Allied Special Forces Insignia, 1939–1948

By Peter Taylor

As early as 1940 political leaders and military commanders responsible for the conduct of the Allied operations relalised that, after a string of disastrous setbacks, national morale could only be restored by taking offensive action against the enemy. With the limited resources available Churchills stirring call to set Europe ablaze called for unconventional solutions and action.From these uncertain beginnings was born a plethora of Allied Special Force units. Inevitably some are household names but others are little known, having had brief and covert existences in far flung parts of the world.rnrnAll, however, had distinctive identities and their proudly worn insignia represent a fascinating and often elusive challenge for militaria collectors. This is due, not just to the scarcity of items in many cases, but to the mystery of their origin; a number of these units were established on an ad hoc and spontaneous basis.Peter Taylors aim in compiling Allied Special Forces Insignia 1939–1948 is to fill a gap in the growing bibliography of militaria collecting. At the same time, Brigadier Bryan Watkins introduction sets in context the growth and development of Allied Special Forces during the global conflict 1939-45.Lavishly illustrated, this work will prove an essential reference work and companion guide for the expert collector and all interested in military history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: May 20, 2013
• ISBN: 9781473822337

Book preview

Introduction

‘Engage the enemy more closely’

Admiral Lord Nelson at Trafalgar

In this catalogue of Special Forces insignia, Peter Taylor has given the reader some background information on the origins and roles of the Forces he lists. This Introduction is intended to augment some of that background and to reflect something of the nature and spirit of Special Forces as a whole. The canvas to be covered was extensive and the heroic contribution made to final victory by Special Forces already fills many volumes. Here I have only sought to show a little of the way in which Special Forces were born and developed and to give the reader some feel for their character and quality. Of necessity, it has only been possible to touch on the major elements and to concentrate mainly upon the earlier years of the story. Many small forces shown in the main text have no mention, simply because of a lack of space to do them justice.

What, in fact, were Special Forces? In his excellent British Special Forces, William Seymour, now a distinguished military historian and a former officer of the Scots Guards, who fought as a Commando in the Middle East and Burma, has given us this definition, suggesting that the term should, strictly, be applied to:

Forces specially trained and equipped to fulfil a particular purpose for which regular formations may not be suitable or available.

He cites the Long Range Desert Group (see page 71) as a perfect example. He goes on to make this important point:

The criteria must be that such a force should not be large, should be kept well under control, should be used only for the special purpose for which it was raised and should be well disciplined.

For many reasons, that wise reservation was not always observed during the Second World War, particularly with regard to size and use, probably because there is always a tendency on the part of both commanders and staffs to put their money on any element under command which has proved to be particularly effective in battle. Even since that war, whenever the whistle has blown, it has been a safe bet that the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marine Commandos will be first down on any Order of Battle even though the task is essentially one for conventional infantry.

Winston Churchill’s stirring and unforgettable speeches to the British public in June and July, 1940, did much to salvage national morale after Dunkirk and to reassure our Allies and the Free World of our determination to fight on, despite the overwhelming odds we faced. Nevertheless, golden though those words may have been, both the Prime Minister himself and the Chiefs of Staff realized how important it had become that practical proof of that determination should be given through offensive action. Hence Churchill’s directive to ‘set Europe alight’.

With the Army in tatters and shorn of much of its heavy weapons and equipment, let alone its supplies of ammunition, the $64,000 question was how that directive could be implemented with the resources available. It was not public morale alone that was at stake but a deep need to enable the Army to regain its self-respect, keenly aware as its officers and soldiers were that they had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of a very tough enemy.

Both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force were already engaged in operations of one sort or another and not long before Dunkirk, the RN had reduced the Germans’ existing destroyer forces by fifty per cent in fierce fighting off Norway. The RAF, soon to inflict a stunning defeat upon Goering’s Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, was determined to carry the air war into the heart of Germany. Although the Army was preparing to do battle in the Western Desert with the Italians, at home there was only one course open to them – raiding against enemy held coastlines and some form of clandestine operations within the boundaries of Occupied Europe. If raiding was indeed to be the name of the game, something radical had to be developed.

The immediate problem was the threat of invasion, for which Hitler had evolved his Operation See Loewe and was busily gathering shipping for that purpose. However, the Navy’s control of the Channel and the coastal waters of the North Sea and the RAF’s victory in the Battle of Britain, together with the realization by the Germans that the invasion barges which the RAF were constantly strafing were quite inadequate for a serious seaborne assault, gradually persuaded Hitler that See Loewe was no longer a starter, and the threat was seriously diminished. Now, at last, the Army could think seriously of mounting limited offensive operations – given the men and the right resources. Both the other Services would provide any support required.

Early in 1940, some months before the end of the ‘phoney war’ in France, the efforts of Major J.EC. Holland, a Sapper working on Intelligence research, were rewarded by the authorization of the formation of ten Independent Companies whose task was to be the raiding of the Germans’ Lines of Communication. The men were drawn principally from the Territorial Divisions and were all volunteers. The invasion of Norway by the Germans in April and the despatch of a small Allied force to the Narvik area saw five of these companies, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Gubbins, being dispatched with that force. When they got there, the shortage of infantry was such that the Companies were pitchforked into battle as infantrymen and were unable to exercise their special skills. Despite this unsatisfactory misuse of Britain’s first Special Forces, their very creation had set a vital precedent and, within weeks, Colonel Dudley Clarke, the Military Assistant to General Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had produced a plan, which had long been hatching in his mind, to establish a number of raiding units, which he christened Commandos after the Boer raiding forces in the South African War. He put his paper to his Chief and received almost immediate permission to go ahead. After the Norwegian fiasco, the Independent Companies were earmarked for disbandment, thereby giving Dudley Clarke an excellent pool of high class, trained men upon which to found his first Commandos.

One severe restraint was imposed upon Clarke – nothing could be issued to the Commandos which might inhibit the redevelopment of the Home Army or was needed for General Wavell’s Middle East Command. Despite this handicap, Clarke’s units began to train with what Seymour calls ‘an assortment of shared weapons’ and to plan two small raids – one against a German airfield near Le Touquet and the other against the island of Guernsey. Seymour comments that ‘Both these raids were poor harbingers of what was to come but they taught valuable lessons and the publicity they achieved was good for recruiting.’

In August, 1940, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, the hero of the Dover Patrol in the First World War and a great fighter, who had returned to the Admiralty ‘to do his bit’ in 1939 and now held the post of Director of Combined Operations, gripped the Commando training problem by concentrating all the newly formed units at the Combined Training Centre at Inveraray. The men accepted for training were all trained infantry soldiers, volunteers and, with some exceptions, of high quality. The twelve week course at Inveraray was extremely tough and exacting. Those who fell by the wayside were immediately returned whence they had come. The right to wear Commando insignia was very hard earned and a source of immense pride to the wearers, as it is in the Royal Marines today – and rightly.

Understandably, there were many Commanding Officers in the Army who were deeply suspicious of what they saw as a piratical exercise that was creaming off all their best soldiers and officers. Some also saw the call for volunteers as a means of offloading some of their ‘hard cases’ and trouble makers. However, as William Seymour observes:

There is no place in Special Forces for scallywags in search of adventure … but there is plenty of opportunity for men with courage, intelligence, initiative and selfdiscipline.

These were the qualities the Commandos demanded and the ‘pirates’ were mostly weeded out in short order. Later, Seymour goes on:

Throughout the story of Special Forces … the quality of courage runs as a golden thread through the rich tapestry of a colourful type of warfare.

Commandos undergoing training. Failure to match-up to the rigorous standards meant a return to unit.

The first major Commando raid, against the Lafoten Islands, off the north-west coast of Norway and within the Arctic Circle, was launched in March, 1941. The concept was brilliant, for the islands, which were of immense importance to the Germans as a source of vast quantities of fish oil, needed for the manufacture of nitro-glycerine for ammunition, were not heavily garrisoned or fortified. Provided the raid had been properly planned and rehearsed and surprise was achieved, there was every chance of an important success at a low cost.

The force consisted of some 500 men of Nos 3 and 4 Commandos, supported by 50 Royal Engineers and a similar number of Free Norwegian soldiers. Surprise was complete and the attack on the four islands created havoc. All the oil stocks were burned, the factories and other installations were destroyed and 20,000 tons of shipping were sunk. It was a bloodless affair, the only casualty being an officer who shot himself in the thigh with an accidental discharge! In addition to a substantial haul of prisoners, the Commandos came away with some 60 Norwegian Quislings and 315 Norwegian volunteers.

The Commandos had arrived. They had closed with the enemy and had shown what could be achieved by a small force of well-trained, well-led, determined men and the use of surprise. The world took note. By no means the least important aspect of the raid was the sterling support given by the Royal Navy, marking the beginning of an unbreakable bond with Commando Forces.

South Vaagso on the south-western coast of Norway was successfully raided by British Commandos in December 1941.

Valuable stores going up in flames depriving the Germans of oil supplies.

German prisoners ‘encouraged’ to pose for the camera.

By the end of 1941, Keyes was beginning