Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics

Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics provides a rigorous and comprehensive overview of dishonesty, presenting state-of-the-art research that adopts a behavioral economics perspective. Throughout the volume, contributors emphasize the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors on the decision-making process. In contrast to related titles, Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics emphasizes the importance of empirical research methodologies. Its contributors demonstrate how various methods applied to similar research questions can lead to different results. This characteristic is important because, of course, it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of dishonesty.

• Reviews many key issues in the literature around lying, cheating, fraudulence, and deception
• Covers both state-of-the-art methods and data collection mechanisms (e.g., laboratory experiments, field experiments, online surveys)
• Discusses novel interdisciplinary research findings and from them proposes new avenues of research

• Language: English
• Publisher: Academic Press
• Release date: Jun 4, 2019
• ISBN: 9780128158586

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Preface

"One percent of people will always be honest and never steal […]

Another one percent will always be dishonest and always try to pick your lock and steal your television. And the rest will be honest as long as the conditions are right."

Anonymous locksmith, reported in Dan Ariely, The Honest Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone—Especially Ourselves

The study of dishonesty has gained growing attention in behavioral economics in the last years. Dishonesty is a pervasive human behavior occurring in virtually all contexts, and manifests itself as the disposition to lie, cheat, fraud, or deceive. This behavior usually gives individuals a personal advantage at the expenses of another party, and more in general, of the society.

This book serves two main purposes. First, it provides a rigorous and comprehensive overview of the current research on dishonesty, collecting state-of-the-art works on this topical field from a behavioral economics perspective that focuses on the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors of the decision-making process. Second, it compares empirical works conducted with different methodologies of research, discussing comparative advantages and limitations of each.

Our goal is to provide students, researchers, and policy-makers who want to become familiar with the topic a tool to gain a good understanding of the mechanisms behind dishonesty and of the conditions that can discourage or favor dishonest behaviors as well as of the impact that different methodologies have on the results obtained.

… After reading the book, we hope you will not find us dishonest in our claim.

Alessandro and Natalia

Section 1

Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview

Chapter 1

Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview

Alessandro Bucciol¹; Natalia Montinari²    ¹ Department of Economics, University of Verona, Verona, Italy

² Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Abstract

Dishonesty is a pervasive human behavior occurring virtually in all contexts, and manifests itself as the disposition to lie, cheat, fraud, or deceive. This behavior usually gives individuals a personal advantage at the expense of the society. This chapter briefly reviews the contributions included in the book, which aims to provide a rigorous and comprehensive overview of dishonesty, collecting state-of-the-art research on this topical field adopting a behavioral economics perspective, which focuses on the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors of the decision-making process. This book highlights the importance of the empirical research methodologies to study dishonesty both in the lab and in the field.

Keywords

Dishonesty; Cheating; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Lab and field experiments

JEL Classification

D91; D63

Chapter outline

1.Introduction

2.Dishonesty among children and young adults

3.Dishonesty, individual, and social preferences

4.Dishonesty in daily life

5.Further topics on dishonesty in behavioral economics

6.Concluding remarks

References

1 Introduction

Dishonesty is a pervasive human behavior occurring virtually in all contexts, and manifests itself as the disposition to lie, cheat, fraud, or deceive. This behavior usually gives individuals a personal advantage at the expense of the society. Over the last decade, researchers from various disciplines have investigated the topic from theoretical as well as empirical (including experimental) point of view. A recent comprehensive review can be found in Jacobsen et al. (2018). However, much has yet to be learned about the reasons behind dishonesty, and the characteristics of who is more prone to act dishonestly.

This book aims to provide a rigorous and comprehensive overview of dishonesty, collecting state-of-the-art research on this topical field adopting a behavioral economics perspective which focuses on the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors of the decision-making process. In contrast to other works dealing with the same or similar topics, this book highlights the importance of the empirical research methodologies discussing how different methods applied to similar research questions can lead to different results. One key reason is that it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of dishonesty. In fact, it is complicate to observe or replicate real-life situations involving misbehavior. On the one hand, those studies where the experimenters try to observe participants acting dishonestly on a cheating task suffer from being artificial and threatened by experimental demand effects, with the consequence that they may affect the magnitude of the phenomenon. On the other hand, self-reported information about dishonesty can be unreliable because people may try to conceal their behavior; therefore studies using self-reported data may underreport the size of the phenomenon. In general, since each method has advantages and disadvantages, in the study of cheating more than in other topics, every research should be seen as complementary—rather than substitute—to other research using different methods.

The book is divided into three parts, which are presented in this introduction in connection with the literature. Each part consists of several contributions on the most recent trends of research on dishonesty, written by influent scholars in behavioral and experimental economics. Unfortunately, we had to make a choice, and exclude from the book topics where dishonesty is also pervasive, such as dishonesty in the financial sector and in the public sector. We briefly discuss them in a separate section.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is as follows: Sections 2–4 provide an overview of the three parts in which the book is organized. Section 2 is about Dishonesty among children and young adults; Section 3 is on Dishonesty, individual and social preferences; Section 4 is on Dishonesty in daily life. Section 5 deals with further issues on dishonesty that are not discussed explicitly in the book, i.e., dishonesty in the financial sector and in the public sector. Finally, Section 6 concludes and mentions desirable avenues of development of the field.

2 Dishonesty among children and young adults

There seems to be consensus in psychology that most of the behavior we observe among adults was present also when adults were children, adolescents, or young adults (e.g., Harbaugh et al., 2002; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). A growing body of literature is therefore paying more attention on the behavior of children to better understand the behavior of adults and to disentangle innate factors and influences due to culture and socialization. This trend applies to the literature on dishonesty as well (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2009; Houser et al., 2016; Maggian and Villeval, 2016). An advantage of studying dishonesty among children is that they have fewer routines than adults and more freedom in deciding how to behave (see e.g., Runco and Cayirdag, 2012, on creativity and Rakoczy and Schmidt, 2013, on the understanding of social norms) and, with their spontaneity and natural capacity to be uninhibited, they can provide to the researcher evidence that is more reliable and less affected by the environment.

In Chapter 2.1, Heyman, Zhao, Compton, and Lee provide a comprehensive overview of the psychological literature on young children’s cheating behavior. The authors document that children manifest whether they are inclined to dishonesty as early as age 4, and that their decision between honest and dishonest behavior is later mitigated by psychosocial factors such as self-concept and social image.

In Chapter 2.2, Cadsby, Song, and Yang try to depict a demographic profile of the dishonest child. In particular, they look at parental presence or absence among children in ages 8–10 living in rural or urban areas. They find widespread cheating and no particular connection with parental presence. However, they observe more frequent cheating among urban females aged 8 and in the presence of low levels of risk aversion.

In Chapter 2.3, Battiston, Gamba, and Rotondi focus their attention on adolescents belonging to a youth organization well known for its values of honesty, integrity, and respect for others. Not surprisingly, in this sample the authors find infrequent cheating. More interestingly, dishonesty seems correlated with self-confidence.

Chapters 2.4 and 2.5 focus on university students and their behavior during academic exams. In Chapter 2.4, Cicognani asks students and former students to indicate if and to what extent they cheated during written exams. She finds that dishonesty is widespread, and that it is more likely associated with trust and the belief that others also cheat, and less likely associated to awareness of the sanction. This research highlights two interesting facts. First, the strong evidence on the belief about the others could reflect a sort of self-justification (Many cheat, and so do I). Second, in some cases cheating may arise when there is ignorance about the punishment. Promoting campaigns on advertising the sanctions in response to misbehavior could be a useful dissuading tool.

In Chapter 2.5, Kliger and Siev expose students performing written exams to exam cover pages reporting different statements about the standards of conduct during exams. The authors see that statements are useless unless they are accompanied by checkboxes; moreover, they find that punitive warnings are also ineffective. This research thus suggests that a simple nudge, recalling correct behavior and making the individual responsible for her actions helps to fight dishonesty.

The empirical chapters in this part exploit the methodology of lab-in-the-field experiments (Chapters 2.2 and 2.3), online surveys (Chapter 2.4), and field experiments (Chapter 2.5). Research on dishonesty frequently uses laboratory (lab) experiments where individuals make artificial decisions under controlled conditions. In contrast, field experiments observe individual decisions in real-life scenarios. Here human behavior is expected not to be affected by the artificial environment of the lab experiments but, at the same time, confounding factors can possibly influence decisions. For a thorough definition of field experiments in contrast to lab experiments, see Harrison and List (2004). In recent years, mixtures of lab and field experiments, called lab-in-the-field experiments, have been growing in popularity. Their idea is to test the validity of lab experiments in the field, that is, outside the lab. Lab-in-the-field experiments share the same advantages and disadvantages of lab (field) experiments, mitigated by the presence of features of field (lab) experiments. The two lab-in-the-field experiments in this part involve popular tasks to infer dishonest behavior, i.e., privately rolling a die (Chapter 2.2) and privately tossing a coin (Chapter 2.3) and then reporting the outcome being aware that different outcomes imply different rewards. While these methods do not allow to understand if the single individual is cheating, they can still provide some aggregate evidence from the comparison with the probabilistic distribution of outcomes in a purely random situation. For the original studies using a die and a coin, see Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Bucciol and Piovesan (2011), respectively; for a review of studies adopting this paradigm see Abeler et al. (2019).

3 Dishonesty, individual, and social preferences

The decision to act dishonestly is intrinsically connected with individual as well as social preferences. Choosing between good and bad behaviors has to do with, morality and self-concept (individual preferences) as well as altruism and conformism (social preferences). The purpose of this part is to make it clear that both types of preference are interrelated.

In Chapter 3.1, Lopez-Perez and Spiegelman seek to connect dishonesty with observable socio-demographic characteristics, and especially the field of study. They find that the field of study has higher predictive power than all the other dimensions; in particular, individuals who studied Business and Economics seem to lie more, and also expect most others to lie. Interestingly, the authors also observe a small fraction of the individuals (again, mostly from Business and Economics) to lie against their own interest, possibly for the fear of being disapproved.

Similar evidence is found in Chapter 3.2, where Muñoz-Izquierdo, Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Rin-Sánchez, and Pascual-Ezama compare students graduating in different disciplines. It turns out that Business students are more likely to be dishonest, no matter the size of rewards and penalties. Their study, however, shows that Business students are also more altruistic, since they are more willing to quit personal benefits in order to donate to nonprofit organizations. Importantly, the authors observe that a prior notice (telling individuals they had to report their donation) favors honesty.

The connection between dishonesty and altruism is also explored in Chapter 3.3, where Maggian checks the effect of imposing negative externalities on a charity organization when being dishonest. She finds frequent cheating but no significant relationship, implying that dishonesty and altruism are not related—at least on an aggregate level. The inconsistency with the previous chapters could depend on the sample composition (i.e., the fraction of participants from Business) and the experimental design (i.e., pure lab rather than lab-in-the-field experiment, giving rise to a more artificial setting).

In Chapter 3.4, Hao and Houser see the decision to behave dishonestly as coming from the comparison between potential profits and the desire to keep a positive self-image. They show that having to predict and announce one’s own future actions serves as a deterrent for misconduct, especially when profits are huge. This evidence suggests a possible explanation for the incomplete cheating that is typically observed in the literature; for an extensive discussion of this issue also see Abeler et al. (2019).

In Chapter 3.5, Sasaki, Yamane, Mardyla, and Ohara study the connection between dishonesty and conformism in a selfish/altruistic environment. Their results indicate that individuals exhibit conformist tendencies; in particular, they tend to send nonaltruistic but truthful messages when they know that a majority of their peers had previously chosen to do so. Hence, this evidence suggests that providing information about others’ behavior may influence actual behavior.

The chapters in this part exploit laboratory experiments (Chapters 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5) and lab-in-the-field experiments (Chapter 3.2). The cheating tasks involved are a coin toss (Chapters 3.1a and 3.2), a die roll (Chapters 3.3 and 3.4), and a set of deception and dictator games (Chapter 3.5). While the coin toss and the die roll tasks do not involve any strategic interaction between players, the deception game actually involves beliefs about the other’s honest behavior. Moreover, while both the coin toss and the die roll tasks rely on a randomization device to determine winnings while ensuring that the randomized outcome is only known to participants, in the deception game some of the participants can deceive others allowing the experimenter to identify the individuals who decide to act dishonestly, allowing a better estimate of correlations between dishonesty and other individual variables. Moreover, as discussed by Moshagen and Hilbig (2017), both in the coin toss and in the die roll tasks additional assumptions are needed, such as: (i) dishonest individuals always claim to have won regardless of the outcome, whereas honest individuals only report to have won if actually having won, and (ii) participants do not lie to their disadvantage by denying to have won despite actually having won (although this is not always the case as reported by Utikal and Fischbacher, 2013). Under these assumptions, the coin toss and the die roll tasks allow to study only the characteristics of groups of participants (composed by both honest and nonhonest participants) rather than individuals.

4 Dishonesty in daily life

Dishonesty occurs to ordinary people in daily life situations, such as when riding a bus, when having dinner in a restaurant, or when filling tax returns. Everyday dishonesty usually involves little money but is so frequent that it imposes extremely large costs on the society (Mazar and Ariely, 2006).

In Chapter 4.1, Dai, Galeotti, and Villeval observe individuals making hypothetical decisions between buying and not buying a ticket for various traveling distances. The fraud rate is lower for longer distances, even when no monitoring is planned, suggesting an increase in the moral cost of frauds. Splitting the sample between real-life fare dodgers and nonfare dodgers, the authors find that actual and hypothetical behaviors are related, and that both types of individual react to changes in the probability of being inspected and the severity of the punishment. This work suggests that individuals are responsive to the characteristics of the monitoring process, and rationally react to the size of the expected punishment. It also highlights, however, that nonmonetary factors matter to determine whether to act dishonestly.

In Chapter 4.2, Azar, Yosef, and Bar-Eli study the behavior of diners paying with cash at the restaurant and receiving an extra change over the correct amount. In most cases, the extra change is not returned (possibly, diners excuse themselves by thinking that receiving the extra money was not their fault). This happens more frequently among men and occasional customers. Interestingly, large extra changes are returned more frequently than small extra changes. This evidence is consistent with Chapter 4.1; the authors claim that the psychological costs of dishonesty increase more rapidly than the amounts involved.

In Chapter 4.3, Ponzano and Ottone link tax compliance to prosociality (meant as the concern for others) in three European countries with different socio-cultural background and different levels of tax evasion. They find that prosocial individuals generally comply more with the rules, but especially when the institutional context works efficiently. Individuals are more willing to pay taxes when they understand that they are not wasted.

In Chapter 4.4, Isoni, Read, Koldko, Arango-Ochoa, Chua, Tiku, and Kariza study the effect of signing honesty declarations on anonymous self-reports about sensitive information where a systematic bias is expected on the answers. They find no significant effect, in contrast to existing literature, suggesting that nudges help stimulate honesty (including Chapter 2.5). The authors conjecture that their result may depend on two facts: responses are evidently not verifiable, and there is anonymity, since the declarer cannot be held responsible for the inaccuracy of the information provided.

The chapters in this part make use of laboratory experiments (Chapters 4.1 and 4.3) and field experiments (Chapters 4.2 and 4.4) by varying the context where dishonest behavior can be observed. These two methodologies provide very different insights on the study of dishonesty. While in laboratory experiments random assignments of participants into control and experimental groups provide a fully controlled environment where clean estimates are possible, the main drawback faced by researcher adopting this method is that participants are aware of being part of a study and may be sensitive to experimental demand effects. In field experiments, the experimenter has less control on the environment which may lead to less clean estimates, but individuals act normally, without the feeling of being watched; as a result there is the chance to observe real dishonest behavior. Another important positive aspect associated to field experiments is related to the fact that its focus on a very specific context also allows for the possibility that individuals self-select in a situation with greater or lower motivation to cheat (Houdek, 2017).

5 Further topics on dishonesty in behavioral economics

This book is mostly focused on daily, small-case dishonesty from ordinary people. There are also other forms of dishonesty, not arising every day and restricted to limited groups of persons, which usually moves a large amount of money. This dishonesty, commonly reported in the media, frequently has to do with both (i) the financial sector and (ii) the public sector.

Frauds in the financial sector, i.e., practices used to earn money based on false information, involve every year billions of dollars. Just to name few notorious cases, the American energy company Enron got bankrupt in 2001, after misreporting financial statements and modifying opaque balance sheets to indicate favorable performance and sustain the stock price. A similar situation arose with the American telecommunication company WorldCom, which got bankrupt in 2002. The largest fraud in the history, however, emerged in 2009 when Bernard Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison for having created and perpetuated a worldwide Ponzi scheme through his investment company.b Among various crimes, Madoff was accused of securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, and money laundering. His company defrauded thousands of investors of around 65 billion dollars.

These and other well-known cases fueling the recent financial crisis (think of, e.g., the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) stress that a key ingredient of the financial markets is confidence and trust in others’ honesty. However, Cohn et al. (2014) find that employees in the banking sector do not seem the persons to rely mostly on, as they tend to behave dishonestly more often than employees from other industries. This evidence could be related to self-selection, as individuals more prone to behave dishonestly may prefer some works to others; findings in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, that Business and Economics graduates are more likely to act dishonestly, are consistent with this possible interpretation. Cohn et al. (2014), however, explain their finding in terms of norms: the business culture is full of financial incentives to greedy and opportunistic behavior, whereas more attention should be paid to ethics and the impact on the society.

Greed and opportunism indeed seem key features of the fraudsters. KPMG (2016) runs a worldwide survey on corporate fraudsters, with the purpose of identifying the most common traits of white collars committing crimes within their organizations. It turns out that fraudsters are most likely to be males aged between 36 and 55 years, who are motivated by greed and opportunity, and who enjoy trust and respect from the colleagues. Fraudsters more often work in group rather than alone (because they need to collude to avoid controls) and do not join the organization with the deliberate purpose of committing frauds, as in most cases they act dishonestly after at least 6 years of experience in the organization. Changes in personal circumstances, and pressure to meet the targets may instead induce them to dishonest behavior later on (KPMG, 2016).

Dishonesty in the public sector is often referred to as corruption, defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Aidt, 2003; Armantier and Boly, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In this field of studies, both laboratory and field experiments have represented a great methodological novelty since before their application estimates of corruption were based on perception surveys (Olken, 2009) posing questions about general levels of corruption such as financial honesty of politicians, and the likelihood of firms having to pay bribes for government services. These surveys were sent either to representative samples of the population or to individuals in relevant positions relating to business and government such as businessmen, judges, lawyers, policemen, and politicians (Sequiera, 2012).

Most studies investigating dishonesty in the public sector have focused on bribery and highlighted the central role represented by reciprocity and trust in sustaining bribing agreements. In many experiments, a participant designated as a public official may request or be offered a bribe in exchange for some sort of favor (Abbink et al., 2002; Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010, 2011). Over the last decades a notable number of experiments have focused on several material and immaterial factors affecting the likelihood of observing corruption. Among the material ones, the literature has investigated on factors such as the wages of the public official, the presence and magnitude of fines in case of detection, the presence and magnitude of externalities or monetary costs imposed to third parties, and the presence of intermediaries. Among the immaterial ones, the literature has extensively studied factors such as moral costs and framings (see Armantier and Boly, 2011).

Besides laboratory experiments, several studies have been conducted in the field where the main advantage is that subjects are not aware of being observed if they act dishonestly. Among others, Olken (2007) conducts a field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects measured by discrepancies between official project costs and an independent engineers’ estimate of costs and also points to the importance and effectiveness of top-down monitoring even in highly corrupt environments. Armantier and Boly (2011) perform a field experiment in in Burkina Faso. In the experiment, an exam grader is bribed for a better grade. They find that increasing the graders’ wage reduces in both environments the probability to accept the bribe. Bertrand et al. (2007) studied obtaining drivers’ licenses in India and attempting to identify which rules can be broken through bribery. The researchers randomly divided participants into two groups in addition to the control group. The first group was offered a bonus for obtaining the license fast while the second group was given free lessons. The results indicated that bureaucrats raised red tape on purpose to extract such bribes and thus undermined the very purpose of regulation. Despite their advantages, field experiments have so far been only few in the literature due to high costs of implementation, difficulties to obtain an acceptable level of control of the environment, and the need to carefully design the experimental intervention due to corruption’s sensitive and illegal nature. Due to the high cost, most of them so far have been held in developing countries.

6 Concluding remarks

The general picture emerging from the works included in this book is that dishonesty is a widespread human behavior: many people behave dishonestly. Actually, as Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi (2015) argue, dishonesty rather than honesty may be the default behavior, when (i) it is tempting and easy to be dishonest, (ii) anonymity is preserved, and (iii) the risk of being caught is minimal. In a similar situation, the psychological costs of acting dishonestly (moral balance, self-concept, social image, etc.) are less important. On the same line, Hao and Houser (2017) argue that individuals cheat as much as possible if they can give the impression that they are honest.

In this scenario, policymakers are becoming more and more interested in the use of behavioral economics to stimulate honest behavior. Common interventions involve the use of moral cues, meant to put individuals in a moral mindset before making their decisions, and the use of signatures on documents, to pass to the individual responsibility for the action. In fact, it seems that explicit reference to the individual herself contributes to limit dishonesty (e.g., Bryan et al., 2013). This book shows evidence on this direction in Chapters 2.5 and 4.4.

Still, in any real-life situation some individuals behave honestly, and some others behave dishonestly. The prevailing literature, consistent with most of the findings in this book, suggests that young malec individuals are more likely to act dishonestly than others (see the review in Jacobsen et al., 2018). However, it could be the set of individual preferences and moral values that explains this difference in behavior and that also affects the individuals’ choice of an environment based on future expectations of (dis)honest behavior.

Although the literature has made impressive progress in the last decades, at the moment we still know little about the psycho-social mechanisms driving dishonest behavior. The complexity of human behavior calls for more integration between economics and other disciplines, primarily psychology and neuroscience, to dig deeper on the mechanisms driving dishonesty and design intervention to help people behave honestly.

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