Operation Bluecoat: Breakout from Normandy

By Ian Daglish

After seven weeks of bitter fighting there was a desperate need to break out of the Normandy bridgehead. In late July 1944 Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempseys Second Army moved two entire corps from the Caen sector to the relatively quiet countryside around Caumont. Here, the British XXX Corps prepared to give battle, with VII Corps advancing in support on the right flank between XXX Corps and the American first Army. The offensive did not go to plan. While the XXX Corps attack stalled, VIII Corps surged ahead. With the experienced 11th Armoured and 15th Scottish Divisions in the lead and Guards Armoured close behind, a deep penetration was made, threatening to take the pivotal city of Vire and unhinge General Haussers German Seventh Army.The main narrative of this book will span the initial break-in from Caumont on 30 July, through the armored battles of the following days, to the desperate German counter-attacks of 4 6 August, the no less desperate German defense of Estry up to the middle of the month, and the final withdrawal from Normandy. The book also examines Montys refusal to seize Vire, the disputed Anglo-American border and the Operations impact on the German Mortain offensive.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Apr 19, 2010
• ISBN: 9781783034499

Ian Daglish

Ian Daglish is a well respected military historian, battlefield guide and lecturer. His other books include Operation Bluecoat and Goodwood (Over the Battlefield).

Book preview

First published in Great Britain in 2009 by

Pen & Sword Military

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

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Copyright © Ian Daglish, 2009

ISBN 9781848840492

eISBN 9781783034499

The right of Ian Daglish, to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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This book is dedicated to the memory of the late Major John Kenneth Officer Commanding 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 28 to 31 July, 1944

He led the battalion during what was, in his own words:

‘Perhaps the most successful op. of all’

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTES ON CONTENT AND TERMINOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: BREAKING IN

Chapter 1   LATE JULY: CAUMONT

Chapter 2   SUNDAY 30 JULY: JOCKS AND CHURCHILLS

Chapter 3   SUNDAY 30 JULY: BAFFING UP THE CHARLIE LOVE

Chapter 4   SUNDAY 30 JULY: REACTIONS

PART TWO: ACROSS THE SOULEUVRE

Chapter 5   MONDAY 31 JULY: DAWN’S EARLY LIGHT

Chapter 6   MONDAY 31 JULY: DICKIE’S BRIDGE

Chapter 7   MONDAY 31 JULY: AN ENEMY DIVIDED

Chapter 8   TUESDAY 1 AUGUST: LE BÉNY-BOCAGE

Chapter 9   MONDAY 31 JULY – TUESDAY 1 AUGUST: GUARDS GO SOUTH

PART THREE: BREAKING THROUGH

Chapter 10 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: HORNS OF THE BLACK BULL

Chapter 11 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: GUARDS ACROSS THE SOULEUVRE

Chapter 12 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: ARRIVALS

PART FOUR: BITE AND HOLD

Chapter 13 THURSDAY 3 AUGUST: EBB AND FLOW

Chapter 14 FRIDAY 4 AUGUST – SUNDAY 6 AUGUST: ON PERRIER RIDGE

PART FIVE: THE HINGE OF NORMANDY

Chapter 15 SATURDAY 5 AUGUST – SUNDAY 13 AUGUST: ESTRY

Chapter 16 SATURDAY 5 AUGUST – SUNDAY 13 AUGUST: VIRE & GROUSE

Chapter 17 MORTAIN TO FALAISE

APPENDIX I: BRITISH ARMY MAPS AND MAP REFERENCES

APPENDIX II: GERMAN COMBAT TACTICS IN NORMANDY

APPENDIX III: ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE IN NORMANDY

APPENDIX IV: RESTRUCTURING THE BRITISH ARMOURED DIVISIONS

APPENDIX V: MONTGOMERY, BLUECOAT, AND THE QUESTION OF VIRE

BIBLIOGRAPHY & A BRIEF NOTE ON SOURCES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The inspiration for this ‘Over the Battlefield’ series derives in part from the author’s long relationship with The Aerial Reconnaissance Archives. Over the years, this invaluable national resource has seen changes. From a windy garret over the geography building at Keele University, the collection was first re-housed into a secure, climate-controlled vault under the university library. Next, questions over the future of the archive were resolved by the untiring work of TARA’s Operations Manager who oversaw the move of the archive to a new home, under the auspices of the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland. The author extends both his gratitude and encouragement to Allan Williams and his staff at the RCAHMS.

Others deserving of the author’s thanks include David Fletcher, Historian at The Tank Museum, Bovington, who supplements the valuable archive in his care with a vast store of knowledge freely shared. The National Archives at Kew continues to provide outstanding service in facilitating access to its wealth of information.

Very special thanks go to friends who have assisted this project. Kevin Baverstock, cartographer and Normandy historian, has continued to offer both encouragement and his remarkable image-processing expertise. Simon Trew of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst has been generous with information and hospitality. Charles Markuss contributed his comprehensive knowledge of the German Army and advised on technical aspects of armoured warfare; both he and Friedrich Tichy assisted the author on matters of German nomenclature.

The author thanks several Normandy friends. Professor Jean-Claude Perrigault of Caen continues graciously to offer documents and advice. Michel Leteinturier, MBE, of Maisoncelles has shared his unparalleled local knowledge, including rare photographs of the post-BLUECOAT battlefield. Annick Bittle of Gavrus typifies a generation for whose parents the war brought untold suffering, yet who now offer friendship and hospitality to visiting veteran and historian alike. Jean-Marc Lesueur of Bretteville is likewise welcoming to visiting veterans, while keeping up a family tradition of tending the graves of British soldiers and maintaining links with the liberators and their descendants.

New sources of information emerging over the five years since publication of the author’s earlier work on BLUECOAT have added both detail and accuracy to this account. Also, comments received from former participants in the battle have contributed still further details as well as (gratifyingly few) corrections, for which the author is deeply appreciative.

Permission for use of 1944 aerial photography by United States forces was granted by the FOIA Officer, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC. Images © Crown Copyright 1944/MOD are reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Other images are used by courtesy of The Tank Museum, Robert Boscawen, Tony Brady, Michel Leteinturier, Andrew Oglesby and Hilary Thornburn.

NOTES ON CONTENT AND TERMINOLOGY

1. As the author’s previous ‘Over the Battlefield’ studies of Operation EPSOM and Operation GOODWOOD, this is the story of a battle. Once again, rather than burden the story with overmuch technical detail, a quantity of background information is presented in chapter-end reference notes and in separate appendices, organized by topic, into which the reader may dip at will.

2. Wherever possible, direct quotations are presented verbatim: retaining original spelling, punctuation, grammar, and abbreviation. In the case of military terminology, the author hopes that the reader will be able to decipher (for example) such standard forms as ‘pl’ for platoon, ‘coy’ for company, or ‘ATk’ for antitank from the context in which they appear. Standardized German unit and rank abbreviations (e.g., ‘Pz.Gr.Rgt.’ for Panzergrenadierregiment; ‘Stubaf.’ for Sturmbannführer) are used only sparingly, and only after the full version has appeared in the text.

British units’ proper designations can be unwieldy: such as ‘2nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry’, or ‘2nd Battalion (Reconstituted), The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders’, and even ‘The Ayrshire Yeomanry (Earl of Carrick’s Own), 151st Field Regiment, Royal Artillery’. Following their first appearance, such titles are routinely abbreviated, as they generally were in the field: hence ‘Fifes’, ‘Argylls’, and ‘Ayrshires’. Similarly, in two specific cases within 11th Armoured Division: 3rd Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment may be referred to as ‘3rd Royal Tanks’ or ‘3rd RTR’; and 8th Battalion, The Rifle Brigade as ‘8th RB’.

Units of measurement are generally reported in terms appropriate to the nationality. The Allies referred to guns by weight of shell (6-pounder, 25-pounder) and calibre in millimetres (75mm, ‘eighty-eight’); whereas the German nomenclature favoured centimetres (7.5cm, 8.8cm; note however that the point is used rather than the German comma for decimals). Both imperial and metric measures of distance are used, as appropriate. For example, if a British unit advanced on a front estimated as ‘two hundred yards’, it would be misleading to record the measure as 200m, yet otiose to give it as 182.88m.

Hills feature in this narrative, and their spot heights are given in metres as on 1944 maps, which sometimes do not correspond exactly to modern trigonometry. They are of course close to the altitudes marked on modern French maps, but with so many hills having similar spot heights, confusion can arise. Therefore, the first time each spot height is mentioned, its equivalent on modern maps is shown in brackets. A similar procedure is used for French road numbers, as nowadays these rarely retain their 1944 designations.

Other details of the maps used in this volume are discussed at length in Appendix I.

3. Where possible, translations into English have been made by the author from original sources. Such translations attempt to be faithful to the original sense rather than word-forword, so may differ from other published versions.

The spelling of French place names is often found to vary. British Army maps of the period based on French originals frequently confused individual letters (in particular ‘n’ and ‘u’ are often transposed). And even the French were not always consistent: period French maps in the author’s possession include variations around ‘le Bény-Bocage’ and ‘Le Bénis Bocage’. The place nowadays known as Montchauvet was referred to by the soldiers of 1944 as ‘Montcharivet’, ‘Montcharival’, and ‘Mont Charivel’; the British Army Geographical Section settled for ‘Montcharivel’. For consistency (apart from verbatim quotations - see above), place names are presented as they appear - including hyphenation - on modern maps of the French Institut Géographique National (IGN).

English-language history often anglicizes German terms. As a general rule, names of German units, ranks, weapons systems, etc. will herein be presented in German form. There are several reasons for this. Recent years have seen a ‘creeping’ of German terms (Panzer, Schwerpunkt, Panzerfaust, and even Auftragstaktik) into English-language texts. Adopted piecemeal, this can result in grammatical absurdities (e.g., ‘panzers’ or ‘panzerfausts’ in place of the correct plural forms Panzer and Panzerfäuste). After consulting German speakers, it was concluded that muddling German and English terms into a sloppy pidgin was a poor option, akin to a badly dubbed film. Faced with the alternatives of consistent English (‘Armoured Group West’) or German (‘Panzergruppe West’), the German form is preferred. Where appropriate for clarity, English translations will be offered: e.g., ‘Panzerarmeeoberkommando 5 (Fifth Tank Army Headquarters)’. The author hopes that the reader will feel flattered rather than inconvenienced by these attempts at precision.

INTRODUCTION

Few battle plans survive contact with the enemy. BLUECOAT is a case in point. Yet it was not only enemy action but other unforeseen events that led to changes as the operation unfolded. The story of BLUECOAT is characterized by opportunities seized upon by individuals at the ‘sharp end’, some of whose initiatives shaped the battle no less than the directives of generals in the rear.

BLUECOAT was a very large operation indeed. In his earlier work on the subject, this author chose to focus on the actions of the British VIII Corps. This occasioned some dismay to veterans and admirers of XXX Corps, who felt that its part had received insufficient recognition. In the author’s defence: the post-war British Army Staff College tours of the BLUECOAT battlefield were principally concerned with VIII Corps operations. Indeed, these focused even more narrowly on the actions of 15th (Scottish) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade during 30 and 31 July. Though now able to discourse at twice the length of the previous work, the author still feels that the British side of the BLUECOAT story is best told from an VIII Corps standpoint. This should in no way disparage the XXX Corps struggle for Mont Pinçon and the Noireau, in spite of early tribulations and subsequent sackings. Their actions, together with those of the Canadians and Poles still further east and the Americans in the west, all played their part in the victorious conclusion of the Normandy campaign. All have been well covered in the histories of the campaign. Less well represented in the histories have been the strategic gains and tactical advances achieved by VIII Corps in this crucial period.

When this author first wrote about BLUECOAT, he was conscious of following in the footsteps of an accomplished historian and soldier: Major J J (‘Joe’) How, whose 1981 study was the first to do justice to this operation. Yet the intervening twenty-two years permitted new findings to be revealed. And now, a further six years on, although some repetition of details from the author’s previous account of Operation BLUECOAT is inevitable, the ‘Over the Battleground’ format allows the narrative to be presented in much greater detail than previously. In particular, this study further extends the story into early August to include the struggles for mastery of the Perrier Ridge and the bitter contest for possession of the German bulwark around the village of Estry as the battle for Normandy reached its climactic conclusion.

Lastly, the author continues to be surprised by the quantity of widely accepted Normandy myth that simply does not withstand close scrutiny. Wherever this work conflicts with numerous other Normandy histories, the author respectfully points out that frequent repetition of a story is no guarantee of accuracy. An appealing anecdote or a genuine mistake of place or time recorded in the field by a harassed Intelligence Officer finds its way into in a regimental history, and unless cross-checked against other sources risks being repeated, gaining credibility in the repetition. As the late, great Colonel A H Burne pointed out, and others have since echoed: ‘Whether history repeats itself may be a matter of doubt, but there can be no doubt that the gibe is true that historians repeat one another.’

Ian Daglish Alderley Edge 2009

GOODWOOD

GOODWOOD was the largest tank battle fought in the 1944-45 campaign for north-west Europe. This important study goes back to original sources, stripping away much of the myth that has grown up around this famous operation while bringing to light important but hitherto little-known episodes. For the first time, an accurate chronology of events is presented, using contemporary reminiscences and official records, supported by the hard evidence of detailed aerial reconnaissance photographs taken while the battle raged below

EPSOM

Operation EPSOM was the first of Montgomery’s major, set-piece Normandy battles: in which highly trained but largely inexperienced British ‘follow-up’ divisions confronted some of the best equipped, best led, and most experienced combat formations of the Third Reich.

EPSOM marked a turning point in the Normandy campaign. Before EPSOM, there remained the chance that a German counter-stroke in Normandy might seriously threaten the bridgehead. After EPSOM, the Allies retained the strategic initiative through to the liberation of France and Belgium.

Part One: Breaking in

Chapter 1 LATE JULY: CAUMONT

Chapter 2 SUNDAY 30 JULY: JOCKS AND CHURCHILLS

Chapter 3 SUNDAY 30 JULY: BAFFING UP THE CHARLIE LOVE

Chapter 4 SUNDAY 30 JULY: REACTIONS

Chapter 1

LATE JULY: CAUMONT

It has been suggested that Allied victory in Normandy was inevitable once a successful lodgement was achieved on 6 June, or at least following the linking of the five beachheads by D plus 6. Rommel himself famously declared that his only hope was to stop the invader on the first day, on the beaches.¹ After the war von Rundstedt was asked if he had hoped to defeat the invasion. His answer: ‘Not after the first few days’.² It can certainly be argued that by early July the Germans’ last realistic chance of landing a strategic counterpunch had passed. The Allies, in particular the British Second Army, consistently prevented the Germans from freeing armoured formations from the defensive line to form a strategic reserve. And the generals with the vision and skill to direct such a force were remorselessly being removed from the theatre: Geyr von Schweppenburg on 10 June, Marcks on 12 June, Rommel on 17 July (all falling prey to air attack).

But if Rommel believed that all would be settled in the course of ‘the longest day’, this was not to be the invaders’ experience. As early as D plus 1, welcoming his army commander to the 1st Division command post on the bluff above Omaha beach, General Huebner complained, ‘These goddam Boche just won’t stop fighting.’ Omar Bradley’s response was prophetic: ‘It’ll take time and ammunition; perhaps more than we reckon on both.’³

SEVEN WEEKS IN NORMANDY

The Germans fought on. Their cause might now seem hopeless to those blessed with all the wisdom of hindsight. But still they resisted. The frustrated invaders found their opponents’ dogged defence of Normandy interminable.⁴ Come the end of June, by which time all Normandy should have been in Allied hands, barely a fifth of that objective had been achieved. As the weeks dragged by and June turned to July, progress against a determined enemy was disturbingly slow. The city of Caen, supposed to have been taken on 6 June, finally fell to the British and Canadians on 9 July; St-Lô to the Americans on 18 July. These victories were symbolic, but anticlimactic. In each case, the victors were bequeathed sterile rubble beyond which stood the enemy in prepared positions. On the ground, from the British airborne infantry in their narrow, mosquito-plagued bridgehead east of the Orne River, to the western flank where American GIs struggled through the hedgerows of the bocage country and the swamps of the Prairies Marécageuses south of Carentan, few had any sense of imminent breakthrough. Behind the lines, an impatient press hungry for success stories began to write of ‘stalemate’ and even ‘trench warfare’.⁵ Fears were voiced that a stagnating battle for Normandy might assume First World War rates of progress and consequent weight of casualties.

Nevertheless, the Allies in Normandy had gained an advantage denied to their opponents. While German armoured divisions were having to be committed to the defensive line of battle as soon as they arrived in theatre, the Allies succeeded in amassing armoured reserves. True, the Americans lacked the space and the terrain to deploy their armoured formations. But in the east the British were not so encumbered. At the end of June, the British VIII Corps flung a fresh, reinforced armoured division through to the open plateau south of the Odon River (incidentally forestalling the newly-arriving II. SS-Panzerkorps’ plans for a breakthrough to the beaches).⁶ After Operation EPSOM, 11th Armoured Division had the luxury of pulling out of the line before being incorporated along with two other armoured divisions into a reformed VIII Corps for another hammer blow against the German defensive line.⁷ And following GOODWOOD, the British armour was again withdrawn to lick its wounds, re-equip, and prepare for the next offensive.

CHANGING THE GUARD: THE ALLIES

In conference on 10 July, General Bradley confessed his disappointment with his own (American First Army) progress, to which Montgomery magnanimously told him to ‘take all the time he needed’ to devise a new plan.⁸ In fact, Bradley took very little time to refine his ideas. In a change to the preferred American policy of applying pressure across the entire front, he would strike a single point, preceded by carpet bombing. Operation COBRA would require all the United States First Army’s reserves of strength, including the American V Corps’ motorized 1st Infantry Division, the ‘Big Red One’. Having fought its way across Omaha beach on D-Day and on inland as far as Caumont-l’Éventé, this division enjoyed a relatively quiet period in Caumont before its relief on 13 July and move west to join VII Corps. In its place, V Corps received the newly-arrived 5th Infantry Division. In support of these moves, Montgomery agreed that the British would take over the Caumont sector, allowing the inexperienced US 5th Infantry to concentrate on a single-regiment front. So, on 22 July, General Dempsey gave the order for British XXX Corps to extend the inter-army boundary to the west of the town, taking under its wing 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division which would hold the extreme British right.

‘Take all the time you need!’ Montgomery told General Bradley.

The men of 15th Scottish were enjoying a rest after their second major Normandy battle. In mid-July, Operation GREENLINE (a push towards Évrecy, west of Hill 112) had been a miserable experience: a night assault which one senior officer described as ‘An ill planned hazardous operation with no chance of success’.⁹ Losses had been heavy. 227 Brigade’s Brigadier Mackintosh-Walker fell to a direct hit on his scout car. Each of the brigade’s battalions had suffered. The 2nd Gordons lost 129; the 10th Highland Light Infantry 76, including a company commander killed and the commanding officer invalided out; and the 2nd Argylls 71 ‘without ever being in contact with the enemy.’¹⁰ Though welcome, the following period out of action was spoiled by spells of pouring rain and occasional random night bombing raids. Many men were sent off to VIII Corps ‘Rest Camps’ though some of these turned out to be little more than slit trenches within earshot of busy artillery batteries. Others enjoyed trips into Bayeux and to the cinema at Cully, which helped to relieve the strain of recent battles. For the first time in thirty-six days, bread was issued to the troops in place of biscuit. Baths were also an addition to the daily routine, though not appreciated by all.

‘There were trips for baths but these were so far in the rear that no one liked the trip, and the sight of so many men in the rear areas only upset the Jocks.’¹¹

‘We were afforded the luxury of a change of clothing from the mobile laundry which had appeared and a visit to the mobile showers. We even went to an ENSA concert and began to realise that these creature comforts were commonplace to the base wallahs and the HQ troops.’¹²

Then, after just four days, on 23 July the period of rest was suddenly cut short. Leaving behind 46 Brigade in the Odon sector, the rest of 15th Scottish was summarily ordered west. The divisional reconnaissance regiment led the way, moving

‘secretly to the extreme right of the Second Army front, relieving the 5th United States Division south of Balleroy in the Caumont sector. It was like going from the bustle of Oxford Street into the tranquillity of Hyde Park, this journey which began in the dust and smell and clatter of the country around Caen and ended in an unscarred land of little fields.’¹³

Not far behind followed the infantry battalions, among them the 10th Highland Light Infantry.

‘There were Brigade O Groups and we knew something was in the wind... When we got on the trucks we were ordered to wear our steel helmets – no balmorals to be shown at all. We were astounded when the trucks turned away from Caen towards Bayeux and we realised that we may be due for a reprieve. The smell of death and dust behind us, our spirits rose as the country became greener and the scars of war fell away.’

At length, the infantry dismounted from the trucks.

‘Marching along the road gave us ample time to survey the untouched countryside, it was all very pleasant and the exercise welcome after the long journey cramped in trucks. We were surprised to see an American signal line team checking telephone wires from the back of a jeep, our own signallers, who checked their lines on their flat feet were rather envious at this sight, trust the Yanks to take things easy.’¹⁴

When British signallers came on the scene, they were impressed by the Americans’ extravagant communications: a network of thirty miles of cable wire around Caumont. With typical British economy,

‘This was taken over and greatly simplified’ by the 10th HLI Signals Officer.¹⁵

First impressions of the American allies were mostly favourable. The Gordons found that,

‘Relieving American troops was a new experience. The men of the 2nd Regiment, 5th U.S. Division were of fine physique, well trained, and admirably equipped. Their rations seemed particularly good and their welfare service elaborate. Moreover they were an open-handed lot for it is mentioned that they were not particular about what they left behind.’¹⁶

It was recorded by 44 (Lowland) Brigade,

‘Neither side had as yet considered it worthwhile to make a serious attack in this difficult area. It was also a pleasure to meet the Americans and to compare their methods with our own. This 5th Division had fine human material - incidentally, many of German descent - and they were clearly well trained. The Jocks took an instant liking to them, although they felt a trifle superior in view of their experiences on the Odon, for these Americans had done little fighting. Three particularly striking features of the American Army were noticeable: their unlimited manpower, which gave them lavish establishments, their excellent equipment and rations, and the enterprise of their welfare services, which brought them baths and cinema in the front line.’¹⁷

The Americans left a network of telephone cable.

And the 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers were particularly appreciative.

‘Hitherto the Americans were a kind of legend beyond the horizon, but here they were, very decidedly, with hearts as big as houses. They seemed thrilled to see us, and proudly showed their automatic rifles to groups of admiring Jocks; and A Company fairly blinked when the particular company we relieved, burdened with more of the amenities of life than they could carry, enthusiastically handed over the whole of their surplus supplies before moving out... enough lavatory paper for a brigade, quantities of excellent tobacco and cigarettes, candy, various tinned foods, and cigars... quite the most refreshing thing that had happened to us in Normandy.’¹⁸

So, on the night of 23 July, Scots took up their new positions. 227 (Highland) Brigade replaced the 11th US Infantry Regiment: the 10th HLI in Caumont itself, and the 2nd Argylls to the east around le Repas.¹⁹ 2nd Gordons were in reserve, though on 24 July it was found that the Argylls were too thinly spread to maintain contact with 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division on their left, and a company of Gordons was brought up to fill the gap. To the west, 44 (Lowland) Brigade took over from the US 10th Regiment around Villeneuve and la Vacquerie, from the outer orchards of Caumont westward to the new inter-army boundary with the Americans. Here, 8th Royal Scots and 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers held the line with 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers in reserve.

‘...not particular about what they left behind.’

As well as appreciating a countryside relatively untouched by war, the Jocks found the combination of their recently acquired battle experience and the lack of enemy action reassuring. On the Argylls’ front,

‘patrols went out every night with the object of capturing a prisoner to discover if 21st Panzer were relieving 2nd Panzer Division, as was suspected. But they could not make contact, the enemy having apparently pulled back a good distance and decided to cover his forward area with machine-gun and mortar fire.’

The Argylls’ historian noted the particular appreciation of

‘much better counter-mortar organization at the Division level’; the troops ‘no longer had the feeling... that the bombs followed them about, which was a great relief.’²⁰

In Caumont itself, long deserted by civilians and held by only a light screen of defenders, Sergeant Green’s intelligence section manned a forward observation post.

‘Caumont was situated on the crest of a hill and though giving an excellent view of the enemy lines, also provided Jerrie with a first class view of the forward outskirts of the town. In front of Caumont the ground descended steeply into a wooded valley before gradually rising to the crest of Hill 309, which could be clearly seen at a distance of about six miles. The front line was forward of Caumont a hundred yards or so but in actual fact the valley was in No Mans Land and the hunting ground of night patrols. The Americans who had occupied the area had been leading a quiet life and in consequence Jerrie had also been behaving very quietly, the policy seemed to be a mutual understanding that neither side bothered the other very much, a nice peaceful kind of war.’

‘The Americans proved to be somewhat afflicted by nerves, and much affected by the unnatural silence, the slightest sound being sufficient to trouble them immensely. They called the valley in front of Caumont Death Valley and insisted that to show ones self in daylight was to commit suicide under a hail of Jerrie machine gun fire. They had modified their behaviour accordingly. Their forward troops stayed in their slit trenches without moving a muscle and were fed by night. They had allowed Jerrie to dominate the scene, though it was obvious that Jerrie had never taken advantage of the fact. In view of the fact that the enemy was reputed to be the 2nd Panzer Division, this all seemed rather odd.’²¹

CHANGING THE GUARD: THE GERMANS

In fact, the enemy opposite was no longer ‘2nd Panzer’, the ‘Wien’ (Vienna, Austria) armoured division. That formation had indeed operated in the area south of Caumont since mid-June, periodically detaching armoured forces to support actions further east.²² But from 21 July, 2. Panzerdivision was progressively withdrawn from the sector as it was relieved by 326. Infanteriedivision. This was the formation which was settling-in to its defensive role as the Scots infantry arrived, and which was destined to bear the brunt of the BLUECOAT assault.

The 326. Infanteriedivision was formed late in 1942 in Westphalia. Originally equipped for a static role on occupation duty in France, the division moved in February 1944 to join 15. Armee, defending the Pas de Calais sector. Though considered a likely target for Allied invasion, this sector remained quiet. The formation not only remained at full strength, but was augmented to the status of a Type 44 line infantry division. In this role, 326. Infanteriedivision had three regiments (numbered 751, 752, and 753), plus a full complement of support arms including a Füsilierbataillon (infantry), engineer battalion, artillery regiment, and an antitank battalion. This last unit included the division’s meagre complement of armour: self-propelled 7.5cm antitank guns including fourteen open-topped Marder and ten Sturmgeschütze.

One of the division’s few Marder antitank guns transporting a section of infantry.

Sturmgeschütz III with the long 7.5cm anti-tank gun.

The division received warning orders to move to the Normandy front in mid-July and by 23 July the 326. Füsilierbataillon²³ was in place south of Caumont, permitting 2. Panzerdivision to commence its withdrawal (though the division’s second, Panzer IV-equipped tank battalion remained to cover the arrival of the rest of the relieving infantry).

The newcomers had a broad swathe of country to defend. The two regiments in the line, 751. and 752. Grenadiere, had between them five battalions covering a front of almost ten miles: from the junction with their LXXIV Korps neighbours, the 276. Infanteriedivision to the east of Villers-Bocage, to the Drôme river west of Caumont, which marked the boundary not only of two corps but of the two German armies in Normandy.

Fortunately for the newcomers, although lacking battle experience they had suffered few casualties and their manpower was up to strength (albeit the strength of the division’s infantry was eked out by the inclusion of ‘Ost’ battalions of dubious quality). The division was also fortunate that its predecessors bequeathed a comprehensive set of defences including extensive minefields, wire entanglements, and cunningly camouflaged firing positions.

The men’s resolve was further stiffened by propaganda. By order of the divisional commander Generalleutnant Viktor Drabich-Waechter, all troops going up to the line were to be given a ‘pep talk’, the contents inaccurate in several respects, but nevertheless representative of the harsh discipline which bound the disparate elements of the Heer.

326 Division going up to the line.

(a) You are relieving a SS formation in a quiet sector.

(b) You will be opposed by troops of the 5 U.S. Infantry Division who have suffered fairly severe casualties.

(c) There is no armour against you.

(d) The enemy will drop, or fire over, leaflets. No one below the rank of major will pick them up. These leaflets invite you to desert, and enjoy the amenities of British prisoner of war camps. Remember that if you do, you will be taken to England and run the risk of death by V1. After that you will be shipped to the United States or Canada for life-long labour. Or you