The Seleucid Army of Antiochus the Great: Weapons, Armour and Tactics

By Jean Charl Du Plessis and Michael J. Taylor

An in-depth study of the ancient Greek ruler’s military might, covering the organization of soldiers, weaponry, armor, tactics, and more.

The Seleucid Empire was a Hellenistic superpower, the largest and most powerful of the Successor States, and its army was central to the maintenance of that power. Antiochus III engaged in military campaigns from the Mediterranean to India with a rate of success that earned him the sobriquet ‘the Great’.

In this authoritative work, Jean C. Du Plessis presents an enlightening analysis of the troop types, weapons, and armor of Antiochus’ army. He combines the latest historical research and archaeological evidence with reconstructive archaeology—in which weapons and equipment are reconstructed for modern testing.

Du Plessis covers the core Hellenistic-style army as well as mercenaries and auxiliaries. Weapons and armor are discussed in detail, including terror weapons such as elephants and scythed chariots. He also examines the army’s performance in its many battles, sieges, and campaigns.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Apr 6, 2022
• ISBN: 9781399091800

Book preview

The Seleucid Army of

Antiochus the Great

To my wife, the flower of my life.

The Seleucid Army of

Antiochus the Great

Weapons, Armour and Tactics

Jean Charl Du Plessis

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by

Pen & Sword Military

An imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

Yorkshire – Philadelphia

Copyright © Jean Charl Du Plessis 2022

ISBN 978 1 39909 179 4

eISBN 978 1 39909 180 0

Mobi ISBN 978 1 39909 180 0

The right of Jean Charl Du Plessis to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Foreword

Introduction

Part I: The Regular Army

Chapter 1The Regular Infantry

1.1The ‘Macedonian’ Phalanx and its Sarissophoroi

1.1.1The Sarissa

1.1.2The Peltē

1.1.3Armour

1.1.4Makhaira

1.1.5The Phalanx at War

1.2The Argyraspides (Silver-Shields)

1.2.1Arms and Armour of the Argyraspides

1.2.2The Argyraspides at War

1.3Conclusion on the Regular Infantry

Chapter 2The Synaspismos and its Possibility in the Macedonian-Styled Phalanx

2.1Synaspismos Formation

2.1.1The Synaspismos in Literary Sources

2.1.2The Modern Opposition to the Synaspismos

2.1.3The Problems of the Synaspismos Formation

2.2The Elevation of the Sarissa

2.3Experimental Archaeology in support of the Synaspismos and the High Guard

2.4Conclusion

Chapter 3The Regular Cavalry

3.1The Guard Cavalry

3.1.1The Arms and Armour

3.1.2The hetairoi and agēma at War

3.2Citizen Cavalry

3.2.1Xystophoroi and Lonchophoroi

3.2.2Cataphract Reforms

3.3Conclusion

Part II: The Auxiliary Forces at Raphia

Chapter 4The Auxiliary Forces at Raphia

The Seleucid Right Wing

4.1Cretan Mercenaries

4.1.1Arms and Armour

4.1.2The Cretans at War

4.2The Mercenaries from Greece

4.2.1Arms and Armour

4.2.2The Thureophoroi at War

4.3Daae, Carmanians, and Cilicians

4.3.1Arms and Armour

The Seleucid Left Wing

4.4Cardacian and Lydian Akontistai

4.4.1Arms and Armour

4.5Persians, Agrianians and Thracians

4.5.1Arms and Armour

4.6Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians

4.6.1Arms and Armour

4.7The Arabs

4.7.1Arms and Armour

4.7.2The Arabs at War

4.8The Auxiliary Troops at War

Chapter 5The Auxiliary Forces at Magnesia

The Seleucid Right Wing

5.1The Galatian Infantry

5.1.1Galatian Arms and Armour

5.1.2Galatians at War

5.2Daae Horse Archers

5.2.1Arms and Armour

5.2.2Daae at War

5.3Tralles

5.3.1Arms and Armour

5.3.2Tralles at War

5.4Mysian Archers

5.4.1Arms and Armour

5.4.2Mysians at War

5.5Cyrtians and Elymaeans

5.5.1Arms and Armour

5.5.2Cyrtians and Elymaeans at War

The Seleucid Left Wing

5.6Cappadocians

5.6.1Arms and Armour

5.6.2Cappadocians at War

5.7Mixed Auxiliaries

5.8Arabian Camel Archers

5.8.1Arms and Armour

5.8.2Arabian Camel Riders at War

5.9Gallo-Graecian Horsemen

5.9.1Arms and Armour

5.9.2Galatians Horsemen at War

5.10 Carians and Cilicians

5.10.1Arms and Armour

5.10.2Carians and Cilicians at War

5.11 Caetrati – Pisidians, Pamphylians and Lycians

5.11.1Arms and Armour

5.11.2Caetrati at War

5.12 Conclusion

Chapter 6The Increased Abilities of the Akontistai with the Akontion Javelin, through the use of the Ankylē Throwing Strap

6.1The Ankylē / Amentum

6.1.1The Ankylē / Amentum in War

6.2Experimental Archaeology

6.2.1Method

6.3Conclusion

Chapter 7Trauma Wounds and Damage Potential from Ancient Slingshot

7.1Slings and Slingshot

7.2The Sling in War

7.3Experimental Archaeology

7.3.1Materials and Methods

7.3.2Calculating the Severity of the Injury though Blunt Criterion (BC) and Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)

7.3.3Anatomical Study of impact of sling projectiles upon Porcine Head and Soft Tissue

7.3.4Projectile Impact upon Armour

7.4Conclusion

Part III: Terror Weapons

Chapter 8Elephants and Scythed Chariots

8.1Elephants

8.1.1Arms and Armour

8.1.2Elephants at War

8.2Scythed Chariots

8.2.1Arms and Armour

8.2.2Chariots at War

8.3Conclusion on the Terror Weapons

Part IV: Battle Assessment

Chapter 9Battle Case Studies

9.1The Battle against Molon

9.2The Battle of Raphia

9.3The Battle of Mount Labus

9.4The Battle of Arius River

9.5The Battle of Panion

9.6The Battle of Thermopylae

9.7The Battle of Magnesia

9.8Conclusion

Chapter 10Assessment of Antiochus’ Armies

Chapter 11Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Acknowledgments

My eternal gratitude to Professor John Hilton from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. I am grateful for his guidance and support throughout the process of writing my PhD thesis, which was published as this book. His knowledge and expertise were invaluable to say the least. He has taught me a lot about analysing and writing history. It was both an honour and a pleasure to have him at my side whilst taking on the PhD.

To Professor De Souza from University College Dublin, who was instrumental in defining the topic and in laying the foundation for my work. He has a wealth of knowledge on ancient military affairs and brought great clarity and structure to my ideas and thoughts. I am greatly thankful for his kindness and his support.

I am also deeply grateful for the National Research Fund (NRF) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) scholarship, which gave me the means to follow my passion and dreams and made it possible to pursue a PhD in Ancient History. It was an honour to be a recipient of the scholarship and I have a deep appreciation for the opportunity I was awarded, one I will forever treasure. Again, this book would not have been possible without their aid.

A special thank you to my editor Philip Sidnell and everyone at Pen & Sword whose hard work and efforts bring all the wonderful history books into existence, including mine.

Lastly, I want to thank my family and friends. To my amazing wife for her continuous support, her positive attitude, encouraging spirit and spending time with our wonderful children when I needed to write. To my mother who always encouraged my passion for history and her assistance in innumerable small things, which freed up time to devote to writing. To Kathy Fielding for her unwavering support on so many levels and her and David Butler’s painstaking task of editing my work. To my wonderful children for obliging me to take compulsory breaks to play outside and constantly reminding me of the beautiful world beyond the confines of an office.

Foreword

The Seleucid kingdom was the largest and perhaps the most dynamic of all the successor dynasties that emerged following the death of Alexander the Great. Seleucus I Nicator (‘the Victor’) managed to improbably parlay his small satrapy in Babylon, which he reclaimed in 312

BC

, into a vast domain that stretched from Anatolia to the Hindu Kush. While the kingdom’s boundaries fluctuated, at times wildly, throughout its history, it retained its basic scope into the mid-second century

BC

. The span of the empire encompassed vast ethnic diversity. Although Seleucid kings granted land to Greco-Macedonian colonists, generally in exchange for military service and established an archipelago of Greek cities through their territory, most of their subjects were native populations who had previously lived under the Achaemenid Empire: Greeks and Jews, Babylonians and Assyrians, Medes and Persians, Phrygians and Lydians, Parthians and Bactrians, and many others.

The Seleucid army was one of the great military institutions of antiquity, whose actions in the field are documented in the works of Polybius and Livy. The largest attested field army, at the Battle of Magnesia in 190

BC

, consisted of 72,000 soldiers, and many thousands more likely remained on garrison duty at strong points throughout the empire. Seleucid kings’ right to rule rested heavily on the notion that they lorded over ‘spear-won land’, and their grip on power depended upon their ability to successfully command their forces.

The Seleucid army was a highly diverse force, centered around a core of Macedonian style troops, the infantry fighting in a dense pike phalanx, supported by heavy cavalry. This cadre was supplemented by a wide array of troops, some Seleucid subject peoples fighting in their native styles, others foreign mercenaries, often hired for their specialized capabilities. The Seleucid kings also maintained special, highly intimidating assets: scythed chariots and war elephants, the latter serving as an icon for the kingdom itself.

This tactical diversity was both a strength and weakness, a strength in that the varied weapons, equipment and fighting styles gave Seleucid kings and commanders a wide array of capacities to bring to bear against the enemy. They were a liability in that the complexity of the Seleucid array made it potentially difficult to adequately coordinate and control in battle. At best, Seleucid armies were lethal combined arms forces. At worst – including at the disastrous defeat at Magnesia – over-complicated battleplans collapsed into chaos.

To lead such armies, Seleucid kings and their officers needed an excellent understanding of the weapons carried by their soldiers, the armor that protected them, their tactical deployment, and how they might interact with other troop types. Thus, the great value of the book before you, examining the weapons, armour, tactics and capabilities of different elements in the Seleucid army, from phalangites to cataphracts to slingers, and in the final chapter considering how these different aspects came together on the field of battle. It has been over forty-five years since Bezalel Bar Kochva’s The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns (Cambridge, 1976), still a classic work but one which rested largely upon the literary sources. Jean Charl Du Plessis’ integration of archaeological evidence, including the results of recent experimental archaeology, offers a welcome new perspective on this ancient fighting force.

Michael J. Taylor, December 2021

Assistant Professor of History, University at Albany, SUNY

Introduction

…an innumerable mass of cavalry was crossing the Hellespont… the cavalry force alone could overwhelm the massed armies of Europe… bodies of infantry many times as numerous… with names they had hardly ever heard of – Dahae, Medes, Elymaeans and Cadusii. The naval forces were such as no harbours in Greece could hold.¹

The Seleucid ambassador in the quotation above paints a frightening picture of the inexorable military power of Antiochus III to the Aetolian assembly. While these words were exaggerations filled

with the rhetoric of propaganda, they were a far cry from empty and hollow. Antiochus the Great ruled over a vast empire which at its height had a foothold in Thrace (modern-day Bulgaria) in the west and shared a border with distant India in the east (see fig. 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Map of the extent of the Seleucid Empire at the start of Antiochus III’s reign. (Author’s personal collection)

Figure 2. Map of the Seleucid Empire at its greatest extent under Antiochus III’s reign. (Author’s personal collection)

By the time Antiochus III inherited the throne, the Seleucid empire, plagued by political infighting and revolts, was crumbling around him. Setting out to restore his kingdom to its former extent from Thrace in the west to the River Indus in the east, Antiochus was opposed by numerous enemies whose armies and cultures were as diverse as the lands he ruled. At the heart of the king’s ambition stood the Seleucid armies, the tools with which the king set out to restore his kingdom to its former glory. With a seemingly inexhaustible source of manpower, the Seleucid monarch fielded some of the most diverse and largest armies of the Hellenistic period. As the historian Livy put it: The king’s line was more chequered with troops of many nations, dissimilar both in their persons and armour.² Macedonian styled phalangites, wielding monstrous pikes, marched alongside specialised mercenaries, conscripted vassals, and allied peoples of countless ethnicities from across the vast empire. Heavily armoured lancers mounted upon equally heavily armoured steeds and swift nomadic horse archers, took the field alongside powerful war elephants and terrifying scythed-chariots. These diverse Seleucid armies of Antiochus III crushed rebel forces in Anatolia and Mesopotamia, campaigned in the mountains of Armenia, humbled the breakaway kingdoms of Parthia and Bactria, marched all the way to India, the very fringes of Hellenism, broke the power of mighty Ptolemaic Egypt and vanquished the wild Thracian tribes in what is now known as modern-day Bulgaria. Antiochus’ eastern campaigns were so successful that he was given the title ‘the Great’, making him the only other Greek monarch to bear the title after Alexander. In 192

BC

the king attempted to bring Greece into the Seleucid fold, putting him at odds with the mighty Roman Republic. But not even the immense manpower and diverse troop types of the Seleucids could overcome the legions of Rome. After two devastating defeats, Antiochus had to sign a humiliating peace treaty and pay an immense war indemnity. Nevertheless, even after being defeated by Rome, the empire Antiochus left to his successor was far larger, wealthier, and more stable than the one he inherited.

The vast expanses of the landmass ruled over by the Seleucids meant the empire was culturally and ethnically extremely diverse. Being the largest of Alexander’s Successor States, it had an enormous source of manpower from which to draw upon in times of war. Numerous Greco-Macedonian military colonies founded by Alexander, the Diadochi, and their successors, dotted the landscape from Asia Minor all the way to the fringes of Hellenism in Bactria.³ But Seleucid manpower stretched far beyond these ‘Hellenistic’ military settlements. As Sherwin-White and Kuhrt and others point out, the Seleucids, following in the Achaemenid pattern, were more than willing to exploit the cultural and ethnic diversity of their empire by fielding ‘non-Greeks’ and other people from the orient in their armies, and in doing so, not only increased their own numbers but expanded upon the diversity and specialization of their military forces.⁴ Bar-Kochva (1976: 1) recognized this ‘heterogeneity and nationality’ as one of the distinguishing features of the Seleucid army. The Seleucids, having inherited the majority of Alexander’s eastern conquests, inherited along with it the vast amounts of wealth derived from tribute, providing the Seleucid kings with deeper coffers than most, a very important element in warfare as armies consumed large quantities of state income. These factors were at the very essence of Bar-Kochva’s statement that the Seleucid army was ‘quantitatively and qualitatively’ superior when compared to the other Hellenistic militaries.⁵

The Seleucid Empire was unique among the Successor States, being the heir to both Alexander and the Achaemenids, and became the culmination of Hellenistic and Eastern institutions. This duality reflected in its military as well.⁶ As a true Successor State, the core of the Seleucid army was modelled on that of Alexander the Great, and a distinct symmetrical pattern of military progression can be seen among the Hellenistic States. The Seleucids, Antigonids, and Ptolemies, and indeed many other smaller Hellenistic states who wished to compete upon the political stage, all adopted the same blueprint, so to speak, when building their armies.⁷ All the components essentially remained the same; it was merely the number and ethnicity of soldiers and the manner of recruitment that differed.⁸ This ‘standardization’ of Hellenistic warfare is evident in the way modern scholars deal with warfare of the period. Most scholars deal with the way the Hellenistic states waged war as a whole, making very little differentiation between the various states.⁹ Even the ancient sources take the same approach, with military terminology, troop types, and military descriptions among the Hellenistic states being interchangeable. The three military tactical manuals of Asclepiodotus, Aelian, and Arrian, which have survived the ravages of time and were passed down to us more or less intact, all deal with the basic components of Hellenistic warfare and, as with the modern scholars, make no distinction between the various states in their description.

This Hellenistic army, however, modelled on that of Alexander’s, only formed about half of the Seleucid battle strength in major battles. The other half was filled with indigenous people of the areas under Seleucid sway, and allies from the vast expanses of the Seleucid Empire and the various forms of contracted mercenary troops. The Seleucid Army can thus be roughly divided into two main components: the first part was the Hellenistic army or the ‘Regulars’, as Bar-Kochva dubbed them, which followed the same development pattern as the rest of the Hellenistic states and were almost exclusively drawn from the military settlers and their descendants; the second part consisted of the various auxiliary forces of satrapal levies, mercenaries, and allied peoples.¹⁰ This book will approach these distinctions in the armed forces in a very similar way to Bar-Kochva, deeming this the most logical and fitting approach when studying the Seleucid Army.¹¹ The term ‘Auxiliary Forces’ will be used, rather than Bar-Kochva’s term ‘Native Contingent’, as I have chosen to focus on their collective function, rather than their ethnicity.¹² The reason for this is that the distinction between these two components was not exact and there were several grey areas and overlaps regarding ethnicity; there were Iranian horsemen as part of the king’s guard and these formed part of the ‘Regulars’. Some military settlers, such as the Agrianians and Thracians who retained their ethnic armament, functioned more as auxiliaries rather than as part of the ‘Hellenistic’ forces or ‘Regulars’, even though they were classified as military settlers.¹³ Then there were other ‘native’ indigenous elements, such as ‘Diaspora’ Jews, who held the status of military settlers.¹⁴ Certain mercenaries were of Hellenic stock such as the Cretans, and were almost always part of the Hellenistic or Regular army of nearly every Hellenistic state but played a supportive or auxiliary role on the battlefield. Even the ethnicity of the Greco-Macedonian military settlers is questioned by some modern scholars.¹⁵ The two main components are thus better defined by their function, rather than their ethnicity.

The purpose of this book is to examine these two main components of the Seleucid army and elucidate how the various troop types of Antiochus III operated on the Hellenistic battlefield. The book determines the exact function of these troops by assessing their arms and armour through a thorough analysis of the archaeological, iconographical, epigraphical, and literary evidence, supported by a critical evaluation of modern scholarship on the armies of Antiochus III.

This book deals with the Seleucid army in four separate parts. Part One deals with the ‘Regular Army’, Part Two with the ‘Auxiliary Forces’, and Part Three with the ‘Terror Weapons’ deployed by the Seleucids. These chapters will examine the various individual units and their arms and armour, as well as determine the factors which dictated their deployment. Finally, Part Four examines the battles fought by the Seleucid armies of Antiochus III and makes an overall assessment of the army.

Chapter 1 of the ‘Regular Army’ and Chapter 4 and 5 of the ‘Auxiliary Forces’ are each followed by a chapter of experimental archaeology. Through this field of study archaeological and historical hypotheses are explored in a very practical way, by recreating equipment and structures based on material remains of artefacts and ancient literary accounts. Experimental archaeology complements the ancient literary sources through the recreation or actualization of the past and brings to life the words of historical literature. The visual representations and practical understanding which experimental archaeology brings, gives a deeper appreciation for the past. The experimental archaeology chapters each explore a specific element in the Seleucid armies of Antiochus III. Chapter 2 explores the heavy infantry of the Hellenistic phalanx which was the flower of the Seleucid army. It examines the possibility of the synaspismos or ‘interlocking shields’ formation, which has been highly criticized by modern scholars and, through the experimentation, suggests an alternative view of how these troops wielded their sarissa pikes. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with two elements of light infantry, javelin men and slingers. Chapter 6 examines how much more effective the akōn javelin was when thrown with the ankylē throwing strap, while Chapter 7 deals with the trauma wounds and damage potential of slings and why the sling was described by some ancient sources as the ‘deadliest’ of range weapons.

Warfare played such a central role in ancient societies and, more often than not, formed the foundation which these societies were built upon. Wars and conflicts were extremely frequent in the Hellenistic era and continuously shaped and moulded the world in which people lived. In the words of Fagan and Trundle (2010: 1): ‘Organized violence was a phenomenon that united communities and consumed their resources like no other.’

Part I

The Regular Army

The regular army can be defined as consisting of the core troops which the king would muster whenever he set out on campaign. They were thus present at almost every major conflict fought by the Seleucids and the composition of the regular troops was thus very consistent from battle to battle. As mentioned above, the regular army was based on the Hellenistic model and had its foundation in the armies of Alexander the Great. ¹ These troops were predominantly recruited from the ‘Macedonian’ settlers and their descendants. ² The exact method of conscriptions of the ‘Macedonians’ is unfortunately far from clear and is a much-disputed topic amongst modern scholars. Bar-Kochva, Adams and Taylor support the award of klēros or land plots in exchange for military service, similar to that of Egypt, while others such as Bickerman oppose this theory. ³ Sekunda again argues that military conscription was connected to the term ‘Macedonian’, which reflected a certain legal status of citizenship rather than ethnicity, and in turn for the legal and fiscal privileges of being a ‘Macedonian’, men were obliged to serve in the Seleucid military. ⁴ While the conscription and recruitment of the regular troops is not certain, it is beyond the scope of this book, the aim of which is to interpret the composition of the troop types, their arms and their tactics and function on the battlefield and on campaign.

Chapter 1

The Regular Infantry

1.1 The ‘Macedonian’ Phalanx and its Sarissophoroi

…admiring the firmness of the serried ranks, and the bristling rampart of outstretched pikes, he was smitten at once with astonishment and terror, as if he had never seen so fearful a spectacle…¹

The heavy infantryman of the phalanx, as in the Classical period, still dominated the battlefields of the Hellenistic era and this did not differ with the Seleucids. The backbone of the Seleucid Army, throughout the Empire’s long history, remained the phalanx. It was by far the largest component in the Seleucid armed forces and, in the large open field battle, was the lynch-pin around which the other forces operated. ² The phalanx was however more than just a weapon for the Seleucid king to wield. Its members, being the descendants of the military settler class and thus the citizen soldiers of the Seleucid state, formed the foundation upon which the king’s authority was based. ³ They were thus the political tool which the Seleucid monarch relied upon to solidify and enforce his position in a world where he was essentially perceived as a ‘foreign king’ by the majority of his subjects, and who ruled over a vast territorial empire of a complex variety of ethnicities to solidify and enforce his position. ⁴ Bar-Kochva states that the phalanx gave the Seleucid kings the means to rule over the many ethnicities of the East, since they had no military answer to it, while Taylor enforces the importance of the phalanx by saying ‘without it, the Seleucid Empire would simply cease to exist’. ⁵ The phalanx was thus the most important component of the Seleucid military on and off the battlefield. The importance and reliance of the phalanx on the battlefield can be seen from Polybius’ account of the Battle of Raphia, where Antiochus III, even though outnumbered by the enemy’s phalanx, still placed his hopes of victory upon his own phalanx. ⁶ At Magnesia, Livy describes Antiochus’ sarissophoroi as the ‘main strength of his arm’, while Appian states that of the 70,000 soldiers ‘the strongest of these was the Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men, still arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Philip’. ⁷

While the Seleucid phalanx was the most important component of the Seleucid military, and the phalanx body can be regarded as a professional corps in the sense that it was a highly trained and skilled military force, its members were not professional soldiers in the modern sense. Soldiery in the Hellenistic age was not necessarily exclusive, and the members of the phalanx had different occupations in times of peace. The citizen soldiers of the phalanx were mobilized in times of war and again disbanded when the campaign came to an end.⁸ Members of the phalanx were drawn largely from the major urban centres throughout Syria and adjacent Mesopotamia, which formed the heartland of the empire, and to a lesser extent from the Iranian plateau in the East and Anatolia in the West. Situating the bulk of the Empire’s military potential around Syria and Mesopotamia was a strategic defensive policy that allowed for rapid mustering and mobilization in times of need. Bar-Kochva’s study of the military output of these urban centres of Syria and Mesopotamia gives manpower at 25,000 men (this excludes the argyraspides).⁹ This corresponds well with Polybius’ account of the Battle of Raphia (217

BC

) which states that the Seleucid phalanx was 20,000 strong. Anatolia at the time was cut off from recruitment by Achaeus’ revolt and the mutiny of the 6,000 Cyrrhesteans in Northern Syria was not yet suppressed.¹⁰ If we are to assume that the Median satrapy, only recently recovered from the rebellion of Molon (221

BC

), did not take part in the Fourth Syrian War, the Syro-Mesopotamian manpower of the phalanx matches that of the phalanx at Raphia.¹¹ We are told by Polybius that the rebel soldiers were indeed sent home after their defeat, but whether they were re-mustered for the Raphia campaign is not known.¹² There are two possible reasons for them not to be included in the Raphia campaign: it is likely that they could not yet fully be trusted as they had very recently revolted against their king, and secondly, it would have been unwise to withdraw them from an already hostile border where two satrapies, Bactria and Parthia, had already rebelled and were creating empires of their own.

Even though the ‘Macedonian’ phalanx had played the most dominant role on the battlefield, Hellenistic phalanx warfare is not clearly understood, especially with regard to the arms and armour of the sarissophoroi soldier, with archaeological evidence and literary evidence often seemingly at odds with one another, leaving most modern scholars with conflicting views.¹³ Even the origin of the Hellenistic pike phalanx is a fiercely debated topic. While most scholars attribute the invention of the phalanx to Philip II of Macedon, there are still several other candidates for the creation of the pike phalanx (including Alexander the Great).¹⁴ More recent scholarship has moved beyond Macedon as the inventor of the pike phalanx, turning further south and to an earlier date, and attributes it to the reforms of Iphicrates in 374

BC

.¹⁵ While the pike phalanx might have originated in Greece proper, it is with its adoption by Macedon that it became the dominant manner of warfare, especially under Philip II and his son Alexander the Great, who bent the Greek states to their will and finally conquered the Achaemenid Persian Empire. The new ‘Macedonian’ phalanx differed in some fundamental aspects with regard to the ‘Classical’ Greek hoplite. Essentially the old heavy and large aspis shield was replaced with a smaller and lighter peltē, and the doru spear was now replaced with a much longer two-handed pike, the sarissa. It was upon this foundation that the Seleucid phalanx was built.

1.1.1 The Sarissa

The Length

By the time of Antiochus III, the ‘Macedonian’ phalanx itself underwent changes of its own. This is as much as modern scholars agree upon. The main offensive weapon of the Seleucid phalanx was still the two-handed pike called the sarissa. The length however changed and the sarissa in the third century

BC

became even more monstrous than in the time of Alexander. Throughout the Hellenistic period, literary evidence indicates that generals experimented with different lengths of the sarissae.¹⁶ The length of the sarissa has been a complex problem and a ‘well-known difficulty’ as stated by Tarn as early as the beginning of the 20th century.¹⁷ The earliest mention of the length of the sarissa comes from Theophrastus, who wrote just after the death of Alexander (322

BC

). He states: ‘The height of the male tree (cornel-wood tree / wild cherry) is almost 12 cubits, the length of the longest sarissa …’.¹⁸

Since Theophrastus wrote at the time of Alexander, we may assume that the sarissa at the time was 12 cubits at its maximum length. It is important to note that since he gives 12 cubits as the length of the ‘longest sarissa’, there must have been other sarissae with shorter lengths. Asclepiodotus writing at the end of the first century

BC

states that the sarissa should be ‘no shorter than 10 pēcheis (the pēcheis was another term for cubit) so that the part that projects forward of the line is no less than eight pēcheis’.¹⁹

This ‘10 cubit sarissa’ might account for the shorter version of the sarissa of Theophrastus. Asclepiodotus continues by saying: ‘In no case, however, is the weapon longer than 12 pēcheis so as to project 10 pēcheis.’²⁰ Asclepiodotus’ 12 pēcheis / cubits is the same maximum length as Theophrastus’ ‘longest’ sarissa. Polybius once again is a valuable source. As a military officer of the Achaean League, Polybius most likely was an eyewitness of the ‘Macedonian’ phalanx, which had dominated Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean for the better part of two centuries. At the very least, he had first-hand accounts of the phalanx in action from Philopoemen, with whom his family was intimate, and later, his acquaintance with Aemilius Paulus who defeated the Macedonian phalanx at Pydna.²¹ Polybius gives the sarissa at 14 cubits in his day but states that its length previously was 16 cubits: ‘…and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen’.²² The length of the 16 cubit sarissa is confirmed by Polyaenus, who states that the Macedonian garrison at Edessa in the 270s

BC

used sarissae which ‘were 16 cubits long’.²³ Aelian in his Tactics, who wrote in the 2nd century

AD

, virtually mirrors Polybius by stating ‘The length of the pikes, on the first institution of the phalanx, was sixteen cubits; but in fact, it is now fourteen…’.²⁴

What may be deduced from this is that the sarissa in Alexander’s time was between 10 and 12 cubits following Theophrastes and Asclepiodotus (it has been suggested that Asclepiodotus’ phalanx refers to that of Alexander’s period).²⁵ The sarissa was then extended to 16 cubits in the early 3rd century

BC

as indicated by Polyaenus’ description of the Siege of Edessa and supported by Polybius and Aelian. Its length was then once again reduced, this time to 14 cubits, by the time Polybius wrote his Histories (thus before the 160s

BC

). Since it is not known when the sarissa was reduced from 16 to 14 cubits, we can only determine that the length of the sarissa of the phalanx of Antiochus (for the campaigns of 220–189

BC

) was between 14 and 16 cubits at its maximum length.

The measurement of the pēcheis / cubit itself is a problematic affair with modern scholastic measurements ranging from 33cm to 49.5cm.²⁶ This has obviously led to a variety of proposed lengths of the sarissa. While the most common acceptance is the 45cm cubit, I have chosen to accept Matthew’s hypothesis for the Olympic / Peloponnesian 48cm cubit with regards to the Hellenistic era.²⁷ Matthew argues for the 48cm cubit based on meteorological relief from Salamis dating to the time of Alexander the Great, giving a 2cm measurement for the dakylos and a cubit of just over 48cm. The Olympic unit of a 2cm daktylos results thus in a peltē of 64cm. This corresponds far better with archaeological finds of peltai shields. A fragmented peltē shield find from Begora was calculated by Liampi, Adam-Veleni and Hammond to have a diameter of an estimated 66cm (see Eight Palms Diameter section under 1.1.2 The Peltē). The shield find from Pergamum is slightly more intact and measures between 65cm and 66cm (see Eight Palms Diameter section under 1.1.2 The Peltē). From the evidence, it appears that Matthew’s suggestion of the Olympic / Peloponnesian 48cm cubit, is the most appropriate when studying the Hellenistic phalanx. This gives us a length of 768cm for the 16 cubit sarissa, 672cm for the 14 cubit and finally 576cm for the Alexandrian era 12 cubit sarissa.

This brings us to the question: why was the sarissa, which had proven so effective under Philip and Alexander, lengthened from 12 to 16 cubits, and then again reduced to 14 cubits? I would like to propose the following hypothesis. What originally gave the Macedonian phalanx its advantage over the Greek hoplite was the length of the sarissa pike compared to the Classical hoplite doru spear. The hoplite spear ranged between 200 to 300cm, and thus was vastly out-ranged by the 576cm (12 cubit) sarissa.²⁸ After Alexander’s death, his Successors almost immediately fell into war with one another. The phalanx, being the most important arm of the military among them, meant that phalanx now went up against phalanx. The advantage of longer reach was now neutralized. In order to regain the advantage, some generals lengthened the sarissa. The other Successors, not wanting to lag behind, would adopt the same length or even longer pikes, eventually culminating in the 16 cubit sarissa. Hellenistic warfare had been described as ‘gigantism’, a term referring to the inflation of a variety of elements of warfare in the era, including the number of soldiers on the battlefield (at Ipsus the Antigonids fielded 70,000 foot, the Allies 64,000; at Raphia the Seleucids 62,000 foot, the Ptolemies 70,000).²⁹ With such large armies on the field, the phalanx began to rely more on numbers and weight than tactical manoeuvrability.³⁰ The longer, heavier pike would thus not have impacted as much on the phalanx as it did not need to be as flexible.³¹ But what about the reversion to 14 cubits? The answer might lie with Polyaenus’ description of the Siege of Edessa:

At the siege of Edessa, when a breach was made in the walls, the spear-men, whose spears were sixteen cubits long, sallied out against the assailants. Cleonymus deepened his phalanx and ordered the front line not to use their weapons, but with both hands to seize the enemy’s spears, and hold them fast; while the next rank immediately advanced, and closed upon them. When their spears were seized in this way, the men retreated; but the second rank, pressing upon them, either took them prisoner, or killed them. By this manoeuvre of Cleonymus, the long and formidable sarissa was rendered useless, and became rather an encumbrance, than a dangerous weapon.³²

From the passage, it seems that the 16 cubit / 768cm sarissa had simply become impractical. At almost 8 metres in length, it appears that it was near impossible to thrust forward with such a heavy and long pike, and that the sarissa was simply held in place. The momentum of the charge was used with the 16 cubit sarissa to break the enemy formations without any effective thrusting and jousting. Since a breach was made in the wall at Edessa, we might assume that the Edessa garrison could not build enough momentum to charge through the breach, or they simply occupied the breach in phalanx formation. Since the pike could not be used to effectively thrust, Cleonymus’ men were able to seize the pikes more easily with both hands. It is very difficult to imagine Cleonymus’ soldiers without weapons and shields for protection, to step forward and seize the pike with both hands, if indeed the weapon was thrust out towards them. Even if they were successful in seizing the first pike by sheer martial skill, they would be completely exposed to a thrust from the second row of pikemen, whilst trying to wrestle the sarissa from the front row soldier. To regain the offensive ability of the thrust, the sarissa was again shortened to 14 cubits / 672cm. The pike could not be reduced too much (for example back to 12 cubits) as the reach advantage would then once again be lost. A compromise was thus met between offensive ability and reach, and the pike settled at 14 cubits. If this is the case, I would like to suggest that the Seleucid phalanx by the time of Antiochus’ campaigns, had already adopted the 14 cubit sarissa. At the Battle of Thermopylae (191

BC

), the Seleucid phalanx standing on a rampart was able to reach the Roman soldiers with their long sarissae from a standing position and not charging. Many Romans according to Livy were run through trying to mount the rampart.³³ If indeed the 16 cubit sarissa could not thrust, and the Seleucid phalanx was in a standing position, it must be assumed