Winfield Scott's Vision for the Army: Mobilizing the North to Preserve the Union

By Mark C. Vlahos

Truly visionary, Winfield Scott’s enduring contribution to the Union war effort was the “Anaconda Plan.” This plan in essence became the basic overall Union military strategy in the American Civil War. Unlike most in 1861, Scott envisioned a protracted four-year-long war that would involve large numbers of troops and a grand strategy.

Winfield Scott had another vision in 1861. This vision determined the role the standing, Regular Army would play as the Union mobilized to suppress the rebellion of the Southern states. Scott’s vision called for the Regulars to be a nucleus for the Union Army to form around as it expanded. Scott’s decision to keep Regular units intact would have a lasting impact on mobilization, training and the war effort the next four years.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lulu Publishing Services
• Release date: Nov 5, 2015
• ISBN: 9781483438344

Mark C. Vlahos

Colonel Mark “Plug” Vlahos retired from the United States Air Force in 2011. During his 29-year career, he served in a wide-range of operational flying and staff assignments including command of a C-130 squadron in combat and Vice Wing Commander of the 314th Airlift Wing at Little Rock Air Force Base, which was then the largest C-130 wing in the world. Colonel Vlahos attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University and holds master’s degrees from Webster University and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a member of the Troop Carrier/Tactical Airlift Association, The Air Force Historical Foundation and the Leon B. Spencer Research Team of the National World War II Glider Pilot Committee. He resides in New Braunfels, Texas.

Book preview

Winfield Scott’s

Vision for the Army

MOBILIZING THE NORTH TO PRESERVE THE UNION

Mark C. Vlahos

Copyright © 2015 Mark C. Vlahos.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted by any means—whether auditory, graphic, mechanical, or electronic—without written permission of both publisher and author, except in the case of brief excerpts used in critical articles and reviews. Unauthorized reproduction of any part of this work is illegal and is punishable by law.

ISBN: 978-1-4834-3833-7 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4834-3834-4 (e)

Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Thinkstock are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Thinkstock.

Lulu Publishing Services rev. date: 10/27/2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Aknowledgements

Foreword

Introduction

Chapter 1   Old Fuss and Feathers

Chapter 2   History of Regular and Militia Forces

I. George Washington’s Vision

II. The Militia Act of 1792

III. The War of 1812.

IV. War with Mexico 1846-1848.

Chapter 3   Frocks & Scales The U.S. Army on the Eve of the Civil War

Chapter 4   "Rally Round the Flag Boys!" War Breaks Out and Mobilization

I. War Breaks Out

II. Mobilization

III. Lincoln increases the Army.

IV. US Regular Army Organization.

V. Congress increases the Army.

Chapter 5   Training Camps and Community Support

I. Raising Volunteer Regiments

II. Creating The New Army Regulars

III. The U.S. Sanitary Commission and the Home front

Chapter 6   The Regulars in Action 1861-1864

I. The Eastern Regulars in action.

II. The Western Regulars in action.

Chapter 7   New Mobilization Policy

I. Conscription

II. Creating the Invalid Corps

Chapter 8   Bounties and Substitutes

Chapter 9   We Are Coming Father Abraham United States Colored Troops

Chapter 10   Analysis and Alternatives

I. Manpower Required to Win the War

II. Army Expansion Analysis

Chapter 11   Epilogue

Bibliography

Endnotes

About the Author

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott in 1862

Figure Intro 1-1 1861 characterized map of Scott’s Plan

Winfield Scott in the War of 1812

Table 1-1 Union General-in-Chiefs during the Civil War

Figure 1-2 Winfield Scott in 1861.

Figure 2-1 The Seal of the U.S. Department of War

Table 2-1 Strength of the U.S. Regular Army 1789 – 1883

Table 2-2 Soldiers Serving in Wars Prior to Civil War

Figure 2-2 John C. Calhoun

Table 3-1 Geographic Army Departments 1861

Figure 3-1 Army Parade Dress Uniform circa 1858.

Table 3-2 Distribution of Companies by Military Departments December 1860

Figure 4-2 President Abraham Lincoln.

Table 4-1 Major Federal and State Arsenals & Armories¹¹⁴

Table 4-2 Quotas and Men Furnished Under the Militia Call of April 15, 1861*

Figure 4-3 The 1³th Regiment New York State Militia

Table 4-3 Report of Northern State Militias 1860

Figure 4-4 Organizational Structure of Regular Army Infantry Regmiment.

Figure 4-5 Colonel Elmer Ellsworth

Figure 4-6 Edwin M. Stanton

Figure 5-1 Illustration of Camp Defiance from Harper’s Weekly²¹⁸

Figure 5-2 The Fourth and Twelfth Illinois’ Infantry Land at Cairo

Figure 5-3 Camp Morton

Figure 5-4 Camp Chase Cemetery Monument

Figure 5-5 Camp Curtin

Table 5-1 Major Union Training Camps

Table 5-2 Colonels of the New Army infantry regiments, 1861

Figure 5-6 Seal of the United States Sanitary Commission

Figure 5-5 Women filling cartridges at the U.S. Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts

Figure 5-6 The Civil War Women by Winslow Homer

Figure 6-1 Nathaniel Lyon

Figure 6-2 George Sykes

Table 7-1 Statistics from the Draft of 1863

Table 7-2 Statistics from the Draft of March 1864

Table 7-3 Statistics from the Draft of July 1864

Table 7-4 Statistics from the Draft of December 1864

Table 7-5 Draft Totals

Table 7-6 Aggregate Strength of Veteran Reserve Corps²⁸⁷

Figure 8-1 New Jersey Recruitment Poster

Table 8-1 Bounties Paid by the Federal Government during the Civil War

Table 8-2 Estimate of the Minimum Amount of Bounties Paid by State Governments During the Civil War

Figure 9-1 Fourth U.S.C.T. in formation

Table 9-1 Negroes Recruited or Drafted by State

Figure 9-2 Colored Men Recruitment Poster

Figure 9-3 Colored Men Recruitment Poster backside

Table 10-1 Aggregate Army Strength as Reported by the Provost Marshal General³⁰³*

Table 10-2 Presidential Calls for Troops

Table 10-3 Men Mobilized for the Union Army by States during the Civil War

Figure 10-1 George McClellan

Figure 10-2 Ulysses S. Grant

Figure 10-3 William T. Sherman

Figure 10-4 Winfield Scott’s grave marker at West Point

Figure 11-1 The U.S. Regulars Monument at Gettysburg

WinfieldScottTitlePage.jpg

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott in 1862

Photo courtesy of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winfield_Scott

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mr. Robert Serio, A good friend, talented historical boot and shoe maker, and fellow reenactor once gave me some simple, yet sound advice…if it makes you happy write about it. This advice was just what I needed in 2014 as I struggled to find a reason to push through with this effort.

I also need to thank my daughter Brooke Vlahos who encouraged me to finish this work and to pursue publishing. When no publisher or university press offered to take this on, Brooke steered me towards self-publishing. I could not have finished this without her. Someday Brooke will inherit my Civil War book collection. My goal is to have a volume, authored by her father included in the gift.

For my brothers and sisters, who always said I should get a history degree and teach, this work substitutes’ for the history degree I never obtained. My military career and school work took me in other directions in life. With some Academic coaching, I believe this thesis would have made a great PhD dissertation.

Finally, all of the pards I’ve met in thirty years of Civil War reenacting across the country have been an inspiration to me as we keep alive what the common soldier experienced in camp and on campaign. Some things you just can’t learn by reading text in a book. Very early in my reenacting career I learned the value of having Regular troops handy to demonstrate the importance of relentless hours of drill. For it was this time spent drilling that produced results on the battlefield. Thank-you and see you around the camp fire.

FOREWORD

Since enlisting in the 2d U.S. Infantry (Civil War, Reenacted, 1989), I am fascinated with the story of the pre-Civil War and Civil War Regular Army. In 1991, the opportunity to hear author Timothy J. Reese speak about his then new, ground-breaking book Sykes Regular Infantry Division 1861-1864: A History of Regular United States Infantry Operations in the Civil War’s Eastern Theater, further peaked my interest on the subject. Mr. Reese was our guest speaker at the "Sykes Regulars" dinner and dance after the annual Gettysburg Remembrance Day Parade. I can remember asking Mr. Reese that day, Could you comment on the decision to keep the Regulars intact vice spreading them out and utilizing them as a training cadre as the Union army expanded in 1861? Mr. Reese responded with a very astute question indeed. That question and the plight of the Regulars have always been on my mind. However, it would be many years before I could really delve into the subject again. The opportunity arose during my year-long study at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 2004-2005. As a research fellow, I was able to pick my own topic and chose to author a paper entitled Winfield Scott’s Vision for the Regulars. This paper addressed how the Regulars were utilized during Civil War Army expansion and searched for twenty-first century relevance with regard to the organization, training, and equipping of forces. Later, I learned that a 40-page paper barely scratched the surface of the issue. Now, two kids and a twenty-nine year career in the United States Air Force later, I finally found the time to fully research and study that question from long ago. This work is a result of my efforts.

Prior to the Civil War, the Regulars played a great role in westward expansion of the United States by protecting the frontiers. However, few people beyond the serious buff and the scholar, who study the American Civil War, are familiar with the U.S. Regulars and the role they played in the Union Army. The tragic story of these well-trained and disciplined troops remained a mystery for a number of reasons. As professional soldiers, they hailed from all over and had no one state that benefited from their regimental histories or accomplishments. The Regular regiments were unable to recruit due to shorter enlistments, looser discipline, faster promotions, enticing bounties and hometown units that Volunteer service offered. By 1864, U.S. Regular infantry regiments in the eastern theater of operations were fought to near extinction. These Regular regiments, no longer combat effective due to low numbers, were pulled from the line. In the western theater, newer and larger Regular infantry regiments were raised and participated in major campaigns through 1864. By late summer 1864, most of the Regulars in these new units, who entered service in 1861, came to an end of their three-year enlistments and were discharged. Reduced in size by combat and discharges, these regiments were also pulled from the line. For an in-depth study of the Western Regulars, see That Body of Brave Men – The U.S. Regular Infantry and the Civil War in the West by Mark W. Johnson, 2003.

In other words, by 1864, the standing, professional Army of the United States almost became nonexistent. I always wondered what caused this situation. While authoring my paper at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I found a few sentences in historical works stating that this situation arose from a decision Lieutenant General Winfield Scott made in 1861. To keep the Regular Army intact instead of spreading their expertise among Volunteer units and/or utilizing them as training cadre as the North mobilized to suppress the rebellion and preserve the Union. This decision became War Department policy and was approved by President Lincoln. What influenced Scott to make this decision?

To answer the question, I explored Union mobilization during the Civil War from a manpower perspective. My intent was to get inside the mind of General-in-Chief of the Army Winfield Scott, whose decision to keep the Regular Army intact impacted mobilization and training more than any other policy.

Scott’s decision became the framework for my study as I delved into his life, his experiences, and analyzed the merits of this policy and its effect on Union mobilization and training. It quickly became apparent that a study on the history of United States forces, both Militia and Regular, and how they were utilized and integrated (or not) was required for my endeavor. This effort then grew into a full-blown work on how the North struggled to mobilize, expand the Army, and raise the needed manpower for combat operations and to preserve the Union.

A career professional soldier, Winfield Scott was well versed in United States military history. He was an active participant in both the War of 1812 with England and the War with Mexico in 1846-1848. Scott’s career spanned five decades; he ascended to the position of General-in-Chief of the Army when the Civil War broke out. Even though he was nearly 75 years old when the war erupted, he took up his sword and applied all his remaining energy to the task at hand; writing plans for the War Department, expanding the Army, and advising President Lincoln.

Totally unprepared, the United States Government and War Department faced a crisis that required a total mobilization of the population as it struggled to raise a Federal force to preserve the Union. Abraham Lincoln would be tested like no other preceding President. With outdated military policies and no plans in place, the War Department learned and codified the mobilization process on the fly as events dictated. Much more was needed than just activating the state Militias upon which the country depended during past crises. Initially overwhelmed, the Federal Government depended on the states to take the lead in recruiting and expanding the army through much of 1861-62. Ironically, the very reason that the Southern states were seceding (States’ Rights) is the power that enabled governors to raise large quantities of troops for the Union!

As patriotism abounded 1861, recruiting opportunities were missed and many miscues occurred along the way. However, by the end of the war, a fully-functioning War Department, strong Army and Navy, United States Sanitary Commission and a united country emerged. New military policies mandating conscription and entire units of United States Colored Troops were utilized for the first time. The evil of the bounty system was exposed and an Invalid Corps was established. All played a key role supplying manpower to build a Federal force and ultimately secure Union victory.

Initially, my intent was to analyze the merits of Scott’s decision for the Regulars. However, through the course of study this little project turned into a larger, historical case study on the United States Army. Through the course of my research, I learned a great deal about Winfield Scott, the history of Regular and Militia forces, and the American fighting man in the Civil War. While many mistakes were made during the organization, training and equipment portion of Union mobilization, it was the courage and perseverance of the common soldier, with support back home that eventually won the battles and the war. Enjoy the read.

Mark C. Vlahos

10 June 2015

INTRODUCTION

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. Mobilization includes assembling and organizing personnel and material for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

Joint Pub 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, 21 February 2014

The above quote, extracted from a current 139-page, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, not only defines mobilization, but highlights the importance and complexity of the process in modern terms. United States military forces have not always benefited from such detailed guidance. This type of policy and directive guidance evolved over multiple centuries, after fighting multiple wars. While the current process is much more complex that it was during the American Civil War, when you break it down to basics assembling and organizing personnel, activating the Reserve Component (previously called Militia), and federalizing the National Guard a direct correlation can be made.

The purpose of this work is to discuss and analyze the merits of Winfield Scott’s decision to keep the Regular Army intact and serve as a historical study on how the Union raised, organized, and trained forces during a total mobilization for the crisis known as the American Civil War. This study will address the manpower portion of mobilization. The equipping portion of Union mobilization, to include contracting scandals and corruption in the industrial base, merits an entire study by itself!

Truly visionary, Winfield Scott’s enduring contribution to the Union war effort was the Anaconda Plan. This plan in essence became the basic overall Union military strategy in the American Civil War.¹ Unlike most in 1861, Scott envisioned a protracted four-year-long war that would involve large numbers of troops and a grand strategy.² The Anaconda Plan framed Scott’s strategic estimate which called for a Regular Army of 25,000 men and 60,000 three-year Volunteers to open the Mississippi River and conduct land operations in conjunction with a tight naval blockade to strangle the Confederacy into submission.³ A spearhead consisting of a relatively small amphibious force, army troops transported by boats and supported by gunboats should advance rapidly, capturing the Confederate positions down the river in sequence. This force would be followed by a