The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945

By David Hobbs

“A comprehensive study of the bittersweet post WWII history of British naval aviation . . . will become a standard reference for its subject.”—Firetrench
 
In 1945 the most powerful fleet in the Royal Navy’s history was centered on nine aircraft carriers. This book charts the post-war fortunes of this potent strike force; its decline in the face of diminishing resources, its final fall at the hands of uncomprehending politicians, and its recent resurrection in the form of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, the largest ships ever built for the Royal Navy.
 
After 1945 “experts” prophesied that nuclear weapons would make conventional forces obsolete, but British carrier-borne aircraft were almost continuously employed in numerous conflicts as far apart as Korea, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, the South Atlantic, East Africa and the Far East, often giving successive British Governments options when no others were available. In the process the Royal Navy invented many of the techniques and devices crucial to modern carrier operations angled decks, steam catapults and deck-landing aids while also pioneering novel forms of warfare like helicopter-borne assault, and tactics for countering such modern plagues as insurgency and terrorism.
 
This book combines narratives of these poorly understood operations with a clear analysis of the strategic and political background, benefiting from the author's personal experience of both carrier flying and the workings of Whitehall. It is an important but largely untold story, of renewed significance as Britain once again embraces carrier aviation.
 
“Makes a timely and welcome appearance . . . will make compelling reading for those with serious concern for our naval affairs.”—St. Andrews in Focus

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Oct 30, 2015
• ISBN: 9781848324121

David Hobbs

UK

Book preview

1  Manpower, Fleets and Changes

The effective strike operations carried out by the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) in 1945 against Japanese strategic, industrial, military and naval targets drew the Royal Navy into a new era of warfare. It had been the only British strike force capable of attacking mainland Japan and had done so with an economy of manpower and equipment that should have demonstrated to post-war British governments how a maritime strategy could be deployed affordably in the nation’s best interests across the world when required in the uncertain years after 1945. The BPF had also harnessed the potential of the Commonwealth to act together in support of a common aim, besides fighting seamlessly alongside the armed forces of the United States. At the dawn of an era when the United Nations was expected to be the guardian of the world’s peace these were factors as important as the fleet’s effectiveness in combat. The BPF’s embarked aircraft had been the core of the fleet’s power and those who understood its achievements predicted a bright future for naval aviation in the post-war era. After the end of hostilities, the BPF had shown further flexibility by transforming a number of ships, especially aircraft carriers, to repatriate former prisoners of war and internees and to provide humanitarian relief to places such as Hong Kong left destitute by Japanese occupation forces. In the power vacuum after the collapse of Japan the BPF had moved seamlessly into a constabulary role to put down piracy and insurrection across the Far East so that peacetime trade could be restored. The fleet demonstrated its ability to deploy the right amount of force or humanitarian aid in the right place at the right time, often using the same resources for both tasks.

For much of late 1945 and 1946, BPF warships and their ships’ companies proved to be not only the most suitable entity for a wide variety of sensitive and difficult new tasks but, in many cases, they represented the only organisation available in the short term to implement UK government policies that had not been anticipated or prepared for. The former French and Dutch colonial empires in Indo-China and the East Indies had to be held against nationalist insurgents until suitable colonial forces could be shipped to them from Europe where the colonial powers were, themselves, trying to recover from German occupation. The restoration of French and Dutch rule in the region, whilst distasteful to some, was supported by the United Nations in the short term to restore stability and was accepted as British government policy. It was an important aspect of the restoration of global trade and, therefore, vital to the recovery of the United Kingdom’s economy after six years of war. The BPF contributed to the restoration of stability and British trade in a number of ways including the protection of shipping against piracy and the illegal use of force by non-state forces. More subtly it ‘showed the flag’ in many ports to emphasise that Britain was a victorious power with global reach, able to act for good as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

The BPF led the Royal Navy into a new era of warfare in which carrier air groups would be used with powerful effect against enemies at sea, in the air and on land, if necessary at considerable distances from the UK. A running range of Corsairs and Avengers is seen here on Victorious, about to take off to strike targets in Japan. RN carrier-borne aircraft like these were the only British aircraft to attack the Japanese mainland during the Second World War. (Author’s collection)

Many urgent operational tasks remained after VJ-Day, among them the clearance of wartime minefields. On the initiative of the Admiralty, an international organisation was created, based in London, to supervise the work of clearance¹ and 1900 minesweepers from many nations were employed on the task. Despite this effort, 130 merchant ships and fishing vessels of all nationalities were sunk or damaged in late 1945 and early 1946, most of them vessels that strayed outside specified channels despite published advice, but no minesweepers were lost. At the beginning of 1946 the Royal Navy operated 513 minesweepers across the world on active duty, all of which had to be manned by skilled personnel available for long enough to avoid constant disruptions to their ships’ companies. By the beginning of 1947 the number had reduced to sixty-five² and over 4600 mines had been swept by British and Commonwealth vessels during 1946³ in areas as far apart as the Atlantic, North Sea, Mediterranean, Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Indo-China and Borneo.

Powerful strike carrier operations had continued in the BPF until the last hours of the war but the Home Fleet had already run down considerably before the Japanese surrender and the Mediterranean Fleet had effectively become a training force, providing operational sea training facilities in good weather for newly commissioned ships. The end of hostilities and the urgent need for the UK Government to recover an economy that was on the verge of bankruptcy after rearmament and six years of global war meant that the Admiralty had to carry out a programme of demobilisation and force reduction on a massive scale. In 1945 there was already a manpower crisis, with new ships including sixteen of the new light fleet carriers coming into service and older ships including the carriers Furious and Argus and several battleships having to be reduced to reserve to find the experienced men needed to man them. The Admiralty had expected the war in the Pacific to last into 1946 but, under pressure from the Government to make manpower available for the restoration of British industry, had already begun to release men in certain categories back into civilian life. The Japanese surrender in August 1945 meant that large numbers of men would have to be demobilised while maintaining operational capability where it was still needed urgently. The RN in general, and its Fleet Air Arm in particular faced a number of problems once the imperative to mount major combat operations at long range ceased and the Service had to revert to a peacetime size and structure.

Manpower and Training

In mid-1945 approximately 866,000 men and women were serving in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) but over 75 per cent of the officers were mobilised members of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) and a large percentage of ratings enlisted since 1939 had joined under ‘hostilities only’ rules, although these had allowed for some of them to be retained until ‘normal’ conditions were restored and men on peacetime engagements trained to replace them. This number was far in excess of the Royal Navy’s approved war strength of 450,000 in 1918 and demobilisation had to be carried out, therefore, on a scale and at a pace that was unprecedented. Some organisations could be demobilised quickly as the requirements for them had ended with the enemy’s surrender. These included Western Approaches Command in Liverpool; the wartime Home Fleet base at Scapa Flow; airfields, air yards and stores depots in Ceylon, Australia, the Admiralty Islands and many more. By 1946 the manpower total was reduced to 492,800 and by 1947 it was 192,665.

Demobilisation was not just a question of numbers, although reductions of 300,000 men per year in two consecutive years were difficult enough to manage. The majority of the pre-war regulars still serving had become senior rates or officers and virtually every branch had shortages of junior rates, felt most keenly in the newer branches such as radar, fighter control, electronic warfare and particularly naval aviation. The RN had only regained full control of its embarked aircraft together with their procurement, shore training and support in May 1939, although recruiting for aircrew and maintenance personnel had begun shortly after the decision by Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for Defence Co-ordination, in July 1937 that both the administration and operation of naval aviation should be under Admiralty and not joint control. By 1945 one man in four of those serving in the RN and its reserves was directly concerned with naval aviation. The Fleet Air Arm was not, therefore, in a position to allow as many early releases as the larger, longer-established branches such as seamen and stokers. The result was that the release of some rating categories had to be held back behind the average level⁴ and by 1947 the disparity between the most advanced release group and the most retarded was eleven. Equality was not achieved before 1948 when the last of the ‘hostilities only’ ratings were released. The manpower crisis between 1945 and 1948 was one of the reasons why the WRNS was retained as a permanent element within the Naval Service.

A number of regular RN officers had qualified as pilots prior to 1939 and others were recruited as short-service RN pilots and observers after 1937. Many of these subsequently gained permanent commissions and several rose to high rank but after September 1939 the great majority of pilots and observers were commissioned into the RNR and especially the RNVR. While some of these were interested in transferring to the regular Navy, many were not. Faced with a serious shortage of aircrew in 1946, the Admiralty decided to cease the training of observers and train officers as pilot/observers to fill the gap.⁵ Officers undergoing observer training at the time, or ear-marked for it, were to be re-trained as pilot/observers. Surprisingly, it was decided not to repeat the pre-war practice of entering officers on short-service commissions as pilots. At the same time it was decided that two-thirds of all naval pilots should, in future be ratings,⁶ the majority to be recruited direct from civil life into a re-constituted rating pilots’ branch but some to be taken from RN branches particularly, it was hoped, aircraft artificers although it was not made clear how this would help the existing shortage of artificers. The first rating pilot intake took place in November 1946 and comprised volunteers from the residue of deferred wartime ‘Y’ Scheme candidates together with a few transfers from other branches. Another new rating branch was created to replace the wartime telegraphist air gunners (TAGs); known as aircrewmen, the new rear-seat crews were to specialise as ‘maintainer-users’ of airborne electronic equipment and were to be recruited, it was hoped, mainly from the electrical branch. Aircrewmen in the higher rating grades were to be trained to navigate aircraft and suitable TAGs were to be offered conversion courses to allow them to join the branch which was expected to fill about 80 per cent of the rear seats in future squadrons.

Changes were also made in the maintenance and servicing branches and those connected with other duties concerning aircraft. The naval airman branch was reconstituted and ratings employed in both aircraft handling and safety equipment duties were transferred into it from the seaman branch. The branch also included photographers, meteorological ratings and mechanics used for aircraft servicing and general duties connected with air ordnance. More highly-qualified mechanics, now known as skilled air mechanics (SAMs), were to be introduced to replace the air fitter branch for employment on aircraft maintenance that required a lower degree of skill than that of artificers.⁷ Artificers themselves were the most highly-skilled rating maintenance personnel and they were qualified in either airframe/engine or electrical/ordnance categories. In accordance with the recommendations of the Naval Aircraft Maintenance Committee, centralised maintenance was introduced for both front-line and training units within which personnel and aircraft were to be formed into cohesive air groups.

Within a year it had to be accepted the changes introduced for aircrew categories and their training had been a failure that had, arguably, made the situation worse rather than better. Few volunteers for the rating pilot scheme had come forward and the Admiralty had to accept that only officers would have the full range of qualities and access to briefing material and intelligence that it required its pilots to have.⁸ This accorded with wartime experience, making the decision to rely heavily on rating pilots difficult to understand. Also, the RAF, which was responsible for all UK military pilot training, had decided that its own pilots should all, in future, be officers and training ratings for the RN alone would have been difficult. The termination of the rating pilot scheme was announced in December 1948⁹ and it was announced at the same time that in future pilot entry was to comprise approximately one-third from volunteer executive officers on the permanent list and two-thirds direct entry officers on short-service commissions. A small number of Royal Marines and engineer specialist officers were also to be recruited to provide a broad base of knowledge in front-line units.

The first conversion course to train pilot/observers started in July 1948 but it immediately became apparent that the concept of appointing dual-trained officers as either pilots or observers was impractical and very uneconomical since the training was excessively long and the maintenance of currency in both skills difficult to achieve. The few dual-trained officers were designated as (F) for ‘flying’ rather than the more usual (p) for a pilot or (o) for an observer in the Navy List. The last pure observer courses in 1946 were composed of RCN and Dutch officers but by 1948 it was accepted that a new scheme for the direct entry of short-service officers for training as observers must be restored. The aircrewman branch took a long time to get started but eventually attracted a number of TAGs; all TAGs rated petty officer or above were offered the choice of conversion to the aircrewman branch or of re-training as naval airmen or air electrical specialists. About 150 opted to continue flying and completed their training in November 1949. The original concept that the branch should draw its recruits from the air electrical branch was abandoned after it proved impractical and a direct-entry scheme was approved. This, likewise, never materialised and by 1949 the branch was composed entirely of former TAGs. A new entry of some form of rating aircrew was anticipated, however, for the three-seat anti-submarine aircraft project that materialised as the Fairey Gannet. Broadly, the changes in the structure of the maintenance branches proved more workable and these stayed in place. One other change was introduced in 1949; since May 1939 officers involved with aviation duties had formed what was known as the Air Branch, although the term Fleet Air Arm used since 1924 had remained in common use. Short-service officers and those mobilised from the RNR and RNVR into the Air Branch, who had not qualified as executive officers able to keep watches or command HM ships had the fact denoted by a letter ‘A’ inside the executive curl of the their rank lace. In 1949 the Branch was disestablished and officers were transferred into the executive or engineering Branches¹⁰ as appropriate and the use of the ‘A’ in rank lace lapsed.

The last course of pilots cross-trained as observers completed its training in September 1949 and there were no plans to train more although, in the normal course of events, it remained possible for some suitable observers to re-train as pilots. At the same time specialisation as observers was re-opened to officers in the executive branch and direct-entry into observer training continued. By 1949 the training of aircrew had, therefore, stabilised although numbers were still significantly below those required. Two very practical schemes were introduced to expand the number of aircrew available at short notice in emergencies, however. The first of these was the establishment of four RNVR naval air squadrons, three fighter and one anti-submarine, in July 1947. These were based at RN air stations and had a core of regular pilots and maintainers. Initially sixty-five pilots and six observers, all officers, were enrolled,¹¹ thus ensuring that their extensive wartime experience continued to be available. The Admiralty also sought to recruit experienced RNVR air engineer officers, supply officers and air traffic control specialists together with an initial ninety ratings with aircraft servicing and maintenance experience to make the RNVR air squadrons fully capable of embarkation at need. They had to commit to carrying out fourteen days’ continuous training per year in addition to 100 hours non-continuous training spread over at least twelve weekends per year. In practice it was found that commitment was needed to two or three weekends per month for the pilots to maintain reasonable currency on their aircraft. RNVR aircrew with a wartime background were obviously a wasting asset as they grew older, however, and the second scheme involved the training of new reserve aircrew. In 1949 it was decided to introduce pilot training, and in due course observer training, for National Servicemen deemed to be suitable for a commission.¹² They were entered as Midshipmen RNVR and followed the normal RN flying training syllabus to ‘wings’ standard during their National Service time. They were then to be fed into the RNVR air squadrons for conversion onto operational types and continuation flying, meeting the normal requirements for training. Both reserve schemes provided a valuable means by which the front-line naval air squadrons could be reinforced in an emergency and both were to be tested sooner than had been envisaged.

As a means of making the most use of the manpower that was available, another 1949 decision led to the civilianisation of several tasks previously undertaken within the Home Air Command training establishment. The main object of this was to enable the release of large numbers of maintenance personnel and a proportion of aircrew for duties more closely connected to front-line operations.¹³ These included the twin-engined aircraft conversion unit and the provision of targets for the aircraft direction school taken over by Airwork Services at RNAS Brawdy, flying in support of the naval air signal school by Air Service Training at Hamble and the provision of an instrument flying school and practice flying facilities for pilots in Admiralty appointments by Short Brothers & Harland at Rochester. Introduced for an initial trial period until 1950, civilianisation worked well and other tasks were considered.

Ships

In 1945 all six operational fleet carriers had served in the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron (ACS) as part of the BPF. By 1947 all of them had returned to the UK, some having been used for trooping duties to the Far East before being reduced to reserve status. Illustrious was modernised and re-commissioned but with accommodation that was far below acceptable peacetime standards she was used with a reduced ship’s company as a trials and training carrier. Even then it proved impossible to keep her running during the manpower crises during demobilisation and she spent periods in reserve. It had to be accepted between 1945 and 1948 that these big ships were manpower-intensive and expensive to operate. Implacable and Indomitable underwent refits to allow them to return to operational service but their low hangar heights and small lifts limited the type of aircraft they could operate. Indefatigable and Victorious were brought out of reserve for service with reduced ships’ companies to act as training ships in the Home Fleet Training Squadron based at Portland, replacing battleships that were placed in reserve or scrapped. Formidable was found to be in such a poor material state after her wartime damage and the years laid up without maintenance that she was never returned to service.

Although they were relatively young, these six ships suffered from the fact that they had been designed before the 1942 Joint Technical Committee decision that aircraft must be embarked in greater numbers with larger dimensions than had previously been allowed and maximum launch weights up to 30,000lbs. None of the existing fleet carriers were capable of operating such aircraft without major reconstruction and their accommodation, designed in the late 1930s was totally inadequate for the increased number of sailors required for their enlarged air groups, radar and other technical advances including the big increases in the size of their close-range armament. In mid-1945 the Admiralty had authority from the Government to build seven new fleet carriers, three of the Audacious class and four of the later and bigger Malta class. The latter could never have been completed during the war and were designed with the post-war fleet in mind but with the nation on the verge of bankruptcy, the Admiralty was unable to persuade the new Labour Government that it needed at least two Malta class and they were all cancelled by December before construction had begun. One of the Audacious class was scrapped on the slipway when 27 per cent complete. The two others were eventually completed as Eagle and Ark Royal, both modified to operate new generations of aircraft and both had a major role to play in the RN strike fleet for two decades.

The light fleet carriers proved to be valuable ships in the immediate post-war years. Four of them, Colossus, Venerable, Vengeance and Glory, had joined the BPF in 1945 just too late for active operations against the Japanese but in time to play an important role in the stabilisation of the Far East when limited force had to be applied in several local conflicts that followed the removal of Japanese occupation forces. By the end of 1946 only two light fleet carriers remained with the BPF and they returned to the UK to be reduced to reserve in 1947 as the manpower crisis reached its height. Other ships of this class were completed after 1945 and were brought into service when manpower and worked-up squadrons were available. None of the improved Majestic class were completed for the RN but Magnificent was completed for loan to the RCN and Terrible was sold to the RAN as HMAS Sydney III. Both navies adopted RN squadron numbers and procedures for their embryonic Fleet Air Arms and the provision of manpower to fill gaps in their establishments and training their air groups absorbed a significant amount of RN effort. 1948 found nearly all RN carriers immobilised in UK ports because of manpower shortages,¹⁴ but by the end of the year the position had improved and it proved possible to re-commission one fleet and four light fleet carriers for operational service with full air groups with one fleet and one light fleet carrier engaged in trials and training duties.

During the Second World War the RN had operated thirty-eight escort carriers built in the USA and made available under Lend-Lease arrangements; a further six were converted from merchant ships in the UK together with nineteen small Merchant Navy-manned escort carriers known as MAC-Ships. By 1947 the surviving American ships had all been returned, the MAC-Ships returned to mercantile use and all but one of the British conversions returned to their former owners. The exception was Campania which was to be converted into an aircraft ferry but that plan failed to materialise and she was converted into an exhibition ship to support the Festival of Britain in 1951. Her naval career subsequently resumed and in 1952 she was refitted to become the flagship of the task force that carried out the first British atomic bomb test at Monte Bello Island off north-west Australia. She operated helicopters and seaplanes on a variety of administrative tasks. Three maintenance carriers, a type unique to the RN, were reduced to reserve by 1946 but Unicorn was subsequently to give valuable service during the Korean War and Perseus as a trials ship and prototype helicopter carrier.

Beyond the short term, once manpower stability had been achieved, the Admiralty still faced major problems. To keep the RN effective, a new generation of aircraft would have to be introduced but the existing large carriers were clearly handicapped by their low hangar height, small lifts and cramped workshops and accommodation. They would need radical reconstruction to make them effective and that would be expensive; just how expensive was not appreciated until work started on the first ship, Victorious in 1950. Reconstruction on this scale had never been attempted in a Royal Dockyard before but in 1949 Admiralty approval in principle, with Treasury acceptance, was given to modernise three of the existing fleet carriers.¹⁵ The flight deck and hangars were to be strengthened to operate aircraft at maximum weights up to 30,000lbs. The hangars were to retain their armoured protection but their height was to be increased to 17ft 6in and a complete gallery deck was to be built in over the hangars, beneath their flight decks. The ships were to be fitted with new, larger lifts including a side-lift, together with steam catapults, improved arrester gear and barriers. Even in 1949, however, it was admitted that ‘owing to the small size of these ships, the full possibilities which should result from fitting all the latest aircraft operating equipment will not be attainable’.¹⁶ There was no immediate intention of modernising any light fleet carriers despite their current usefulness.

Aircraft

In many ways the Royal Navy’s problems with aircraft mirrored those with its ships; it had a lot of them in 1945, some of which remained in production but new technological developments and the requirement for long-range strike warfare meant that most of these were already obsolescent. A considerable number, roughly half the total, had been provided by the United States under Lend-Lease arrangements and after the end of hostilities these had to be paid for in dollars, returned to the USA or destroyed. Unsurprisingly the last option was the cheapest and thousands of aircraft were dumped into the sea off Australia, India, Ceylon, South Africa and in the waters around the United Kingdom. To add to the problem, the British aircraft industry was going through its own post-war convulsions with the shutting-down of the shadow factory scheme and the financial difficulties that followed the cancellation of large numbers of aircraft under contract.

Two aircraft types were under development for the RN in 1945 which were intended specifically for use in the Malta, Audacious and Hermes class carriers. Both were too big and heavy to operate from the existing fleet or light fleet carriers and with the cancellation of the Maltas and likely long delays before the ships that became Eagle and Ark Royal and the four remaining Hermes class ships would be completed there seemed little point in continuing with aircraft which were expected to be obsolete before they could go to sea and both were cancelled. The first was the Fairey Spearfish, intended as a Barracuda replacement in the strike and reconnaissance roles, ordered to meet Specification O.5/43.¹⁷ Unlike its predecessor, dive-bombing was considered the primary attack method with torpedo attack relegated to secondary status. The first prototype, RA 356, flew in 1946 and it was followed by two other prototypes which were used for development work until 1952 but production orders for 208 Spearfish were cancelled and the airframes broken up on Fairey’s Stockport production line.¹⁸ It had a wingspan of 60ft 3in and a maximum launch weight of 22,083lbs, making it considerably larger and heavier than its predecessor, and had a large internal weapons bay capable of carrying a single Mark 15 or 17 torpedo or up to four 1000lb bombs. Defensive armament comprised a single 0.5in Browning machine in a turret aft of the cockpit that was controlled remotely by the observer. Another advanced feature was the torpedo and sight which included an early example of an analogue computer. It would have had a radius of action of about 400 miles. The prototypes and the first 100 production aircraft were powered by a single 2320hp Bristol Centaurus 58 radial engine; subsequent production aircraft were to have been fitted with the projected Rolls-Royce Pennine engine which was to be more powerful.¹⁹ The Spearfish was one of the largest single-engined aircraft ever flown.

The other cancelled project was the Short Sturgeon which was designed to meet Specification S.11/43 for a long-range reconnaissance and light strike aircraft. Like the Spearfish, it was specified after the Joint Technical Committee’s decision to increase the size and weight of aircraft and intended for the new generation of carriers. The only twin propeller-driven aircraft to be designed for the Royal Navy from the outset rather than evolved from a design intended for the RAF, it was too big and too heavy for operation from the existing carriers. Powered by two Rolls-Royce Merlin 140 engines, each developing 2080hp, it had a wingspan of 59ft 11in and a maximum all-up weight of 23,000lbs.²⁰ A small internal bomb-bay was capable of carrying a single 1000lb bomb or four depth charges; it was also intended to have two 0.5in Browning ‘front-guns’ fitted in the wings and hardpoints under the wings for sixteen 3in rockets with 60lb warheads. These gave it a useful attack capability but its principal role equipment would have been two F-52 cameras with 36in or 20in lenses which would have given the aircraft a strategic reconnaissance capability. It would also have carried ASH radar in the nose and was capable of both radar and visual surface search and shadowing an enemy force at sea. The radius of action on internal fuel would have been an impressive 700 miles in still air and maximum speed was 325 knots. Like all twin-engined propeller-driven naval aircraft, the Sturgeon suffered from an asymmetric problem if a single engine failed on the approach to a carrier. Shorts tackled this by fitting the two engines with contra-rotating propellers which solved the problem of yaw on takeoff but successful deck landing with asymmetric thrust after a single engine failure would still have been marginal because of the ‘good’ engine being necessarily offset from the aircraft’s centreline to give space for the propeller’s rotation. A single prototype of this variant, RK 787, flew in 1946.

The Sturgeon T 2 was an unusual target facilities aircraft in that it was fully equipped for deck landing. This aircraft of 728 NAS at RNAS Hal Far is about to be given the ‘cut’ by the batsman as it lands on a light fleet carrier of the Mediterranean Fleet.

In August 1945 a contract had been placed for thirty Sturgeon S1 aircraft and, rather than cancel them, the Admiralty tasked Shorts to modify them into highspeed target-towing aircraft to meet specification Q.1/46 and two further prototypes were built, VR 363 and VR 371. These retained the ability to operate from a carrier with tail hooks and power-folding wings but had a lengthened nose with extensive glazing to house cameras. It is a measure of the importance placed on realistic weapons training required after 1945 that twenty-three aircraft from the original production order were completed as target-tugs to this modified TT 2 standard for service with RN fleet requirements units in the UK and Malta. Of these, nineteen aircraft were further modified in the mid-1950s to TT 3 standard with the deck landing and photographic equipment removed together with a reversion to the original nose design. They remained in service until replaced by Meteor TT 20 jets in 1958.

Another aircraft that saw limited production in the years immediately after the Second World War was the Blackburn Firebrand, originally conceived to meet specification N.11/40 for a fleet air-defence fighter. Large, robust and never to prove popular with its pilots, the Firebrand’s first prototype, DD 804, first flew in February 1942 by which time the Seafire appeared to fill the role adequately and it was decided to modify the Firebrand into a long-range torpedo-carrying strike fighter. Further development spanned the remaining war years and the first production version, the TF 4, only entered service with 813 NAS in September 1945. It took part in the victory flypast over London in June 1946. A total of 220 aircraft were produced, mostly to TF 4 standard but a small batch was built to the definitive TF 5 standard. A number of TF 4s were upgraded to TF 5 standard.

A Firebrand of 813 NAS armed with a Mark 17 torpedo taking off from Indomitable. The aircraft parked aft are Sea Furies and Firebrands. (Author’s collection)

The Firebrand²¹ had a maximum all-up weight of 17,500lbs and a wingspan of just over 51ft which meant that it could only be operated from Implacable, Indefatigable, Eagle and the modernised Indomitable. By 1946 it lacked the essential performance needed from a fighter but with no strike aircraft other than the obsolescent Barracuda capable of carrying a torpedo it had a limited usefulness and equipped two front-line units, 813 and 827 NAS. It was expected that both would re-equip with the new turbo-prop Westland Wyvern in 1948 but development difficulties delayed their replacement until 1953. The Firebrand TF 5 had a 2520hp Bristol Centaurus 9 engine giving a maximum speed of 380 knots. It had four 20mm cannon, each with 200 rounds per gun, in the wings and a single 1850lb Mark 15 or 17 torpedo on a hardpoint on the fuselage centreline which could be fitted with alternative loads of a single 2000lb, 1000lb, 500lb bomb, Mark 6, 7 or 9 mine or 100-gallon fuel tank. Hardpoints under each wing could be fitted with 500lb or 250lb bombs or depth charges, 50-gallon tanks or eight 3in rockets with 60lb heads. Radius of action with internal fuel was about 250nm; this could be extended with external tanks but the aircraft’s handling qualities would have been marginal with a heavy load. In any event it was a cumbersome aircraft to fly to the deck and was considered obsolete by 1950.

A specialised variant of the Mosquito fighter/bomber, known as the Sea Mosquito, had been developed after Lieutenant Commander EM ‘Winkle’ Brown landed a modified Mosquito on Indefatigable on 25 March 1944; the world’s first carrier landing by a twin-engined aircraft.²² Designed to meet specification N.15/44, the RN variant was designated the Sea Mosquito TR 33 and a contract for three prototype examples was followed by another for 100 production aircraft, the first of which was delivered in late 1945. 811 NAS re-formed with former RAF Mosquito FB 6 aircraft to convert aircrew onto the new type at the end of 1945 and re-equipped with Sea Mosquitoes in April 1946. By then, there was literally no deck from which the type could operate at its maximum all-up weight of 22,500lbs with a torpedo and full fuel although its wingspan of 54ft was acceptable. It could have operated at reduced weight from Indefatigable or Implacable but there were concerns about its marginal single-engine deck landing performance and, while these might have been acceptable in wartime, they were not in peacetime. 811 NAS operated ashore at RN Air Stations Ford, Brawdy and Eglinton before disbanding in July 1947.²³ The production Sea Mosquitoes were subsequently used by second-line squadrons until the mid-1950s, together with a small batch of improved TR 37 versions.

A Sea Hornet NF 21 seconds before catching number 2 wire on its parent carrier. The batsman has his bats lowered in the ‘cut’ position and is continuing to watch the aircraft’s arrival from his position aft of his wind-break. (Author’s collection)

The Mosquito’s designers, de Havilland, had also produced a later twin-engined design from 1943 which was wisely produced in both land and carrier-based versions as a single-seat strike fighter. Both had two Merlin engines of 2030hp with propellers that rotated in opposite directions so that there was no yaw on take-off but the problem of asymmetric recovery after a single engine failure remained.²⁴ The naval version was modified to meet specification N.5/44 from the basic design by Heston Aircraft and the first prototype, PX 212, flew for the first time in April 1945 with deck-landing trials on the new light fleet carrier Ocean following in August. The naval variant was given the name Sea Hornet and the RN eventually procured three versions; the F 20 long-range strike-fighter, the NF 21 night fighter and the PR 22 reconnaissance aircraft. The NF 21 was the heaviest version, equipped with ASH radar and a second crew member to operate it. It had a maximum all-up weight of 19,530lbs and, like all versions, a wingspan of 45ft which meant that it could be operated from Indefatigable, Implacable, the modernised Indomitable, Eagle and even, in limited numbers, from a modernised light fleet carrier. With a maximum speed of 406 knots the Sea Hornet F 20 was the fastest piston-engined fighter ever to serve with the RN and it had a radius of action of 600nm with internal fuel which could be extended to 800nm with drop tanks fitted under the wings. The F 20 and NF 21 had four 20mm cannon in the nose with 180 rounds per gun²⁵ and both versions had wing hardpoints, each capable of carrying a single drop tank, 1000lb bomb or mine. Alternatively, rails for up to eight 3in rockets with 60lb warheads could be fitted under the wings. Surprisingly, the addition of radar and the extra crew member in the NF 21 only reduced its maximum speed by 4 knots. The PR 22 was a strategic reconnaissance version which lacked the guns but could still be fitted with underwing drop tanks. It was fitted with two F52 vertically-mounted cameras for day reconnaissance or a single K19B for night work.²⁶ Later F 20s were fitted to take oblique photographs from cameras fitted in the rear fuselage and designated FR 20s. Only one frontline unit embarked with Sea Hornet F 20s and PR 22s, 801 NAS, which re-commissioned with the types on 1 June 1947 although 806 NAS was partially equipped with Sea Hornets together with Sea Vampire jets and Sea Furies for a demonstration tour of the USA in 1948. Although it had a greater radius of action than any other fighter, the F 20 was withdrawn from front-line service in 1951 so that the fighter force could be standardised on a single type, the Sea Fury. The PR 22 was withdrawn at the same time although both variants continued to serve with second-line units until 1957. The NF 21 equipped 809 NAS on 20 January 1949 and continued in service until 1954 when it was replaced by Sea Venom jets. A total of 178 Sea Hornets was built, comprising seventy-seven F 20s, seventy-eight NF 21s and twenty-three PR 22s.²⁷

The other new type was the Hawker Sea Fury which flew for the first time in February 1945 and carried out deck landing trials on Victorious during 1946. Development then proceeded at a slow pace because of the run-down of Hawker’s production facilities after 1946 and the RN’s large stock of legacy Seafire fighters which did not need immediate replacement. The first version was the F 10,²⁸ intended for use as an interceptor fighter for fleet air-defence duties, and it equipped 807 NAS at RNAS Eglinton in August 1947.²⁹ Development work continued, however, towards what would become the outstanding piston-engined fighter of its generation, the Sea Fury FB 11. This had a 2480hp Bristol Centaurus engine driving a five-bladed propeller. The four 20mm cannon fitted in the wings had 580 rounds per gun, making the Sea Fury a persistent ground-attack aircraft as well as an effective fighter for the period and hardpoints under each wing were capable of carrying a single 1000lb or 500lb bomb, or 90- or 45-gallon drop tanks in addition to a maximum of twelve 3in rockets with 60lb warheads on underwing rails.³⁰ With a maximum all-up weight of 14,555lbs and a wingspan of only 38ft 4in spread, the Sea Fury could operate from any British carrier and its usefulness as a strike fighter operating from the light fleet carriers that formed the backbone of the RN and Commonwealth carrier strike forces by 1950 was obvious. It had a radius of action of 300nm on internal fuel which could be doubled if 90-gallon tanks were fitted, although they limited its manoeuvrability as a fighter. The first FB 11-equipped unit, 802 NAS, recommissioned at RNAS Eglinton in May 1948 and the type eventually replaced the Seafire and equipped eight front-line fighter squadrons in the RN plus another eight RNVR fighter squadrons and twelve second-line units. Logically the Commonwealth navies that bought light fleet carriers bought Sea Furies to operate from them and squadrons were formed by the RAN and RCN. The Dutch Navy also operated the type from its light fleet carrier and land-based versions were exported to Burma, Cuba and Germany. Eventually 665 Sea Furies were built for the RN with the last batch of thirty ordered in October 1951. The early jet fighters were only marginally faster than the Sea Fury and were unable to out-turn it, so it remained a viable fighter into the mid-1950s and was not finally withdrawn until 1957.

Although the majority of American types were destroyed soon after VJ-Day, several squadrons retained them for a short period. The four light fleet carriers serving with the BPF in 1945 retained their Corsair squadrons because there was no viable replacement until stocks of the Seafire F 15 arrived in the Far East. The last Corsair unit, 1851 NAS, was not disbanded until August 1946. Sufficient Hellcat NF 2 night fighters, the equivalent of the USN F6F-5N, were retained to re-commission 892 NAS as a night fighter unit in April 1945 for service in the night carrier Ocean which was originally intended to join the BPF. Another night fighter unit, 1792 NAS equipped with Firefly NF 1s, joined Ocean in late 1945 and in the first half of 1946 the ship and her squadrons carried out a trial of night operations in the Mediterranean, based in the Malta area and using RNAS Hal Far as a diversion airfield. The trial was also intended to evaluate the difference in capability between the single-seat Hellcat and the two-seat Firefly and the importance placed on its outcome can be judged from the fact that the Admiralty had to pay, in US dollars, for the retention of the Hellcats and their AN/APS-6 radar mounted in a pod on the wing. The Fireflies were fitted with a pod under the fuselage which contained an American-supplied AN/APS-4 radar which also had to be paid for as there was no British equivalent. It was found that the APS-6 was the better air-intercept radar but that the APS-4 had a useful secondary surface-search capability and both the pod and ‘black boxes’ could be fitted into any Firefly as role equipment to convert it into a night fighter. It was also felt that having an observer to concentrate on the radar while the pilot concentrated on flying the aircraft was a safer option in bad weather at night. The trial ended in April 1946, having concluded that the Firefly was the better night fighter since it was available in large numbers and could also be used in other roles with a minimum of modification by squadron engineers. The contemporary decision to cease observer training is interesting but it was assumed that the new aircrewmen branch would be able to provide a suitable number of radar operators for the radar intercept role. The Hellcats were returned to the USN. During the trial Ocean logged 1100 day and 250 night deck landings without accident.

A Sea Fury photographed from above seconds before landing on Illustrious. (Author’s collection)

The Firefly was one of several legacy types that the RN retained in service after 1945. Eventually 1702 were built with the last examples being used as pilotless target aircraft by 728 NAS at RNAS Hal Far in Malta. The last production Firefly was delivered to this unit in March 1956, nearly fifteen years after the prototype first flew in December 1941. Wartime Fireflies had a single Rolls-Royce Griffon XII engine of 1990hp.³¹ Post-war development led to the improved FR 4 and FR 5 versions with the more powerful Rolls-Royce Griffon 74 engine developing 2250hp.³² With a maximum all-up weight of 13,480lbs and a wingspan of 41ft 2in the Firefly could operate from any contemporary British aircraft carrier and made an ideal companion to the Sea Fury in the strike-fighter wings embarked in the light fleet carriers. It had four 20mm cannon in the wings with 160 rounds per gun and could carry single 1000lb or 500lb bombs or depth charges on hardpoints under each wing. Up to four 3in rockets with 60lb heads could be mounted on rails under each wing. Fireflies equipped sixteen front-line RN squadrons at various times after 1945, seven RNVR air squadrons and no less than twenty-one second-line squadrons. It operated in the fighter, fighter-reconnaissance, night fighter and anti-submarine roles with different equipment fits and was also operated by the RAN, RCN and Dutch Navy besides being exported to operate ashore in Thailand, Sweden, Ethiopia and Denmark.³³ A further mark, the AS 7, intended for use purely as a three-seater anti-submarine aircraft, was not a success and only operated ashore with training squadrons.

Seafire FR 47s equipped front-line squadrons but a number of earlier versions, such as this Seafire F 17 of 771 NAS at RNAS Lee-on-Solent, continued in use until the early 1950s. (Author’s collection)

The other legacy types were the Seafire and the Barracuda. The latter had been built in large numbers for the RN during the war as a torpedo/dive-bomber/reconnaissance aircraft. With the reduced torpedo attack role being assumed by the Firebrand, a number of Barracudas were scrapped or ditched at sea but a single unit, 815 NAS, was retained with the radar-equipped AS 3 variant for the development of airborne anti-submarine tactics based ashore at RNAS Eglinton after 1945. The type’s 1642hp Merlin 32 engine had only given it a marginal performance and Lend-Lease Grumman Avengers had replaced it in the BPF. Of interest, delays in producing a replacement led to the transfer by the USN of 100 Avengers to the RN under the Mutual Defence Assistance Plan (MDAP). Some of these re-equipped 815 NAS in 1953 giving the Barracuda the unique distinction of having been replaced in service by the same type on two occasions nine years apart.

The Seafire was also built in large numbers and both production and development continued after 1945 as the Griffon-engined F 15 replaced the Mark III.³⁴ They were the only fighters available to replace the Lend-Lease Corsairs and Hellcats and gradually equipped all the operational fighter squadrons as the situation stabilised after 1946. The RN procured 791 Griffon-engined Seafires after 1945, the final variant being the FR 47 with a 2375hp Rolls-Royce Griffon engine. It had an improved undercarriage which made it less susceptible to deck landing accidents and an armament of four 20mm cannon.³⁵ Hardpoints under the fuselage and wings could each carry a single 500lb bomb or 90-gallon drop tanks and rails for four 3in rockets with 60lb warheads could be fitted under each wing. Oblique cameras could be installed aft of the cockpit to give a reconnaissance capability, hence the FR designation. The type’s weakest feature was its radius of action of only 150nm on internal fuel, although drop tanks could increase this to 250nm with a small bomb load. The Seafire FR 47 was the last variant of the Spitfire/Seafire line and differed radically from the early versions produced a decade earlier but it was never able to overcome its diminutive size and the weakness stemming from its lightweight airframe and undercarriage. A developed airframe with a new ‘laminar-flow’ wing named the Seafang was flown in prototype form but had unpleasant handling qualities, offered little advantage over the FR 47 and was cancelled.

The British aircraft industry ran down quickly after 1945 with the end of the ‘shadow’ factory scheme and every firm sought to rationalise its production capacity to meet the new peacetime reality. Aircraft such as the Seafire and Firefly had been ordered in large batches but many of these were cancelled and, henceforward, types were generally ordered in small numbers which increased the individual price of an aircraft but decreased the sums required in the annual naval estimates, a process that became familiar over the next seventy years. The methods used to develop new types by the British aircraft industry were outdated and in need of radical modernisation as aircraft became more complex and this contributed to the slow progress with which the new generation of jet and turboprop aircraft were introduced during this period. However, the massive reduction in orders after 1945 gave little inducement for change. The Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough was tasked by the Government with developing the technology of flight and would suggest new developments to both the Admiralty and industry. ‘Undercarriage-less’ landing on a flexible deck, ‘swing-wings’, swept wings and ‘zero-length’ launches are examples of the Establishment’s advanced ideas, some of them derived from captured German technology. The Admiralty took up ideas that appeared useful for the next generation of naval aircraft and issued requirements to the Ministry of Supply which took over the responsibility for military aircraft procurement from the Ministry of Aircraft Production after 1945. The Ministry would give advice on the practicality of producing aircraft to meet the specification and, if general agreement was reached, issue a specification and request for proposals to firms it deemed ‘suitable’. Of interest, Saunders Roe had to meet all the costs of its own submission to the specification that evolved into the SR 177 Joint Strike Fighter because, with background of flying boat manufacture, the Ministry of Supply did not consider it to be ‘suitable’.

A number of firms would often offer sketch designs and it was usual to give a contract to two of these for the construction of one or two prototypes which were evaluated against each other. It would have been impossible for the firms to cost a project accurately at this stage because they would not know the size of the production quantity. The prototypes that were selected would then undergo proof testing by the manufacturer followed by acceptance tests of the airframe, systems and armament by the RAE and, finally, service trials including deck landing so that the type could eventually be released for naval use. This tortuous process was made even longer by the separate development of systems such as radar at the Royal Radar Establishment (RRE), which designed sets speculatively without a defined aircraft project in mind, and engine manufacturers who designed new power units which often had no specific application at first. Radios, armament and other systems were usually Admiralty or Air Ministry-supplied items and modifications to new aircraft designs might be needed to fit them. No matter how good the initial specification had been, protracted development led to changes being specified to meet the latest front-line requirement and these added to the time needed to achieve front-line capability. As if these potential causes of delay were not enough, the majority of British aircraft manufacturers built prototypes by hand in special departments that were often remote in both location and thought processes from the production sites. If they were selected for production, the prototype would have to be ‘reverse-engineered’ to make the design suitable for large-scale production. Prototypes were ordered in small numbers, as they had been with the simple biplanes of the 1930s, but now had to fulfil a number of different tests to evaluate airframes, engines, armament, radar avionics and carrier compatibility which had to be carried out sequentially and added to the delay. The loss of a prototype could set a new type’s entry into service back by years. The lesson was eventually learnt and in the mid-1950s the Admiralty ordered twenty Blackburn NA39 Buccaneer prototypes so that testing could be carried out concurrently

This was the situation in the late 1940s, made even worse by limited funding, but the Admiralty had to maintain a latent capability through the manpower crisis and replace obsolescent aircraft types at a time when politicians saw no immediate threat to the UK. Existing stocks of legacy aircraft had to equip the front line for longer than had been intended and it was against this background that the requirements for the new generation of jet and turbo-prop naval aircraft were drawn up. Jet fighters had entered service with the RAF in 1944; they were at the start of their development process whereas piston-engined aircraft were probably close to their limits. A prototype RN Sea Vampire, LZ 551/G, was the world’s first jet aircraft to land on a carrier when Lieutenant Commander E M Brown landed on Ocean in December 1945. It had a good view of the deck but had to use a new technique in which the aircraft was flown into the deck at constant speed without closing the throttles. This, together with a slow engine response, gave concerns about climbing away after a baulked approach. The Sea Vampire had a high top speed but its endurance was even more limited than the Seafire and although the RN formed second-line jet fighter units to give pilots experience of the new technology and tactics, none were embarked on a regular basis as a component part of a carrier air group. To add to the Admiralty’s concern, aviation turbine fuel, known as avtur, was not yet refined in the UK and had to be bought from the USA in dollars, making jet aviation expensive. On the other hand, it had a higher flashpoint than avgas and could be stored in carriers’ double bottoms like furnace fuel oil, greatly increasing the amount a single ship could carry and significantly reducing the risk of fire or explosion.

Vengeance taking part in Operation ‘Rusty’ during 1949. This was a six-week deployment into the Arctic to evaluate the effect of extremely cold weather on men, ships and aircraft. Her air group included Sea Vampire jets and Dragonfly helicopters as well as more usual front-line types. (Author’s collection)

The first jet fighter to enter service was the Supermarine Attacker which had the same ‘laminar-flow’ wing as the cancelled Seafang and was expected to be an interim type while better fighters were developed. It had a single Rolls-Royce Nene 3 centrifugal-flow turbojet engine of 5000lbs thrust and a maximum all-up weight of 12,210lbs,³⁶ but the design was marred by having a tail-wheel undercarriage, the only jet fighter to date ever to have this feature. Attackers equipped three front-line units, 800, 803 and 890 NAS, They only operated from Eagle and were replaced by Sea Hawks in 1954 although a number continued to serve in five RNVR fighter squadrons until 1957 together with a number of second-line units.

A number of other advanced projects began at this time. The first among these began with specification GR 17/45 which evolved into the Fairey Gannet which I flew in the 1970s. Initially described³⁷ as being specially designed for anti-submarine work, including operation from escort carriers; it was originally to be a two-seat aircraft with a tricycle undercarriage and powered by two gas turbine engines driving contra-rotating, co-axial propellers. This would give twin-engine performance without the asymmetric problem after a single engine failure. Two prototypes each were ordered from Blackburn, whose version was to have two Napier Naiad engines and Fairey Aviation whose version was to have two Armstrong Siddeley Mamba engines. The production aircraft were to have ASV 15 radar, initially with a 22in scanner but later with an improved one of 36in, eight sono-buoys and a sono-buoy receiver and a 2000lb homing torpedo. Alternative armament loads were to include bombs, rocket projectiles or mines. GR 17/45 was to have no fixed armament but the capability to be fitted with two detachable 20mm gun installations. The estimated top speed was to be 290 knots and the aircraft was to fly comfortably at 150 knots on patrol. Optimistically, the Admiralty expected the type to come into service during 1949.

The Westland Wyvern was a single-seat strike fighter and an initial production batch of fifteen had been built with Rolls-Royce Eagle piston-engines. In 1947 it was hoped that trials with these would lead to a speedier release to service for a Mark 2 version fitted with a Rolls-Royce Clyde turbo-prop engine. The estimated top speed was to be 416 knots with a radius of action of 650nm³⁸ or an endurance of five hours with a torpedo or up to 2000lb of bombs. It was designed to take the 1000lb anti-surface ship rocket known at the time under the project name of ‘Uncle Tom’ or up to sixteen 3in rockets and 100-gallon drop tanks to extend the combat radius still further. It was expected to enter service in 1949 but development problems and the need to fit a new engine, the Armstrong Siddeley Python, delayed its entry into service until 1953 by which time it was already obsolescent and the last squadron was disbanded only five years later, in 1958.

Last of the new types was the Hawker N.7/46 which evolved into the Hawker Sea Hawk jet fighter. It was to have the same Nene engine as the Attacker but its more refined design was expected to give a top speed of 537 knots³⁹ with a combat radius of 386nm on internal fuel which could be extended by the use of two 65-gallon drop tanks, one under each wing. It was hoped that the type would enter service in late 1949 or early 1950 but, again, delays in development meant that the first unit, 806 NAS, did not form until March 1953 at RNAS Brawdy.

Air Weapons

Air weapons were rationalised after 1945, beginning with guns. The 0.5in machine gun was removed from service after the last American Lend-Lease aircraft were withdrawn in 1946 but the 0.303in machine gun was retained for use in the Seafire F 17. Otherwise all strike and fighter types carried 20mm cannon as their standard front guns. Stocks of bombs were reduced and standardised on 2000lb armour-piercing, 1000lb and 500lb medium-capacity, 500lb semi armour-piercing and 250lb general-purpose weapons, the latter only retained for the early marks of Seafire while they remained in operational service. The wartime ‘B’ bomb, a buoyant weapon intended to be dropped close to a ship in order to float up under the hull to detonate under the keel, had proved a disappointment in service and was discarded despite the existence of large stockpiles. A new standard bomb-carrier was introduced capable of carrying all types of bomb on all types of aircraft.⁴⁰

The 3in rocket projectile remained standard and could be fitted with either a 25lb solid armour-piercing head or a 60lb high-explosive head for use against different targets. The solid head was intended for use against submarines to penetrate the pressure hull and against armoured vehicles on land. A new 10in rocket remained in development; it was known as ‘Uncle Tom’ and was expected to subsume the torpedo as the primary ship-killing weapon used by strike aircraft. In the event, development difficulties, lack of funds and lack of RAF interest in such a weapon in the late 1940s led to its eventual cancellation.

Training for torpedo attack pilots ceased in 1946, a year in which 813 NAS with its Firebrands was the only operational unit capable of dropping them. It carried out a few experimental drops before disbanding in September 1946 and the Admiralty stated that torpedo-attack training would resume when the necessary aircraft and manpower became available but, in the event, it never returned to the earlier level of importance. A homing torpedo intended for use against submarines continued in development under the codename ‘Dealer’ and was eventually to

Reviews for The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945

[charlesferdinand_1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

A very exhaustive history of British carrier operations after WW II, both with the well know highlights (Korea, Suez, Falklands) and with lesser known operations in the Middle East or Asian waters. The various aircraft programmes are also discussed.Just two small quibbles: a systematic overview of which carriers were in service and their general characteristics would have been practical. Secondly, the style is textbook-dry.

[shrike58 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

When it comes to aviation and the Royal Navy it seems safe to say that if David Hobbs doesn't know it then it's probably not important. However, it also means that this tome often has some of the flavor of official history and feels more like a reference book than a narrative history. Anyway, the real core of this work is the "CVA-1" debacle of the 1960s which almost drove the RN out of the carrier business, even though there was a continuing need for to provide air support for the British expeditionary mission. Hobbs observes that there was something of a perfect storm situation between how the RN wasn't managing its resources very well, the RAF was traumatized by the loss of the main nuclear deterrent mission to the RN and apparently determined to sabotage the project (to save its own nuclear-armed bomber force) and an economic situation that was bad and couldn't be ignored by Britain's political leadership. Whatever the issues with the new British fleet carriers and their air groups Hobbs observes that they represent a capability that never should have been lost in the first place so long as London has a serious interest in force projection.