Fundamentals of Naval Warfare

By Lee J. Levert and William T. Brady

An outline of the principles and methods of naval warfare, comprehensive and excellently organized, this book will interest the general public as well as naval personnel.

Intended for the general reader, Fundamentals of Naval Warfare is a plea for better understanding of the facts about naval warfare in order to support security measures. Ships and bases need trained personnel—the cost of unpreparedness is high. Here is a summary of the history of war, of weapons, of ships, of battles. Here is a discussion of the tactics of shore installations, base planning, harbor defense, employment in naval warfare, amphibious warfare, engineering problems, staff work, logistics, etc.

Lieutenant-Commander Lee J. Levert carefully avoids any implication of personal bias, speaking only rarely of specific officers. He presents sample problems in planning and execution of plans to illustrate his points. He feels we have reached the twilight of carriers, as such, and presents the ideal ship-a combination of a battleship and a carrier, in one.

Fundamentals of Naval Warfare is primarily a book for students of strategy and tactics, of naval warfare—and for armchair admirals.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Release date: Dec 5, 2018
• ISBN: 9781789126662

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Text originally published in 1947 under the same title.

© Arcole Publishing 2018, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL WARFARE

BY

LEE J. LEVERT

Sketches by William T. Brady

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

PREFACE 4

GENERAL NOTES 6

SECTION ONE—Introductory 7

CHAPTER 1—Why This Book Was Written 8

CHAPTER 2—Offensive and Defensive Warfare 10

SECTION TWO—History 12

CHAPTER 3—The History and Development of Weapons 14

CHAPTER 4—History of Propulsion 18

CHAPTER 5—Development of Fighting Ships: Pre-Dreadnought Era 21

CHAPTER 6—Development of Fighting Ships: Post-Dreadnought Era 26

CHAPTER 7—Epochal Naval Battles: Galley and Sail 31

SALAMIS (480 B.C.) 31

THE GREAT ARMADA (1588) 31

ST. VINCENT (1797) 32

ABOUKIR (1798) 32

TRAFALGAR (1805) 33

CHAPTER 8—Epochal Naval Battles: Mechanical Age 35

THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC (1862) 35

LISSA (1866) 35

TSUSHIMA (1905) 36

THE FALKLANDS (1914) 36

JUTLAND (1916) 37

CHAPTER 9—Epochal Naval Battles: World War II 39

RIVER PLATE (DEC. 1939) 39

H.M.S. HOOD AND THE BISMARCK (MAY 1941) 39

PEARL HARBOR (DEC. 1941) 40

CORAL SEA (MAY 1942) 41

MIDWAY (JUNE 1942) 42

U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA (NOV. 1942) 43

SURIGAO STRAIT (OCT. 1944) 43

SECTION THREE—Weapons 46

CHAPTER 10—Explosives, Chemical and Atomic 47

CHAPTER 11—The Gun 58

CHAPTER 12—Rockets and Flying Bombs 62

CHAPTER 13—Torpedoes 66

CHAPTER 14—Mines 69

CHAPTER 15—Aerial Bombs 72

CHAPTER 16—Depth Charges and Forward-Throwers 74

SECTION FOUR—Ships 77

CHAPTER 17—Battleships (BB) 78

CHAPTER 18—Aircraft Carriers 88

CHAPTER 19—Cruisers 93

CHAPTER 20—Destroyers (DD) 99

CHAPTER 21—Submarines (SS) 103

CHAPTER 22—Motor Torpedo Boats 107

CHAPTER 23—Patrol Craft 109

CHAPTER 24—Landing Ships and Craft 111

CHAPTER 25—Auxiliaries 114

CHAPTER 26—Aircraft 116

SECTION FIVE—Shore Installations 123

CHAPTER 27—Base Planning 124

CHAPTER 28—Building an Imaginary Base 128

CHAPTER 29—Hydrography 134

CHAPTER 30—Harbor Defense 138

SECTION SIX—Types of Naval Warfare 140

CHAPTER 31—Fleet Actions 141

CHAPTER 32—Commerce Raiding 146

CHAPTER 33—Naval Blockade and Shore Raiding 151

CHAPTER 34—Aerial Warfare 155

CHAPTER 35—Submarine Warfare 162

CHAPTER 36—Anti-submarine Warfare 166

CHAPTER 37—Mine Warfare 169

CHAPTER 38—Amphibious Warfare 173

SECTION SEVEN—Engineering 177

CHAPTER 39—Hitting Power, Range, and Accuracy 178

CHAPTER 40—Armament 182

CHAPTER 41—Protection 186

CHAPTER 42—Speed and Power 192

CHAPTER 43—Propulsion Machinery 195

CHAPTER 44—Mobility 201

CHAPTER 45—Ship’s Dimensions 205

SECTION EIGHT—Communications and Control 208

CHAPTER 46—Gyroscope and Electronic Devices 209

CHAPTER 47—Communications 214

CHAPTER 48—Maneuvering Board 218

CHAPTER 49—Search, Detection, Bearing, and Range 222

CHAPTER 50—Radar 228

CHAPTER 51—Fire Control 235

SECTION NINE—Staff 241

CHAPTER 52—Line and Staff Organization 243

CHAPTER 53—Success or Failure as a Criterion 246

CHAPTER 54—Strategy and Tactics 249

CHAPTER 55—Logistics 253

CHAPTER 56—Basis for Solution of Problems 256

CHAPTER 57—Decision 260

CHAPTER 58—Detailed Plans (Organizing) 264

CHAPTER 59—The Directive 269

CHAPTER 60—Supervision of Carrying Out the Plan 272

CHAPTER 61—Subsidiary Plans and Annexes 274

SECTION TEN—Staff Problems 277

CHAPTER 62—Mr. Smith’s Problem 278

STEP I 278

STEP II 281

STEP III 285

STEP IV 289

CHAPTER 63—Military Problem, Part I: The Decision 290

STEP I 290

STEP II 294

CHAPTER 64—Military Problem, Part II: Detailed Plans 300

STEP III 300

STEP IV 304

CHAPTER 65—The Naval Campaign of the Philippines 307

CHAPTER 66—Target Japan 313

SECTION ELEVEN—The Future 322

CHAPTER 67—The Twilight of the Aircraft Carrier 323

CHAPTER 68—Battle-Carriers 330

CHAPTER 69—Geopolitics 338

CHAPTER 70—Naval Warfare in the Atomic Age 345

BIBLIOGRAPHY 351

GLOSSARY 353

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 358

PREFACE

THIS book is intended for the general public and seeks to outline the principles and methods of naval warfare. Some aspects of aerial and land warfare are discussed, but only in relation to naval warfare.

If through this book the reader is enabled to acquire a greater knowledge and a clearer conception of what is involved in naval warfare, the writer will feel that his efforts have been usefully productive. He is convinced that dissemination of such knowledge should contribute to a more enlightened support of measures designed to improve the security of the nation.

This security is now being threatened as never before by the advent of atomic weapons and long-range rockets. The atomic bomb, like all other weapons, requires a carrier, such as a ship, aircraft, or rocket. The increase in carrier speeds has made defense extremely difficult. Radar-controlled guns and projectiles equipped with influence fuses, which are set off by the target itself, have proved their value in World War II. There is no doubt that in the near future we shall have projectiles which will literally chase and destroy the target, which is carrying an atomic or any other kind of war head. This development may at least partly counterbalance the threat of nuclear or, as they are commonly known, atomic explosives.

The atomic bomb is a terrible weapon which in addition to liberating truly fantastic amounts of energy also emits shortwave radiations. These radiations are far more penetrating and more destructive to life than the most powerful X-rays. The menace of nuclear explosives must be minimized by an international agreement, but to depend on that alone would be foolhardy indeed. We must explore every avenue for combating these atomic weapons and at the same time maintain our defenses against more conventional tools of destruction. We can ill afford to drop the old means of defense, which served so well in World War II, until new and better ways are found. To do so would be to give up the fight before it has started.

Ships and bases are not enough—they must be manned by well trained personnel. This is an age of specialization, and the use of various mechanical and electrical gadgets makes thorough training even more important than it has been. Complicated automatic devices, if not properly maintained, may be a hindrance instead of a help. Frequent drills train the personnel not only in operating and maintaining these devices but also in doing without them should such a necessity arise. These drills act as a check on the equipment and help to establish the necessary knowledge of capabilities and limitations. A well trained damage-control party may easily spell the difference between life and death of the ship and her personnel.

All this requires a large peacetime establishment to provide an adequate reservoir of trained personnel. Again, having the equipment is not enough—we must have men who know how to use it. In the long run, such a policy not only saves lives and money but is bound to reduce personnel requirements in time of war.

The writer believes in the policy of maintaining a large navy in peacetime, but it also must be an efficient navy. For a given total effort, which is supposed to be the maximum a nation is capable of in time of war, the navy’s strength is directly proportional to its efficiency.

Because of the almost unbelievable complexity of modern warfare, no single human mind can possibly grasp all its multifarious activities. This is necessarily the work of a team, each member of which, from a five-star admiral to a non-rated enlisted man, plays a vital part. The American public should know that its money is being spent to the best possible advantage on the navy, which belongs to the people and is an integral part of our national life.

The writer is not willing to subscribe to the various mathematical rules upheld by some authorities on the subject of naval warfare. He has reference to such rules as those which state that the damage inflicted on the enemy varies as the square of one’s own strength, or that difficulties of logistics are proportional to the square of the distances involved. Various offensive and defensive attributes, such as fire-control efficiency and damage-control provisions, cannot be evaluated in numerical terms. And who is so bold as to put numerical value on the spirit of the men behind the guns?

Much of the detailed data has been omitted because giving it would mean going beyond the planned scope of this book. Because there are several excellent books, among them Fred T. Jane’s Fighting Ships, the writer has kept purely statistical data to a minimum. Salient features of various ships are described, and figures are given only when they serve to clarify the text.

The writer wishes to thank Dr. Serge Korff, Professor of Physics at New York University, for his helpful suggestions in preparing this book; Mr. Fletcher Pratt, well-known author on naval subjects, for his encouragement and advice on editorial matters; Commander Freeman Lusk, U.S.N.R., for his suggestions while this work was still in the embryo stage; Colonel Earl R. Thomas, A.U.S., and Commanders Robert McAfee and David Williams, U.S.N.R., who have been of great help in the preparation of this book. Last but not least, the writer is indebted to Mr. William Brady for supplying the sketches for the text.

The writer is an officer in the United States Naval Reserve, now on inactive status, who has seen service in the Pacific. This book was not written from the standpoint of a naval officer but represents the viewpoint of a private citizen. Therefore, the text of this book does not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the Navy Department.

GENERAL NOTES

Unless stated otherwise, all distances are given in sea miles, the length of which is fixed at 6,080 feet. All land areas, however, are measured in terms of statute (5,280-foot) miles.

Tonnage figures are given in terms of so-called long (2,240-pound) tons as distinguished from short (2,000-pound) tons.

SECTION ONE—Introductory

NORMAL human beings hate war. It is, in Clausewitz’s words, violence in its extreme form. It calls for the utmost exertion in order to destroy rather than to build. General Sherman did not overstate the case when he said "War is hell." Yet there are occasions when peace is less desirable than war. At such times it is necessary to fight to secure a peace which will be both enduring and endurable.

Peace may be rendered lasting only when we have the means to enforce it. A strong military establishment is bound to discourage all would-be aggressors and thus prevent wars. The advent of nuclear energy has not altered the situation. Maintaining a strong military establishment is therefore the most effective although not necessarily the most desirable means of preserving the kind of peace that mankind desires.

Isolationism, in its defensive outlook, is archaic. In this changing world we must keep pace, or else perish as a nation. Enlightened self-interest dictates that we cannot stop at our borders and complacently watch the fires of potential war burning on the other side of the fence we have built. Sooner or later conditions are bound to arise which will fan the fire into a conflagration and cause the flames to leap over our defenses. Our own safety requires that we cross our borders to help extinguish the smoldering embers while it still can be done. We must take the offensive against these threats, or live under the sword of Damocles.

CHAPTER 1—Why This Book Was Written

WASHINGTON said: In time of peace prepare for war. It is almost a certainty that, had this advice been followed, World War II would have been avoided. If in the 1920’s we had been willing to admit the possibility if not the probability of another world conflagration, and had prepared accordingly, the Second World War need never have taken place. That is why the writer does not consider himself unduly pessimistic when he speaks of the next war.

It is obvious that no nation would be willing to start a war of aggression unless its leaders believed that their plans would bring success. The advent of nuclear energy has not altered the situation in this respect, because future Hitlers may use it as well as we. It is more than likely that the Axis nations would never have set forth upon their paths of aggression had they known that the industrial might of this nation would be ready in time to stop them. In World War II, as in World War I, they believed that America would come in too late.

Our country was not prepared for World War I, nor, as we know too well, for World War II. Let us then be ready for World War III, as the best and cheapest insurance against being called upon to sacrifice our lives and treasure in another inferno. In World War II we had to buy time, and time is an expensive commodity. Surely we shall fare better if we spend several billions annually on our armed forces in peacetime than if we have to pay another bill of over 300 billion dollars in the next war.

The writer, who had an opportunity to observe activities in the forward areas, noted many errors. These mistakes, costly in money, and possibly in lives, were due largely to the fact that we were forced to improvise with an inexperienced personnel. This book is frankly an appeal for maintaining a large military establishment in time of peace, as the best guarantee against future wars. It is a sound economy in both lives and money.

Legislating against our future involvement in wars, our isolationists’ opinions notwithstanding, is no more effective than is fighting plague with incantations. Wishful thinking cannot give us peace. Let us be ready for war, and only then shall we have peace. It will be cheaper to police the world during this, and even the next, century than to risk being destroyed by atomic rockets and bombs. Even should the cost of this policing run high in money, it will be cheap in lives—American lives. We must protect the investment in lives and wealth which we made in World War II. We could have done this after World War I, but we chose to retire into our shell instead, hoping that the world would let us alone. We failed to realize that a conflagration in a neighbor’s house was bound to affect us sooner or later, and probably sooner in this shrinking world. The adage that we are our brothers’ keepers applies today more than ever before.

The nineteenth century can be called the period of Pax Britannica. England enforced the peace during that time by preventing the spreading of war across the seas. Conflicts were localized. This Pax Britannica came to an end in 1914. When England emerged from World War I, she was too weak to resume her former role as the policeman of the world.

Sea power never abolished land power as a factor in war. It merely made it impossible for a land conqueror to extend his aggressions beyond certain limits, or to hold them for any great length of time. It is no more likely that air power will enable nations to dispense with armies and navies. The agency which undertakes the task of enforcing the peace must employ both sea power and air power to limit the spreading of wars. Land forces must be used to nullify the foci of contagion. In the present century, Germany’s expansion was stopped by sea barriers. However, this fact did not eliminate the necessity for landing troops to quench the fire which had been started.

Chamberlain signed the Pax Umbrellica at Munich because he feared German air power. He knew that the sea provided an effectual barrier against an invasion, but it could not prevent strikes by aircraft. England, heretofore safe behind the shield of her fleet, could no longer count upon it as her sole protection. The time is fast approaching when the broad Atlantic will no longer insure the United States against the horrors of air attack.

We can no longer depend on our navy alone to give us time to arm. We need both a navy and an air force. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and we should have immediately available an adequate military establishment with which to extinguish any potential conflagration before it can spread. It has been said that all fires are of the same size when they start.

We all should remember a caricature which depicted one American soldier pointing a broomstick at another, and saying Boom-boom, you’re dead. The fitting reply was made, You can’t do it to me—I am a tank. Fortunately for us, we had England and the Atlantic to restrain our enemy. But the Atlantic is constantly growing narrower, and may in the future serve as a highway for invasion rather than as a barrier. We cannot ask England to hold the ramparts for us again while we prepare. She may not be able to do it next time.

Being forced to maintain an expensive military establishment is an evil, but unfortunately we are not in a position to choose between good and evil in this instance, but only to take the lesser of two evils. There is no doubt that an annual bill, no matter how high, would be a lesser evil than another war, in which once more countless lives would have to be sacrificed.

This policy need not entail a question of revenge. President James Abram Garfield once said: For mere vengeance I would do nothing. This nation is too great to look for mere revenge. But for the security of the future I would do everything.

These sentiments were reiterated by Winston Churchill when he said: Our [British] policy is not revenge, but to take such measures as may be necessary to secure the future peace of the world.

Above all we must remember that the national emblem of this country is an eagle and not an ostrich, which hides its head in the sand of isolationism.

CHAPTER 2—Offensive and Defensive Warfare

IT IS impossible to draw a sharp line of distinction between the concepts of offensive and defensive warfare, or to determine which weapons are, by their nature, best suited for offense and defense. Germany, upon invading Poland, proclaimed this action as a defensive move, and labeled the aggression a counterattack with pursuit.

It is obvious that fixed fortifications, with their zero mobility, are predominantly defensive in character. This is also true of short-range interceptor planes and small coastal craft. At the same time, these weapons or weapon-carriers assist in offensive operations by providing for offensive weapons a point d’appui. Fixed fortifications, by reducing the manpower requirements at some points, enable the attacking side to utilize the man power thus saved in launching offensives. Conversely, a long-range bombing plane, which is primarily an offensive weapon-carrier capable of striking deep into enemy territory, can be employed defensively as a means of reducing the amount of supplies available for the enemy’s offensive action.

Purely defensive tactics cannot win, because they leave the initiative entirely in the enemy’s hands. This enables him to strike at the time and place of his own choosing. Such tactics (and strategy), furthermore, serve to inform the enemy of the exact limits of intended action. This is equivalent to an invitation to move up as far as the indicated limits. For instance, a statement to the effect that we would resist an invasion of Mexico, but would take no action should invasion of Brazil occur, would encourage the enemy to invade Brazil with the assurance that this victim would receive no aid from us.

The chapter on Mobility (Chapter 44) explains how strategical mobility{1} has been sacrificed to a great extent for the sake of improving tactical mobility,{2} When a nation, using a defensive psychology, allows a potential enemy to occupy a base within tactical range of his weapons (or weapon-carriers), it is in effect permitting him to retain all the advantages of tactical mobility without having to pay with the reduced strategical mobility imposed by the use of modern weapons and high-speed equipment. Time is given him to build up his supplies and facilities sufficiently to support a full-scale offensive, without interference from the nation he threatens.

The Maginot line mentality is much too prevalent. The Maginot Line was outflanked and its smaller edition, the Mannerheim Line, was broken by direct artillery assault. One cannot repeat too often that the main purpose of all fortifications is to economize man power at certain points in order to make it available for offensive action elsewhere. There is no lock which cannot either be broken or be opened, and this applies to all fortifications as well. The word impregnable is a relative term, not an absolute one. We have thought many fortresses to be impregnable, only to see them fall in short order. The real strength of a fortress rests in the quality of the men within it, and fortifications are no stronger than their personnel.

Trying to sit out a war behind fixed fortifications, with no intention of sallying forth at the first favorable opportunity, is courting disaster. No soldier’s morale, however high at first, can survive such an ordeal. It is easier for him to take it when he knows that he is also dishing it out. To wait until the enemy is ready to strike is the equivalent of handing him an invitation on a silver platter. To tell him so is even worse. This seems obvious now, and yet some of our public figures urged us to do just that.

The defensive alone cannot possibly win. It is destructive to morale and it gives the enemy the advantage of the initiative. Only when defensive policy is interspersed with offensive moves can it succeed, because with the offense comes at least a chance for victory. Men tire of inaction, of sitting behind fences and watching the enemy prowling around in his search for weak spots.

The writer does not advocate embarking upon a foolhardy adventure before thorough preparations have been made, or without adequate strength. It is necessary, however, for men, while on the defensive, to believe that this state is temporary, and that their high command intends to strike at the enemy as soon as opportunity presents itself. The defensive, while occasionally useful or even necessary as a temporary expedient, is sure to fail when adopted as a permanent policy. A well prepared offensive, on the other hand, at least has a chance of winning. The choice is obvious!

Every concession serves not only to encourage the aggressor, but to strengthen him as well. Each successive time he needs to rely less and less upon bluff, and correspondingly must depend more and more upon real strength, largely gained through the concessions. Hitler bluffed in 1935, but at Munich his strength was real. Ten years ago we could have stopped him at a small fraction of the price we subsequently had to pay to save ourselves.

We repeat, the defensive alone cannot possibly win. This is a rule which allows no exceptions. The advent of the atomic bomb has emphasized its significance. Some authorities have gone so far as to say that there exists no effective defense against atomic weapons. A peace-loving nation must therefore be prepared to strike at an aggressor as soon as the need arises, and not merely to seek to ward off the blows. Offensive action at the proper time and place is the wiser and the only really effective defense.

SECTION TWO—History

NO work on any subject is complete unless some historical background is given. This is necessary for intelligent understanding of the present. History is a must for all students of military and related sciences. But history, like all tools, must be employed intelligently. If used blindly it is apt to mislead us.

In studying the history of naval warfare, we would do well to analyze the strategy and tactics employed by Nelson, the greatest of all admirals. Nelson was a first-rate strategist, and as a tactician he had no peer. The tactics he employed at St. Vincent, the Nile, and at Trafalgar, represented the acme of perfection. One might well ask what the naval warfare of Nelson’s time can teach us today. Before rejecting the past altogether, we must study it to find out whether it can offer any lessons which might prove useful to us now. The great difference between the modern battleship and Nelson’s ship of the line should not blind us to this fact.

Conservatism, inherent in all human beings, resists change so long as old methods succeed. This characteristic is normally intensified with age. It requires a youthful imagination to project past experience into the future, to use it as a guide rather than as an established rule, and thus avoid the deadly ruts of tradition which permit of not the slightest digression from the rules—nor even from those paths which lead straight to a precipice.

The opposite extreme, however, ignores the lessons of the past altogether. Individuals who have had no experience or training in military matters are particularly pro ne to jump to conclusions. They are handicapped by neither facts nor figures. This extreme is at least as dangerous as is overconservatism. Old weapons should not be discarded until better ones have been made available. It is better to be armed with old weapons than not to be armed at all.

Although many of the tactics of the past, among which boarding may be regarded as typical are not likely to be used today, there are others which remain applicable to modern problems. Within the limited space available here, one example must suffice. During the Battle of St. Vincent, Nelson struck at the windward portion of the Spanish fleet. This proved to be a sound maneuver because it forced the leeward ships to tack, in order to assist the hard-pressed windward detachment. Nelson, by striking first at the windward force, brought his concentrated strength to bear against that portion of the enemy fleet which was capable of the greatest speed. In a modern navy, a detachment of fast units would be analogous to the windward forces of the past, in so far as the factor of mobility is concerned. It is obvious that, in general, the initial strike should be directed against the force which possesses that attribute in the highest degree. This principle was put to the test by Nelson at St. Vincent and at Trafalgar. Its application might prove undesirable only in some isolated cases.

It would indeed be folly to ignore the past. We must study it, and then apply intelligently the lessons we have learned. Above all, in naval warfare, we must study Nelson’s campaigns. The dream of every naval officer is to find the Nelson touch.

CHAPTER 3—The History and Development of Weapons

THE rapid strides that have been made in technology do not necessarily eliminate the usefulness of old weapons. The development of more efficient agencies of destruction serves first to alter their relative importance, and eventually to do away completely with some of the older versions. Many of today’s weapons are as old as mankind. Our hands, which can be used for hitting, strangling and gouging, are still with us. On occasion, they are used without assistance from mechanical aids, and so primitive a weapon as biting has not been entirely discarded. The Commandos were trained to use their bare hands with lethal effect. Frequently such refinements as brass knuckles or thin wire are added. Thus, the crudest and most ancient weapons are still in use, together with modern, efficient means of murder and mayhem.

All weapons can be divided into two broad types—the club weapons and the rock weapons. The wielder of club-type weapons, while controlling them, also retains possession of them. With the rock type, however, while control may be retained, possession is lost. Although modern radio-controlled weapons may be guided, once launched they are normally irrecoverable.

The characteristics of club-type weapons are as follows:

a.—The wielder retains possession at all times.

b.—They can be used repeatedly.

c.—Control is never lost.

Rock-type weapons may have any one or two of these characteristics, but not all three. A javelin, for instance, may be used over and over again, but it cannot be controlled in flight. Nor, as stated above, are radio-controlled weapons normally recoverable.

Club-type weapons are incomparably cheaper to make, and require no expendable ammunition. Their range, however, is severely limited. Their use also calls for personal contact with the enemy. They place a far greater premium upon physical strength and endurance than do rock weapons. The following is a list of typical club-type weapons in the order of their historical development: bare hands and feet, club, spear, pike, battle ax, halberd, sword, rifle butt, bayonet, etc. It matters little that the bayonet is made of steel, while the ancient spear was made of stone or bronze-tipped wood. Their general methods of employment and their purposes are identical. The rifle butt is to all intents and purposes a club. Devices such as the battering ram can also be classed as club-type weapons. They still survive in anti-submarine ramming tactics and in suicidal ramming by planes.

From the dawn of history, efforts have constantly been made to improve the hitting power and to increase the range of weapons. Because of the lack of maneuverability on the part of club-type weapons, then range has necessarily been limited. With this type, range cannot be increased without rendering the weapon unwieldy. It is much easier to wield a three-foot sword than a fifteen-foot pike. In regard to hitting power, the same limitation applies. Greater strength is required to handle a heavy club than a light one. Whenever human muscle is the only source of power there is a definite limit to both the range and the hitting effect of the weapon involved. This, then, constitutes the weakness of the club-type weapons.

The purpose of the rock-type weapon is to diminish the enemy’s power and to weaken his will to fight. When the enemy is on the offensive it is used to prevent him from using his club-type weapons. When he is on the defensive, it serves to weaken his resistance (or will to resist) to the club-type weapons of his opponent.

The first type of rock weapon was, as its name implies, a stone. When no mechanical aids were involved, hitting power had to be traded for range. When primitive man realized the limitation to his hitting power depending on muscle alone, he developed the spear and the javelin, thus making his weapon more effective for a given weight. The spear, because of its sharp point, had better penetrating power. It also proved to be more accurate, and it was easier to handle than was an equivalent weight of rocks. Later still, methods of storing energy and of using mechanical advantage were discovered. Thus, range and hitting power were both increased.

The bow and arrow exemplifies the principle of the storing of energy followed by its sudden release. The slingshot is another example of this. Ancient counterparts of modern artillery were developed in the form of catapults and ballistas. Energy supplied by human muscle was stored in springs, twisted rope or weights concentrated at one end of a lever. This, in turn, was held in position by some device such as a rope. However, these early war machines were extremely unwieldy. They required considerable time to load, and their accuracy was poor even at their limited ranges.

Because of the very low efficiency of the rock-type weapons of the day, club-type weapons were very effective by comparison. However, as improvements were made upon the rock type, the importance of the club type began to wane. This was largely because the wielder of the club-type weapon had to approach within a few feet of his antagonist before his weapon could be effective. The rock weapon proved its superiority by placing the unprotected club wielder hors de combat while he was making his approach. As the range of the rock-type weapon increased, the club wielder’s chances of getting through to his enemy grew correspondingly fewer. The invention of breech-loading weapons and of automatic weapons has made such approaches to all intents and purposes far too costly, except under unusual circumstances. Breech loading also made long-range guns possible because muzzle loading limits the length of the gun barrel. The club wielder must have sufficient means of protection during the critical approach period to be able to use his weapons at all.

Such protection can be passive in character, or active. Examples of passive protection are concealment, shields, armor, or trenches. Active protection might consist of the use of rock-type weapons to destroy the enemy’s power, or to force him to keep under cover, thus limiting his freedom of action. Shields and armor were effective against all club-type weapons and against the older sorts of rock-type weapons. The advent of firearms, however, made useless all armor which could be worn, afoot or on horseback. Today, some protection against rock-type weapons of limited hitting power can be built into such land vehicles as tanks or armored cars. Any vehicle capable of withstanding hits by heavier ordnance would necessarily be too big to be operated on land. Effective protection against heavy projectiles can be built only into stationary fortifications or large battleships. A cubic foot of steel weighs well over 400 pounds. To provide twelve-inch armor on a tank would add so greatly to its weight as to cause it to sink into the ground. Even then, it would be difficult to protect its caterpillar treads from mines.

It is possible to build ships large enough to make the use of heavy armor feasible. This is because a ship is supported by water throughout its entire length and breadth. The same principle explains why an animal as large as a whale could not possibly exist on land. But not even the heaviest armor on ships can withstand hits by heavy ordnance at short range. A modern battleship would be blown out of the water before boarding distance could be reached. Thus it is clear that in naval warfare the club-type weapons are even less effective than they are in land warfare.

We see, then, that the use of club weapons is today restricted to occasions when the explosive type of rock weapon, like the hand grenade, would be likely to injure the wielder. They can also be used as a last resort, when the rock-type weapon’s ammunition is exhausted, or when the adversaries are but a few feet apart. We have seen that the hitting power of rock-type weapons was increased by making the projectiles heavier, by imparting higher velocities, and by loading them with explosives. A higher initial velocity is also essential for extended range. The range of rock-type weapons was increased by making use of energy stored in gunpowder, and by releasing it with maximum velocity. Initial velocity can also be magnified by adding to the powder charge, by lengthening the gun barrel, or by special shaping of the gun barrel itself.

The hitting power stored in a projectile is effective only upon deliverance to the target—and that applies to atomic projectiles as well. Mere range is of little avail if the burst occurs too far away to damage the target. Only actual hits count—not the number of rounds fired. The importance of accuracy varies with the size of the gun caliber. With small calibers, great accuracy is of less importance, because such guns can be fired on the shotgun principle. They can depend upon the large spread of their projectiles. With heavy, slow-firing ordnance, however, this method is impractical. It would be far too costly and wasteful of the time element. Thus what counts is not the extreme range, but the effective range, the range at which a reasonable percentage of hits can be expected.

When using cheap small-caliber ammunition at short ranges, a trial-and-error method is acceptable. In Nelson’s day this was the only available method. Upon approaching the enemy at Trafalgar, he had one gun of the leading ship firing in order to determine whether the enemy was within gun range. At extreme ranges, extending over many miles, far more elaborate means are necessary. Corrections must be applied to the direction, as well as to the elevation of the gun. Firing a long-range gun over an open sight with no adjustment is certain to result in a miss. At long ranges the target, because of the earth’s curvature, is not even visible from gun level.

Mechanization, elaborate fire-control equipment, rapid rate of fire, high tactical mobility, etc., all cost money in manufacture and operation. It is not surprising, then, that it cost us 50,000 dollars to kill one Nazi. During the First World War, when we were less highly mechanized, we paid 20,000 dollars per head. The still cruder killing methods of the Civil War cost the taxpayer only 5,000 dollars per man. Napoleon, who was the first military leader to place greater dependence upon fire power, and who was the first general to understand the use of artillery to the maximum advantage, accomplished his killing at the rate of 3,000 dollars per head. In the days of ancient Rome, when the main weapon was the short Roman sword, a one-way ticket to Valhalla cost only seventy cents.

The reasons for this startling increase in cost are obvious enough. The Roman legionnaire was armed with a short sword and a throwing spear. These weapons involved no expenditure of ammunition, and were relatively inexpensive to make. A limited number of ballistas and catapults were also employed, these being the equivalent of present-day artillery. There existed no such means of mechanical propulsion and elaborate electrical gadgets as are indispensable today.

By Napoleon’s time the cost of mass murder had risen considerably. A fairly large amount of irrecoverable ammunition was then being spent. His larger armies could not possibly live off the land, and his artillery pieces added to the expense. In the Civil War more and better guns were added, and the rapidity of fire by small arms was further increased. The First World War led to the introduction of motor vehicles, of a limited number of aircraft, of vastly improved guns with a more or less elaborate system of fire control, and of a limited degree of mechanization.

The real payoff came with World War II with its multitudes of tanks, motorized guns, aircraft and ships. The rapidly increasing operational speeds on both land and sea have made further demands upon our fuel supplies. To the vast quantities of shells used in the First World War we have added fantastic numbers of airplane bombs. The fire control of that war was child’s play as compared with the electrical gadgets in use today. Expensive radar and other electrical equipment was then unknown. Only mass-production methods prevented the costs of the second war from mounting even higher.

Weapons and technology are inextricably bound together. Every improvement in manufacturing technique and each development in scientific knowledge is sooner or later reflected in the design and construction of weapons of war. Originally made of wood and stone, weapons were improved by the techniques of the Bronze Age. Bronze was in turn displaced by iron, and later by steel. Guns, rockets, torpedoes, mines, aerial bombs and various anti-submarine projectiles are all the result of work done by metallurgists, chemists, physicists and mathematicians. Science, pure and applied, plays the most vital part in the development of weapons. Any nation which permits scientific research to lag behind that of its potential adversaries may later find itself confronting insurmountable handicaps. The advent of the atomic bomb is sufficient proof of this.

CHAPTER 4—History of Propulsion

THE first vessels built for war purposes were propelled by means of oars and were known as galleys. They were in use as late as the sixteenth century, long after sail had replaced oars on merchant ships. The unsatisfactory maneuverability and the inferior tactical mobility of sailing vessels account for the long delay in their introduction as warships.

The war galley was developed by the Phoenicians and was improved by the Greeks and Romans. These galleys were known as biremes, triremes, quadriremes and quinqueremes, having respectively two, three, four and five tiers of oar banks. The triremes appeared to be the most popular. Usually there were several rowers per oar, often as many as eight Large galleys, called galleasses, were employed in the Battle of Lepanto (1571). These could develop speeds of almost five knots for the first hour while the crews were still fresh.

Sails were added to the galleys as auxiliary devices for transferring the ships from one to another of widely separated points, but were not used in battle. Here the sails provided badly needed strategical mobility and helped to sustain tactical mobility by enabling the crews to remain fresh for actual combat.

Gradually, as more and more was learned about sailing, and as tackle was improved, sail began to displace oars as means of propulsion, even in battle. At first the ships were merely