General Naval Tactics: Theory and Practice

By Milan Vego

In General Naval Tactics, Naval War College professor and renowned tactical expert Milan Vego describes and explains those aspects of naval tactics most closely related to the human factor. Specifically, he explains in some detail the objectives and methods/elements of tactical employment of naval forces, command and control, combat support, tactical design, decision-making and planning/execution, leadership, doctrine, and training. Vego derives certain commonalities of naval tactics that occurred in recent and distant wars at sea. Many parts of his theoretical constructs are based on works of a number of well-known and influential naval theoreticians such as Admirals Alfred T. Mahan, Bradley A. Fiske, Raoul Castex, and René Daveluy.and influential naval theoreticians. Whenever possible, the author illustrates each aspect of theory by carefully selected examples from naval history--making the theory more understandable and interesting. Vego aims to present theory that is general in nature and therefore, more durable in its validity. The more general the theory, the greater the possibility of accommodating changes based on new interpretations of past events and as a result of gaining fresh insight from the lessons learned.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Release date: Oct 15, 2020
• ISBN: 9781682477205

Book preview

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GENERAL

NAVAL

TACTICS

THEORY AND PRACTICE

MILAN VEGO

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2020 by Milan Vego

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Vego, Milan N., author.

Title: General naval tactics : theory and practice / Milan Vego.

Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2020] | Series: The U.S. Naval Institute Blue & Gold Professional Library | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020016979 | ISBN 9781682475416 (hardback)

Subjects: LCSH: Naval tactics.

Classification: LCC V167 .V43 2020 | DDC 359.4/2—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020016979

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992

(Permanence of Paper).

Printed in the United States of America.

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First printing

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

PREFACE

Tactics is one of the three components of the art of war at sea, the other two being operational art and strategy. Each component consists of theory and practice. In a naval context, the greatest emphasis is placed on practice; theory is generally given short shrift. Many naval officers are averse to studying naval theory or even military theory writ large. This is mainly due to a lack of knowledge of how naval theory is developed. Too many naval officers believe that all that counts is practice. Yet naval theory is not developed in the abstract but is derived from the historical record. It is universal in its scope, and when theory conflicts with reality, reality takes precedence. Some naval officers are also contemptuous of naval theory because they overemphasize the importance of new technologies. Others believe that all they need to know is naval tactical doctrine, yet naval theory is much broader and deeper than any naval doctrine—it is the big picture. Experience shows that a naval officer armed with theoretical knowledge of naval warfare is far better prepared to apply tactical doctrine and to use it creatively.

Theory and practice of naval tactics encompasses two broad categories: general naval tactics and tactics of naval forces. The theory of naval tactics can be grouped into two broad components: general naval tactics and tactics of naval forces. General naval tactics is predominantly focused on the role of the human factor. It is the very foundation of all other types of tactics. In contrast, tactics of naval forces deals with the methods and procedures in the employment of naval platforms and their weapons systems, and single and combined naval combat arms. General naval tactics is the key for successful tactical employment of naval forces. Its various elements are an integral part of each type of tactics of naval forces.

The main purpose of this work is to describe and explain the key aspects of naval tactics. As the title implies, the major focus is on the human elements of theory and practice of naval tactics. The general approach has been to point out certain commonalties of naval tactics from the recent and more distant wars at sea. Many parts of the theoretical construct are based on the writings of the well-known and influential naval tacticians. Whenever possible, each aspect of theory is illustrated by examples from naval history. The sole purpose is to make the theory less arcane and more understandable. Hence, the selected historical examples should not be understood as being valid for the present or in the future.

The aim here is also to present theory that is general rather than specific. Relatively few references to current and emerging tactical concepts and new naval technologies have been included. The more general the theory, the greater the possibility of accommodating changes based on the new interpretation of the past events and lessons learned.

This work consists of twelve chapters. The first chapter, Introduction, defines and describes the meaning of various categories of tactics, the relationship of theory and practice to tactics, mutual dependence and the influence of naval tactics and technology, and the relationship between naval tactics and the other two components of the art of war at sea. The chapter entitled The Objectives describes and explains the distinction between major and minor tactical objectives, the meaning of the tactical level of war, and the main features of tactical offense and defense. The next chapter, Methods of Tactical Employment, describes differences between and the purpose of naval tactical actions, both with weapons and without. The focus is on the methods of tactical employment of naval forces; that is, attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and naval battles. Elements of Naval Tactical Actions explains and illustrates the main elements of naval tactical actions, including the deployment, concentration, and tactical center of gravity. Also discussed are the point of culmination, tactical fires, deception, reserves, and pursuit.

The Tactical Organization/Command and Control chapter encompasses two closely related topics: command organization and command and control (C2). One cannot exist without the other. The sections on command organization describe and evaluate administrative and operational chains of command, types of tactical-sized forces, their mutual relationship, and types of support. In the part on command and control, both centralized and decentralized C2 are addressed. However, the focus is on the mission command as practiced at sea. The next chapter, Combat Support, describes and assesses tactical intelligence, tactical information warfare (IW), tactical logistics, and tactical force protection. Optimally, combat support should already be established and fully integrated in peacetime. The tactical commanders bear the ultimate responsibility to synchronize all elements of combat support with the plan and its execution. The chapter entitled Tactical Design describes and assesses ultimate/intermediate objectives, central vs. exterior position, lines of operation, interior vs. exterior lines of operation, an identification of the tactical centers of gravity, and concept of operations. The tactical design is not a plan but the framework for the discussion between the tactical commanders and the staff prior to making a decision and planning.

The next two chapters describe and analyze making tactical decisions and selected elements of tactical planning and execution using historical examples. In the Tactical Leadership chapter the focus is on personal and military traits of a good naval tactical commander. These traits are illustrated by using examples of famous fighting admirals. The last two chapters deal with tactical doctrine and training. The critical importance of doctrine and combat training cannot be overemphasized. The seeds of victory or defeat should be sought in doctrine and training in peacetime. When the ultimate test comes, the compromises made in regard to tactical doctrine and training would invariably have severe, and in some cases even fatal, consequences.

There is generally a great scarcity of books in the United States and the West on the theoretical aspects of naval tactics. In contrast, in the former Soviet navy and Warsaw Pact navies, a substantial number of textbooks have been published on theory of methods of tactical employment, tactics of single and combined combat arms, and tactical planning. However, except for tactical maneuver and fires, very little was written on other elements of naval tactical actions. The aim here has been to evaluate the great variety of secondary sources—official histories specifically—textbooks, biographies of fighting admirals, general naval histories, monographs, and articles/essays, and place them in the context of general naval tactics.

This work required the support of several individuals. I am greatly indebted to Capt. Edmund Hernandez, USN (Ret.), former chairman of the JMO Department, Naval War College; Capt. Fred Horne, USN (Ret.), executive assistant, JMO Department; Paul Merzlak; Tom Cutler, Gordon England Chair of Professional Literature; Jim Dolbow; Capt. Mike Critz, USN (Ret.); Aden Nichols, copyeditor; and Rachel Crawford, production editor.

ABBREVIATIONS

Map 1. The Mediterranean Sea (Distances in nautical miles at mid-latitude)

Map 2. The English Channel and Its Approaches

Map 3. The Caribbean Sea

Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016).

Map 4. The Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons Archipelago

Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016).

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Naval tactics¹ is critical for ultimately winning a war at sea. No major naval operation or campaign could be successful without victories achieved in physical combat—which is the domain of tactics. Yet there is no accepted definition of the term naval tactics. This is largely due to differences in the national and the navy’s cultures. Definition of naval tactics also changed over time. For example, in the French navy in the late nineteenth century, naval tactics was understood as the art of grouping naval forces, of moving them in order with rapidity and safety—at the time of battle—of deriving the greatest amount of benefit from them in winning a victory.² In 1884, the U.S. naval theorist William Bainbridge-Hoff defined naval tactics as the art of disposing naval forces in order of battle, and performing evolutions in the face or vicinity of the enemy; also, of performing all the possible evolutions with ships, sections, groups, divisions, squadrons, or fleets when acting together; … [and] the employment of all the offensive powers of a ship, artillery, rams, torpedoes, or any naval weapons.³

In 1914, an anonymous author of the Royal Navy’s professional journal, Naval Review (established in 1913), differentiated among grand, minor, and fire tactics. Grand or major tactics was concerned with the conceptions, plans and methods of execution of supreme leaders.⁴ Minor tactics dealt with the work of subordinate leaders in the battle and handling of their divisions in relation to the main plan and also with the combination of the work of the separate types of force of which divisions consist.⁵ Fire tactics was the application to battle of weapon techniques.⁶ In general, tactics was concerned with the movements of armed forces in contact with the enemy executed for producing a decisive difference of effective fighting energy, favorable to ourselves or correspondingly unfavorable to the enemy. Theory of tactics cannot exist if the meaning of tactics is improperly understood. The field of naval tactics is too large to be expressed in a short sentence. Tactics deal with the movements of forces in battle. All operations prior to the contact with the enemy belong to the category of strategy. The object of the battle, and therefore, of tactics is victory; the demoralization, defeat, and destruction of the enemy’s forces; and negatively it is avoidance of defeat.⁷

In the former Soviet navy, the theory of naval tactics was considered as an integral part of the art of war.⁸ Theory of naval tactics dealt with preparation and execution of tactical-size actions by ships, aircraft, helicopters, ship or aircraft groups, and the troops and units of several services aimed at accomplishing partial objectives of a major operation.⁹ The main purpose of naval tactics is to explore conditions of single or combined combat arms, to execute tactical actions, and anticipate future development in conducting tactical actions.¹⁰ Tactics is the most dynamic part of the art of war. It is most closely linked to weapons and equipment. Fast technological advances result in rapid changes in naval tactics.¹¹

Regardless of all these differences, it is commonly accepted that naval tactics is a component of the art of war that deals with physical combat. In generic terms, naval tactics can be defined as the theory and practice of planning and conducting combat actions/measures by naval forces aimed at accomplishing tactical objectives. The theory of naval tactics is concerned with exploring combat capabilities of naval forces—both friendly/allied and enemy—and devising methods for the tactical employment of one’s own forces. It explores employment of tactical forces independently and in cooperation with combat arms branches of other services. Naval tactics also provides both framework and direction for tactical force planning.

The theory of naval tactics can be arbitrarily grouped into two broad components: general theory of tactics and tactics of naval forces. General naval tactics explores mutual relationships and patterns of tangible and intangible elements common to tactics of platforms and weapons/sensors and tactics of naval combat arms. Specifically, it deals with objectives and methods of tactical employment of combat forces, command structure/command and control, combat support, designing naval tactical actions, decision-making and planning, leadership, tactical doctrine, and tactical training (see figure 1). All aspects of general naval tactics are in varying degrees also part of tactics of naval forces and their individual parts. Without general naval tactics all other categories of naval tactics would be empty of content. They would lack the single most vital element—the human factor.

Fig. 1. General Naval Tactics

Tactics of naval forces encompasses tactics of naval weapons/sensors and gear/equipment; naval platforms and their groups; single naval combat arms; and combined naval combat arms (see figure 2). Each of these types of tactics consists of theory and practice. Tactics of naval weapons/sensors deal with the employment of each type of missiles (e.g., air-to-surface missiles, antiship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and surface-to-air missiles), shipboard/coastal guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine (A/S) rockets, depth charges, and mines. A specific type of tactics is developed for the use of mine countermeasures (MCM) gear/sensors. In recent years tactics for unmanned vehicles (unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles) are also being developed.

Tactics of naval platforms and their groups consists of tactics for the employment of various types of surface combatants (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, missile craft, gunboats, patrol craft, combat craft, minelayers, MCM ships/craft), submarines (ballistic-missile-armed submarines, attack submarines, midget submarines), fixed-wing aircraft (e.g., attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft), and rotary-wing aircraft (e.g., multipurpose helicopters, antisubmarine warfare [ASW] helicopters, transport helicopters).

Fig. 2. Tactics of Naval Forces

Tactics of naval combat arms deals with the methods and procedures in the tactical employment of individual combat arms (surface forces, submarine forces, naval aviation, naval special forces, and coastal defense) in obtaining/maintaining and exercising control or denying sea control. It also deals with the tactics in their employment in operations short of war (combating piracy, combating terrorism, support of counterinsurgency, etc.). Tactical methods and procedures in the employment of platforms and their weapons/sensors and naval combat arms are mutually dependent. Tactics of surface forces pose certain requirements on the tactics of weapon/sensors. Development of more advanced weapons/sensors in one combat arm might have significant repercussions on the development of other combat arms. For example, in the early interwar years (1919–39), development of the gunnery for the capital ships in the U.S. Navy had considerable effect on the development of carrier aviation.¹² Airplanes, submarines, torpedoes, and smoke screens forced battleships to engage at ever-increasing ranges.¹³ For the U.S. Navy, battle fleet gunnery, not scouting, was the most important part of its doctrine.¹⁴

Tactics of combined naval combat arms deals with the employment of two or more naval combat arms plus combat arms branches of other services from time to time. It is far more complex than tactics of individual platforms or individual combat arms. It requires synchronized employment of diverse forces in terms of the objective, place, and time. The three-way employment of surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft is the most complex of all and extremely difficult to execute in practice. This problem is even more vexing when large combatants, submarines, and aircraft must cooperate with small surface combatants and coastal defense forces plus land-based air defenses deployed in the littorals. Combined naval combat arms tactics is the key requirement for success in anti-surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, amphibious warfare, maritime trade warfare, and mine warfare. In each of these areas, combat arms/branches of other services (and air forces in particular), are also employed in cooperation with naval forces. Combined naval arms tactics is the very heart of any sound operational concept. These in turn, are designed to serve as the basis for operational-level war doctrine.

Like the other two components of naval art, naval tactics is largely an art. It is also a science, because scientific methods must be used in properly studying tactical employment of naval forces. In general, development of a comprehensive theory is one of the most complicated problems to resolve satisfactorily. The greatest difficulty is to link together various parts of theory and bind them together as a whole. A sound theory of tactics should fully recognize the human factor as absolutely dominant. Fundamental principles derived from history must be reduced to a form readily applicable to existing conditions. The practice should serve to check the exuberance of theory.¹⁵ Unaided by theory, practice remains stagnant. And with unsound theory, practice will be misguided and result in wasteful effort. It is only when sound theory has full sway that the utmost useful development of practice can be expected. Theory and practice are complementary. The one without the other results in poor balance.¹⁶

Theory of naval tactics is based on the experiences of all the navies. However, applications of knowledge of tactics are largely an art, not a science. It is only in application that a navy’s way of warfare and its culture play a major role. For example, there were great differences in the practical application of tactics among the Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Like the theory of naval/maritime strategy and that of naval operational art, a sound theory of naval tactics is based on practice. The most valuable source of that knowledge is personal experience in combat. However, combat experience is hard to acquire during one’s active service. But even if one’s combat experience is extensive, it is usually limited to relatively few situations and few platforms/forces.

Naval history is the foundations of the theory of naval tactics. Naval history is a record of the experiences of war at sea throughout many centuries. It transcends geography, climate/weather, and ethnic or national boundaries. Hence, long-term and thorough study of naval history is critically important to obtain that badly needed broad and deep knowledge and understanding of all aspects of tactics. It would also help one to understand the broader operational framework in which naval attacks, strikes, or naval battles took place. Such study also shows mutual relationships among naval/maritime strategy, naval tactics, and naval operational art. It reveals how critical the qualities and skills of tactical commanders, education, doctrine, and combat training were to achieve ultimate success.

Theory of tactics should fully explain and analyze the current and future naval technological advances and their effect on tactical employment of naval forces. Yet because of the frequent and sometimes unpredictable changes in naval technologies, the durability of these influences is of course relatively short. Naval tactics is far more affected by the advent of new technological advances than are operational art and strategy.

In developing a theory of naval tactics, many historical examples should be studied in great depth. The greater the number of examples studied, the more likely one is to derive some commonalities that could be of value today and for some time in the future. Naval tactical combat is normally an integral part of a major naval/joint operation or maritime campaign. Hence, study of the historical examples must always consider that broader operational framework. Generally, the study of recent tactical combat is more useful than that of a long-past era. Clearly, the usefulness of the study of naval tactics of a past era is very limited in terms of matériel and the tactical methods and procedures.

Study of historical examples of naval tactical actions should end with conclusions. Afterward, tactical lessons learned or identified should be derived based on these conclusions. Tactical lessons learned regarding methods and procedures of tactical employment are less durable than comparative operational or strategic lessons. Tactical lessons on the human factors—such as command and control (C2), leadership, morale/discipline, unit cohesion, will to fight, and combat training—is highly useful today, regardless of the era in which a certain tactical action took place.

The lessons of history are not confined only to naval strategy and operational art; they are also fully applicable to naval tactics. The proponents of the paramount importance of matériel firmly (but falsely) believe that naval technologies change everything in tactics. In their view, history is largely irrelevant today. However, while new technologies exerted a profound influence on the character of naval warfare, they never changed the role and importance of the human factor in the conduct of war at sea. The timeless importance of offensive vs. defensive, decentralized vs. centralized command, and initiative vs. passivity can be found in a long series of naval battles fought since the ancient era. The importance of a thorough understanding of the intentions of the commander and of the refusal to acknowledge defeat, is to be found in the past wars at sea.¹⁷ The principal reasons for the success in tactical combat are in having a plan prepared beforehand, not being wedded to a formalistic scheme, articulating a broad and flexible intent and leaving details of the execution to the subordinate commanders. Experience shows that the reasons for great defeats were failure of leadership, poor seamanship, and the lack of courage.¹⁸

Theory of naval tactics should avoid being exclusively based either on history or on new technologies. The importance of new technologies should neither be overrated nor underrated—a difficult task indeed. The reality of war at the tactical level should always dominate theory. Expressed differently, a theory of naval tactics will not be sound if it conflicts with the practice of war.

Naval tactics is one of three components of naval art, the other two are naval/maritime strategy and operational art. Strategy, operational art, and tactics are mutually dependent. They have some commonalties. At the same time each component has some special characteristics.¹⁹ All three components of naval art involve theory and practice. Tactics of naval forces find its unity in theory and practice.²⁰ Some tenets of strategy and operational art have their basis in tactics. Yet lines separating them are blurred and might be even indistinguishable. Naval tactics is the most dynamic domain of naval art. It is far more affected by technological advances than are operational art or strategy. Changes in tactics due to the advent of new weapons/sensors can greatly affect operational art and strategy. Naval tactics serves as the foundation for theory and practice of operational art.²¹

The ultimate objective of a major naval operation is accomplished through series of tactical successes.²² Yet bad tactics can invalidate good strategy and operational art. Major tactical defeats could sometimes have serious negative effects on the course—and in some cases even outcome—of war at sea. Future operational commanders cannot successfully apply operational art without having a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of tactics. Tactical victories are meaningless and could even endanger the success of the entire operation if fought outside a given operational framework. For example, in the battle for Leyte on 24–27 October 1944, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander, U.S. Third Fleet, won a tactical victory in the battle off Cape Engaño on 25 October 1944 with his Task Force (TF) 38 (fast carrier force) over a much smaller and weaker Japanese carrier force. However, the Third Fleet’s principal mission in the Leyte operation was to provide distant (operational) cover and support to the Allied forces that landed on Leyte.²³ By uncovering San Bernardino Strait and moving too far north TF 38 went beyond supporting distance of the Allied forces that landed at Leyte. Only the decision by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita (commander of the First Diversionary Attack Force) to turn north toward San Bernardino Strait with his force and leave the scene of action when his force was on the verge of destroying the U.S. escort carrier force in the battle off Samar on 25 October saved the U.S. Navy from suffering a humiliation at the hands of a much weaker force.

Tactical victories, no matter how decisive, cannot compensate for the lack of operational competence and the lack of sound and coherent strategy. Naval tactics should not be confused with strategy. Strategy, for its part, while considering the limitations imposed by tactics, should ensure that tactical combat is conducted under favorable conditions. At the same time, naval tactics should never be allowed to influence significantly, much less dominate, naval/maritime strategy, either by design or default.

Poor application of operational art can lead to tactical defeats. They in turn can have not only operational but also strategic consequences. For example, the Japanese Combined Fleet suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway on 4–7 June 1942 not only because of the luck the Americans had in sinking four Japanese fast carriers, but also a deeply flawed operations plan. This example perhaps best demonstrates how the superiority of one’s forces can easily be squandered when operational thinking on the part of operational commanders is inadequate or entirely lacking.

Full knowledge and understanding of theory and solid application in practice are critical for the ultimate success of one’s naval forces in combat. Yet experience shows that an overemphasis—or even worse, almost exclusive focus—on naval tactics has ended ultimately badly. In the Royal Navy prior to 1914, there was lack of balance; even if a decade of technical and theoretical instruction was pursued, neglect of the study of war was liable to render it useless. In the Battle of Jutland on 31 May–1 June 1914, defective tactics and a faulty command and control reduced the gun power of several battleships to zero as they never got into a position to use their guns effectively. Likewise, the Admiralty’s policy of hunting U-boats and raiders instead of escorting convoys rendered antisubmarine craft useless and brought Britain to the brink of disaster in 1917.²⁴

In the interwar years the offensive action was deeply ingrained in the U.S. naval officer corps through study at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and during tactical exercises at sea.²⁵ During this same period, the Royal Navy was obsessed with fighting a Jutland-like battle. In such a battle, the battleship would have a central and decisive role.²⁶ The U.S. Navy’s tactical doctrine envisaged using carriers to sink or disable enemy carriers, while carrier-based aircraft would be used as gun spotters for the battle line, which would then engage the Japanese battle fleet in a decisive battle.²⁷ The IJN was fixated on the single decisive battle. That preoccupation with fighting a decisive battle à la Tsushima and Jutland guided the IJN’s tactical doctrine and ship designs, resulting in a powerful surface force that was both one-dimensional and brittle.²⁸ The Japanese did not have what can be called grand or military strategy until a short time prior to the outbreak of war in 1941.²⁹ Little attention was also given to the broader strategic, economic, and logistics matters.³⁰

The pursuit of military ends has always been determined by the inherent potentialities or limitations of the machines with which the war is waged.³¹ A war at sea (and also in the air) is generally much more affected by the technological advances than is war on land. The main reason for this is that naval warfare revolves around platforms, and their weapons and sensors. The changes in the character of naval warfare have been due to several major and numerous minor technical inventions. These advances have affected all three components of the art of war at sea. They had the greatest effect on naval tactics, less on operational art, and the least on naval strategy. For example, the advent of steam propulsion in combination with the invention of the electric telegraph and undersea cable brought about revolutionary changes to naval tactics. Steam-powered warships had a higher speed than the sailing ships and were also independent of the wind. The higher ship’s speed required quicker thinking and decision-making by the commanders than in the era of sail.³² Steam propulsion greatly increased the chances of contact between two opposing fleets. This, in turn, made it far more dangerous for a weaker force to remain at large within effective range of the stronger force. Hence, the amount of control by the superior force in the areas within range of its bases was also increased.³³ Steam propulsion improved tactical mobility of warships, but initially their strategic mobility was drastically reduced. The endurance of steam-powered warships was measured in terms of days, not months as the sailing ships’ had. Coal carried on board a warship in the mid-nineteenth century was adequate for only ten or eleven days of sailing.³⁴

In contrast, sailing ships were able to sail practically anywhere as long as there was a wind. In the early era of steam, the fleets became more dependent, as the armies were, on their lines of supply. The problem of logistical support became more complex because the steam-powered warships also needed to carry munitions, lubricants, and spare parts.³⁵

In some cases, the original purpose of an invention was changed to something very different. The initial purpose of the iron armor was to provide protection to the ship’s crew from the enemy shells. However, after the advent of a gun capable of perforating the ship, the purpose of the iron armor was changed to providing protection to a ship as a whole. The purpose of a new platform was initially very different from the one that emerged later on. For example, the airplane was originally intended for conducting scouting but later became a bomber.³⁶ The submarine was originally considered for defense of naval bases/ports and the coast, but shortly after the outbreak of war in August 1914, it became one of the most effective and terrifying platforms for attacking merchant shipping.

The design of ships and aircraft in the modern era tended to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In the nineteenth century, the advent of steam propulsion, internal combustion engine, iron hulls, long-range guns, mines, torpedoes, and electric telegraph revolutionized naval warfare. Since then, there have been few revolutionary technological advances, with the exception of the submarine, airplane, radar, guided missile, nuclear propulsion, analog/digital computers, and satellite navigation/communications. The key was to concentrate on the integration of the existing and diverse technologies to obtain greater combat potential. For example, the advent of the dreadnought in 1906 was due not to any revolutionary technological advance but to a proper integration of the existing technologies. Among other things, new optical technology allowed the ship to get accurate range and bearing information on the target. Electrical transmission technology allowed accurate and simultaneous transmission of this information spotting to all the guns. It also enabled simultaneous firing of all the big guns in the main battery. This, in turn, greatly enhanced the broadsides’ lethality.³⁷ The result was a huge increase in the combat potential of the British battle fleet so that other major navies of the day had to meet the new standards in the battleship design or remain hopelessly ineffective.

Experience shows that revolutionary advances in naval communications such as the invention of telegraph, undersea cable, and wireless radio had a dramatic impact on both naval tactics and operational art. For example, the invention of radar in the late 1930s had a profound effect on the development of the carrier forces in the U.S. Navy. Prior to the advent of radar, fighter air patrols were stationed over the carriers. They were vectored toward an attacking enemy force when one of the patrols made a visual sighting.³⁸ In January 1939, radar was fitted aboard the battleship New York. By mid-1940, radar was also fitted on board the battleship California. The U.S. Navy also benefited from the exchange of information from Britain. The Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) lessons of the Battle of Britain were applied to carrier operations. Radar obviated the need for elaborate scouting around the carrier force and reduced the number of aircraft for air defenses. This in turn amplified the offensive potential of the carriers. By March 1941, the U.S. aircraft carrier Yorktown reported that in radar exercises, fighters had been reliably directed to intercept incoming raids. By June 1941, radar’s range was increased to more than sixty miles compared with twenty-five miles (which had been the limit of scouting aircraft patrols).³⁹ Between October 1942 and August 1943, U.S. carrier operations were at a virtual standstill. This gave more time to adopt lessons learned from the previous operations. Among other things, great efforts were made to strengthen carrier defenses against bomb and torpedo hits. The number and type of antiaircraft (AA) guns on board carriers and screen was greatly increased. The speed of plotting and disseminating information to the officer in tactical command was greatly increased. The number of fighters was doubled. The new carriers—like those of the Essex class and the Independence class—led to new forms of tactical organization. Two or more carriers were grouped within a screen; the entire formation maneuvered together.⁴⁰

Not only the number of weapons and equipment, but more importantly, their quality considerably affect the overall combat potential of a force.⁴¹ In the interwar years, the IJN was inferior in numerical strength to the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. However, it made a decision to build bigger and technologically more advanced ships as a means of equalizing this inferiority. The IJN’s battleships had speed of twenty-five knots—four knots higher than U.S. battleships. The Japanese also developed optical fire directors for successful engagement at 40,000 yards. The range finders were installed at the top of 130-feet-high bridges.⁴² New classes of cruisers and destroyers came in service in the 1920s and 1930s; they were probably the most advanced in the world. The 2,890-ton Yubari commissioned in 1923 was equal in combat power to the 5,000-ton cruisers. In 1928, the 10,980-ton Miyoko–class heavy cruisers were armed with ten 8-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes. The 11,250-ton Takao-class heavy cruisers entered service in 1932. The 11,200-ton Mogami-class heavy cruisers armed with fifteen 6-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes entered service in 1935.⁴³ In 1928, the first of the 1,680-ton Fubuki-class destroyers was commissioned. These destroyers were armed with six 5-inch guns in twin mounts and eventually with three triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. More advanced destroyers came in the 1930s.⁴⁴ In 1937, plans were prepared to convert three light cruisers (Kitikami, Oi, and Kiso) to torpedo cruisers, each fitted with forty torpedo tubes.⁴⁵

The early successes of the Japanese in the Pacific war had much to do with the superior quality of their Mitsubishi A6M (Zero) fighters and the Nakajima B5N (Kate) torpedo bombers. Eventually, the United States produced not only more but also higher-performance carrier aircraft than those of the Japanese.

Tactics of various types of naval platforms is greatly influenced by tactics of naval weapons/sensors. During the Solomons campaign (1942–43), the Americans were unpleasantly surprised to find out that the Japanese cruisers and destroyers were armed with the 24-inch Type 93 Model 2 torpedo (dubbed Long Lance) with an effective range of 22,000 yards at a speed of forty-nine knots.⁴⁶ The first test with this oxygen-powered torpedo was carried out in 1933. The torpedo weighed 5,950 lbs. and carried a warhead of about 1,000 lbs.⁴⁷ The Japanese also developed distance concealed firing (enkyori omitsu hassha) with a firing range of at least 21,870 yards.⁴⁸ In contrast, the U.S. standard 21-inch MK 15 torpedo on board the destroyers had an effective range of only 6,000 yards at fortyfive knots. The Type 93 torpedo was adopted in November 1935 for the Japanese destroyers and cruisers. Each of the Japanese cruisers was able to launch up to twenty Type 93 torpedoes at once.⁴⁹ An aerial version (Type 94) and a submarine version (Type 95) were developed in 1935. In 1940, an improved version of this torpedo was fitted on board new destroyers.⁵⁰

In contrast, the U.S. Navy not only had low-performance torpedoes but also, because of a false economy in peacetime, had not resolved problems with its warheads and exploders until many months into the war. Initially, the IJN was also superior to the U.S. Navy in the fields of optics and pyrotechnics.⁵¹

Very often, too much emphasis on the technological aspect of a war or even a single battle leads to wrong lessons learned. Technological or tactical lessons are too narrow and short-lived. Even if these lessons are correctly derived, they should be reevaluated in light of new technological advances. Perhaps the best-known example of learning the wrong lessons was the Battle of Lissa in July 1866, in which the Austrians inflicted a decisive defeat on a much stronger Italian fleet and thereby obtained control of the Adriatic. A single event in that battle, the sinking of the Italian ironclad Re d’Italia by the Austrian ironclad Erzherzog Ferdinand Max with the use of a ram, was sufficient to convince many naval tacticians of the day that the ram had emerged as the real competitor to the supremacy of the gun. The real lesson of the Battle of Lissa was, of course, not the ram, but that a navy with a vigorous offensive spirit would generally be successful against a passive and incompetent opponent. Superficial judgment gave all the credit to the ram, even after conditions and weapons had changed considerably.⁵² The French in particular became convinced that the ram and the torpedo could hit armor below the waterline and sink a battleship in a single stroke.⁵³ Also, for many tacticians of the day, the Battle of Hampton Roads in March 1862, in which the Confederate ironclad Virginia sank two wooden-hulled Union warships (the Cumberland and the Congress), seemed to support the use of the ram as a weapon. What was forgotten was that in this case, and in the Battle of Lissa, the victims were stationary targets.⁵⁴

Another common error is exaggerating the importance of a single weapon or sensor. This cannot help but have a negative effect on naval tactics. During the Solomons campaign, the U.S. Navy had too much confidence in its radars. It was convinced that radar could lay guns accurately and track their salvoes. Although the Japanese did not have radar, they fitted radar detectors on board their surface combatants. These sensors allowed detection of the U.S. ships at a much longer range than that at which the U.S. radars were able to detect the Japanese ships. In the naval battles at Kula Gulf on 6 July and Kolombangara in the night of 12–13 July 1943, the Japanese detected the U.S. ships some two hours before they detected them. The Japanese launched torpedoes almost as soon as the U.S. ships opened fire with their guns.⁵⁵ The U.S. Navy also falsely believed that if a blip on the radar screen disappeared, it meant that the enemy ship was sunk. However in many cases the target just moved out of the radar range or blended with the coast background.⁵⁶ The U.S. Navy had too much confidence in its 6-inch guns by using a continuous rapid-fire technique. However, they were very imprecise, as shown at Casablanca in November 1942 and in the Battle of Kolombangara.⁵⁷

The most common error is an overemphasis on the importance of matériel in naval warfare. Yet experience shows highly adverse effects of overreliance on the new naval technologies or even worse on unproven technologies in combat. The advent of any radically new technological development in the past led many observers to believe that it would make all the previously existing technologies essentially obsolete. And in each instance, whether it was the introduction of some new naval platform or weapon system, the changes in the conduct of war were far less than their proponents had predicted. In an era of rapid technological changes, there is a great and perhaps understandable temptation to conclude that superior technology will somehow ensure success in combat and win wars. Proponents of the new technologies often make assertions, with little or no proof, as to