On the Soul

By Aristotle

Written in 350 BC, Aristotle’s “De Anima” or “On the Soul” is not a work on spirituality, as the title would suggest, but rather a work that could be described as one of biopsychology, or a work on the subject of psychology from a biological perspective. Aristotle’s exposition centers on the soul. Aristotle’s soul however is not the same as the common modern spiritual conception of something distinct from the body that lives on past death. Rather Aristotle defines the soul as the form or essence of a living thing which is wholly inseparable from that living being. In the work Aristotle engages in a discussion of the differences between all living things with regard to this conception of the soul including the differing capacities for nourishment, reproduction, perception, and intellect that different forms of life possess. Philosophers, theologians, and students alike will find Aristotle’s discourse a fascinating examination on the essence of life. This edition follows the translation of Edwin Wallace.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Digireads.com Publishing
• Release date: Sep 24, 2020
• ISBN: 9781420969757

Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a Greek philosopher whose works spanned multiple disciplines including math, science and the arts. He spent his formative years in Athens, where he studied under Plato at his famed academy. Once an established scholar, he wrote more than 200 works detailing his views on physics, biology, logic, ethics and more. Due to his undeniable influence, particularly on Western thought, Aristotle, along with Plato and Socrates, is considered one of the great Greek philosophers.

Book preview

cover.jpg

ON THE SOUL

By ARISTOTLE

Translated by EDWIN WALLACE

On the Soul

By Aristotle

Translated by Edwin Wallace

Print ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-6974-0

eBook ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-6975-7

This edition copyright © 2020. Digireads.com Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Cover Image: a detail of Ideal Portrait of Aristotle (384-322 BC), copy of an illustration from ‘Aristoteles cum Leonardi Aretini Commentariis’, Venice 1516, used in a ‘History of Magic’, published late 19th century (woodcut) (later colouration) / Bridgeman Images.

Please visit www.digireads.com

CONTENTS

BOOK I.

Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Chapter III.

Chapter IV.

Chapter V.

BOOK II.

Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Chapter III.

Chapter IV.

Chapter V.

Chapter VI.

Chapter VII.

Chapter VIII.

Chapter IX.

Chapter X.

Chapter XI.

Chapter XII.

BOOK III.

Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Chapter III.

Chapter IV.

Chapter V.

Chapter VI.

Chapter VII.

Chapter VIII.

Chapter IX.

Chapter X.

Chapter XI.

Chapter XII.

Chapter XIII.

BIOGRAPHICAL AFTERWORD

Book I.

Chapter I.

The acquisition of knowledge is, we conceive, always something high and honorable: but one form of knowledge is superior to another either in virtue of the self-contained simplicity of its truths or by the greater dignity and wondrousness of its contents: and on both these grounds the investigation of the soul might with justice claim a foremost place. And, besides, the knowledge of it is thought to have important bearings on truth generally and especially on nature: for soul is as it were the prime factor in animal existence.

The object of our enquiry is to observe and to discover both the historical development and the essential nature of the soul, and further to find out the phenomena occurring in connection with it—phenomena of which some are thought to be affections peculiar to the soul itself, others, while owing their existence to the soul, are thought to belong to the animal nature taken as a whole. By far in every way the greatest difficulty connected with it is that of reaching some certainty about it. The object of investigation is, it is true, the same here as it is in many other subjects—it is, that is, the question of the essential notion and of the generic character. It might therefore be supposed that there is some one common method applicable to all objects of which we wish to discover the essential nature, just as deductive argument traces out the properties dependent on the genus: and in this case we should have to seek the method in question. But if there be no one common method for finding out the generic character, our procedure becomes still more difficult, as it will then be necessary to settle with regard to each subject of investigation what is the method of enquiry which is appropriate to it And even if it were clear whether some deductive argument or Platonic division or some other method were the right one to apply, yet even so the question from what points we should begin our enquiry is one which offers many difficulties and leaves much room for divergent views, because different conceptions have different fundamental principles, as we see in the difference between the elementary ideas of arithmetic and those of geometry.

The first point however which demands our attention is to determine in which of the higher classes soul is included and what is its generic character—whether, in other words, it is an individual thing and real substance or a quality or quantity or any other of the categories as they have been distinguished. We must further ask whether it belongs to the class of potentialities or is rather a completed actuality—two conceptions between which there is no small difference. Another question, we shall have to ask, is whether it is divisible or free from parts, and whether again all souls are homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether it is specifically or generically that they differ: for at present writers who investigate the soul seem to confine their observations to the soul of man alone. Special care must be taken to discover whether there is one definition comprehending all the different forms of soul just as the definition of animal applies to all particular animals, or whether the definition is different in respect of each individual species: just as if for example we were to allow a definition of horse, dog, man and God, but should assert that the universal ‘animal’ either signifies no actually existing thing or is posterior to the particular species, this also holding good of any other common term. Should it however be ascertained that there are not several souls, but merely different parts in the soul, the question rises whether we should begin by investigating the whole soul or should start rather with the parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which of them are really different from one another, and whether we should first of all investigate the parts or their functions—whether we should for instance investigate the act of reasoning or the faculty of reason, the act of sensation or the faculty of sense: and so also in other cases. And supposing we determine to examine first of all the functions, still the further question may be raised whether we should beforehand treat of the objects which are their counterpart—treat, that is, of the object of sense before the faculty of sense, and of the object of thought before the faculty of thought.

The truth however seems to be that it is not only a knowledge of the generic character of anything which helps towards detecting the causes of the properties of substances—as in mathematics the knowledge of straight and curved or the generic character of what is a line or superficies assists us in seeing to how many right angles the angles of the triangle are equal—but even conversely the knowledge of the properties contributes in great measure to a knowledge of the ‘what’ or the generic notion. When, in fact, we are able to present to the mind’s eye all or most of the properties which appear to be connected with an object, we shall be in a position to speak as well as may be about the thing itself: although the starting point of all demonstration consists in knowing what a thing is. And thus all definitions that do not convey a knowledge of the properties attending on an object and do not even render it easy to frame a conjecture regarding them are evidently mere empty phrases such as transcendentalists alone would use.

It is a further question whether the affections of the soul are also all shared along with the soul by the body which contains it, or whether there is in addition something peculiar to the soul itself. This is a question which it is necessary and yet not easy to answer. It appears at any rate that in the great majority of cases the soul is neither active nor passive without the co-operation of the body, for example in being angry, in showing courage, in feeling appetite—in one word, in being sensitive. Thought seems to be the clearest case of a state peculiar to the soul alone: but if even thought is only the presentation of an image or not independent of such presentation, it would follow that it is impossible for even this act of the soul to be exercised in independence of the body. If then there be any of the functions or affections of the soul which distinctively belong to it, it would be possible for the soul to exist in separation from the body: if, on the other hand, there be no functions or affections so belonging to it, the soul would not admit of separate existence: it would resemble the straight line which as straight has many properties, such as for example to touch a brazen globe in or at a point, while at the same time it cannot touch the globe when separated from its material embodiment: the straight line being really inseparable as always existing along with some body or another. So in like manner the different feelings appear to be all accompanied by some particular condition of the body—such feelings, viz. as anger, meekness, fear, pity, courage, and further joy and love and hate—all of which appear to be accompanied by some particular affection of the body. This indeed is shown by the fact that sometimes great and evident disasters which have befallen us cause us no irritation or fear, while at other times the feelings are excited by trivial and almost imperceptible mischances, the body being at such times boiling full and in the same state of excitement as in anger. Still more is this evident from the fact that even without the occurrence of anything really terrible people have the same feelings as a person in fright.

The feelings then are materialized notions, and they require to be defined in correspondence with this character. The feeling of anger for instance has to be defined as on the one hand a certain movement on the part of such and such a body or part or faculty, and as on the other hand excited by such and such a cause and due to such and such motives.

These facts themselves show it to lie within the province of the natural philosopher to investigate the soul, either in its whole extent or with reference to the states we have described. Every such state however would be differently defined by the natural philosopher and by the transcendentalism Take, for instance, the question—what is anger? The transcendentalist would define it as the effort after retaliation or the like, the natural philosopher would describe it as a ferment of the pericardial blood or heat. Here then the latter describes the material aspect of the phenomenon, the former states its form and its notion: for it is the notion which constitutes the form of the object, although at the same time it must in order to exist be realized in such and such a matter. Thus in the case of a house, the notion of it would be somewhat to this effect, that it is a shelter fitted to prevent our sustaining damage by winds and rains and violent heats, but the one observer will describe the stones and bricks and timbers, the other will seize upon the form and end which those materials contain. Which then among these is really the true philosopher of nature? Is it he who concerns himself simply with the material aspects and neglects the notion, or is it he who deals with the notion only? Rather, we may answer, it is he who considers the question from both these standpoints. How then, it may be asked, are we to describe each of the enquirers whom we have named? May we not reply that there is really no one occupied only with the qualities of matter, which are inseparable from it, and so far as they are inseparable from it, but that the natural philosopher is concerned with all the functions and properties attaching to body or matter in so far as it is of some specific kind? (When the qualities are not taken in this general way, they are dealt with by a specialist, who becomes, it may be, respecting some of them an artist, as for instance