Wellington's Peninsular War: Battles and Battlefields

By Julian Paget

This history and battlefield guide is an essential reference for anyone visiting the sites of Wellington’s war with Napoleon in Spain and Portugal.

Wellington's Peninsular War provides a concise and comprehensive account of the battlefields as they exist today, with historic context and practical details to help readers find and explore them. The Peninsular War of 1808 to 1841 was a major part of the twenty-year struggle against Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperial ambitions. Military historian Julian Paget presents a balanced picture of the conflict, covering the Duke of Wellington’s campaigns as well as the crucially important efforts of the Spanish and Portuguese.

Paget begins with an overview of the war and its background, followed by a complete year-by-year account. He then presents a chapter on each of the major battles, includes maps and photographs of the battlefields, orders of battle, and helpful information about the battlefield today. The maps show the ground as it was at the time but also include modern features for easier identification.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Nov 18, 2005
• ISBN: 9781473820661

Book preview

WELLINGTON’S

PENINSULAR WAR

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WELLINGTON’S

PENINSULAR WAR

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Battles and Battlefields

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Julian Paget

First published in Great Britain in 1990

and reprinted in 2005 and 2009 in this format by

Pen & Sword Military

An imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street

Barnsley

South Yorkshire

S70 2AS

Copyright © Julian Paget, 1990, 2005, 2009

ISBN 978 1 84415 290 2

The right of Julian Paget to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted

by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is

available from the British Library

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in writing.

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Contents

List of Maps

Foreword

by The Duke of Wellington, LVO, OBE, MC, DL

Many years ago when I was Defence Attaché at the British Embassy in Madrid I had the opportunity to visit and walk over most of the battlefields of the Peninsular war. It is something I would thoroughly recommend to all who are interested in military history; but one’s appreciation of a field of battle of the past is enormously heightened if reference can be made to an account of the battle which not only details the sequence of events but gives an up-to-date picture of what one is looking for. Over the centuries features change and modern developments radically alter the topography. Today the ridge of Busaco for instance is covered by trees and Vitoria and Talavera are bisected by motorways. I was lucky enough on my walks over those historic fields to have in my hand Jac Weller’s recently published Wellington in the Peninsula which enabled me to re-create vividly in my mind those scenes of long ago.

The pace of change in Spain and Portugal has increased rapidly in the last twenty-five years and an up-to-date picture of those great campaigns in the Peninsular is long overdue. In Julian Paget’s book we have that picture, greatly enhanced by the author’s own distinguished career in the Army. He approaches the problems faced by my ancestor with the sort of military perception which will benefit his readers when they visit the battlefields and of which I hope to take advantage in the years ahead.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to a number of people for the help they have given me over this book. I owe much in the first place to Serena Fass and the staff of Serenissima Travel for setting me on the path of studying the battlefields of the Peninsular War. I am also indebted to Stephen Drake-Jones, Chairman of the Wellington Society of Spain for checking many facts, figures and references for me; Michael Stilwell and Robert Bremner for help over the campaigning in Portugal; Lord Nicholas Gordon-Lennox, British Ambassador in Madrid, and his staff for their help and support; Lt-Colonel Bill Watson for supplying some of the maps and Neil Hyslop for drawing them so effectively; also Mrs Gibbon for typing the manuscript. I am also most grateful to Colonel Henry Radice who provided many of the photographs of the battlefields which appear in the book.

Preface

There have been many books written about the Peninsular War, and I hesitate to add yet another to the list. But, having led several battlefield tours to the Peninsula, it seems to me that there is a need for one, simple account of the campaign.

Some of the histories are classics, but out of date. Some cover particular aspects, such as Michael Glover’s excellent Wellington’s Army. Some are very involved; some are biased one way or another. The only one that deals with the actual battlefields is Jac Weller’s Wellington in the Peninsula, but that was written 20 years ago and is now out of print.

My aim in this book is to provide a short, simple but complete account of the whole war, including details of the battlefields as they are today, and how to go and look at them. This account is written primarily from a British viewpoint, but I have tried to present a balanced picture of the whole campaign, giving due credit to the Spanish and Portuguese war efforts, without which victory would not have been possible.

The book is written in various sections, giving varying degrees of detail. It starts with a broad-brush review of the whole war and the background to it, for those who want to grasp the outline story and the historical setting in just one chapter. Then there is an account of the war year by year, outlining events in more detail: these seven chapters give a complete and chronological account of the whole campaign.

Finally, there is a chapter on each of the major battles in which the Peninsular Army was involved. These include a detailed account of the battle, maps of the battlefields, orders of battle, and instructions on how to find the battlefield today and what to see there. The maps show the ground as it was at the time of the Peninsular War, but also include enough modern features such as roads, railways and landmarks, to enable readers to identify the ground where the fighting took place.

In addition, there are several Appendices giving basic information about the rival armies, the commanders involved and the British regiments which saw service in the war.

It is hoped that this approach will be of interest to a wide range of people, including the general reader, the professional historian, the harassed young officer seeking a quick answer and tourists who want to look at history and stand where Wellington stood.

There is something very dramatic and impressive, to my mind, about standing today where Wellington stood, and being able to look at the same ground as he did. Most of the battlefields of the Peninsular War are still identifiable, and are not built over, though there are unfortunately motorways across both Talavera and Vitoria.

In most cases, it is not difficult to envisage the battle, and I hope my book may help readers to do just that. Salamanca, Talavera and Vitoria can be clearly imagined. The Crossing of the Douro took place near the modern road bridge (and temptingly near the port ‘lodges’ of Vila Nova!). The Lines of Torres Vedras can be seen on many hilltops. One can still stand on Cadoux’s Bridge across the Bidassoa or on the Tres Puentes Bridge at Vitoria. There is a modern motorway along much of the Retreat to Corunna, but it is still possible to follow the old road, and one can easily still imagine the horrors and hardships of that mid-winter nightmare.

Studying the Peninsular War, I have been constantly struck by the number of comparisons that can be made with the Second World War, and it is one of the themes of the book. To give just two examples: the importance to British strategy of sea-power is dominant throughout both wars, and on a smaller scale, the parallels between Corunna in 1809 and Dunkirk in 1940 are obvious.

The Peninsular War is a fascinating piece of history, and I hope that this book will help a few more people to understand it, and to obtain pleasure from reading about it, as well as perhaps looking at some of the battlefields.

Chronology

The War in

Perspective

CHAPTER ONE

The Peninsular War (1808–1814)

Introduction

It is essential to look at the Peninsular War as a whole, in order to understand and fully appreciate individual events.

The war lasted six years (1808–14), but it was only a small part of the struggle against Napoleon Bonaparte that lasted for 20 years (1795–1815) and was known until 1914 as ‘The Great War’. It involved campaigns not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East, Russia, the West Indies, South America and South Africa.

One of the most intriguing features is the number of close parallels that can be drawn between the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War of 1939 to 1945, and this is an inescapable theme throughout this book.

The first obvious similarity is that the Peninsular War was above all a matter of sea power. Britain, with its superb navy, controlled the seas, and from the start this enabled the Army to keep attacking Napoleon’s outlying territories. At the same time, the Navy thwarted every French effort to starve Britain into submission by cutting off her trade and her food supplies. There were no U-boats then, but the principle was the same as in the 1940’s.

In 1800, as in 1940, a defiant Britain stood virtually alone, inspired to fight on by the rhetoric of William Pitt, just as we were by that of Winston Churchill 140 years later.

Napoleon, like Hitler, set out to conquer the Middle East, and like Hitler, he was stopped in Egypt. But he still ruled supreme throughout Europe; Britain alone remained in the fight and inevitably had to remain on the defensive in order to survive.

From 1803 to 1805 (just as in 1940–41), we faced the threat of invasion, when Boney assembled a Grand Army of 160,000 troops and a fleet of 2,100 barges, determined to crush the only country that still thwarted his ambitions.

Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, he demanded angrily of his admirals, and we shall be masters of the world.

But Admiral Villeneuve could no more grant him that than could Admiral Raeder and Field-Marshal Goering grant it to Hitler 137 years later.

In 1803, it was ‘those far-distant, storm-beaten ships, on which the Grand Army never looked, (that) stood between him and domination of the world.’ In 1940 the only difference was that there were a few Spitfires as well.

I do not say the French cannot come, growled Lord St Vincent, the First Sea Lord in Nelson’s day. All I say is that they cannot come by sea.

It was a spirit, and a fact, that Napoleon could in no way overcome. After two years of frustration, he finally gave up, turned the Grand Army about and vented his fury on Austria, Russia and Prussia, all of whose armies he resoundingly defeated. But still Britain fought on.

Origins of the War

In 1806 Napoleon, thwarted over invasion, decided to try to starve Britain into submission, just as Hitler did with his U-boat warfare; to this end he issued the Berlin Decrees, forbidding any country in Europe from trading with England. But Portugal, a great maritime nation who did almost half their business with England, refused to comply, whereupon Napoleon sent 30,000 men under General Junot through Spain to occupy Portugal.

They reached Lisbon on 30 November, 1807 – just 24 hours after the Navy had evacuated the Portuguese royal family to Brazil (shades of Holland in 1940).

Not content with that, Napoleon invaded Spain in the spring of 1808 and put his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the throne. It was in fact a major error, for both Spain and Portugal rose up against the invaders, and appealed to Britain for help. It was given, and the Peninsular War had begun.

The Spanish Ulcer

On 2 May, 1808, the famous ‘Dos de Mayo’, the Spanish people rose in revolt against the French, and for the next six years they waged a ruthless, unremitting struggle against them – a Resistance Movement that was to be as decisive as in 1940–45. It became known as ‘The Spanish Ulcer’, a running sore from which France would ultimately bleed to death.

The Spanish Army was erratic and unreliable, but brave and full of spirit. They met with many defeats, but their great contribution was that for six years they tied down so many of the 250,000 Imperial troops in Spain that France never succeeded in concentrating enough men to defeat Wellington’s 50,000¹. Napoleon sent some 600,000 men over the Pyrenees altogether, a drain on his resources that he could ill afford and which would achieve little.

Alongside the Spanish Army were the ‘guerrillas’,² who operated with relish, courage and skill throughout the Peninsula, and were a constant threat to the invaders. Convoys were ambushed and messengers waylaid, so that it eventually reached the stage where it took 200 cavalry to ensure that a message got through, and up to 1,000 men to enable a French general to travel round the country and survive.

The whole population in both countries fought the enemy relentlessly, be it as soldiers or guerrillas, and it was a major factor in the war. Wellington, to use a modern phrase, had ‘the hearts and minds’ of the people, and it was a significant advantage to him. At the end of six years of occupation and oppression the Spanish people were undefeated, and they could justifiably speak of having fought La Guerra de la Independencia.

Wellington’s Strategy

To understand the campaign in the Peninsula properly, we need to know something of the strategy that was followed by the British Government, based on the appreciations made by Wellington.

Again, one is struck by the similarities to the Second World War. In 1808, as in 1940, Europe was dominated by a ruthless and powerful dictator with an apparently invincible army that had overrun virtually the whole Continent. Only Resistance Movements survived in most of the occupied countries, and only Britain fought resolutely on, hoping others would join her one day.

The situation in 1808 gave the British Government an opportunity to use their sea-power, for the Peninsula was ideal for sea-borne operations from north, south, east and west, and it was on Napoleon’s doorstep. Sea-power enabled England to send an expeditionary force to Portugal in August, 1808, withdraw it from Corunna five months later, and then send another to Portugal in April, 1809.

It seemed a remarkably bold venture to despatch this second force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, but the decision was based on his own Appreciation of the Situation³ in which he set out the strategy that was to be followed throughout the Peninsular War.

Wellesley maintained that Portugal could be defended by quite a small expeditionary force, provided that four requirements were met:

a.

The Spanish must continue to resist and must support England.

b.

England must retain her sea-power.

c.

The expeditionary force must not suffer defeat or undue losses.

d.

The French must be prevented from concentrating 100,000 men against them.

It was on the strength of this far-sighted assessment that England’s main army landed in Portugal in 1809. Wellesley’s strategy throughout was to ensure that it survived, which was why he remained so firmly on the defensive for the first three years and took few risks. He fought when the odds were favourable, and won, and prevented the French from ever concentrating enough men to defeat him.

Then in 1812, the tide turned. Napoleon, like Hitler, invaded Russia, and immediately faced the problems of a war on two fronts, as well as a vast coast-line to defend against Allied sea-power. In 1812, as in 1942, the Allies were at last in a position to take the offensive. Eighteen months later, the war was won.

How Was It Done?

It is of value to outline at this stage the ingredients of Wellington’s success, because one can then see how they apply to each of the battles.

The over-riding factor of sea-power has already been mentioned. As Sir Arthur Bryant put it in his ringing phrases: The British people put a ring of sea-water round the tyrant’s dominion, slowly tightened it, and then greatly daring, sent in their armies to assail his inner fortress. He was writing that in 1944, and he added: The events of the past four years have made this story strangely familiar.

The resistance of the Spanish and Portuguese people was another vital element without which the war could not have been won. It meant that Wellington always had first-class information⁴ – an advantage that usually comes to any liberating power. He usually knew more of the French plans, strengths and dispositions than did either Napoleon or indeed the Marshals of Spain themselves. It is intriguing that he was regularly breaking the French codes, just as we did through ‘Ultra’ in World War Two.

Wellington was much better than the French at providing supplies and seeing that they reached his troops. He organized his Commissariat extremely well, and he also always insisted on paying for what he took from the Spanish and Portuguese. The French, on the other hand, tried to ‘live off the land’, which inevitably led to plundering and was difficult in a country that was already living largely at subsistence levels, and was made even less hospitable by Wellington’s ‘scorched earth’ policy.

Sea-power, the support of the people, and supplies all contributed to victory in the Peninsula. But above all, it was Wellington himself who was primarily responsible. First, his strategy was far-sighted and effective. Second, his tactical skill was such that he out-manoeuvred every Marshal sent against him and never lost a battle. Most of the battles were between armies of around 50,000 each, and it was a matter of command and control, at both of which Wellington was a true master.

Finally, he organized, trained and inspired with confidence not only a raw British army, more accustomed to defeat than victory, but also did the same with a Portuguese army, to the point where it fought with distinction alongside his own and