape the future of the world order are evident. My effort has been to outline these in the hope that they will provide a framework for the reader to contextualise developments in the post-COVID world.

Second, this is a book about China, and the Chinese leadership’s political, diplomatic and narrative response to the pandemic. Yet, some of the ideas that you are likely to encounter have global resonance. For instance, it is extremely difficult to divorce domestic politics and policies from foreign policy. In fact, one can view foreign policy as an extension of domestic political priorities. The Chinese leadership’s efforts to spin a positive international narrative around its epidemic containment policies make this apparent. Often this narrative was accompanied by what has come to be known as Wolf Warrior diplomacy and even military assertion. For external observers, such behaviour appeared erratic and devoid of strategic direction. There indeed seems to be some truth to this. However, arriving at a holistic understanding requires examining Beijing’s actions at the international stage in the context of the shifts in the domestic political and policymaking landscape over the past decade and during the pandemic.

Third, there are many peculiarities about the Chinese leadership’s management of the political fallout of the outbreak of COVID-19. However, as the pandemic became a global phenomenon, several governments around the world adopted similar narrative approaches. For instance, much was made in the international press in early February after Xi Jinping announced a ‘People’s War’ to deal with the outbreak. In fact, the title of this book draws from a speech delivered by the Chinese foreign minister, during which he described China’s approach to epidemic containment as a ‘smokeless war’. As the virus spread around the world, the war analogy was repeated ad nauseum by governments even in democratic polities. What this did was that it allowed mass mobilisation and empowered the State. More crucially, in most cases, it absolved governments and leaders of responsibility for ill-conceived policy decisions. Discussions over the failure to anticipate the threat and undertake adequate preparations were pushed to the margins. Instead, the narrative focussed on the extraordinary nature of the challenge, conspiracy theories, the need to rally around the government and honouring the sacrifice of medical staff, security personnel and essential workers. In this sense, populists around the world, as in China, have displayed tremendous adaptability to effectively compete in a contested information ecosystem.

Finally, the response to the pandemic around the world, including in China, has initiated a shift in the power dynamic between the citizen and the State. From an economic perspective, there is fresh focus on government spending, stimulus measures and a return to industrial policy to drive growth. At least in the near term, the State has reasserted itself and will play a much greater role in economies around the world. At the same time, policy debates over infringement of privacy, the regulation of new technologies and restrictions on individual rights ground to a halt through the year. Increasingly, fearful people around the world have been much more willing to part with private data, and while there is distrust of large technology conglomerates, people have been more willing to place their trust in governments. While the status quo is unlikely to be sustained in the long term, the new normal that will emerge will likely tilt the balance in favour of the State. This is the case in China, as it is in the wider so-called democratic world.

1

In Search of Discourse Power

As our country moves closer to the center of the world stage, we need to form an international right to speak in line with our country’s comprehensive national strength and show the world a true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China.

—Yin Yungong, People’s Daily, 29 July 2020¹

On 7 June 2020, journalists packed a press conference called by China’s State Council Information Office in Beijing. Before them on the dais was a row of officials led by Xu Lin, the deputy chief of the Communist Party’s propaganda department. It was symbolically significant that unlike the journalists, none of the officials were wearing a face mask. Earlier in the day, the Chinese government had released a 37,000-word white paper on the country’s efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.² Holding the paper aloft for the shutterbugs, Xu said that it documented the Chinese leadership’s efforts in containing the virus and shared details of ‘effective practices’. He then went on to weave together a carefully crafted narrative.

The picture Xu painted was of the ‘sudden, ferocious onslaught’ of an unknown virus just as people in China were preparing to celebrate the New Year. The situation posed a ‘crisis and major test’ for the Chinese governance system. Faced with this, he said, the Party and government ‘put life, health and security of the people above anything else and decisively took the most comprehensive, most rigorous, and most thorough containment measures’. There was fleeting acknowledgement about the ‘run on medical resources’ that Hubei and Wuhan had experienced, the ‘enormous physical and mental pressure’ that the people had faced, and the challenges owing to the economic fallout of containment measures. ‘Notwithstanding the complexities and grave challenge’, Xu soldiered on, ‘under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people put on a fierce fight, and paid huge prices and made great sacrifice. We won a decisive victory in the battle of safeguarding Hubei and Wuhan.’ This ‘extraordinary journey’, he concluded emphatically, ‘is a collective memory of the 1.4 billion Chinese people, which will forever be engraved in the minds of the Chinese people.’

In positing the above, Xu was constructing what political scientist Deborah Stone would classify as a tale of control, which fed a broader story of change. In her landmark text Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Stone explains how policy stories are like fairy tales. They often use ‘literary and rhetorical devices to lead the audience ineluctably to a course of action. They have good guys and bad guys, even though nonhuman entities may be cast in these roles, and they have a moment of triumph’.³ In her assessment, two types of stories are most prevalent in the politics of policymaking. These are stories of change and stories of power. The former can be either the story of decline or of rising; these are evident in narratives about the decline of the West and the rise of Asia. The latter, that is, stories of power, fall along the spectrum of helplessness and control, the two extremes of power relationships. From a political perspective, the most critical component of these narrative stories, of course, is the role of human agency.

Examining Xu’s story in this light, it is clear that his was a narrative that began in the realm of fate. Human agency would come into play in the form of the subsequent action taken by the Chinese leadership to navigate through the challenges that had emerged. In other words, the outbreak was an accident of fate followed by a story about the control exhibited by the Communist Party—with Xi Jinping at its helm—to will the people out of what appeared to be certain tragedy. The narrative arc in Xu’s story rises gradually yet steadily to a climax, punctuated by the glittering laser light show that had heralded the end of the 76-day lockdown of Wuhan on the night of 7 April 2020. So far, this was a story of power—of concerted actions taken by the Chinese leadership to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. In this official version of China’s fight against the novel coronavirus, there were heroes and victims, twists and turns, and, of course, an invisible villain against whom was waged an unrelenting, smokeless war. But this fed a broader story of change that Xu was articulating. That was a tale about the durability and strength of the Chinese system in the face of an historic challenge. This, in turn, underscored the progress that China had made under the Party’s rule, thereby lending legitimacy to the argument for continued Party control.

It is another matter that this effort to forge a state-approved ‘collective memory’, as Xu called it, did not go uncontested on social media in China.⁴ But the truth is that the white paper and the narrative it stitched together weren’t simply meant for domestic audiences. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged as much on 8 June, saying that the white paper had been issued so that the ‘history of the combat against the pandemic should be recorded with the correct collective memory of all mankind’.⁵ The document’s release had come in the backdrop of intense international discourse contestation.

In the weeks leading up to its publication, the Chinese leadership had been under fire for allegedly concealing facts about the virus’ origins, delaying the release of information about the outbreak, economic opportunism and exporting faulty medical supplies. So much so that on 6 April, state media put out a day-by-day official timeline of events.⁶ At the extreme end of the charges against Beijing were theories about the research being carried out at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which lay next to the seafood market that was believed to have been the epicentre of the outbreak in the city. This led many to question whether the pandemic was the outcome of poor safety standards at the lab or perhaps even biowarfare by Beijing. For instance, in April, Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin reported that two years ago, US Embassy officials had visited the WIV several times and had sent two official warnings back to Washington about inadequate safety at the lab.⁷ At the same time, US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo repeatedly claimed that there was enough evidence, which they had been privy to, about the institute being linked to the outbreak. In comparison, most other key world powers were much more measured in their public statements. Yet many, particularly China’s neighbours, bristled at what was seen as Beijing’s increasingly abrasive diplomacy, coercive use of military force and economic opportunism. Nevertheless, they tread with caution on the issue of assigning blame for the global spread of the pandemic, emphasising the need for transparency, cooperation and scientific inquiry.

When examined via Stone’s framework of narrative stories, it is clear that a competitive dynamic between different stories of power was playing out internationally. Whereas the Chinese government’s official version emphasised fate as the causal factor triggering the pandemic, other narratives focussed on human agency. These ranged from arguments about structural failures of the Chinese system, concealment of facts by officials, wilful deceit in order to escape public and international opprobrium, to even conspiracy. In contesting these, Beijing relied on more than just the narrative of control and change that it put out in the white paper. It floated its own tales of conspiracy, while also engaging in some old-fashioned coercion. In addition, Chinese officials and media lashed out at critics for what they said was victim blaming. They argued that instead of being vilified, the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the people of Wuhan and Hubei should be lauded for their sacrifice—for it was their efforts that delayed the spread of the virus globally.⁸ Another narrative was about China assisting countries around the world, even while it was being chastised and stigmatised by the US. Such propaganda was accompanied by steps to impose costs on domestic and international critics via legal action, trade restrictions, displays of military might, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and so on.

At the same time, the Chinese leadership was also quick to shift the discourse from qualitative and structural issues to the quantitative domain. For instance, the dwindling number of COVID-19 cases in China in comparison to the West was projected as a product of China’s systemic and cultural superiority. This effort was not just limited to data about daily caseload. Data about production of pandemic supplies, rapid creation of hospital capacity, deployment of healthcare workers, number of tests conducted and the export of medical supplies were shared as examples of the decisiveness of the Party leadership and effectiveness of the Chinese system. This was used to blunt the criticism about systemic failures and shift the narrative to a potentially manageable, if not controllable, domain. As long as the numbers told a positive story, it was critical to keep them front and centre. They would not only help restore confidence, but also buttress claims about transparency. Eventually, China’s success in maintaining favourable numbers, coupled with the US government’s particularly poor handling of the pandemic, fed the broader ideological contest that the CCP would actively engage in.

Each of these aspects are explored in detail in subsequent chapters. But, for the moment, it is important to mention that through such narratives, Beijing vigorously contested all charges of laxity, opacity and malice—often to the point of its own detriment. What facilitated the Chinese leadership in this drive was the high degree of attention paid over the past few years to cultivate the theory and tools of what has been described as huayuquan or discourse power, something that Xi Jinping categorically focussed on since he became General Secretary in late 2012.

Cultivating Huayuquan

Within his first year in power, Xi set the tone for a more nimble, innovative and combative propaganda approach. Addressing the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in August 2013, he called for ‘consolidating and expanding mainstream ideology and public opinion’ to wage a ‘magnificent struggle with historical characteristics’.⁹ Acknowledging China’s weakness in comparison to the West in the public opinion domain, he emphasised that it was critical to ‘tell China’s story well, disseminate China’s voice well, and strengthen our discourse power internationally’.¹⁰ This was something that he reiterated at a similar conference in 2018, underscoring the need to ‘make the voice of China heard’.¹¹ The objective in doing so was not merely to foster ‘stronger confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ but also to expand ‘China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape’ global affairs.¹² All this tied into his desire for China to ‘become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence’. This effort of the leadership to craft and guide the development of the Party’s voice as China’s unique voice and the quest for it not just to be heard internationally but also influence and shape governance norms and values underpins the concept of huayuquan.

In many ways, this is not an entirely new phenomenon. The propaganda department, established in 1924—three years before the Red Army came into being—is among the oldest organs of the CCP. Mao Zedong’s engagement of Edgar Snow, which led to the production of Red Star over China in 1937, the acceptance of Maoism as the CCP’s guiding ideology and efforts to seek ideological independence from the Soviet Union through the late 1950s and 1960s are early examples of the struggle to expand the Party’s discourse power.¹³ Towards his later years, Mao’s effort to theorise the geopolitics of the 1970s by classifying countries into three worlds was an attempt at