Tomcats and Eagles: The Development of the F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War

By Tal Tovy

During the first half of the 1970s, two new fighter aircraft entered operational service in the United States: The Navy's Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the Air Force's McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. These two aircraft were part of the backbone of the tactical air power of the United States; their introduction was accompanied by comprehensive reforms in pilot training as well as new technologies and weapon systems. In addition to the tactical significance of the two aircraft as innovative fighting platforms, however, their development and deployment should be viewed within a broad geopolitical and geostrategic context.

Tovy explains how the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle were an integral part of the aerial component of the conventional arms race within the Cold War. He argues that the trend of Soviet advanced weapon systems development created a perception of threat to the United States, challenging its conventional military power. Tomcats and Eagles explores how the Vietnam War accelerated the need for advanced fighter-interceptors, and that the lessons learned from aerial combat in Vietnam had a significant impact on the design and operational characteristics of the F-15. The author reveals that after F-14s were sold to Iran and F-15s to Israel in the second half of the 1970s, these jets were integrated into their armed forces, leading to Israel's use of the F-15 during the First Lebanese War. Finally, the author provides an in-depth look at the operation of the F-14 and F-15 in U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, beginning with the Tanker Wars in the mid-1980s, through Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom, and ending with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2022
• ISBN: 9781612519111

Book preview

Cover: Tomcats and Eagles, The Development of the F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War by Tal Tovy

TITLES IN THE SERIES

Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd

The Bridge to Airpower: Logistics Support for Royal Flying Corps Operations on the Western Front, 1914–18

Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience

The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory

Beyond the Beach: The Allied Air War against France

The Man Who Took the Rap: Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and the Fall of Singapore

Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–2015

Winning Armageddon: Curtis LeMay and Strategic Air Command, 1948–1957

Rear Admiral Herbert V. Wiley: A Career in Airships and Battleships

From Kites to Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance

Airpower over Gallipoli, 1915–1916

Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign against German Industry

Airpower in the War against ISIS

To Rule the Skies: General Thomas S. Power and the Rise of Strategic Air Command in the Cold War

Rise of the War Machines: The Birth of Precision Bombing in World War II

At the Dawn of Airpower: The U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps’ Approach to the Military Airplane, 1907–1917

THE HISTORY OF MILITARY AVIATION

Paul J. Springer, editor

This series is designed to explore previously ignored facets of the history of airpower. It includes a wide variety of disciplinary approaches, scholarly perspectives, and argumentative styles. Its fundamental goal is to analyze the past, present, and potential future utility of airpower and to enhance our understanding of the changing roles played by aerial assets in the formulation and execution of national military strategies. The series encompasses the incredibly diverse roles played by airpower, which include but are not limited to efforts to achieve air superiority; strategic attack; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions; airlift operations; close air support; and more. Of course, airpower does not exist in a vacuum. There are myriad terrestrial support operations required to make airpower functional, and examinations of these missions is also a goal of this series.

In less than a century, airpower developed from flights measured in minutes to the ability to circumnavigate the globe without landing. Airpower has become the military tool of choice for rapid responses to enemy activity, the primary deterrent to aggression by peer competitors, and a key enabler to military missions on the land and at sea. This series provides an opportunity to examine many of the key issues associated with airpower’s usage in the past and present and to influence its development for the future.

TOMCATS

AND

EAGLES

The Development of the

F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War

Tal Tovy

Naval Institute Press

Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2022 by Tal Tovy

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Tovy, Tal, author.

Title: Tomcats and Eagles : the development of the F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War / Tal Tovy.

Other titles: Development of the F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War

Description: Annapolis : Naval Institute Press, 2022. | Series: History of military aviation | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022017596 (print) | LCCN 2022017597 (ebook) | ISBN 9781612519104 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781612519111 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Eagle (Jet fighter plane)—History. | Tomcat (Jet fighter plane)—History. | United States. Air Force—Tactical aviation—History—20th century. | United States. Navy—Aviation—History—20th century. | Air power—History—20th century. | Cold War. | BISAC: HISTORY / Military / Aviation & Space | HISTORY / United States / 20th Century

Classification: LCC UG1242.F5 T68 2022 (print) | LCC UG1242.F5 (ebook) | DDC 623.74/64—dc23/eng/20220706

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022017596

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022017597

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

Printed in the United States of America.

30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

First printing

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Command of the Air and the Influence of Sea Power: Theories about Aerial and Naval Power

2. The Soviet Navy

3. Backfire and Foxbat: The Soviet Air Force and Air Defense after 1945

4. Continuity and Change in the American National Security Policy, 1947–63

5. Political Imperatives and Military Disputes: Thought Processes toward an Air Superiority Fighter

6. Air Superiority versus Air Denial: The Air War in Vietnam

7. Air War over the Middle East, 1967–73

8. The Return to Air Superiority

Summary

List of Acronyms

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgments

The writing of this book would not have been possible without the help of a number of people whom I have a pleasant duty to thank. First, I would like to thank Israel Guy for the great help and time he spent translating and editing the manuscript. At the same time as I was writing the book, I was teaching the history of airpower in various academic settings. The students’ questions and the joint discussions with them helped me identify and highlight the important topics for discussion for this book. Thank you. Teaching about airpower together with writing the book only proved to me to a great extent that I still have to learn about this topic. I also received a lot of encouragement and support from two dear friends, Gideon Sharav and Dvir Peleg, who greatly appreciated the written word and the long journey that the author undertakes.

Special thanks go to Prof. Paul Springer, who opened his home to me during my research in the United States. Over a cold beer and good food, he also helped me make this book more accurate. Needless to say, the contents of this book and any mistakes are solely my responsibility. I also want to thank the people at the Naval Institute Press whose dedicated and rigorous work turned my manuscript into a book. Finally, I owe immeasurable gratitude to my life partner, Michal. One of the main subjects of this book is the Vietnam War, and this wonderful woman always claims that if we were living in the 1960s in the United States, she would probably be dancing at Woodstock and I would be hiking in the jungles of Vietnam looking for someone named Charlie. She is a shelter of support from all wrong, and living alongside her is a unique and far from obvious privilege.

Introduction

During the first half of the 1970s, two new fighter aircraft entered operational service in the United States: the Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, the first serving the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the second serving the U.S. Navy (USN). These aircraft have become the backbone of the tactical airpower of the United States in the twenty-first century. The introduction of these aircraft was accompanied by comprehensive reforms in pilot training as well as new technologies and weapon systems. However, in addition to the tactical significance of the two aircraft as innovative fighting platforms, they should be viewed within a wide geopolitical and geostrategic context.

The process of military force building can provide significant insight about the national goals of a state. A state with global interests would build a military force of a size and quality capable of realizing these goals. Thus, military power must also be evaluated in accordance with the underlying principles of the state’s foreign policy by asking whether the state’s military power can support the execution of its foreign policy. Carl von Clausewitz taught us that war is the continuation of policy by other means. Similarly, we can say that preparations for war, especially those visible to the enemy including development, acquisition, and deployment of new weapon systems, also constitute a form of continuation of policy by other means. Therefore, we can assert that any significant weapon system acquired by the military must be evaluated within not only the narrow framework of its tactical contribution (i.e., its possible use in war) but also a wider framework (i.e., its place within the national security framework of the state). The proving of this claim will be the central focus of this book.

Tomcats and Eagles: The Development of the F-14 and F-15 in the Cold War deals with the analysis of the processes and other factors leading to the development of two of the most significant aircraft in the late 20th century in the context of American tactical airpower, the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle. Jet fighters are commonly categorized as belonging to generations. This classification has been used since the 1990s to describe the massive improvements and developments in fighter aircraft design, avionics, and weapon systems. Usually, a new generation emerges when existing aircraft can no longer be upgraded by using new technologies. There are, however, some who maintain that the generations classification is also motivated by the competition between aerospace manufacturers. Thus, for example, Lockheed Martin started using this term to show that there is a significant difference between the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II, being fifth-generation fighters, compared to the competing Eurofighter Typhoon. According to this approach, the Typhoon would be classified as fourth generation. This implies that the generation classification is sometimes used as a sales promotion method rather than to differentiate aircraft based on significant technological and operational factors.¹ Due to the variety of classification methods, with each one having its own logic, and given that the term only began to be used in the 1990s, this book does not classify aircraft according to generations. However, any classification scheme confirms that the F-14 and the F-15 represent innovative technology and engineering in fighter aircraft design compared to their predecessors as well as conceptual advances in doctrine and tactics, which had a significant impact on their combat effectiveness.² The main assertion of this book is that these two aircraft should be looked at as more than just additional aerial combat platforms in the U.S. weapons arsenal for reasons that will be discussed in the following chapters. Primarily, these two aircraft are an important part of the aerial component of the conventional arms race during the Cold War, complementing the arms races on land and at sea. Although research of the conventional arms race has been hidden by the dark shadow of the nuclear arms race, it is important to note that while the nuclear arms race remains in the theoretical realm (given that nuclear war between the superpowers has never broken out), the conventional arms race manifested itself in a series of military confrontations that flared occasionally throughout the period. These confrontations, mostly proxy wars such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War and the wars between Israel and its neighbors, became to a large extent a collision between American technology and weapon systems and their Soviet counterparts. Thus, these proxy wars served as a lethal, bloody laboratory for evaluating the operational capability of new weapon systems, while the lessons of the wars served to upgrade existing weapon systems or guide the development of new ones. One of the goals of this book is to review the aerial arms race during the years of the Cold War, with two aircraft serving as test cases for the evaluation of the process.³

The arms races during the Cold War consisted of loosely coupled processes that evolved in parallel on both sides. Sometimes the United States would lead, while at other times the Soviet Union had a military breakthrough. If we consider the Korean War (1950–53) to be the first military confrontation of the Cold War, we can argue, from a point of view of tactical airpower, that the two superpowers started the arms race side by side on an equal footing both technologically and militarily. During the war, both sides deployed jet fighters—the American F-86 Saber and the Soviet MiG-15 Fagot.⁴ Over the years, the two superpowers continued to develop and deploy a long series of tactical fighters that, during the decades following the Korean War, fought each other in a long series of air-to-air battles in various wars and various geographic regions. One of the main arguments of this book is that the trend of advanced weapon systems development by the Soviet Union created a perception of threat in the United States and among its allies that challenged their conventional military power.⁵ The processes that Soviet military power had undergone served as the background for the discussion of the operational characteristics of future American tactical fighters.

Thus, the second argument of this book is that the development of the two aircraft must be viewed within a larger framework, encompassing more than just the narrow domain of the arms race. The first viewpoint would be through the geopolitical derivative of the Cold War. The second viewpoint involves an examination of political continuity and the strategic changes in U.S. foreign and national security policy. The third viewpoint looks at the arms race and the American response to the various weapon systems the Soviet Union started to acquire during the late 1950s and early 1960s. These discussions will help shed light on the need for new fighter aircraft, which in addition to the desire to achieve tactical air superiority provided answers to the guidelines dictated by the political echelon starting with Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency and ending with Lyndon Johnson’s. Thus, proving the claim that the characterization of these two aircraft had its roots in events and processes that took place as of the end of the 1950s will help bolster an additional claim of this research.

Many studies mark the aerial combat during the Vietnam War, starting in 1966, as the main (sometimes exclusive) factor that brought about the development of these two aircraft. However, since thinking about these two fighters started at the beginning of the 1960s, long before aerial combat in Vietnam broke out, we can see that air-to-air fighting in Vietnam was not the trigger for the need for these two fighters; rather, the trigger was events and strategic processes that preceded the war. There is no doubt, though, that the war accelerated the need for advanced fighter-interceptors and that the lessons learned from aerial combat in Vietnam had a significant impact on the design and operational characteristics of the F-15.

The process of developing a fighter aircraft as well as any other major weapon system is not linear. It is instead complex and multidimensional, involving multiple participants operating independently and often complicated by external intervention that causes the course of the development process to change. Thus, every chapter attempts to expose a domain that influenced the development of the two fighters and their operational characteristics, while the discussion within each chapter is chronological. The book consists of two main parts. The first part deals with the theoretical, geopolitical, and strategic frameworks, which are the external background factors behind the need for the development of the F-14 and the F-15, while the second part focuses on the immediate factors that influenced the thought processes and the development, emphasizing the American lessons from the Vietnam War experience as well as the operational experience of the Israeli Air Force (IAF).

The first chapter provides historical and theoretical reviews on the essence of aerial and naval power in order to establish the basic terms in these domains used in subsequent chapters. The second and third chapters deal with the building of Soviet aerial and naval power between 1945 and 1965 as a derivative of Soviet foreign policy, which was a direct continuation of the principles of the foreign policy of tsarist Russia. The purpose of these two chapters is to help explain the American need for advanced tactical fighters capable of tackling the variety of Soviet aircraft that entered operational service in the Soviet Air Force and the aerial arm of the Soviet Navy in the second half of the 1950s. The fourth chapter analyzes change and continuity in American foreign and national security policy in the first two decades following World War II.

During these years American policy underwent tremendous changes, which had a decisive influence over the U.S. military. The change was due to the move from the massive retaliation concept of the Eisenhower administration, which put the emphasis on nuclear weapons, to the flexible response concept of the Kennedy administration. This new policy defined the communist threat as operating on three planes: nuclear, conventional, and insurgency. Although the Kennedy administration focused on the insurgency threat, the armed services reverted to developing the capabilities required for conventional war. This had a tremendous influence on the USN, which once again became an important strategic factor in conventional war with the role of defending the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the North Atlantic, thus requiring a fighter capable of intercepting the aircraft of the Soviet Navy’s aerial arm at a very long range.

The fifth chapter analyzes the preliminary thought processes that developed in the USAF and the USN during the early 1960s as well as the professional and bureaucratic battles between the armed services and between both services and the Department of Defense, headed by Robert McNamara. The central focus of this chapter is the thought process by which the USAF changed its requirement from a fighter-bomber to an aircraft optimized exclusively for aerial combat, that is, an air superiority fighter. Some attention will also be given to the professional and bureaucratic thought processes that the USN conducted during this period in order to develop an advanced fighter suitable for its operational requirements.

Several wars that took place during the long gestation period, accompanied by intense debates within the American military establishment, also had a significant influence on the thought processes that developed in the USN and the USAF. In the latter case, the wars caused the requirement to switch from a fighter-bomber to an air superiority fighter. The sixth and seventh chapters deal with the American experience from the air war in Vietnam and the Israeli experience in the years 1967–82. The purpose of these chapters is to provide additional insights into the processes that the USN and the USAF went through when processing and analyzing the lessons of their Vietnam experience as well as the Israeli lessons. This learning process, in addition to finalizing the understanding that the USAF needed a new air superiority fighter, showed a critical need for a structural change in pilot training as well as improvements in technological and weapon systems, especially air-to-air missiles (AAMs). As a result, the USN established the Top Gun program during the Vietnam War, while the USAF revamped its Red Flag program only toward the end of the war. The discussion of the Israeli experience is essential for understanding the reforms made by the USAF in the area of pilot training.

The last chapter of the book integrates all the subjects discussed in the other chapters while focusing on several topics: the continuation of the development process and the acquisition of the new fighters, the upgrading of the AAMs used in the Vietnam War and the development of new ones, and the reforms in pilot training in both the USN and the USAF. The second part of the chapter reviews the operational history of the two fighters, thus demonstrating the American readoption of the combat capabilities needed to achieve air superiority over the battlefield and the focusing that had been achieved with great effort during World War II and the Korean War, only to be neglected during the decade that preceded the Vietnam War. In fact, the entry of the F-15 into operational service illustrates this return to old values. The second part of the chapter also covers the operational history of the two aircraft in the service of foreign countries: Iran, which deployed the F-14, and Israel, which deployed the F-15.

This book has two main goals. The first goal is to research and analyze the conventional arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the domain of aerial power during the first decades of the Cold War whereby the fighter aircraft can serve as test cases. The second and in fact main goal of the book is to review the entire spectrum of historical processes that had an influence on the development of the two aircraft. Thus, the book is not focused on the technological and operational history of the two aircraft. In this spirit, it can be said that the book should end once the USAF and the USN started the deployment of the two aircraft. However, the last chapter deals with the operational history in order to show the culmination of the requirements definition and development processes and also answer the question of whether these two aircraft have fulfilled their purpose. Additionally, although the book describes the development of two fighter aircraft that brought about a significant breakthrough, it does not discuss the technical and engineering aspects of the development but instead attempts to focus on their combat performance as part of an operational setup, which was influenced by larger historical processes. In other words, the goal of the book is to analyze the historical processes that took place during the first three decades of the Cold War and show their influence on the specifications and design of the two aircraft. More specifically, the goal of this book is to show how and why the two aircraft caused the United States to refocus on gaining air superiority over future battlefields, a concept that has been neglected since the end of the Korean War because of the focus on platforms that could carry and launch strategic nuclear armaments.

From a historiographic standpoint, this book can be classified as a study of the conventional arms race in the area of tactical airpower during the Cold War. The book also adds to the research of U.S. foreign and national security policy in the first three decades of the Cold War, with development of the F-14 and the F-15 helping to shed light on these topics. An additional historiographic view of the book is a study of the history of American aerial power. Although each one of these subjects has been amply researched, this book integrates all these aspects into a wide view, illuminating their influence on the requirements specification, design, and acquisition of these two new aircraft by the USN and the USAF. Such a panoramic discussion can illuminate additional aspects and provide a more comprehensive view on the development of American aerial power after World War II in general and particularly the development of American fighter aircraft.

CHAPTER 1

Command of the Air and the Influence of Sea Power

Theories about Aerial and Naval Power

The fighter aircraft developed by the superpowers in the years following World War II were part of the Cold War’s arms race. Although some of these aircraft had a role in the nuclear arms race, they were also part of the conventional arms race. In addition to their important role in the history of the Cold War, their development was influenced by theories of the building and operation of aerial power. The goal of this chapter is to review the military theories of aerial and naval power in order to place the F-14 and F-15, the two fighter aircraft that are the central focus of this book, as a component of a system with strategic and tactical consistency. Additionally, since some of the chapters deal with the aerial arms of the two superpower navies during the first decades of the Cold War, it is important to understand the historical and theoretical frameworks of sea power and their influence on the force building of the two superpowers during this period. The first part of the chapter describes basic terms in the area of aerial power, with an emphasis on combat missions and especially air superiority. In addition to providing a historical background, this part also deals with theories in the area of air warfare and the place of aerial power within the framework of warfare. The second part of the chapter deals with naval theories, with an emphasis on the theories of the American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan as well as additional theories that contradicted his theory. In other words, this chapter is a combination of history, theory, and action in the research of aerial and naval power.

Airpower: From the Real World to Theory and Back

In 1893 a prophetic prediction was made concerning the revolutionary impact of aerial power on war. The claim was that future wars will start by massive aerial battles in which the appearance of a bomber fleet over the enemy’s capital may bring about rapid surrender.¹ A decade later on December 17, 1903, the Wright brothers flew a mechanically powered airplane. This pioneering short flight set the world thinking about the military applications of such a machine. On November 1, 1911, the Italian pilot Giulio Gavotti became the first combat pilot, having dropped several bombs in an improvised manner on an Othman force in Libya during the Italian-Othman War (September 1911–October 1912). Airplanes were used for bombing in several other armed clashes in the years before World War I, thus plunging the world into the age of aerial warfare that not only added an additional dimension to fighting but also changed the character of land and sea warfare and set new requirements for force building and operations.²

The deployment of aircraft during World War I exhibited all the main roles of airpower, which are still relevant today. This was an evolutionary process whereby at first aircraft were only used for reconnaissance, observation, and artillery target spotting. Soon afterward, aerial battles developed between aircraft that set out to intercept the reconnaissance and observation aircraft and those that took off in order to protect them. This is the beginning of the endless battle for air superiority, which would allow freedom of action over the battlefield.³ Additionally, World War I saw the beginning of tactical bombing of forces at the front as well as the beginning of strategic bombing. The pioneers of strategic bombing were the Germans, who bombed the cities of Belgium and the United Kingdom, first using zeppelins and then Gotha G.IV bombers. During the war, the German air force launched fifty-one sorties, dropping 196 tons of bombs and causing the death of several hundred civilians. While damage from the German bombings was minimal, the psychological effect on the British population was huge. This was because until that time, Britain, being an island state, considered itself safe, protected from invasion by the might of the Royal Navy. In parallel, Britain started to build strategic bombers that toward the end of the war were capable of carrying a ton of bombs all the way to Berlin.⁴ Although the impact of the aerial dimension on the development of the war on land and sea was not decisive and some might even call it marginal, it would grow dramatically during the years that led to World War II.⁵

The strategic bombing during World War I brought about a complete blurring of the difference between the battlefield and the home front, causing cities to become legitimate and even critical targets in order to achieve decision in war. Although attacks against civilian populations and urban areas have been common throughout history, whereby cities have been damaged and even destroyed in battles of siege, the development of aerial power made the bombing of civilian populations an important element— sometimes the main element—of aerial warfare.

Historical literature about the development of military thinking on aerial warfare usually starts with the theories of the Italian general Giulio Douhet. There is no doubt about the importance and influence of Douhet’s theory. However, the forerunners of the age of aerial warfare can be found in Britain. Even before World War I, the British were thinking about the effective use of aerial power. During World War I, Britain was the first to establish an independent air arm (April 1918), and the Royal Air Force (RAF) maintained its independent status even after the war.⁶ These processes took place a few years before Douhet published his book The Command of the Air (1921), but there is no information about the influence of British thinking and action over Douhet’s theoretical writing.

The aerial component of the British Expeditionary Force during the war was commanded by Hugh Trenchard, who later served as chief of the air staff until 1929. His actions consolidated the organizational and operational independence of the RAF. During the war mainly because of the German strategic bombing, Trenchard also embraced the concept of strategic bombing. As of the summer of 1917 the British aerial force, stationed in France, performed bombing attacks against German industrial and infrastructure targets. After the war, a combination of logic, accumulated experience, and political direction caused Britain to accept the concept of strategic bombing as an operational mechanism that could decide a war.⁷ Additionally, Trenchard’s activity during the decade after the war laid a solid foundation for the RAF Bomber Command. Thus, we can claim that Trenchard was more of a practitioner than a theorist, rightfully deserving the title father of the RAF.

The first theoretical discussion of strategic bombing as a tool for deciding wars can be traced to Douhet’s book The Command of the Air. Douhet had witnessed the terrible bloodshed on the Italian front and the Western Front in general during World War I. The lethal deadlock on the Italian front, the result of static trench warfare, brought him to believe that the correct use of aerial power would enable victory without the need to engage in bloody, exhausting trench warfare.⁸ Aerial power, according to Douhet, could jump over the front, since airpower is not hindered by trenches, barbed wire, and minefields and is not influenced by the topography and geography of the battle zone.⁹ As a lesson of the war, Douhet believed that on land, defense would always be stronger than offense; however, since only offense can decide the war, it is only aerial power that can achieve victory. According to Douhet, this is true because airplanes are unstoppable, since they can arrive everywhere and approach their target from an infinite number of directions. Victory required the achievement of total command of the air, which became a primary doctrinarian principle as described in his book. Thus, Douhet claimed that command of the air guaranteed victory in the war.¹⁰

Unlike land warfare, control of the air can be achieved not by maintaining a constant presence but rather by destroying the aerial capability of the enemy. This approach suggests surprise attacks on the enemy’s airfields followed by a systematic bombing of population and industrial centers.¹¹ In Douhet’s opinion, planning should rely only on the aircraft that are available at the start of the war and can participate in the initial offensive operations against the enemy and should not rely on aircraft that would be built during the war. However, Douhet also stipulated that after the initial attacks on the enemy’s airfields, aircraft manufacturing plants should also be targeted and destroyed.

It is important to remember that unlike earlier military theorists, Douhet could not rely on historical precedents, since strategic bombing only played a marginal role in World War I. Thus, we can argue that Douhet as well as other airpower theorists developed an original thinking and that Douhet did not develop his theories based on previous wars; however, we can also argue that in trying to project the possibilities of future aeronautical technology, Douhet turned to speculation, which he considered logically irrefutable.¹²

When we analyze the causes of the end of the war on the Western Front, we can perceive that the war ended not because of the collapse of the German army at the front but instead because of Germany’s weakness as a nation. The German leadership clearly understood that if Germany wished to maintain its territorial integrity, maintain its gains, and avoid being invaded, it had to reach a cease-fire. A continuation of the war was certain to bring about the collapse of the German army, especially when facing the tide of fresh American troops on the battlefield. Douhet believed that such a national collapse could be rapidly achieved at the beginning of the war by a systematic campaign of strategic bombing against the enemy’s territory and especially by bombing urban centers, where industry and government are concentrated. The enemy nation could also be defeated by bombings that erode its morale and its will to fight. In other words, it should be possible to avoid land fighting, with its ensuing millions of casualties at the front, if the economic, social, and moral strength of the enemy population could be severely degraded shortly after the breakout of war.

The importance of Douhet and the other early theorists of airpower can be seen not only in their influence on the development of aerial warfare but also in the inspiration they provided for the budding air forces of many nations. The trends of development of airpower and the missions with which it was tasked in the years following World War I evolved out of a combination of the opportunity presented by technology and the search for solutions to operational problems in the interwar era as well as during World War II.

The common denominator among the early theorists was their harsh criticism of the military establishment of their respective armies, which they perceived as overly conservative. They accused senior officers of ignoring or not understanding the forthcoming change in the nature of warfare as a result of the addition of the aerial dimension. The new theorists believed that airpower had created an operational mechanism that would bring future wars to a quick end. Reading the works of these early theorists clearly shows that they all perceived the fact that the airplane had brought about a new era