Phantom in the Cold War: RAF Wildenrath, 1977–1992

By David Gledhill

An RAF veteran presents an in-depth study of one of the Cold War’s most effective fighter, defense, and reconnaissance planes.

The McDonnell Douglas F4 Phantom was a true multi-role combat aircraft. Introduced into the Royal Air Force in 1968, it was employed in ground attack, air reconnaissance and air defense roles. Even after the arrival of the Jaguar in the early 1970s, it continued to play a significant role in air defense. In its heyday, the Phantom was Britain’s principal Cold War fighter. There were seven UK-based squadrons, two Germany-based squadrons, and a further Squadron deployed to the Falkland Islands.

Phantom in the Cold War focuses on the aircraft’s role as an air defense fighter, exploring its contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force at RAF Wildenrath during the Cold War. Author David Gledhill, who flew the Phantom operationally, also recounts the thrills, challenges, and consequences of operating this temperamental jet at extreme low-level over the West German countryside, preparing for a war which everyone hoped would never happen.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 30, 2017
• ISBN: 9781526704108

David Gledhill

David Gledhill joined the Royal Air Force as a Navigator in 1973. After training, he flew the F4 Phantom on squadrons in the UK and West Germany. He was one of the first aircrew members to fly the F2 and F3 Air Defence Variant of the Tornado on its acceptance into service and served for many years as an instructor on the Operational Conversion Units of both the Phantom and the Tornado. He commanded the Tornado Fighter Flight in the Falkland Islands and has worked extensively with the Armed Forces of most NATO nations. He has published a number of factual books on aviation topics and novels in the Phantom Air Combat series set during the Cold War.

Book preview

Chapter One

From Bomber to Fighter

The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II was a remarkable aircraft by any standards and justifiably deserved the title of multi-role combat aircraft. With well over 5,000 examples delivered into service, it served with air forces around the world setting new world records for performance and seeing combat in Southeast Asia. Known by many nicknames, most popularly The Rhino, it was revered by those who flew it yet generated considerable frustration with a number of noteworthy foibles, significantly in the areas of airframe handling and ergonomics.

The original order for the Royal Navy was for fifty-two F-4Ks, of which two were prototype YF-4Ks, and for the Royal Air Force, 118 F-4Ms of which two were prototype YF-4Ms. The British Phantom’s heritage stems from the F-4B, via the US Navy F-4J version, to the F-4K, the F-4M being a development of the K model. The F-4J benefitted from slightly more internal fuel over its predecessors with the installation of the number seven tank in the fuselage and was fitted with drooped ailerons and a slotted stabilator for better approach characteristics for carrier operations. An AN/AJB 7 heading and attitude reference set was the primary attitude source, while modified communications and navigation equipment, power and cooling systems made the aircraft lighter. The F-4K inherited these changes in addition to the modified rear fuselage and redesigned air intakes to accommodate the original Rolls-Royce Spey Mk 201 engines. The engines were later upgraded to Mk 203 standard. The Spey was used to increase the static thrust for launches from the catapults on UK carriers. The arrestor hook was strengthened and the nose gear redesigned to give extra extension for catapult operations on the smaller British carriers in addition to fitting new anti-skid brakes. A quick-fold antenna allowed both the radome and the radar pack to be folded back for better space utilisation in the cramped confines of the carrier hangar. Using a cockpit-mounted selector, the pilot could fold the outer wing panels upwards, again for better space utilisation. Inheriting a similar missile control system (MCS) as the F-4J, the F-4K was fitted with the Westinghouse AN/AWG 11 missile control system, itself a development of the US Navy AN/AWG 10 and a British Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system operating in modes 1, 2 and 3. Modes 1 and 3 allowed the pilot to transmit a cockpitselectable identification code to a ground controller, while Mode 2 was a fixed identification code which was selectable only on the ground and unique to each airframe.

The F-4K Phantom, known by the British designation FG1 or fighter, ground attack Mark 1, was ordered by the Royal Navy to equip the two Audacious class aircraft carriers HMS Eagle and HMS Ark Royal, the only ships large enough to take the Phantom. Refitted with an 8.5-degree angled flight deck and new blast deflectors, Ark Royal re-entered service in 1970, but the refit to Eagle was cancelled and the Navy’s Phantom fleet was reduced to twenty-eight aircraft with the rest transferring to the RAF which would form a dedicated air defence unit, 43 Squadron. HMS Ark Royal operated F-4Ks from 1970 with 892 Naval Air Squadron until the Ark was retired in 1978. The final cruise generated instant fame when the ship starred in the BBC documentary series Sailor in the late 1970s inspiring a generation of potential Phantom aircrew. The RAF FG1s would only ever operate from RAF Leuchars in Scotland, often alongside 892 Naval Air Squadron jets when they disembarked. Once the Navy retired the Phantom, 111 Squadron replaced its FGR2s with the ex-Navy FG1s and RAF Leuchars became, exclusively, an RAF Phantom air defence base.

The F-4M lost the slotted stabilator and the fast reheat modifications resulting in the introduction of the Spey Mk 202 engine which developed 12,250lbs thrust in cold power and 20,515lbs in full reheat. The Spey Mk 203 was similar in configuration but was equipped with a modified reheat control system for faster light up. The Spey was an axial flow, bypass turbojet engine which produced a 10–15 per cent improvement in combat radius and ferry range over the F-4J’s J-79 engine with improved performance at lower levels. In service this came at the cost of lower performance and top speed in the upper air, albeit faster at low level. The extending nosewheel was also gone and, through various modification programmes, the wing-fold switch was relegated from the cockpit to the wheel well and eventually removed. The major changes were in the avionics. A lead computing optical sighting system was introduced, eventually retrofitted to the F-4K as it was not a Navy requirement, the system driven by a lead computing amplifier. A Ferranti inertial navigation/attack system, or INAS, was installed in the rear cockpit of the F-4M providing the primary flight reference source working with a new flight director computer. A radio altimeter operated at low level in tandem with the barometric system allowing the pilot to fly at ultra low level accurately. A battery provided a secondary starting option as well as maintaining DC power during emergencies. A high-frequency radio giving long range communications used shunt antennas installed in the fin alongside new UK-supplied Plessey VHF/UHF radios. An F95 strike camera could be carried in an aerodynamic fairing which fitted in a forward Sparrow air-to-air missile [AAM] semi-conformal launcher giving high-quality imagery. The F-4M was fitted with the Westinghouse AN/AWG 12 missile control system which was also a modification of the AN/AWG 10 radar system used by the US Navy but not the US Air Force.

An RF-4M was proposed by McDonnell in which a short plug was fitted in the forward fuselage thus lengthening the nose to take nose-mounted cameras similar to the RF-4E. Two sideward facing camera ports were complemented by a downwards looking port under the fuselage. If the variant had been procured, the plug would have housed a range of cameras including F126 (12″), F95 (3″), F135 and F96 (6″) cameras. This option was never taken up in favour of a role-equipped version of the F-4M fitted with the Thorn/EMI recce pod containing optical, infra-red and radar sensors, controlled from a panel fitted to the grab bars in the rear cockpit set at eye level. The F-4K was never able to carry the recce pod, hence the designation FGR.2 in respect of the F-4M.

On 1 August 1966, the F-4M was offered to the Royal Air Force and the detailed proposals were outlined in a McDonnell Report No. B617, assuming initially that Mk 201 standard Speys would be fitted requiring extensive modifications to the airframe. With Navy deliveries due to start in late 1967, the RAF was offered first deliveries in Spring 1968 which, remarkably, occurred on time.

The proposal envisaged an empty weight of 30,918lbs, take-off weight of 46,785lbs, a combat weight of 41,489lbs and a landing weight of 34,745lbs when fitted with a single centreline tank (Bravo fit). The envisaged service ceiling of 54,500 feet was reasonably realistic but the maximum speed of Mach 2.0 was rarely achieved in service. With a rate of climb of 13,020 feet per minute in military power and 45,600 in full reheat, the new version appeared remarkably nimble. With an approach speed of 133 knots (actually 145 basic in service), the landing roll would be 2,350 feet with a brake parachute or 3,440 feet unassisted. In practice, landing without a brake chute took most of the runway and resulted in very hot brakes. The airframe would be capable of 8.5 G at sea level and 6.5 G at 35,000 feet.

The combat ranges quoted in the proposal were typical for a sales pitch and the figures relating to the air defence mission were optimistic.

Ferry range of 2,289nm with three external fuel tanks.

Combat radius for an area intercept of 889nm with three external fuel tanks.

Time on station of 3.26 hours with three external fuel tanks at 150 miles range.

A Quick Reaction Intercept with a single centreline tank of 318nm.

In service, as an example, a high level ferry trip flown at realistic heights of about 25,000 feet climbing to the low to mid-30s as fuel burned off, would allow a UK- based Phantom to reach the eastern coast of Italy – or about 1,200 miles. The McDonnell figures would have seen a UK-based Phantom, in Delta Fit with three external fuel tanks, able to reach Cyprus, a distance just over 2,000nm, in a single hop. This was in reality unachievable. A typical CAP mission carrying three fuel tanks, operating at 15,000 feet, unrefuelled, lasted at most two hours and, more usually, 1 hour 45 minutes in a two-tank fit from 150 miles away.

As the Phantom procurement progressed it became mired in politics. With the cancellation of the P1154 supersonic Harrier fighter/strike fighter and the TSR2 bomber projects and even the subsequent cancellation of the American F-111K replacement, the Phantom became a stop-gap bomber for the RAF. The Navy had decided on the F-4K to replace the obsolescent Sea Vixen on the carriers but when the decision was taken to retire the steam catapult-equipped carriers, and replace them with through-deck cruisers the Sea Harrier, the Phantoms and Buccaneers of the Fleet Air Arm became homeless. In the event, both the Buccaneer S2 and the FG1 Phantoms were transferred to the RAF and provided sterling service for many years afterwards. With the Buccaneer available and the Jaguar on order as a ground attack aircraft, the Phantom would only ever serve for a short time as a bomber, although it was, arguably, more capable than the Jaguar which replaced it.

The order of battle in RAF Germany (RAFG) comprised three ground attack squadrons at RAF Brüggen, 14, 17 and 31 Squadrons and a single reconnaissance unit, 2 Squadron, at RAF Laarbruch. From its arrival in 1970, the Phantom operated from these bases until handing over to the Jaguar squadrons during 1975 and 1976. War plans envisaged the Brüggen and Laarbruch Phantoms operating from their own bases with the UK-based 38 Group Phantoms (re-equipped with Jaguars from 1974) of 6 and 54 Squadrons deploying forward to RAF Wildenrath.

For a ground attack squadron, the FGR2 was an ideal mount with its accurate inertial navigation system (INAS) and a formidable weapon load, although it would be 1972 before INAS was incorporated fleet wide. With the capable AN/AWG 12 radar it could fly and fight in all weathers down to 100 feet above ground level. With a typical fuel fit of two external tanks it could still carry six 1,000lb bombs, more typically four, on inboard triple racks and four Sparrow AAM missiles as self-protection plus a gun pod. It was ideally suited to the offensive counter-air role and battlefield air interdiction against airfield targets and logistics facilities. Although not optimised for the close contact battle, SNEB pods (containing 68mm rockets) and the SUU-23 20mm rotary cannon still offered a useful capability and the crews often found themselves in direct support of land forces. Unfortunately, as the modification to introduce the radar warning receiver did not begin in earnest until 1975, the ground attack squadrons did not benefit from its capabilities.

For a crew tasked for a ground attack mission the whole sortie emanates from the point at which the weapons are delivered. Precise aiming points are selected known as desired mean points of impact, or DMPIs, and the weapons must be placed precisely on the target at a nominated time. Most attacks would not be from a single formation so other aircraft might follow within minutes and be coordinated through the overhead. Timing was always critical, although post-target it became less so. Stepping back from that vital time, the lead crew would plan a route which allowed an element of flexibility. After take-off, an orbit would be flown if needed to effect a join-up en route before crossing the forward line of troops, or FLOT. The formation would not penetrate beyond the FLOT at less than 420 knots unless fuel was critical. This tactical speed was normally maintained from the initial point, or IP, to the target for conventional weapons deliveries but increased to 480 knots for a nuclear weapon delivery. Selective use of the different speeds around the route gave a compromise between range and performance.

14 Squadron Phantom FGR2, XV484. This aircraft was destroyed on 17 October 1983 when it flew into Mt Usborne in the Falkland Islands during a training sortie. (© UK MOD Crown Copyright (1974))

A 4-ship formation of 19 Squadron Lightning F2As captured by the oblique camera of a 31 Squadron Canberra in 1970. The decode at the bottom shows date, time, camera, height, a training sortie, the pilot and that it was originally classified Restricted. (© UK MOD Crown Copyright (1970))

In contrast for the air defender, time on target, unless in support of a combined air operations package, rarely needed to be precise and navigation techniques were area driven. An air defence aircraft mounts a combat air patrol in a defined box for a nominated duration. Staying out of missile engagement zones or controlled airspace are the driving factors allowing free rein within the kill zone. Speeds vary drastically up to the limits of the airframe, airspace and rules. With its broad range of capabilities, the Phantom proved able to adapt to both roles, including reconnaissance, effortlessly.

In its role at RAF Wildenrath the UK Phantom, specifically the FGR2 version, served exclusively as an air defence aircraft, the only ground-attack-related profile being a secondary strafe capability introduced in the wake of the Falklands conflict. As you will see, the Squadron dallied briefly with a reconnaissance trial, although it was never a serious intent to reintroduce the capability despite the problems experienced in transferring the capability to the Jaguar force.

A Lightning at low level over the West German countryside captured from the strike camera pod of a 17 Squadron Phantom in 1975. (© UK MOD Crown Copyright (1975) courtesy Al Sawyer)

The deployment of the F-4M Phantom on 19 and 92 Squadrons at RAF Wildenrath occurred at the end of the air defence re-equipment programme once all the UK Phantom air defence squadrons had formed. The Wildenrath airframes were drawn from a variety of squadrons as they were retired from ground attack duties with the vast bulk arriving from 41 Squadron as it gave up its reconnaissance role.

The Phantom offered a massive increase in fighter capability almost overnight. Replacing the two squadrons of Lightnings at Gütersloh, although the Phantom airframe was less agile when carrying external fuel tanks, its weapon system and war load were vastly superior. The two-man crew and improved navigation system made operating in the crowded airspace easier, particularly given the predominance of poor weather conditions. The first commander of the re-equipped 92 Squadron noted that the introduction of the Phantom FGR2 into the air defence forces of the Central Region was an exciting prospect and that the pulse-Doppler radar would require a total revision of tactics. It is for that reason that the differences will be discussed later in much greater detail. Nevertheless, the introduction would revolutionise air defence operations in the Central Region and the Phantom would reign supreme until the advent of the US and Soviet air superiority fighters in the 1980s.

A trio of 6 and 54 Squadron Phantoms carrying various role fits including the Thorn EMI reconnaissance pod, Sparrow missiles and SNEB pods. The 6 Squadron aircraft is furthest from the camera. (© UK MOD Crown Copyright (1969))

Chapter Two

The Phantom FGR2 in the RAF Germany Air Defence Role

It could be assumed that the obvious choice to provide a fighter for the NATO Central Region would be for a highly manoeuvrable, air superiority design. Although such performance would be preferable, when it was first deployed to Germany in 1977, despite its relatively poor turning performance, the Phantom proved to be an excellent choice. The significance of the arrival of the Phantom FGR2 in RAF Germany cannot be understated because, for the first time, NATO had deployed a weapon system with a pulse-Doppler radar and all-aspect radar-guided missiles that could be employed in all weather. Whilst the Lightning had a capability in the upper air, it suffered at low level which is where the Soviet threat was expected to operate, and carried only two limited-aspect air-to-air missiles with a limited probability of kill even when fired within the ideal envelope. It did, however, carry two 30mm Aden cannon. The Phantom with its complex weapons system, generous fuel load and two-man crew was a revolution.

An AN/AWG 12 radar extended for rectification. A rare shot. External views of the radar were classified and work was normally only done in a closed hangar and not on the line. (© UK MOD Crown Copyright (1977))

The AN/AWG 12 radar showing the highpower microwave packs. The scanner is a later modification state and has the black Jubilee Guardsman IFF interrogator antennas mounted on the face. (© Ferranti Ltd)

The line replaceable units were mounted in a pod which could be lowered for easier access to connectors. (© Ferranti Ltd)

Undoubtedly the main factor which made the Phantom FGR2 so suitable for the role was the AN/AWG 12 radar, also known as the missile control system or MCS. Housed in the cavity forward of the cockpit and protected by the ogival-shaped radome, the main radar pack consisted of a mainframe around which the line replaceable units were hung. The assembly could be drawn out on a large bar which could be fitted to the airframe, and known as the pantograph, allowing access to the electronic packs for rectification and servicing.

Each section of the radar was allocated a line replaceable unit, or LRU number. In broad terms, the LRU 1 controlled the scanner, the LRU 2 and 3 the receiver, the LRU 4 and 5 the transmitter, and the LRU 6 the antenna and continuous wave radar. Each individual circuit board within the line replaceable units was allocated a sub number so, for example, the LRU 6-A1 might be changed if the navigator reported any problems in controlling the scanner.

The scanner was mounted centrally to the front of the pack and was a dominant feature as the diameter of the scanner set the size of the radome, hence the FGR2’s bulbous nose shape. On the F-4E and F-4F, which had the smaller diameter but less capable AN/APG 120, it was possible to streamline the aerodynamics and to fit an internal gun. The AN/AWG 11/12 antenna was driven by a complex series of servos and resolvers operated by hydraulic pressure which meant that with certain hydraulic failures the radar was inoperable. The radome’s complex shape gave the best radar performance and the construction material and paint were carefully selected to ensure that the radar waves were transmitted and received at peak efficiency. The rectangular funnel-shaped object offset to the side was the illuminator antenna for the continuous wave radar which guided the semi-active missiles providing a reflected signal on which the missiles could home to the target. Later, small black, dipole antennas were fitted across the face of the scanner which transmitted and received electronic signals for the Jubilee Guardsman identification system controlled from the cockpit.

The powerful main radar transmitter was powered by a Klystron amplifier which in its original form pushed out a massive 1,525 watts of power. It was this which was to give the biggest problem in service as the waveguides suffered numerous failures simply because of the power demands. When the radar reliability modifications were introduced in 1980 under Electronic Change Programme 152, the transmitter power was drastically reduced to 400 watts to alleviate these issues. Although there was concern that this would reduce the effective range of the radar markedly, in practice the losses were not so evident and proved acceptable. Once embodied, radar reliability improved drastically. In addition to the main transmitter, a smaller power amplifier developing around 900 watts powered the continuous wave, or CW radar.

The disparity in power levels between the two transmitters might seem unusual but the reason lay in the way radar operates. A radar does not transmit at all times, rather, it sends out a signal towards the target and then switches off to listen for the return echo. Once received it calculates the range in the case of a pulse radar or the closing velocity in the case of a pulse-Doppler radar. It then transmits again to update the information before closing down to listen once again. This on/off cycle is known as the duty cycle and was typically less than 50 per cent for the AN/AWG 12. A higher duty cycle meant it spent more time transmitting but at the risk of missed detections. The most efficient way to track a target is to illuminate it with a continuous wave radar beam but some information is lost when doing so. To compensate for the inefficiency of the switching, the transmitter power must be increased.

With AN/AWG 12, the responses from the main radar signal were fed to the rear cockpit and displayed on the radar scope controlled by the navigator. The CW signals were sent to ports in each of the semi-conformal missile housings under the fuselage and used to tune the semi-active Sparrow missiles before launch. Additional priming signals were fed from the main radar. Once launched, the missiles received guidance signals from the antenna and updated target information. The CW transmitter was controlled by a switch in the front cockpit on the pilot’s missile control panel.

On the face of the scanner, a long tubular projection fitted with a bulbous end cap, positioned in the centre of the antenna dish was known as the feedhorn. Signals left the transmitter via the feedhorn, bounced back at the antenna and were reflected into free space. After bouncing off the target, on their return, the shape of the scanner focussed the received signals onto the tip of the feedhorn and back to the receiver. Once a lock was commanded from the rear cockpit, the feedhorn began to rotate in a wobbling motion known as nutation centred on the target’s position in space. By sensing the target’s movement away from the central position, or the null, the radar could update the spatial coordinates and track the target in three dimensions. This was known as a full track lock or more commonly, a lock on. Once locked the radar would follow the target automatically in space. The navigator could override the automatic tracking by using the navigator’s hand controller to break lock.

An additional feature on the scanner was known as the spoiler bar and used in the mapping modes. When selected on the radar control panel the spoiler bar deployed shaping the beam to optimise coverage over the ground. This was known as a cosecant squared beam and, in the cockpit, mapping mode was displayed in the traditional cheese wedge shape many would recognise from ground-based radars.

A new airborne interrogator known as Jubilee Guardsman was fitted to the Phantom in the mid-1980s along with an automatic identification friend or foe code changer. The system could interrogate the IFF box fitted in most aircraft using both Mode 1 and Mode 3 codes selected on a control box in the front cockpit. In peacetime, an air traffic or fighter control unit allocates a code to each aircraft it controls and, if known, the pilot could select the code on the Automatic Code Changer, or ACC, control box and the navigator could interrogate the contact by pressing a button on the navigator’s hand controller. If the code was recognised, a symbol would appear on the radar display giving information about the target. The function operated entirely separately to the radar and was derived from exchanges of information between the IFF black boxes. Although this information could not be used to declare a target hostile, it was useful for identifying friendly contacts in the fighter’s area of responsibility. Knowing the position of friendly contacts is just as important tactically as finding hostile contacts. A target which failed to respond electronically would attract much closer attention.

A built-in test box for the radar was fitted in the rear cockpit. Run on the ground either by the navigator or a technician, the box allowed static test profiles to be run on the electronics within the radar and could identify faults and allow defective components to be isolated and line replaceable units, or LRUs, to be changed. Later on in the service life, the analogue box was replaced with a digital version which was much more effective.

The AN/AWG 12 in the FGR2 had four basic modes:

Pulse-Doppler was the innovation which allowed the Phantom crew to detect targets when looking down into ground clutter. It was also the most powerful mode with detection ranges against an airliner flying at medium level being, typically, 100 miles. Against a low-flying target with the Phantom flying at medium level, this would be reduced to 50 miles but could be as short as 27 miles if both were at low level. The radar cross section, or the target’s echoing size, affected detection range with pickup ranges against a small target such as the MiG-21 reduced even further. Because of the duty cycle, the radar could suffer from a phenomenon known as eclipsing where the transmitter was still active as the returned pulse was being received. For this reason the pulse repetition frequency, or the rate at which the on/off sequences were timed, was varied constantly. Poor detection performance was often attributed to this effect and skill and patience was needed from technicians to fix an errant radar as the phenomenon was hard to reproduce on the ground.

In pulse-Doppler search mode, the target range was not displayed until the radar was locked to the target and up to that point, only closing velocity, or Vc (pronounced V Sub C), was shown. Targets towards the top of the display were closing rapidly with targets near the bottom of the scope moving away. The range of velocities which could be displayed were from plus 1,600 knots closing to minus 500 knots opening and was adjustable using an increase/decrease switch on the radar control panel. The switch would only come into play against a fast supersonic target or in-behind where pulse was the favoured mode rather than pulse-Doppler, alleviating the limitation. A mode known as pause to range could be selected in which the scanner would move left to right and briefly stop if it detected a target giving a range indication. It was, however, difficult to use and was not favoured by most navigators who preferred to maintain more control over the radar often using lock mode in preference.

Once the radar was locked-on, the crew would see additional information displayed, most significantly the target range. Velocity information was still available plus an expanded velocity display on an A scope which was useful in the electronic countermeasures battle. As the missile launch point approached, additional steering and parametric information was displayed.

The simplest mode was short pulse which gave a range and azimuth to a target relative to the Phantom. The value might be 20 degrees right of the nose at eight miles. A pulse was transmitted and received and could be displayed from the minimum radar range of about 200 yards out to five miles. In the VI mode, for Visident, the blip became fuzzy on the display.

A second pulse mode was also available known as Chirp. Using clever radar processing which my radar instructor described beautifully, albeit unintelligibly at the time, the pulse was compressed on its return leading to an increase in range performance. For that reason the pulse mode would show targets from five miles out to the limit of detection range. Against a Phantom-sized target that would be approximately 30 to 40 miles, albeit much greater against a large airliner. Again, this information was shown on a range versus azimuth display.

In mapping mode the display in the cockpit changed and the navigator would see a cheese wedge display originating from a single point of origin at the aircraft. The longest range was 200 miles but in Lo Map the definition was much higher allowing radar fixing and bombing. It was occasionally used in the air defence role but often navigators would use pulse mode in preference.

The pulse Doppler radar display.

The pulse Doppler lock display.

Pulse search mode.

Mapping mode.

There were two principal air combat modes. The pilot lock mode allowed the pilot to override the controls in the back cockpit and place the radar into an acquisition mode. The radar was locked to the weapons boresight and a range strobe ran out and locked to anything it detected in the beam. It was useful if the target was in the area of the gunsight and the pilot was able to track the target visually. This mode was useful in the highly dynamic air combat environment when the target position remained reasonably stable. If the pilot was unable to bring the nose to bear through lack of airframe performance, another short-range mode was available but controlled from the back seat. By selecting gyros out and boresight on the radar control panel, the radar was again locked to the Phantom’s centreline, or weapons boresight. By rolling the thumbwheel on the navigator’s hand controller upwards relative to the weapons line, it might be possible to paint the target giving the opportunity to lock even if the pilot could not bring the nose to bear. It did, however, need good crew coordination and snappy radar handling as the opportunities were fleeting as the air situation changed rapidly.

A final option was to fire the semi-active missile in an unlocked condition. By fixing the radar to the centreline using boresight mode, the pilot could manually select the continuous wave radar to on and fire the missile. By constantly tracking the target during the missile time of flight, there was a chance that the missile might pass close enough to the target in order to activate the proximity fuse. It did, however, require a very cooperative, or dumb, target pilot and the probability of kill using this mode was extremely low.

One of the first tasks for a fledgling air defence crew was to master the art of interpreting a B Scope which was the basis for the Phantom’s tactical displays. Because much of the finesse in an intercept occurred at close range, the area around the nose was expanded for better definition. The baseline, or zero range point, which was normally a single point immediately on the nose, was expanded out to 60 degrees either side of the nose. Instead of a cheese wedge display, the crew were offered a square grid. With a cheese wedge, the targets at close range would be clumped together and difficult to differentiate. By widening the baseline their position in space could be resolved more accurately and a more effective attack prosecuted. It did, however, mean that the new air defence navigator had to spend considerable time understanding and interpreting this new environment and the information it was showing.

Phantom crews were trained to operate in instrument meteorological conditions, namely when the cloud and visibility was poor, using a radar to radar technique. This meant that the navigator would be expected to position the aircraft to a point at which missiles could be launched effectively both in the front hemisphere and in the stern. Depending on weather or light conditions, the pilot may not see the target visually, and would follow verbal commands to position the Phantom accurately using his flight instruments.

A missile engagement zone is complex and not symmetrical and launch ranges are higher in the front sector than behind a target. A Sparrow missile could be launched in the head sector out to a maximum range of about 18 miles, although Company advertising literature might suggest longer ranges. This would be against a supersonic target at high level with the range reducing at lower speeds and lower altitudes. At very low level or in a manoeuvring environment that range might be as short as four miles. In the stern hemisphere, the range might be as high as five miles but, more typically, no more than two. Although an all-aspect capability was suggested, realistically there was a small sector on the target’s beam where the missile would struggle to track the target and the probability of kill would be much reduced, particularly if looking down. With the arrival of the Skyflash missile with its bigger motor, in the late 1970s, not only was the engagement envelope expanded over the Sparrow but the missile was more capable in an electronic jamming environment in which the crews expected to fight. The corollary was that operating the radar under jamming conditions was a much greater challenge in the back cockpit requiring dexterity and mental gymnastics to operate the complex anti-jamming modes.

For the shorter range Sidewinder infra-red guided missile the performance varied with the variant. The older AIM-9G standard, which initially equipped the British Phantom, was a stern aspect only weapon. The missile could be fired up to 60 degrees off the target’s tail out to a range of five miles at medium level. At low level the maximum range was no more than one mile. With the advent of the AIM-9L variant, although the ranges did not increase markedly, the missile could be fired in the head sector all the way around into the stern sector. Being a fire and forget missile, once it had acquired the target and left the aircraft the crew had no further input to the engagement and could disengage.

For most of its time in Germany, the Phantom was declared to NATO equipped with the SUU-23 gun. This might seem surprising given the lack of any air-to-ground role and the weight and drag penalty conferred by carrying the bulky pod. The gun, however, was a flexible addition to the armoury, particularly for quick reaction alert duties on Battle Flight. It might have been the only viable weapon to divert a rogue airliner from its chosen flight path, short of engaging with an air-to-air missile with the obvious and likely consequences. A warning shot across the bows, particularly when armed with high-explosive incendiary rounds might be enough to convince a hijacker that his goal was impossible. It was also useful as a counter to helicopters which were difficult to track on radar and had very small infra-red signatures. Without a radar lock or with no infra-red acquisition, a gun might have been the only weapon available to down a belligerent helicopter, particularly if it landed when attacked.

Arguably, tactics in Germany were driven by deficiencies in the weapon system rather than the strengths. During most of its time in RAF Germany the FGR2 was not fitted with an airborne IFF interrogator or any of the later identification systems