The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson

By Marie Joseph Paul Lafayette and Thomas Jefferson

For four decades the friendship of Thomas Jefferson and Lafayette spanned some of the most tumultuous upheavals in Western History, the revolutions in American and France and the birth of two great republics.

It was 1781 that Jefferson met, the wealthy, aristocratic and idealistic French general who had volunteered to assist the nascent American revolution. When Jefferson was appointed to the court of France (1792) his acquaintance with the Marquis blossomed into an intriguing and complicated friendship that survived dangers and upheavals that engulfed Europe and America until Lafayette’s death in 1826.

“Above all, these letters may be considered as human documents of singular importance for the study of international life. With all his love for his adoptive country, Lafayette wished to remain and did remain essentially French. Temperamentally he had nothing in common with Jefferson and yet between these two men whose views and reactions on so many subjects were widely divergent, there existed for almost fifty years a sincere and unvarying friendship.”—From the author’s introduction

• Language: English
• Publisher: Barakaldo Books
• Release date: May 8, 2020
• ISBN: 9781839744259

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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THE LETTERS

OF

LAFAYETTE AND JEFFERSON

with an introduction and notes

by

GILBERT CHINARD

Professor in the Johns Hopkins University.

Table of Contents

Contents

Table of Contents 5

PREFACE 6

CHAPTER I 12

THE GOVERNOR AND THE MAJOR-GENERAL (February-June 1781.) 12

LETTERS — February 1781-October 1784 18

CHAPTER II 41

LAFAYETTE AND JEFFERSON IN FRANCE (1785-1789.) 41

LETTERS — (February 1785-August 1789.) 63

CHAPTER III 104

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION — THE YEARS OF CAPTIVITY AND EXILE — 1789-1800 104

LETTERS — (APRIL 1790-APRIL 1799.) 114

CHAPTER IV 125

THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE (1800-1815.) 125

LETTERS — (1800-1815.) 138

CHAPTER V 187

THE TWILIGHT OF LIFE (1815-1826) 187

LETTERS — (February 1815-February 1826.) 187

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 187

PREFACE

The purpose of the series beginning with this volume is simply to make available some documents pertaining to an aspect of international relations which after being long neglected has recently drawn the attention of a few historians and comparatists.

Due to the inroads made by hasty applications of scientific or pseudo-scientific principles into the field of history, there has been in recent years a marked tendency to emphasize unduly the part played by economic factors in the development of a given people and in its relations with neighbor nations. In more than one sense, this conception of history has brought about a healthy and necessary reaction against historians who wrote largely in order to prove the correctness of a priori hypotheses, to satisfy posthumous hatred, or to justify the program of a political party. It is obvious however that because of its ambition to deal only with quantitative and measurable data, economic history presupposes a mechanistic theory of life the soundness of which has yet to be demonstrated. Sometimes it is granted as an unimportant concession, that nations as well as individuals are not exclusively led by the realization of the immediate necessities of life, that emotions and ideas can, in critical times, weigh heavily in the scales of destiny. But too often such considerations are laid aside as not being the proper domain of science and they are left to be dealt with to emotional orators and impressionistic writers.

If this is true of national history it is even more evident in the field of international history. The great emotional pressure which enabled so many nations to carry on through the war, has resulted in a sort of international nervous breakdown from which we are slowly recovering. The necessity of resuming our daily tasks in order to obtain our daily bread has concentrated man’s attention on the most pressing problems of the moment. The economic aftermath of the war, the economic consequences of peace have pushed into the background all other considerations, and the financeer has established himself in the center of the city.

Yet anyone who has lived through the last two decades and looks back towards our immediate past, has to admit that there have been times when the great majority of individuals forming a given nation have acted as if they were inspired with entirely different motives. Whether or not, as some seem to believe, the great parade was directed by a few cold calculating minds who pulled the strings from their well protected studies, even if this simpliste idea were true, the fact would remain, that in order to make the masses march in the assigned path, they had to appeal to considerations entirely foreign to economics. There is little doubt that in times of crisis men are led by ideas and by emotions often mistaken for ideas or, as Napoleon repeated after Pascal, by their imagination.

If nations as well as individuals were ruled throughout their existence solely by a single set of unchanging motives, if all of us had single track minds, to write history would be an easy task and the science of government would have become long ago a real science. But varying with individuals, with times and circumstances, complex and manifold motives obtain alternatively. The so-called stream of consciousness has many eddies, and cross-currents, and very often breaking the levees baffles the forecasts of the wiseacres.

To distribute men into a limited number of categories, to assign to each class a fixed label is as attractive an undertaking as it is unscientific, unless room is provided in each category for an infinite number of subdivisions and varieties. Even physicians have to reckon at times with such unexpected phenomena as idiosyncrasies and individual temperaments. But strangely enough these anomalies and exceptions, these infinite nuances are generally ignored by social psychologists and students of the international mind.

Whether there are such things as inborn national or racial characteristics, which would enable one to determine in advance how a Frenchman, a German, a Britisher or an American would react under certain circumstances, is a question which cannot be satisfactorily answered in the present state of our knowledge. As a matter of fact, when these apparently irrefutable and generally accepted judgments are analyzed, they resolve themselves into a confuse mass of contradictions which render impossible any serious classification. The French are called at one and the same breath, logical, emotional, chivalrous, dishonest, generous, imperialistic, highly intelligent and narrow-minded, while the Americans in turn seem to be greedy and wasteful, practical and idealistic, looking forward to the future and unmindful of their past and yet unchanging in their attachment to certain political traditions and to their Constitution. Each of these statements taken separately and applied to any of the individuals composing a nation would probably prove untrue. And yet when taken together, they seem to express to a certain extent the compound of contradictory qualities and faults to be expected of any people formed of individuals.

Furthermore, it is a remarkable fact that to whatever extremes of enthusiasm or hatred a nation may go in her attitude towards another people in times of crisis, the pendulum swings back as soon as the emergency is over, old prejudices, old opinions reappear and reassert themselves and the same attitude of mind as formerly prevails once more.

If this is true, it becomes the obvious duty of the student of international relations not to be content with these verities toutes faites, but to analyze the different elements which compose these commonly accepted truths, to trace historically their development, and thus to test their authenticity and value, in other words, if we knew more exactly, or at least with some degree of approximation, the history of national pride and international prejudices, it might become easier to demonstrate objectively the falsity of many generalizations commonly taken at their face value, and at the same time to find out whether it is possible to discover a common ground upon which some intellectual international entente might be established.

Such an undertaking is probably outside the field history proper, and this may explain why these phenomena have hitherto received so little attention{1}. As a matter of fact, the pioneers in the field are students of comparative literature, and it is probable that this rather undetermined but tremendously rich domain can best be exploited by comparatists and students of international psychology. Before any conclusion can safely be reached, it will be necessary to do a considerable amount of collecting, sifting and publishing the material available. It is essentially a cooperative work to be undertaken simultaneously in several countries by many investigators having the same aim in view. A modest attempt towards the proper solution of the problem may however be undertaken and a beginning can be made,—in America probably better than in any other country.

To a large extent, the United States may be considered as a unique laboratory for the study of international relations.

For the older nations of Europe the beginnings of national consciousness are buried in a remote and scarcely accessible past. In many cases it may prove impossible to trace historically in all its detail the slow growth of these idées toutes faites which are inherited from generation to generation.

In America, on the contrary, the material is not so overwhelming, it is comparatively recent and in most cases easily obtainable. It seems that very early in their history the colonists agreed tacitly or avowdedly on a certain number of principles, ideas, ways of feeling and regulating their domestic and public life, which have remained practically unchanged to the present day, and constitute what I called once the Doctrine of Americanism.

Furthermore, in spite of her comparative remoteness and her apparent isolation, America because of her large immigration had more direct contact with a greater number of representatives of various nations than any of the older countries of Europe. To form a general idea of a particular people of the old world an American has not to travel far. He will find right at home small foreign colonies of immigrants who have retained some of their so-called national characteristics, who have adapted themselves more or less rapidly to new conditions of living, react more or less vigourously against their environment and sometimes keep for several generations the language and traditions of their mother-country. The data thus obtained may be very insufficient; the Italian cobbler or fruit vender, the French cook or laundryman are certainly not qualified representatives of their nationalities, but by their very presence the average American is constantly reminded of the existence of foreign nations and of foreign ways of living. In America more than anywhere else, international problems are essentially domestic problems, and the United States constitute in themselves a sort of League of Nations.

Under these circumstances the study of some phenomena of international life becomes comparatively easy. It is not within the scope or a short introduction to map out the plan of a work undertaken several years ago with the sole help of a few students. The value of our project will be better judged by the quality and significance of the material it is our intention to publish. In a general way however, it may be said here that our intended publications may be roughly divided into two classes. First a series of repertories giving not only references and titles, but also substantial extracts and quotations from significant articles published in American magazines during the last two centuries. Occasionally the views expressed on America and American things in foreign magazines will also form the subject of separate studies. In this way we hope to be able to determine the formation, growth and variations of the judgments passed on a given nation by a certain portion of the reading public. A single magazine can in nowise be accepted as representing public opinion as a whole, but it certainly reflects the views and tendencies of a well defined class or group of people.

On the other hand, it happens that American libraries and archives contain a wealth of material of a somewhat different nature which has never been fully utilized or published. It consists mainly of letters exchanged between distinguished Americans and their foreign correspondents. By far the richest collection is found in the Jefferson papers. During his sojourn in Europe and after his return to America, Jefferson formed many international friendships and acquaintances with a considerable number of famous foreigners. With them he discussed freely and frankly American affairs as well as the affairs of their own countries. In many cases he sharply disagreed with them, while they were unable to understand him completely or to modify their a priori views on certain American subjects. Yet Jefferson and his correspondents, despite marked differences in their formation, training, surroundings, individual or national characteristics succeeded in meeting each other on a common ground. I have already published in another collection Jefferson’s correspondence with Volney, Destutt de Tracy and the Idéologues. The letters he exchanged with Lafayette during almost half a century of the most eventful period of modern history are given in this volume.

The new light thrown by this correspondence on some of the most important events of that time would suffice to justify its publication. Lafayette’s interest in American affairs between 1784 and 1789, the part he played in the development of satisfactory commercial relations between his mother-country and his adoptive country had remained hitherto practically unknown. The discovery in the Library of Congress of a draft of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme, corrected and annotated by Jefferson, will enable one to determine for the first time the exact participation of the author of the Declaration of Independence in the events which immediately preceded the French Revolution. That America was never ungrateful towards Lafayette will appear in the story of the land grant voted by Congress, told here for the first time also. Finally, many letters of Lafayette will help in tracing the slow growth of the liberal movement under the Empire as well as in determining exactly the influence of the American example on the survival of the political philosophy formulated during the preceding century.

Above all, these letters may be considered as human documents of singular importance for the study of international life. With all his love for his adoptive country, Lafayette wished to remain and did remain essentially French. Temperamentally he had nothing in common with Jefferson and yet between these two men whose views and reactions on so many subjects were widely divergent, there existed for almost fifty years a sincere and unvarying friendship.

The reasons for the remarkable permanency of this friendship will more clearly appear in the following chapters; one of them, the most potent perhaps, may be indicated here, in all the letters sent by Jefferson to Lafayette, there is hardly a passage in which the author of the Declaration of Independence assumed a superior attitude, pointed out the superiority of American ways, preached the gospel of Americanism, or manifested the slightest intention of americanizing France. That he found many things to criticize in France, in political institutions as well as in social customs, may be seen in other letters, but not in the letters to Lafayette. Far from trying to convert his friend to his views, Jefferson always strove to moderate the uncautious zeal of Lafayette for American institutions, and he persistently maintained that instead of adopting bodily the Constitution of the United States, the French should develop a form of government in harmony with their past, their traditions and their present condition. The same attitude is easily observed in Lafayette’s letters. It would have been natural enough for the young Marquis, brought up at the Court, related to the most aristocratic families of old France, acquainted with the most prominent artists and philosophers of his time, to find fault with the domestic customs of the Americans, to notice occasionally the evident superiority of an old and refined civilization over a young and still uncouth country. Many French travellers in America did not fail to do this, but if Lafayette was ever shocked or amused by American ways, he never gave any evidence of it in his letters to Jefferson, nor did he endeavor to convince him that for the arts, letters and sciences America should borrow from France and transplant French culture into the United States. One might say that neither Jefferson nor Lafayette manifested any superiority complex, if the same idea could not be more exactly expressed simply by saying that both of them observed in their correspondence the ordinary rules of good breeding and politeness without which no lasting friendship may exist between individuals nor probably between nations. Ardent missionaries do not always promote good feelings between nations, and amour-propre probably plays a part as important in relations between peoples as in the daily life of ordinary men. Whatever may be the case, both Lafayette and Jefferson displayed a tact and a spirit of tolerance which we might well borrow from an older age. Neither of them attempted to force his views and theories on the other; but fully aware of the differences existing between their respective countries they recognized they had a right to be different.

Gilbert CHINARD

Baltimore, January 1928.

Most of the letters and documents printed in this volume have never been published before and were copied from the originals in the Library of Congress. The letters of Lafayette dealing with the Virginia campaign were obtained through the kindness of Dr. H. R. Mcllwaine, Librarian of the Virginia State Library. For letters already published I usually referred to the Memorial edition of the Writings of Thomas Jefferson and to the English edition of the Memoirs Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Published by his family. London, 1837. 3 vols. As only the first three volumes of the Mémoires de Lafayette seem to have been translated, I had to use for the last three volumes the French edition, Paris and Leipzig, 1838. Passages omitted in the Mémoires are indicated in brackets, and the original spelling of Lafayette has been restored. As for my precedent publications I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Dr. J. C. Fitzpatrick in charge of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

G. C.

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κρεῖσσον ἢ φίλος σαφής,

οὐ πλοῦτος, οὐ τυραννίς: ἀλόγιστον δέ τι

τὸ πλῆθος ἀντάλλαγμα γενναίου φίλου.

Euripides, Orestes, 1155

Nothing is better than a reliable friend, not riches, not absolute sovereignty. Nay more, the crowd is not to be reckoned with, in exchange for a noble friend.

From Jefferson’s Literary Bible.

CHAPTER I

THE GOVERNOR AND THE MAJOR-GENERAL (February-June 1781.)

THE GOVERNOR AND THE MAJOR-GENERAL

(February-June 1781.)

The first meeting between Lafayette and Jefferson took place under very dramatic circumstances. Lafayette had already been four years in America; but in spite of his eagerness to meet the famous author of the Declaration of Independence, he had never been able to leave the army except on missions which did not take him to Virginia. Jefferson, on his part, had retired from Congress in 1776, and given all his time to his native State, making Monticello his headquarters, working at the revision of the laws of Virginia and attending the meetings of the House of Representatives, until, in July 1779, he was elected Governor to succeed Patrick Henry. He took charge under very unauspicious omens. During the two years of his administration, Virginia had to be sacrificed by the Commander-in-chief, who until the late summer of 1781 considered that the pivot of the operations was in the Northern States, Without any regular troops, without any adequate fleet, with a badly equipped militia, lacking horses, artillery and ammunition, Jefferson cooperated as well as he could with the army commanded by Greene in the South, while trying to give some degree of protection to the State of Virginia. By the end of 1779, Steuben and Mulhenberg were in command of about 4800 regulars, and the militia under General W. Nelson may have amounted to approximately the same number. The population was restless and discontented. Both money and subsistances were lacking; the troops had literally to live on the country, as whatever was necessary had to be obtained through impressment.

The situation came to a climax with the treason of Arnold, the occupation of Portsmouth at the mouth of the James river by British troops, and the raid of Arnold against Richmond (January 3-6, 1781). Washington yielded at last to the entreaties of Jefferson, who only voiced the anxiety of the whole State, and on February 20, the Commander-in-chief gave instructions to Lafayette to proceed by land to Head of Elk, then by convoy down the Chesapeake Bay to Hampton Roads and thence, if possible, to conduct a punitive expedition against Arnold, with the mission, if the traitor should fall into his hand, to execute the punishment due to his treason and desertion in the most summary way. The next day, Lafayette announced to the Governor of Virginia that he was coming with a Continental detachment, assuring him of his ardent zeal to do any thing in his power to cooperate with the Executive of the State, and adding in the naïve English he was still writing at that time that he would precipitate his soldiers as much as he could (Ms. From New Windsor. Feb. 21, 1781).

Washington had not decided upon the choice of Lafayette without some very good reasons. Baron Steuben, who was then in charge of the Regulars in Virginia, proved himself a splendid soldier, but had already had countless difficulties with the civil authorities of the State and the officers of the militia. As no extensive operation in Virginia could be carried out without the whole-hearted support of the State forces, and that the immediate object of the expedition required more dash than Steuben had heretofore displayed, Lafayette was selected as much for his personal qualities, his winning ways, his accommodating spirit and his tact, as for his military talents. The history of the following six months was going to demonstrate that once more Washington had been a good judge of men.

Jefferson, at first, answered simply to manifest his real joy at the coming of the Marquis, and to assure him that he would have the pleasure to cooperate with him with every aid in his power (Ms. March 2, 1781). But as Lafayette had reached Head of Elk much earlier than was expected, and as he had already called upon the State authority to deliver some practical assistance, the Governor had to confess that he had only limited means and could offer very little aid. It must have irked the proud Virginian to admit that even the unlimited good will promised in his preceding letter would probably be lacking. Knowing Lafayette but by name, thinking of him as a professional soldier and the aristocratic representative of a militaristic nation, the Governor felt that he had to apologize for the unsoldierly attitude of his fellow citizens. Mild laws, a people not used to prompt obedience, a want of provisions of war and means of procuring them renders our orders often ineffectual, obliges us to temporize and when we cannot accomplish an object in one way to attempt it in another (March 10. 1781). Certainly, he would endeavor to have everything in readiness and the State quartermasters were exerting themselves to get horses, but their exertions were slow and doubtful. The upshot of it all was that the support of the militia was very uncertain, that boats could not be had to transport the small army of Lafayette from Head of Elk to Hampton Roads, that horses could not be provided to bring the artillery by land. Instead of seaworthy vessels, the governor offered scows which could not be used in wide waters, and instead of horses, oxen. The explanations were rendered less painful from the knowledge Jefferson already had of the accommodating temper of the young general and in conclusion he could appeal with more confidence to his understanding of the situation:

I think it proper therefore, to reduce our expectations from what should be ready to what probably will be ready, and even calculating on probabilities I find it necessary to reduce my own expectations at times. I know that you will be satisfied to make the most of an unprepared people, who have the war now for the first time seriously fixed in their country and have, therefore, all those habits to acquire which their northern brethren had in the year 1776, and which they have purchased at so great an expense (Richmond, March 12, 1781).

In the letters written on March 12 and March 14, after a careful study of the list of requirements drawn up by Lafayette, the Governor had again to come to the conclusion that endeavors shall not be wanting but still they must not be counted upon.

The two letters written in answer by Lafayette from Williamsburg on March 16 and 17, exhibit some of the best qualities of the Marquis, the very qualities which endeared him so much to the American people. Far from complaining about the lack of preparation, he had at once turned back to the Quartermaster all the saddle horses, field artillery horses and horse wagons that could be dispensed with, and since oxen were available, had at once requested that 200 be impressed. He even apologized for the necessity of disturbing the inhabitants of the State of Virginia and regretted that a siege operation could not be carried without great expenses and great means of transportation. In his anxiousness to relieve the feelings of the Governor, he thanked him warmly for the good maps that had been provided, although he added that his farther knowledge of the country must come from personal observation. As a matter of fact, he considered and presented himself as the guest of the State of Virginia, and not as a military commander in charge of federal troops, with the ordinary scorn of a regular for militia men. And most of all, he assured Jefferson that he was perfectly familiar with the slight inconveniences and the lack of efficiency that result from a popular government, but there also numberless blessings compensated these petty annoyances. Once again, Lafayette had proved that he was a good harmonizer, and it took more than ordinary qualities to supersede Baron Steuben in command without hurting the amour-propre of the old martinet, to take actual charge of all the operations in Virginia while nominally Greene was in command, and to navigate between the State authorities, the militia, the quartermasters, and a more than lukewarm population of farmers and country gentlemen who resented the impressment of their horses, cattle and wagons by regular troops. And yet, in spite of all these difficulties, in spite of the fact that sometimes he found provisions but no soldiers and, at other times, militia men but no ammunition (Ms. Camp near Sleepy Hole. March 20), he managed to infuse a new spirit and a new élan in worn and discouraged troops.

However, the result of the campaign hanged on the assistance that the French squadron under des Touches could give, in order to make safe the mouth of the James river and the coast. Lafayette and Jefferson had expected from day to day the arrival of the French vessels; when at last they were sighted, they engaged the English fleet but sailed back at once to Newport. The expedition against Portsmouth had to be abandoned and Lafayette thought only at first of going back to Head of Elk in order to join the Northern army. On March 4, he announced to Jefferson that he was withdrawing from Virginia, not however without leaving for the use of General Greene four field pieces twelve hundred rounds and near hundred thousand cartridges.

After repelling two English vessels blockading the entrance of Annapolis, he succeeded in transporting part of his force to Head of Elk, where he received new orders from Washington, Instead of going back to headquarters, he was expected to lend a hand to General Greene whose lines of communications were threatened, and who was in great danger of being hemmed in between Cornwallis and the forces operating from Portsmouth. Using his own money, signing promissory notes, with the help of the merchants and the ladies of Baltimore, he equipped his soldiers as well as he could, and decided to hurry back by rapid and forced marches, impressing on his way horses and wagons. This measure he wrote to Jefferson, I have reluctantly adopted, but as uncommon dangers require uncommon remedies, thought that the State of Virginia being so far interested in this movement, they would put up with momentary inconveniences provided we could rapidly advance to their succour (Ms, Baltimore, April 17, 1781).

The relief of Jefferson was evident in the letter he wrote in answer (April 23, 1781). Leaving baggage and artillery on his way, Lafayette raced for Richmond, which he suspected to be the precise object of Phillips. He entered the city on the 29th, barely on time to save it from being captured by the English general, who had occupied Manchester on the opposite bank of the river the day before. There, for the first time, the young Major-General met the Governor of Virginia, in the city he had just rescued from the hands of the enemy.

The last act of the drama which was to come to a close at Yorktown had just begun. The details of the Virginia campaign have been told by Lafayette himself in his Memoirs, and more recently by Mr. Charlemagne Tower Jr. (The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution. Philadelphia, 1895. 2 vols.). But the letters published here contain much more than points of strategical value.

Lafayette followed the slow withdrawal of Phillips from the Northern bank of the James, and when the British general died (May 13, 1781), after giving order to operate a junction with Cornwallis near Petersburg, vainly attempted to head off his troops. On the 15th, he encamped at Wilton, eight miles below Richmond, which Jefferson was about to leave for Charlottesville to meet the General Assembly. The Governor postponed his departure to call at the headquarters of the young general (Richmond, May 14th, 1781). From Charlottesville, he wrote Lafayette a long letter to inform him that the Legislature had decided to extend his powers of impressment, particularly with reference to horses, although he insisted that stud horses and brood mares will always be excepted, because to take them would be to rip up the hen which laid the golden eggs.

This was the last letter to be sent by Jefferson as Governor of Virginia to the young Frenchman in command of the Federal troops. It was an ultimate effort to provide Lafayette with more adequate facilities and to force the hand of a reluctant Legislature (Charlottesville, May 29, 1781). The day before he had written to Washington to take official leave:

A few days will bring me that relief which the Constitution has prepared for those oppressed with the labors of my office, and a long-declared resolution of relinquishing it to abler hands, has prepared my way for retirement to a private station.

Yet, never had the situation been more critical. Tarleton in command of the British cavalry was soon to make a new effort to capture the Legislature and captain McLeod occupied Monticello, while Jefferson escaped being taken prisoner by but a few minutes.

Placed in command of the Federal troops, Lafayette was to begin against Cornwallis the strategical campaign that won for him the gratitude of Virginia, the admiration of the American officers and, a result even more difficult to achieve, acknowledgement from the French of the wisdom and prudence that had guided him in the various decisions he was called upon to make. (Ségur to Lafayette. Dec. 5. 1781. Memoirs, I, 447).

Once more, during the same year, however, he had an opportunity to transmit to Jefferson a letter from the President of Congress announcing the former governor’s appointment as a plenipotentiary to act with Adams, Franklin, Jay and Laurens to treat for peace at the proposed Congress of Vienna. Much to his mortification, Jefferson felt that he had to decline, as he had already declined a similar mission in 1776, for the same reasons as before, according to his Autobiography. As a matter of fact, and even admitting that the precarious health of his wife would have been sufficient to motivate his refusal, his main motive was somewhat different and appears clearly in the letter he wrote Lafayette on this occasion.

As soon as the Legislature had reconvened, after the Charlottesville affair, and Nelson had succeeded Jefferson, some delegates, dissatisfied with themselves and with their unglorious exit from the city before the cavalrymen of Tarleton, tried to make the former Governor the scapegoat. Although he was a friend of Jefferson, George Nicholas arose to move that an inquiry be started into the facts of the Governor’s conduct during the Arnold’s invasion. No formal procedure was followed, and Jefferson was in no sense put on trial; he felt however that he had to appear in person before the Legislature, to answer the charges made against him and vindicate his good name. From his letter to Lafayette, on August 4, it appears that it was, if not the only reason, at least the main reason for his refusal to accept a mission to France: Declining higher objects, therefore, my only one must be to show that suggestion and fact are different things, and that public misfortune may be produced as well by public poverty and private disobedience to the laws, as by the misconduct of public servants. But he could not conceal that his unability to avail himself of the opportunity to see countries whose improvements in science, in arts, and in civilization he admired from a distance, caused him more mortification than almost any occurence in his life.

Randall, and many others after him, have told how Jefferson was not only acquitted but entirely vindicated by the unanimous votes of both houses of the General Assembly. If additional evidence of the efficiency of Jefferson as Governor of Virginia were needed it would be found in a letter of Lafayette to Washington (Sept. 8, 1781. Mem. I, 440). At any rate Jefferson’s successor, although a general, did not prove more efficient and, during the following months, was equally unable to remove the obstacles placed in the way of military operations by the inertia of the Legislature. The governor does what he can, wrote Lafayette, the wheels of his government are so very rusty that no governor whatever will be able to set them free again. Time will prove that Jefferson has been too severely charged.

From that time until the departure of Lafayette from Virginia, after Yorktown, no communications passed between the former Governor and the young Major-General. Lafayette’s official letters were sent to Governor Nelson, with whom he tried to work as harmoniously as with his predecessor. But he had not forgotten the advice and recommendations contained in the letters received during the first part of the year 1781. A lover of horses himself, he understood the reluctance of the Virginians to sell or lend their best mounts to the army, and he had always kept in mind the necessity to avoid as much as possible measures of impressment. Yet, impressing could not always be avoided, and although Lafayette had hopes that his delicacy in the matter was such as to render him worthy of the approbation of the State (March 17. 1781), he felt that he could not leave Virginia without presenting to the people or the State he had so well defended, complete apologies for the arbitrary steps he had occasionally taken. Consequently he wrote to Governor Nelson a letter which has never been published, and in which reappears that delicacy of feeling so characteristic of the Marquis:

The anxiety I feel to obtain the approbation of the people of Virginia, induces me to request a very great favor from your Excellency. It is, that you would be pleased to lay before the honorable the Assembly an account of my conduct in executing their recommendations for the impressement of horse. As this was done often in sight of the enemy, and sometimes, as it were from under their hands, it has been altogether impossible, in every occasion to pursue all those forms which I could have wished. But whatever has been done by my orders, will, I hope, appear to have been conducted in the best method which the moment would admit. (To Governor Nelson. York, October 31st, 1781. Virginia Suite Library.)

Contrarily to his expectations, Jefferson was to be called once more by Congress, and his wish to see Europe was finally to be fulfilled. On May 7, 1784, Congress decided that a Minister plenipotentiary was to be appointed for negotiating treaties of commerce with foreign nations and Jefferson was chosen for that duty. He sailed on July 5th on the Ceres from Boston. A week before, Lafayette had sailed from Brest for a visit to America. The two friends crossed each other on the Ocean but were soon to meet again. During his American visit, Lafayette wrote his friend one of these affectionate letters so often found in his correspondence. Jefferson was taking along with him to France his young daughter Martha, and Lafayette knew that the little girl who had so recently lost her mother would probably feel estranged in a new country. She would be in want, at any rate, of the womanly affection and guidance so necessary at that age, and so Lafayette ended his letter with these few lines which better than long protestations demonstrated the sincerity and warmth of his feelings:

My house, Dear Sir, my family, and anything that is mine are entirely at your disposal, and I beg you will come and see Mde de Lafayette as you would act by your brother’s wife. Her knowledge of the country may be of some use to Miss Jefferson whom she will be happy to attend in every thing that may be agreeable to her. Indeed, my Dear Sir, I would be very angry with you, if either you or she, did not consider my house as a second home and Mde de Lafayette is very happy in every opportunity to wait upon Miss Jefferson (Ms, Hanford. October 11, 1784).

LETTERS — February 1781-October 1784

LAFAYETTE TO JEFFERSON

New Windsor, February the 21st, 1781.

Sir,

I Am the More flattered By the Command Which His Excellency General Washington Has Been pleased to intrust me, as independant of the General Good that May be Hoped from this Expedition, it seems to promise an Opportunity to Gratify the High Sense I Have of My personal obligations to the State of Virginia.

I shall from time to time inform your Excellency of the Movements of the Continental detachement that Has Marched from this place—they will be precipitated as Much as I can, and I’ll have the Honor of writing to your Excellency from Philadelphia where I intend to preceed the troops.

Begging Leave to Refer you to the letter of the Commander-in-chief, and to Express the desire I have to be Honored with a line from your Excellency I shall only Add that with the most Ardent zeal to do any thing in my power which May promote the wishes of your Excellency, and with Every sentiment of the Highest Respect I have the Honor to Be,

Your Excellency’s

Most humble and

Most Obedient Servant,

LAFAYETTE.

His Excellency Governor Jefferson. E. r.

JEFFERSON TO LAFAYETTE

Richmond, March 2, 1781{2}.

Sir,

I was two days ago honored with your letter and that of General Washington on the same subject; I immediately transmitted by express the one accompanying it to the commanding officer of the naval force of his Christian Majesty in our bay and took measures for providing pilots. Baron Steuben will communicate to you the arrangements he proposes, which I shall have the pleasure of forwarding with every aid in my power. I hope that when you shall arrive at the point of action every thing will be found in readiness. I think the prospect flattering of lopping off this branch of the British force and of relieving the southern operations by pointing all their efforts to one object only. The relief of this State being the most immediate effect of the enterprize it gives me great pleasure that we shall be so far indebted for it to a nobleman who has already so much endeared himself to the citizens of these States by his past exertions and the very effectual aids he has been the means of procuring them. I have the honor to be with sentiment of the most perfect gratitude and respect, Sir, Your etc...

JEFFERSON TO LAFAYETTE

Richmond, March 8th, 1781{3}.

Sir,

I had the pleasure of receiving last night your letter of the 3rd instant and of learning of your arrival at the Head of Elk three days sooner than General Washington had given us reason to expect. In the mean time I hope you will have received my answer to your first letter which I forwarded by express to the Head of Elk, and, which is of great importance, a letter from Baron Steuben who commands in this State, explaining to you what he proposed.

The number of militia desired by the Baron will be provided, though not quite so early as had been proposed, so that your delays at the Head of Elk, will not produce any inconvenience. Arnold’s retreat is at this time cut off by land. Provisions and arms for the troops are in readiness and the Quartermasters are exerting themselves to get horses. Their exertions are slow and doubtful. Oxen I apprehend must be used in some measure for the artillery. We have no heavy field artillery mounted. Four battering cannons (French 18 pounders) with two 12 inch mortars fall down from this place this evening. Scows I am afraid cannot be used for the transportation of your cannon on the wide waters where the operations will be carried on. We shall endeavor to procure other vessels the best we can. The total destruction of our trade by the enemy has put it out of our power to make any great collection of boats. Some armed vessels of public and some of private property are held in readiness to cooperate, but as they are in James River they cannot venture down till the command of the water is taken from the enemy. Baron Steuben is provided with the most accurate drawings we have of the vicinities of Portsmouth: they are from actual survey of the land, and as to information of the navigation the most authentic will be obtained from the pilots in that neighborhood, ten of the best of which are provided. I shall continue to exert my best endeavors to have in readiness what yet remains to be done, and shall with great pleasure meet your desires on this important business, and see that they be complied with as far as our condition will render practicable. On this and every other occasion I will take the liberty of begging the freest communication with you.

JEFFERSON TO LAFAYETTE

Richmond, March 10th, 1781{4}.

Sir,

Intending that this shall await your arrival in this State I with great joy welcome you on that event. I am induced to from the very great esteem your personal character and the hopes entertained of your relieving us from our enemy within this State. Could any circumstances have rendered your presence more desirable or more necessary it is the unfortunate one which obliges me to enclose the enclosed papers.

I trust that your future acquaintance with the Executive of the State will evince to you that among their faults is not to be counted a want of disposition to second the views of the Commander against our common enemy. We are too much interested in the present scene and have too much at stake to leave a doubt on that head. Mild laws, a people not used to prompt obedience, a want of provisions of war and means