The Cavalry Battle That Saved the Union: Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg

By Paul D. Walker

Civil War historians have long been puzzled by Pickett’s seemingly suicidal frontal attack on the Union center at Gettysburg.

Here, for the first time, Paul D. Walker reveals Robert E. Lee’s true plan for victory at Gettysburg: a simultaneous strike against the Union center from the front and rear—Pickett’s infantry to charge the front, while Stuart’s cavalry struck the rear. The frontal assault by Pickett went off as scheduled, but as Stuart’s forces approached from the rear, they encountered a Union cavalry contingent. As the forces joined, the Union cavalry leader was quickly killed, and command fell to one of the most dynamic figures in American history—George Armstrong Custer.

What followed was America’s greatest cavalry battle: 7,500 Confederate horsemen ranged against 5,000 Union cavalry, Jeb Stuart against George Custer, with the outcome of the Civil War at stake.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Apr 30, 2002
• ISBN: 9781455601950

Paul D. Walker

A distinguished military graduate of Missouri State University, Paul D. Walker served two tours in Vietnam and went on to a thirty-year career in the armored cavalry division, earning sixteen awards for valor and achievement. He earned master’s degrees in both international relations and public administration from Shippensburg University and taught political science and history at a local university in Salt Lake City. He is a member of the Civil War Round Table, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Purple Heart Society, Vietnam Veterans of America, and American Legion. He has published two additional books on military strategy and history with Pelican: The Cavalry Battle That Saved the Union: Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg and Truman’s Dilemma: Invasion or The Bomb. Walker resides in Salt Lake City, Utah.

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Introduction

With the thousands of pages and hundreds of books written on Gettysburg, no clear, concise account of the crucial cavalry action that occurred there has appeared. This battle pitted Union Gen. George Armstrong Custer against Confederate Gen. J. E. B. Stuart and is considered "the most dramatic, largest man-to-man, horse-to-horse, saber-to-saber galloping cavalry engagement ever fought in the Western Hemisphere and the final horse battle fought on a scale of this magnitude in the entire world. (Riggs, 68). The focus and uniqueness of this book deals with the vivid description of cavalry warfare, which was swift, fluid, and difficult to understand but often changed the outcome of numerous battles. This, then, is the story of America's greatest cavalry battle and its impact upon the outcome of the Civil War and world history.

Gettysburg was the largest battle fought during the Civil War and one whose casualty figure, of over 60,000, would not be exceeded until the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. This is the dramatic battle that most of today's Americans associate with the Civil War.

I'm fully aware of the contributions of the other branches of infantry and artillery and the crucial engagements where their employment played such a key role. For example, a most noteworthy action occurred on the first day of the Gettysburg battle: Gen. Richard S. Ewell's infantry corps inflicted over 10,000 casualties on the Union forces and, given a little more support, could easily have begun the process of defeating each Union corps as it came up, as Lee had originally envisioned in his plan for the invasion of Pennsylvania. Union Gen. O. O. Howard's Eleventh Infantry Corps deserves the credit for holding the line that day. Furthermore, at several points during the battle, the artillery on both sides is given credit for carrying the day. Of particular note was an incident that occurred on the third day. As the Confederate forces were assaulting the Union center, Federal artillery took a horrible toll of the gray lines. Several Union cannons were rolled out onto the field and fired point-blank into the flanks of Pickett's advancing infantry. Their canister shot, tearing bloody paths of carnage throughout the tight formations. Artillerymen could easily have boasted of saving the day for the Union in this action of the greatest battle of the war.

Since the contributions of the other branches have been well documented and considering the prejudices that sometimes exist in the minds of historians, who favor one over another, I have chosen to complete the picture, by presenting the grand story of a critical cavalry battle between two of the finest cavalry forces ever assembled, and show the impact this battle had on the outcome of the Battle at Gettysburg.

The invasion of Pennsylvania was much more than just a military campaign. It was Lee's effort to bring forth a political end to the war.

As he scored one victory after another over his Union opponents, Lee was very much aware that, with each battle, his foe was becoming a little stronger and more difficult to defeat.

It was no secret that the North, with its vast resources, was having little difficulty replacing losses in men and equipment, whereas the Army of Northern Virginia was still arming itself with weapons, equipment, and even clothing picked up from the battlefield. Shortages existed in every category of supply and one of the primary reasons for invading the North was that the Virginia countryside had been stripped of provisions and could barely support the local inhabitants, let alone an army of 100,000. In Pennsylvania, Lee would find provisions in abundance.

Additionally, as Lee came to grips with the dimming realities of winning a military victory over his Northern foe, he became more aware of the growing peace movement in the North. Several Northern editorials had been written about the futility of continuing the war, and these, along with several large antidraft marches in the larger cities, had convinced him that there was definitely a large sentiment that advocated an immediate end to the killing and a negotiated settlement to stop the war. Lee believed that his invasion of the North would bring the harsh and brutal realities of the war home to these peace advocates and, hopefully, increase their influence in the general movement to end the war.

The reaction of foreign governments was also a consideration before the invasion. In the final days before Secession, the newly formed Confederate government had sent officials to visit European heads of state, to seek recognition and military assistance. Much time and effort were spent with the British government, which, because of the Union blockade and the harm this was doing to their economy, always appeared on the verge of recognizing the new government. Lee and other members of the Southern government felt that all that was needed in order to gain the long, sought-after recognition was a decisive victory in a major battle, such as the one at Gettysburg.

Historians, without question have considered Robert E. Lee to have been a rare military genius. Over the years, countless military leaders, both in America and Europe, have extensively examined his campaigns in order to try and uncover his secrets of command. In an examination of his impressive list of victories, historians have long argued over what went wrong at Gettysburg, and remarkably, most do agree that this battle stands out as one of the very few examples of where the magic of Lee's genius was slightly tarnished. The mishaps that occurred there can always be blamed on the fog of war, but most historians concur that Lee's major handicap was that he did not receive timely information about the enemy. He appears to have been surprised by the Union army's presence at Gettysburg and by the speed with which Gen. George Meade, the Union commander, was able to deploy against him. This information was crucial to his plan of defeating the enemy in detail as he arrived on the field.

The justification and planning for the battle of Gettysburg began long before July 1, 1863, and to better follow the growth and development of the two main participants, Custer and Stuart, plus understand the tremendous significance of this little-known cavalry battle, the military situation prior to the invasion will be reviewed. Its presentation will be primarily from the perspective of the cavalry and presented in a hard-charging, hellbent-forleather style, in a deliberate attempt to capture the true spirit of the cavalry.

This story begins with Lee assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia just before the Seven Days' Battle. It follows the key leaders, on both sides, to Gettysburg and lays out the circumstances that led to the greatest cavalry battle ever fought in North America.

The Cavalry Battle That Saved the Union

CHAPTER ONE

The Seven Days' Battle

In the opening days of the Civil War, shortly after the Union disaster at First Manassas, morale was high and the South was thought to be invincible.

When thirty four year old General George B. McClellan arrived in Washington on July 26, 1861, the streets, bars and hotel lobbies were clogged with soldiers wandering aimlessly in defeat. Even five days after the battle, demoralized Federal officers and men continued to limp across the bridges into the city. On the other side of the river on the rolling plains of Northern Virginia, the victorious Confederates had advanced their outposts to within ten miles of the bridges to Washington. Upstream, cavalry patrols, led by a red-bearded twenty-eight year old colonel, recently a lieutenant in the U.S. Army, J. E. B. Stuart, had appeared near the river. The troopers were fine looking outdoorsmen, mounted on blooded horses and lounging carelessly in the saddles as if watching a sporting event instead of surveying a system of forts (Dowdey, 19).

But now, almost a year later, things had changed dramatically. With Lincoln's reluctant approval of the Peninsula Campaign, McClellan, commanding the North's largest army, had begun moving his now well-trained, superbly equipped, and generously supplied army to its objective at Fort Monroe. He brought with him over three hundred cannons, mostly twelve-pound brass Napoleons and three-inch ordnance rifles, as well as his own favorite weapons, 100 heavy-siege cannons.

The North's movement of the Army of the Potomac from Washington to Fort Monroe was a spectacular accomplishment that dwarfed anything done before or during the war. With only a little over five weeks for planning and preparation, Gen. A. L. Tucker, who had been given the assignment, had obtained almost four hundred vessels (113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges) and moved an army of 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 44 batteries of artillery and associated wagons, ammunition, and other equipment, with the loss of only eight mules and nine barges. The embarkation began at Alexandria, Virginia on 17 March and the movement was completed by 6 April 1862. The army was subsequently resupplied by sea (Luvaas-Nelson, 271).

McClellan wasted little time in pursuing the rebels back to the outskirts of Richmond. There, within sight of the spires of the city, his army of 100,000 effectives prepared to dig in. Against this powerful force, Gen. Joseph Johnston, the rebel commander, had barely fifty thousand men. Although the Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, had pleaded earlier with his general to turn and fight, Johnston had declined. In the face of such odds, he would not risk battle until he was ready.

The Union advance down the Peninsula had not been unopposed, as many Southern units stood and fought bravely before being forced to withdraw. The mission of covering this evacuation and protecting the Confederate rear was the responsibility of J. E. B. Stuart and his six cavalry regiments.

Upon discovering the Southern soldiers' evacuation, the Federals put together a pursuit force under Gen. George Stoneman, consisting of four regiments of cavalry and supported by two infantry divisions commanded by Gens. Joe Hooker and Al Smith. Their plan was to attempt to cut off the retreating Southerners and capture all or a portion of their force. Discovering the Union's plan, Stuart deployed his forces along expected enemy avenues of approach, with the objective of making sure that no retreating forces were left behind.

Stuart displayed great courage and ability in deploying his forces to their full advantage. Repeatedly, his small force would engage superior units and, at the point of being overrun, withdraw under fire to the next delaying position. Due to the marshy nature of the ground, the Union forces pursuing Stuart were confined to the roads and, as a result, suffered heavy casualties, in men and horses, from Stuart's artillery.

In covering the withdrawal, Stuart would need all his talents to protect the rear of the army. The area was enclosed by two broad rivers and threaded throughout with small streams and swamps, which were flooded. Perfectly good roads became bottomless quagmires where men, mules, and guns sank and were virtually immobilized until the rains stopped and the ground had a chance to dry.

Because of the difficulties Union forces were having on land, an end run was tried on 7 May. The Union force consisting of General Franklin's division was loaded aboard gunboats, then, brought in upstream, behind Southern forces at Eltham's Landing on the York River. Upon discovery, Stuart, with the help of elements from two Southern divisions, made short work of the Federals, driving them back under the protection of their gunboat's covering fire.

As the Southern states had begun to secede, one at a time, Robert E. Lee had followed his native state, Virginia, into the Confederacy. He then applied to the Southern secretary of war for a commission in the new Confederate army and his request was granted and within a short time, with his seniority and experience, President Davis directed that he be appointed military advisor to the president.

For the first year of the war, Lee served as spokesman for the president, traveling throughout the South, resolving problems, adjusting troop allotments, requisitioning supplies, and improving defenses that involved more than one major command.

During his many assignments, Lee was able to see the big picture and also hear the frustrations the Southern president expressed in trying to coordinate defensive efforts among the various states. This was due to the nature of the organization of the Confederacy more than to personalities. From the first, Confederate forces were parceled out among military departments and geographical divisions, each of which, according to a war-office clerk, was a separate nation for military purposes, without divisions, cooperation, or concert. In the Southern president's concept of a cordoned defense, each army, whatever its size or strategic relationship with neighboring forces, was responsible for its own territory. Cooperation with other Confederate armies or military operations against a Union threat was virtually impossible because all interdepartmental correspondence and coordination was routed through Richmond.

At the beginning of June