Trireme Olympias: The Final Report

By Boris Rankov

This volume represents the final publication of the Olympias project, which saw the building of a full-scale reconstruction of a 170-oared Athenian trireme of the 4th century BC and its operation in five series of sea-trials in the Aegean Sea. The first three sea-trials in 1987, 1988 and 1990 have already been published in separate volumes (the last two by Oxbow) and this completes the series with reports of the 1992 and 1994 trials. The 1992 report by Paul Lipke of Trireme Trust USA, which collaborated with the Trireme Trust in the operation of the ship, offers an alternative view of the project as a whole from that presented in previous reports. The rest of the volume is devoted to some twenty-six papers presenting more recent research on the trireme, some of them originally presented at a conference held in Oxford and Henley in 1998. One group of papers by Timothy Shaw and John Coates presents the argument for making relatively small adjustments to the hull and oar-system of Olympias , which would enable the crew to generate far more power and so match the performance under oar which is implied by the ancient sources. The papers, therefore show the detailed thinking behind the modifications proposed in the second edition of The Athenian Trireme (2000). Another set of papers offers further critiques of the project, some positive and some sceptical and hostile. A third group investigates aspects of operation and performance under both oar and sail, including slipping and launching, the ancient evidence for speed under oar and physiological aspects of the ship's "human engine". A fourth group looks at aspects of construction and maintenance and a final set of papers presents some of the latest research inspired by the project, including an investigation of the effects of ramming, a reconsideration of the evidence for the dimensions of the ancient trireme and the modelling of battle manoeuvres based on the data produced by the trials of Olympias .

• Language: English
• Publisher: Oxbow Books
• Release date: Jan 31, 2012
• ISBN: 9781842178584

Book preview

Part 1

The 1992 and 1994 Sea Trials and Other Excursions

1. Olympias 1992 Trials Report

Edited by Paul Lipke

Acknowledgements

Paul Lipke

My thanks go to the Hellenic Navy, the entire Olympias trials staff and crew, and particularly to Ben Brungraber, Denis Chagnon, John Coates, Ben Fuller Jr., John Howarth, John Morrison, Seán McGrail, and Ford Weiskittel for their expert advice and support.

Perhaps the most important ‘Lesson Learned’ in the course of the Trireme Project is that such a huge project only moves forward on the patience, determination and support of the families of the participants. It would be impossible to count their hours of clerical and logistical support, waiting, heat prostration and the many meals they lovingly prepared, and that then grew cold while they waited for their trireme-addicted relative. They did all this with the utmost good nature, in support of obscure historical research and their loved ones having a great deal of fun.

Thus the author has special debts of gratitude to pay to Jane Coates, Mary Morrison, Kati Rankov, Ann Roberts, Nan Shaw, Harriot, Elisabeth and Charlotte Weiskittel, and the mostly-unknown-but-very-appreciated families of the rowers with whom I’ve been honoured to work.

These chapters are dedicated to my wife Marcelle Lipke, in deep appreciation of her constant good humour and support through 24 years (and counting) of my fascination with the trireme project.

1.1. Introduction: salvaging value from a failed effort to publish a 1992 Olympias sea trials report

Paul Lipke and Ford Weiskittel

Nearly two decades ago, we were asked to write and edit the 1992 Olympias sea trials report. This remains unfinished due to various complications, other obligations (such as earning a living), and an overly ambitious outline for the work. The envisioned publication was to be written to be valuable to both specialist and non-specialist audiences, and include new data and perspectives in a number of areas.

One advantage of having developed such an expansive outline is that it offers insights into new areas of study. Therefore, in order to advance any future sea trials, historical research, and publications, and to inform readers of some broad concepts worth consideration, below are brief descriptions of the major areas that were to be included in the 1992 report. Some of these topics are considered briefly in the context of other chapters within the publication you have before you.

I. 1992 Aims and performance on the water:

II. The thesis that Olympias’ previously published performance data warrants even further caveats than those presented in the Log Summary (see Chapter 1.2: Some Results of Olympias’ 1992 trials), due primarily to lack of data and errors in performance of the measuring equipment. This makes suspect any interpretations and debates about Olympias’ viability based largely on her top speed. There are many other, far more valid, reasons to value Olympias, her performance and the entire project.

III. Brief commentaries by veteran naval architects and shipwrights who have worked on other historic vessels, replicas and reconstructions. We wanted their insights on how much Olympias design ‘pushes the envelope’ in terms of strength, safety, and hull durability. This proposed chapter was in no way intended to call into question John Coates’ extraordinary work designing Olympias. Rather we sought to provide non-specialists with a relative sense of how extreme Olympias is from an engineering point of view, and how far and in what ways more or less conservative safety and performance standards might affect the design. Could a ‘more risky’ ship gain materially better performance, and in what parts of the ship might the most effective risks be taken?

IV. The evolution of our understanding of the optimum trireme stroke, ‘How to row Olympias’, and how the latter might differ from rowing in a trireme where stroke length is completely unrestricted.

V. The human engine:

VI. Suggested protocols for future trials

1.2. Some results of Olympias’ 1992 trials and log summary

Paul Lipke, Andrew Ruddle and Ford Weiskittel, with assistance from Charles Hirschler

The principal efforts of the 1992 sea trials were to explore operations with a reduced crew, crew performance during longer voyages/hours at the oar, and to improve the accuracy of our speed and position data using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology.

1.2.1 Reduced numbers of crew and crew performance

The oarcrew in 1992 numbered approximately 154 (out of a possible complement of 170) at the start of the trials, and reached a low of 121 on August 8, 1992 (the low numbers resulted in part from a late decision to conduct trials, and therefore a late recruiting effort.) Despite the low numbers, the ship and crew performed well. In fact the reduced 1992 crew rowed better and faster more quickly than the full 1990 crew, especially during the first four training days (this period was followed by a physically demanding voyage leading to cumulative fatigue). Since the 1992 crew was no more fit physically than earlier crews, we believe the improved performance reflects continuing advances in training and coaching methods.

A full hour of non-stop, ‘firm’ rowing showed what a small crew might do under short-term pressure to perform, i.e. in battle. A 156 kilometre (112 nautical mile) voyage to Aegina, Corinth, Salamina and return to Poros tested the small crew’s stamina, especially during an 11-hour, non-stop row into headwinds reaching 20 knots with higher gusts.

During much of this long day the crew rowed in rotations of 40 minutes on, 20 minutes off, the thalamian seats being occupied by those who were resting. In such a headwind it was very important to maintain the ship’s headway (and thereby her heading) while the oarcrew were swapping seats. This was achieved by reducing the time needed to complete a rotation to well under two minutes (sometimes as little as 80 seconds) and/or by keeping the bow or stern rowing while the balance of the crew changed seats and started up again.

1.2.2 Global Positioning System: accuracy of trials data

Researched by Charles Hirschler, written by Paul Lipke

Previous trials relied primarily on a somewhat inaccurate ship’s log for speed measurements (Morrison and Coates 1989, 44–5; Coates, Platis and Shaw 1990, 23–4). Measurements by Dutch log (which involves dropping a buoyant object, such as a wooden block, off the ship’s bow and counting the seconds needed for the vessel’s length to travel past the block.) and timed runs past measured markers on shore were used to develop an adjusting factor which reduced any recorded reading to 89% of the value displayed. It must be said that almost everyone involved lacked confidence in both the log and the adjusting factor. The 1992 results call for further modest adjustments, but overall greatly increased confidence in the data.

In 1992 Global Positioning Systems used signals from 3–7 orbiting satellites to provide highly accurate measurements of position, speed and distance traveled anywhere on the surface of the earth. It must be said here that GPS accuracy claims fuel stiff competition between manufacturers. Furthermore, there are tensions between users, manufacturers and the military because the latter intentionally introduces random error in the signals in the interests of national security. The introduction of error is called ‘selective availability’ and is measured by the Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP).

The manufacturer of the Trimble Ensign hand-held GPS used in the 1992 trials claims in their literature that under the best conditions it will determine your two-dimensional position on the globe to within 10 metres (vertical position accuracy is not considered here since Olympias is always at sea level). When the signals are being degraded, as they have been (until recently) at virtually all times except during the 1990 Gulf War, GPS accuracy is limited to twice this distance, or 20 metres multiplied by the HDOP.

Typical HDOPs during the 1992 trials consisted of:

Lows of 1.4, i.e. accuracy was 20 m x 1.4 = 28 m (92 ft) Highs of around 3.0, i.e. = 60 m (198 ft) For entire outings, the HDOP averaged 2.1, giving an accuracy of 42 m (138 ft).

An average accuracy of ±138 feet of the position displayed seems realistic. Over distances of a few miles or more such an error is small. Over short distances, i.e. for a 2000 metre (1.25 mile) row, assuming an error of up to 42 meters (138 feet) seems reasonable and reduces the usefulness of the GPS for establishing distance traveled.

1.2.3 Speed

Speed resolution is ± one unit of the smallest units displayed per second (i.e. if the GPS displays 5.1 knots, actual speed could be 5.2 or 5.0 knots). Speed readings are more accurate under ‘selective availability’ than position readings because the error factor in the satellites’ signals changes gradually over time. This means the built-in error factor does not affect the speed readings which are based on changes in relative positions taken within a few tenths of a second of each other. One of the major factors that typically has significant negative impact on GPS speed accuracy, i.e. blockage of the signal by buildings, bridges, and mountains is clearly not a problem on the water.

The published maximum speed record of 8.9 knots (Shaw 1993, 43) achieved during the morning outing on 9th August, 1990 deserves some discussion. The figure of 8.9 knots has since been widely published and quoted as Olympias’s top speed. It should be said however, that this run had an average speed of 8.3 knots (adjusted) for the last half of the run with a single reading of 8.9 knots at the very end of the run (Table 1.2.1).

Clearly the 8.9 knot (corrected) reading was not sustained for any appreciable period, whereas the 8.3 knot adjusted average is solid.

In 1992, we sought to get a better sense of the accuracy of the 1990 (and earlier) readings. We received some reassurance, but the peak of 8.9 knots remains a little suspect. For example, the GPS consistently displayed 7.8–7.9 knots for a 2-minute speed run with a reduced oarcrew of about 135. This is consistent with an 8.3 knot average achieved with a full crew in 1990.

The next day, with a reduced crew of 121, a brief peak of 8.2 knots was recorded by the GPS. Given this and other runs with a small crew at speeds well above seven knots, the authors believe a brief peak speed of about 8.5 knots and more sustained speeds of 8.3 knots can be claimed for Olympias with confidence. Given the previous uncertainty about the accuracy of the ship’s log and the correction factors used in 1990, the GPS readings are reassuring.

This lower number is further strengthened by the speeds recorded in 1988 with a laser tracking system called a geodimeter, which showed that a less well-trained crew was capable of producing a burst of 7.9 knots, with most of the acceleration runs producing speeds from 7.3–7.5 knots (Lowry and Squire 1988, 53–60).

1.2.4 Summary of results of the 1992 trials of Olympias

Based on Andrew Ruddle’s log

Note: The early days of each set of trials have always focused primarily on crew training and adjustment. This means getting the international crew understand the command language and process on board, learning to row in unison with 169 other people, moving rowers around the ship to find levels and triads within which they row and mesh well, etc.

Trials day 1: (22/7/92): max speed of 5.8 Nautical Miles/ hour (NM/Hr)

Trials day 2: (23/7/92): max speed of 6.0 NM/Hr

Trials day 3: (24/7/92): max speed of 6.9 NM/Hr, distance covered 6.78 NM

Trials day 4: (25/7/92): max speed of 6.3 NM/Hr

Overview of the Voyage

This was four-day voyage totaling 111.85 NM: 67.8 NM rowing, 7.7 NM rowing/sailing, 24.3 NM sailing; 4.73 NM under tow (through the Corinth Canal). Some long passages were made under oar as a bireme, with rowers pulling in shifts of 40 minutes on, 20 minutes off; rotating rowers between active and inactive seats took well under two minutes. See below for more details.

NB: In the following data set, average speeds were calculated from the time rowing actually started to time rowing stopped. Time waiting for support vessels and other delays are not included.

Table 1.2.1

Trials day 5: Voyage day one (26/7/92):

Poros to Aegina: 15.77 NM in 4 hrs 16 min time overall, an average of 3.7 knots into wind of 10 knots or less.

Trials day 6: Voyage day two (27/7/92):

Aegina to Corinth: 33.06 NM in 11 hrs, 7 min time overall; rowing 28.33 NM in 9 hrs, 38 min into wind (20–50 degrees off starboard bow with the wind speed averaging 20 knots) for an average of 2.9 knots; tow of 4.73 NM through the Corinth canal.

Trials day 7: Voyage day three (28/7/92): rest day

Trials day 8: Voyage day four (29/7/92):

Corinth to Salamina: 30.73 NM in 8 hrs, 55 min overall for an average for the day of 2.3 knots; rowing and row/ sail 20.9 NM (18.7 row and 2.2 row/sail) for 8 hrs and 9 min at an average of 2.56 knots into a 15–20 knot wind 0–35 degrees off the starboard bow and seas of up to 0.75 metre.

Trials day 9: Voyage day five (30/7/92): unplanned rest day

Trials day 10: Voyage day six (31/7/92):

Salamina to Poros: 32.29 NM in 6 hrs, 18 min overall, for an average for the day of 5.1 knots; rowing 5.0 NM in 1 hr 55 min for an average of 2.6 knots in a light wind and a 1-metre swell for approximately 2 NM; sailing 3 hrs 44 min over 21.8 NM for an average of 5.8 knots.

Average speed under oar during voyage:

2.94 knots into a 15–20 knot headwind and seas to 1 metre in height.

Average speed under sail during voyage:

5.8 knots in winds of 7–15 knots for about 2 hrs, and then in winds of 15 to 20 knots for almost two hours.

Trials days 11–12: (1–2/8/92): Rest days

Trials day 13: (3/8/92):

One continuous hour of rowing ‘firm’ at an average of 5.77 knots with a peak of 7.2 knots after 45 minutes; outing maximum of 7.4 knots during 1 min of firm conducted after the hour of firm; hogging measured at 9 cm to starboard and 13 cm to port.

Trials day 14: (4/8/92):

Outing maximum of 6.6 knots in a series of three 10-minute pieces averaging 5.3 knots at rating 34, 6.0 knots at rating 38, 5.5 knots at rating 39.5; max speed in tests of backing down of 5.3 knots with all three levels after turning around in their seats in 10–15 seconds, with rudders held straight.

Trials day 15: (5/8/92) (with 37 empty seats):

Four ‘staircases’ of 10 strokes at each rating of 38/40/ 42/44/46/48 (to train the crew for higher ratings) with averages of 6.3, 6.7, 5.8 and 6.7 knots; backing down exercises with maximums of 2.4 knots with conventional rowing astern, and 3.2 knots with the rowers reversed in their seats; efforts to scull or row the ship sideways were ineffective.

Inconclusive results were also had in an experiment on the effect of unrestricted stroke length by removing thalamians and every other rower in the top two levels. Surplus zygians and thranites stood in the gangway. The results were inconclusive due to sudden wind increases at key times, failure to measure or record any actual increase in stroke length (if any), and lack of data on wind drift of Olympias under various wind speeds and directions with which to calculate corrected speeds. It should also be noted that zygian stoke length is further restricted at the catch in some seats by oar shafts hitting the outrigger brackets, even though the latter have been shaved down to reduce the problem in some cases.

Trials day 16: (6/8/92):

Two speed trials of 2 minutes each, first with both rudders down and a maximum of 7.5 knots about an average of 7.4 knots; then with one rudder hauled out and the other half-immersed, which gave a max of 7.9 knots about an average of 7.9 knots. Turning tests of 1 minute 3 seconds for 180 degrees to port, and a turn to starboard at a full knot faster, which was cut short by an emergency stop.

Trials day 17: (7/8/92):

Four outings were cancelled at the discretion of Capt. Mavrikis, due to on-shore wind and very close mooring of an adjacent cargo ship. This raised questions as to our ability to dock safely if wind strength increased to force 6 (39–49 knots) as forecast. The cancelled outings were the morning outing on Thursday, 6th August, both outings on Friday, 7th August, and the morning outing on Saturday, 8th August. The time ashore was spent completing crew testing of percentage of body fat, 1 and 6 minute ergometer tests, and measurement of optimum stroke length.

Trials day 18: (8/8/92) (with 49 empty seats):

A five-minute piece with a peak of 6.3 knots and an average of 5.9 knots; an 8.2 knot peak at the end of a staircase (of ten strokes per step) averaging 7.5 knots. Turning tests showed that turns taken with an entire inside stern section holding water take 5–10 seconds less but produce drops in speed of 2.5 to 2.9 knots, compared to the drop during those taken without the inside stern rowers holding water of 0.5 to 1 knot.

1.2.5 Sample of the full Log

In the interests of providing readers with the maximum detail and some of the flavour of the trials, the 1992 report was originally to include the minute-by-minute record of each outing or day of the voyage. This proved overly ambitious, as it would involve many hours of transcribing handwritten notes. Here is one short outing’s notes, to give a taste of the material available.

Outing 1: AM Wednesday 22/7/92

NB: ‘easy’ means ‘stop rowing.’

Summary: very first outing, rowing with different bireme configurations, and then whole ship; did one 20 minute piece, one 31 minute piece, and one 27 minute piece, sail assisted.

At pier 2 × single stroke, 2 × 5 strokes; wind negligible

Bibliography

Coates, J. S., Platis, S. K. and Shaw, J. T. (1990) The Trireme Trials 1988. Report on the Anglo Hellenic Sea Trials of Olympias. Oxford, Oxbow Books.

Lowry, I. J. and Squire. T. M. (1988) Trireme Olympias Extended Sea Trials, Poros, 1988. Cardiff, Maritime Dynamics Ltd/Dept. of Maritime Studies, Cardiff University (unpublished)

Morrison, J. S and Coates, J. F. (eds) (1989) An Athenian Trireme Reconstructed. The British Sea Trials of Olympias, 1987. BAR International Series 486. Oxford, Archaeopress.

Shaw, J. T. (ed.) (1993) The Trireme Project. Operational Experience 1987–90. Lessons Learnt. Oxbow Monograph 31. Oxford, Oxbow Books.

Trimble Ensign equipment literature and personal communication between Charles Hirschler and the manufacturer

1.3. Training, section leading and crew leadership 1990 and 1992 sea trials

Paul Lipke

Previous publications have presented observations of Olympias’ rowing masters. Here is the perspective of a member of the trial’s ‘middle management’, the six section leaders, each of whom coaches a team of about 28 rowers. This chapter was originally written as an internal document; to give the reader the flavour of the project; only minimal changes have been made for a broader readership.

1.3.1 Crew management, training and control

In examining the experience of the Trireme Project as it relates to crew command and control in classical times, it is essential to bear in mind some important differences between ancient and modern practice. Classical triremes had a petty officer, a keleustes, who was in charge of the crew under oar. The keleustes was assisted by the bow officer, the prorates, and at least at times, by the piper, the auletes. By contrast, this project has divided the ancient role of the keleustes between a rowing master and six section leaders. As a result, in order to derive from our work any comprehensive picture of the role of the keleustes in ancient times, the work of both the rowing masters and section leaders must be considered.

The project has painfully acquired a body of knowledge which has enabled us to characterize what makes a good keleustes. It is probably fair to say the technical knowledge and skills needed to coach in Olympias are likely to be very similar to those needed by the keleustes of an ancient trireme: rowing terminology, commands and theory, body mechanics, human physical capacity, battle manoeuvres, etc.

The crew management skills might be somewhat different due to substantial and unknowable changes in the psychology of individuals and groups between modern volunteer oarsmen and ancient navies under threat of war. Surprisingly, experience as a coach of eight-oared racing shells or individual athletes does not necessarily constitute good training to be a coach in Olympias. The former tends toward autocracy, the other shows too much for concern for individual rowers.

For modern volunteer trireme crews, the ideal keleustes would probably be:

The rate at which a trireme crew becomes capable of meaningful performance as well as the absolute level of performance reached may be as much a function of the experience of the rowing masters and section leaders as it is the qualities of the crew and the ship. The 1990 and 1992 crews produced statistically identical power, when it was measured collectively by the ship’s performance or totaled from ergometer test results of every crew member. Yet with apparent ease, the 1992 crew averaged nearly six knots in their first piece of rowing ‘firm’ during their very first row in Olympias. By comparison, the 1990 crew took three outings and more visible effort to reach this same speed.

Since the ship’s condition and the percentage of crew members with previous experience were essentially the same between years (as was power output) the difference can only be explained by the improvements in crew training and leadership. As it happened, the 1992 trials enjoyed unusually strong unanimity of technique and philosophy among the section leaders, rowing and trials management. It was also the first year the Trireme Trust (UK) followed the Trireme Trust USA’s example and built a training mock-up for training its portion of the crew.

1.3.2 The training camps

Many publications have discussed the primary importance of oarcrew recruitment and training to the success of classical navies. In particular it is clear that Athenian supremacy at sea was largely the result of constant training (Thucydides 1.142.6–9). Diodorus (13.39.3) says that in preparation for meeting the Athenian fleet in battle, Mindarus spent five days carrying out manoeuveres and training his men.

At the instigation of rowing master Ford Weiskittel, beginning in 1988, the Trireme Trust USA began operating training camps for the 90 or so North American rowers the weekend of departure for Greece. In 1990, nearly half the crew had attended such a training camp, in 1992 there were 54 North American participants. These 2–3 day, intensive programs included:

During the latter, the cooperative, international nature of the enterprise was stressed, as was the need to work within the inevitable personal and national differences in style and commitment. Future training camps should get experienced fixed seat rowers into sliding-seat 4- or 8=oared racing shells in order to reduce their long layback, and improve their timing and finesse.

The training camps have provided insights into crew effectiveness that may be relevant to trireme operations in classical times, and in general stress the importance of shared mental models, rich contextualization and nourishment of a rowing ‘culture’ to optimizing oarcrew effectiveness. Those insights include:

1.3.3 Positive lessons learned in 1992

Contrary to previous trials, the rowing masters and section leaders reached consensus in advance as to the basic components of the stroke, and subsequently taught the same stroke throughout the ship. Problems were addressed in debriefings following virtually every outing. Careful observation of crew problems and brainstorming by rowing masters and section leaders helped enormously.

The coaches were generally more active in addressing problems with seating, personality and technique. Most section leaders actively sought to defuse difficult situations, working closely and confidentially in crew assignments. The importance and effectiveness of these efforts in turning any disruptive individuals or those with particular problems in technique into contributing rowers cannot be overstated.

Section leaders and rowing masters can help rowers enormously if they speak in time with the stroke whenever possible, even when giving general information. Numerous voices of encouragement were heard when this was done.

1.3.4 Increasing stroke length

Stroke length averaged 82–85 cm throughout the ship, a vast improvement over averages of 75 to 77 cm the author observed in much of the crew in 1988. Tw o triads (port 6 and 7) consistently reached 100 cm or more! The author never had the time to measure the equipment at these positions, but believes this large range resulted from fractional differences in oarport size, seat/thole positions and a serendipitous collection of properly sized rowers. These positions might be worth studying in detail in future trials. In many cases triads were prevented from extending their average further not so much by the thalamian beams as by human backs being in the way and/or zygian oars hitting the oarports or outrigger brackets at the catch.

When rowing space was limited by the back of the person immediately sternward, it could often be increased through careful adjustment of the foot stretchers of the three or four rowers immediately towards the stern. The problem could often be traced to a rower sitting in an ‘unfamiliar’ seat two or three slots down who had not bothered to adjust the stretcher, particularly if this rower was of noticeably different stature than the slot’s regular occupant. If the limits of stretcher adjustment were reached, the rower could be told to sit further forward or aft on the seat. Similarly, if a rower was generally too long-legged or deep in the chest for the ship, the ‘damage’ to stroke length and rowing comfort could be minimized if the slots immediately either side of this person were filled with smaller-than-average rowers.

Many zygian rowers found their stroke limited by their oarshaft hitting the oarport and stretcher rail. The problem is related to where a rower sits relative to his or her ‘room.’ To date, rowers have been left to sit as they please, with the result that some rowers sit relatively far back, giving themselves more comfort in greater extension at the catch. Others sit farther forward in order to give those behind them more room. The author has not yet had the time to explore where within the ‘room’ the optimum position is, but suspects there is an optimum location, and that greater consistency throughout the ship might help iron out some stroke length, comfort and power limitations. In any case the matter deserves attention in any future trials and in the design of Mark II.

1.3.5 Some negative lessons learned in 1992

The section leaders were encouraged to row as much as the seating plan allowed. While this had many benefits, in some cases section leaders virtually joined the ranks of oarsmen without setting up substitute coaches, so that sections were left without effective leadership. This, combined with slack coaching during the long voyages, meant:

Future trials can correct this and increase the number of people with experience of coaching in Olympias by assigning assistant section leaders. In the smaller port and starboard sections forward of the boatmast, one coach and an assistant are probably all that are needed to cover both sides after the first week. The extra section leader and assistant could then move aft to help other sections.

The workload on the rowing masters (and the possibility of having to try and run a set of trials without an experienced rowing master) should be reduced by having more people trained in this position. It is a significant failing that to my knowledge the experienced rowing masters have not written up in detail the process and techniques used to ‘master’ the ship. From observation and their vociferous comments, it is apparent there is a lot to this process!

The author considers it remarkable (and does not wish to push the odds) that the project has had so few injuries to date, especially given that rowers are not required to stretch and warm up properly before each outing. There should be organized stretching sessions before each outing. The Chief Medical Officer should probably not have regular rowing duties (though some who have filled that slot would doubtless refuse to participate in the trials at all if this were enforced), and should double as a safety officer.

1.3.6 Minimizing delays

Section leaders and their teams need to learn to be flexible in rowing with some triads out of action, even temporarily. Valuable time was wasted with the entire ship waiting for one or two rowers with equipment or other delays.

In many cases, the triads in the immediate vicinity of the problem can wait or row short ‘air shots’ (i.e. going through the motions of rowing a very short stroke with the blade in the air so as to maintain pacing and keep the torso out of the way of the next rower towards the bow) until the problem is solved, then fall in and complete the piece. Section leaders need to have a sense of how long repairs, etc. should take if they are to make spot decisions.

Rather than have only ready or not ready as possible responses to the command query, Are you ready? (to start rowing), a third option such as, two out and ready (meaning two triads out, but otherwise go ahead) would effectively both reduce the waste and apprise the rowing masters of the situation. It is hard to believe that as a practical matter the classical Athenians would wait for every last seat to be ready when they were rowing day in and day out.

If team leaders managed their own rotations, spares and the filling of empty seats, the rowing masters would not have to stay up late at night handling such details, and the crew management would be more attuned to the particulars of the situation.

For example, two rowers of the same triad fell asleep on the beach one night and came in to the Hellenic Navy base where the training camp was held at 4:55 a.m. (they were neither drunk nor amorously entangled!). They made an effort to get up on time and row hard that same morning, but the rowing masters, not knowing their effort and seeing the hour at which they came on base, rotated this triad out the following day as part of the standard disciplinary procedures. By contrast, two members of another triad spent the entire night drinking, came in at 0700, failed to show up to row that morning, and got of without any discipline what so ever. To say the first pair were angry is an understatement.

1.3.7 Points on section leading

Some section leaders held a quick debriefing with their team after every outing: addressing questions, reviewing progress, hearing complaints/suggestions and generally making themselves available. As a section leader, the author found the comments voiced at these sessions extremely productive and helpful. This author recommends the rowing masters, trials officer etc. make a practice of attending these debriefings on a rotating basis; it is a ready source of ideas and observations.

Crew members from teams who did not have leaders following this practice complained on occasion, or addressed section leaders from other parts of the ship asking them to communicate certain points to their section. This particular section leader was then in an awkward position as to whether to talk with the section or transmit the request to the proper section leader. Holding such meetings should be a requirement of all section leaders; if there are no issues to address on a given day, the meeting can be immediately adjourned.

New section leaders should be instructed that it is not always easy to properly interpret what you can see from the gangway, i.e. the actions of the oar handles, in a way that always corrects problems with what is happening to the blades in the water. From the gangway, you cannot see the blades in the water. If you climb up on the canopy to observe the blades of a triad that was having difficulty, you disappear and become less accessible to other rowers in the section. From atop the canopy the section leader cannot see the thalamians or zygians in the triads with the problem, nor can you communicate easily with anyone but a thranite.

The only place a section leader can observe both the blades in the water and all the rowers guiding them is from a crouching position on the outrigger. From this position there is the risk of falling into the forest of moving oar shafts. While in this position, you must also avoid cramping the stroke of any adjacent thranites. Even from such a spot, communication with a zygian or thalamian usually meant relaying instructions through the thranite of the triad. While this author never felt endangered while crouched on the outrigger, it would be wise in Mark II to install a rail or line at the canopy edge which section leaders can use to attached a short safety line and snap ring when they need to be out on the outrigger.

1.3.8 Rowing in the bow

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the use of the bow as ‘the place for poor rowers’ is counterproductive. If anything, the bow should have some of the strongest oarsmen. First and foremost, the bow has the only ‘clean’ water in the ship and therefore has the potential of providing the most power as rated by seat. Rowers from the middle and stern sections (including section leader and one-time rowing master Corny Foster) observed upon moving forward that rowing in the bow was more work. Several said they could apply more power, or the same power through a greater part of the stroke. They perceived the difference as reduced slip and/or reduced tendency of the oar blade to be carried quickly aft (before they could apply power) by the slipstream.

The absence of zygians and/or thalamian beams in the very bow means the first six rowers can have longer, less restricted strokes than any rowers except those in the sternmost positions. Powerful rowers could be very effective in these seats.

The bow is isolated from the stern (i.e. command) by distance and the obstructing masts. A rowing master should be aware that what is happening in the stern sections immediately in front of him/her may not be indicative of what is happening (or the effort being made or effectiveness) in the bow. Negative statements and practices serve to further isolate the bow and reduce its effectiveness.

Tests should be conducted to assess the effectiveness of these positions and the applicability of the racing eight ‘engine room’ theory by swapping sections. Such tests should be conducted before rowers have developed too strong an affinity for a particular seat or part of the ship.

The bow Triad 1 and 2 thalamians were allowed to develop longer strokes and their own rotations. They also had their own emergency escape procedures in the absence of an escape hatch. Bow-triad 1 thalamians had to slowly and carefully climb forward over gear, oar shafts and the hypozoma (the ship’s steel cable hogging truss) in order to reach the slot at the very end of the gangway. The Triad 3 and Triad 4 port and starboard thalamians taught their zygians to vacate quickly and climbed out (with difficulty) through their slot. Following a swamping (however unlikely) a simple length of pipe or hose with a mouthpiece could save the lives of these rowers.

In general, the foredeck needs to be stronger. It needs to be stronger to handle the impact of crew members handling lines and jumping down to it from the canopy, as often happened. It also needs to be re-designed to give zygians and thalamians more air and elbow room, and if thalamians are still underneath it, should have an escape