Iron Fist From The Sea: South Africa's Seaborne Raiders 1978-1988

By Arnè Söderlund and Douw Steyn

This seminal work documents the clandestine sea borne operations undertaken by South Africa’s 4 Reconnaissance Commando Regiment. It breathtakingly reveals the versatility and effectiveness of this elite unit which worked with a range of other South African and Rhodesian forces, including the Rhodesian SAS, to engage in a range of raiding and war fighting activities. These operations saw the clandestine reconnaissance of harbors, the sinking of enemy shipping and the destruction of shore installations in Angola and Mozambique. Just some of the tasks undertaken by this extraordinary maritime capability which totaled no more than 45 operators, both black and white!

With unparalleled access to previously secret material, the authors, both of whom worked to develop 4 Recce’s operating capabilities, trace the origins of the Regiment back to the 1970’s when the South African’s determined the need for a maritime force projection capability. They relate how maritime doctrine was developed within South Africa’s wider Special Forces capability and how joint operational approaches were configured with the South African Navy. This saw the development of a range of swimmer, reconnaissance, diving and boat operator training courses, along with the design of specialist raiding craft and amphibious assault platforms, which were originated to operate from the Navy’s existing shipping and submarines. All of which demonstrated the immense potential of this newly emergent force and the resourcefulness of its individual operators. Required to successfully complete a grueling selection process, the operators of 4 Recce were relentlessly tested to prove their physical and mental mettle, not to mention their leadership skills and initiative.

Steyn and Söderlund’s chronological analysis of the operations undertaken by 4 Recce and the South African Navy is stunning to behold. They impartially detail the secret and specialized actions which saw both success and failure. From Cabinda on the West Coast to Tanzania on the East, 4 Recce, and whose existence and capability was largely kept secret even within the South African Defence Force, conducted numerous clandestine raids. They attacked shipping and strategic targets such as oil facilities, transport infrastructure and even ANC offices. And sometimes the raids did go wrong, spectacularly so in one instance when two operators were killed and Captain Wynand Du Toit was captured. He was later paraded in front of the world’s media, much to the embarrassment of the South African government.

This is a fascinating work and one that will enthrall anyone with an interest in Special Forces operations. Profusely illustrated with many previously unpublished photographs, it stands as a testament to the author’s endeavors as, respectively, the former Operations Commander of 4 Recce and the former Commander Task Group of the SA Navy - as well as the incredible operators of 4 Recce.

Explosive and compulsive, Iron Fist from the Sea takes you right to the raging surf; to the adrenaline and fear that is sea borne raiding...

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Jan 19, 2015
• ISBN: 9781910777466

Book preview

The Reach of the South African Navy and Special Forces

Table of distances

1

The Prelude

Operation Starlight

Introduction

It was a dark moonless night but a broad arc of flickering lights to the west outlined the large port with a light house flashing every 7.5 seconds marking the entrance to the channel. There was little movement amongst the vessels anchored in the roadstead off the channel as, some twenty miles off the coast, the dark surface of the sea was cut by a periscope, heralding the stealthy approach of a submarine. Then, when less than ten miles off, the black hull slowly broke the surface and the first figures appeared on the bridge atop the conning tower whilst the low rumbling sound of exhausting gasses completing the Low Pressure blow could just be heard above the subdued voices as the Captain and bridge team scoured the horizon with their binoculars, sweeping through 360 degrees to confirm they were alone and could not be observed.

Instructions were passed down the voice pipe and a minute later the door on the side of the conning tower swung open and the ‘special casing party’ exited quickly, closing up forward of the fin. Then the large torpedo loading hatch was opened and the casing party, assisted by crew just inside the hatch carefully brought out three partially assembled kayaks and positioned them on the casing before the six special forces personnel set to work in pairs, completing the final preparations of their two-man craft in the dark. Whilst this was going on, paddles, kitbags with mines and survival kit along with weapons were carefully passed up through the hatch, the menacing outline of a ‘Tommy’ gun (Thompson sub-machinegun) discernable even in the dark. These were passed to the operators dressed in dark nondescript coveralls, woollen comforters covering their heads and with hands and faces darkened with burnt cork, who carefully secured their kit in the frail craft. Barely twenty minutes after surfacing, all was ready and the submarine stopped in the water. Last-minute confirmation of the navigation marks to run in on was given by the submarine’s Captain to the operators before he and the casing party disappeared below and the six men climbed into their kayaks. The submarine, still static, slowly submerged and, as the kayaks floated free, they took up their paddles and set out for the landing beach, whilst, behind them, they could still hear the last of the ballast air escaping as the boat began submerging and heading out to sea to ensure her presence would not compromise the mission. This was for real; not another exercise.

This scene could have been from the script of the 1954 movie They Who Dare starring the legendary Dirk Bogarde and based on Operation ANGLO, the Special Boat Section (SBS) raid on Axis airfields on the island of Rhodes in September 1942. Or it could describe many of the other SBS raids on enemy targets in the Middle East during World War II when they deployed from boats of the 1st Submarine Flotilla based in Alexandria, using ‘folboats’ (folding boats) such as these kayaks and armed with weapons such as the Thompson sub-machinegun (The Thompson was favored by Second World War special forces for its ergonomics, compactness, large .45 ACP round, reliability, and high volume of automatic fire. Its high rate of fire and stopping power made it very effective in the kinds of close combat these special operations members may have had to face). The activity described above, however, took place thirty years later in 1972 and was a historic occasion, as it was the first true seaborne special operation carried out by South Africa’s Defence Force since its founding in 1912.

Political Background

In the early 1970s, the Apartheid policies of the Nationalist government, whilst soundly condemned by the outside world, were little threatened by the growing African Nationalism both within the country and to the north of its borders. Internally, repressive measures were used to suppress any attempts to destabilise the ‘black’ population, whilst externally there was a ‘cordon sanitaire’ of friendly or neutral states that could be depended on to keep any external threat far away from our back yard. These included the then Rhodesia and the two Portuguese Overseas Provinces of Angola and Mozambique. But all three were already fighting civil wars or insurrection within their own borders. In the case of Mozambique, the Liberation Front of Mozambique or Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), which was formed in Dar es Salaam in 1962 to fight for independence from Portugal, had already wrested control of some rural areas of the central and northern parts of Mozambique from the Portuguese authorities. An estimated 7,000 guerrillas were pitted against some 60,000 Portuguese troops mainly concentrated in the Cahora Bassa region to protect the dam and hydro-electric plant under construction at the time.

Whilst it did occupy some areas inside Mozambique, FRELIMO relied on training and logistic facilities provided by Tanzania’s founding President, Julius Nyerere, and it became apparent to the local Portuguese authorities that this Tanzanian support was the critical factor in sustaining and escalating the war. They therefore looked for means of disrupting this support. In the early 1960s, the Portuguese had established contact with one of Nyerere’s most trusted friends, the first Foreign Minister of the newly independent country, Oscar Kambona. Kambona played a pivotal part in subduing the mutiny in the then Tanganyikan Army in 1964 but he began to fall out with the President when the nation became a one-party state in 1965. After the Arusha Declaration in 1967, a political blueprint for the transformation of Tanzania into a socialist state, the rift became too great and, fearing for his life, he went into exile in the UK. At a meeting between the Portuguese and South African Military Intelligence agencies in Pretoria, it was decided that Kambona could be a viable replacement for Nyerere in event of his downfall, and a plan was developed to enhance his credibility and support within Tanzania. To achieve this, it was proposed to show that his supporters were becoming more militant, and a plan was adopted to achieve this by conducting operations within that country on a slowly increasing scale. The SA Defence Force agreed to implement this plan with support of the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique.

Preparations

The targets would be low value and unsophisticated as well as of a nature that would avoid injury or loss of life. A study to ascertain potential targets that would attract the necessary attention came to the conclusion that they should be in the capital, Dar es Salaam (ironically Arabic for ‘harbour of peace’!). The newly formed Special Forces group then known as the Operational Experimental Group (OEG) and based in Oudtshoorn under command of Commandant (Cmdt and later changed back to Lt Col) Jan Breytenbach, was tasked to conduct the operation. The plan was for a small team to be taken to a position just off of Dar es Salaam by a submarine and paddle to a beach in kayaks. Once ashore, they would place mines on a nearby road bridge and a few other small targets before withdrawing to the submarine early the next morning. Whilst the OEG included a Clandestine Sea Group, which had undergone certain specialist training overseas, it had little experience and no training with the SA Navy in the procedures to be used in this highly classified operation, to be known as Operation STARLIGHT. It also had little specialised equipment, and, with little time in hand, quickly established an intense training and preparation programme.

The men chosen for the operation were the OC himself, the Sergeant Major, WO Trevor Floyd, SSgt Kernaas Conradie and SSgt Koos Moorcraft with two naval members WO Ken Brewin and Chief Petty Officer William Dewey, both divers and qualified parabats, whose nautical skills would be invaluable during the training and insertion. The team commenced the sea training at Mossel Bay where, using Klepper kayaks, they spent many days venturing out to sea in all weather and sea conditions, learning the hard way, even attracting the attention of the local National Sea Rescue Institute (but not their suspicion) when called out by concerned residents on a particularly rough day. During this period, the two naval members were also cross-trained to ensure their proficiency with weapons and Special Forces procedures. WO Brewin had in fact carried out training with the unit before, and in late 1971 had participated in an advanced para-dive attack exercise in Swartvlei, a lake near Sedgefield, pairing with Capt John More, another of the founding members of the unit.

The use of a submarine with its crew of just more that 50 officers and men did pose a minor security risk, and it was decided to identify any possible threats in terms of procedures and routines before the operation. Thus SAS Maria van Riebeeck was sent on a dummy patrol mission whilst the OEG team was being worked up. Only the Captain, First Lieutenant (2iC) and Navigator were in the picture with respect to the destination. On return, it was possible to identify any possible sources of leaks and implement changes or amend procedures. One aspect which facilitated a higher level of security was the cohesiveness of submarine crews due to interdependency and camaraderie due to their living circumstances aboard.

The ship’s company of SAS Emily Hobhouse (Lt Cdr ‘Woody’ Woodburne) was summoned to their headquarters at SAS Drommedaris (later renamed Hugo Biermann) in late March for a briefing, where an officer from Military Intelligence informed them that the training they were about to embark on was classified as it covered the development of a new capability in the SADF that could not be revealed to anyone outside of the briefing. Coming only a few months after the boat’s arrival in South Africa, this new challenge came as an unexpected surprise and it was a serious but solemn crew that left the briefing, knowing that a very busy and active few months lay ahead. Few realised that they were preparing for the first combat operation of its kind since the Second World War, and that it would be classified as Top Secret and remain so for some years. Every aspect of the training and preparations, in which they would be participating, would be just as classified. Even when underway to the target area, only the very basics of the operation were explained but not the target or any specific details.

Once the OEG members were confident in the basic skills, they commenced training aboard a submarine, initially aboard SAS Maria van Riebeeck (Cdr ‘Jaap’ Weideman) but later in SAS Emily Hobhouse which was the submarine tasked for the operation. Aboard Emily Hobhouse (EHB) all the procedures for the operation were finalised and dress rehearsals conducted. An indication of the lack of equipment was the discovery that, after all the preparations at sea, the kayaks were no longer ‘seaworthy’ and had to be replaced with three civilian Kleppers purchased from a commercial source – by the father of one of the team members! Being dark blue rather than the dark green used by the military, they had the advantage that they would not attract too much attention if discovered during the operation. Even their weapons were somewhat elementary and not entirely suited for such operations as proven when the team leader fell overboard when getting out of his kayak one dark night during a dress rehearsal off of Durban’s North Beach. The weight of his ‘kukri’ and Thompson sub-machinegun (nearly 5kg without the 30-tound stick magazine!) nearly dragged him under and caused the submarine to stop her engines until he was recovered – not a happy situation when just off the surf line but part of the learning curve and all in a night’s work for the Cmdt and his team. Of the six weapons carried, only the two AK47s were post Second World War and the Russian SKS semi-automatic rifle and PPSh-41 sub-machinegun were both designed during the war. At least these Soviet weapons were all at least 1.5kg lighter than their ‘Tommy’ guns!

When the operation was initially being planned, the then Chief of the Navy, VAdm J. (Flam) Johnson, was most concerned about the safety of his submarine, and, due to the lack of recent hydrographic information on the coral growth on the reefs north of Dar es Salaam, was very reluctant to give approval. He finally gave in but instructed that the boat would not get closer than 20 nm from the coast. Cmdt Breytenbach was dismayed as they only had one night to conduct the operation and having to paddle 40 nm to and from the beach not only left little, if any, time to infiltrate the town, but also might endanger the lives of the operators, who needed to rendezvous with the submarine at night. Lt Cdr Woodburne was, however, made of sterner stuff and assured him that he would ensure there would be no problem as he would turn a traditional blind eye in the interests of safety and success. As an ex-naval officer (having served as an Observer or Navigator in the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy from 1955-61) Breytenbach recognised the ‘Nelson touch’ in the submarine’s Captain and agreed that the operation could go ahead.

Transit

One quiet weekend in late May, a small convoy of Land Rovers arrived alongside EHB in the Submarine Basin and the loading of equipment began. It was not an easy task as the main access was via the vertical hatchway forward. All the equipment, explosives and weapons, including a box of hand grenades, had to be safely stowed in the forward mess, with much secured below the torpedo tubes, while the grenades were placed under the Captains bunk! The submarine had been fuelled to capacity and victuals for a long trip had been stowed. Two nights later the submarine sailed after dark for what the crew thought was yet another exercise and patrol, although there were no passengers aboard. Once at sea, it became clear that this was not going to be an ordinary trip. The navigational read-outs on the chart table were covered and all the chart-work was done by the Navigator, not the Officer of the Watch. The crew was told that both the objective and therefore the navigation would be classified. However, on leaving False Bay, the submarine turned east and it appeared that Durban would be the next call.

All appeared to be relatively normal until the crew began to realise that they had long passed Durban, even though the navigator, Lt Cdr Wryno Hartz, was being very secretive with his charts. After a long passage, the crew of EHB finally closed up at harbour stations one evening and, in total secrecy, entered a port they later discovered was Nacala in Mozambique. In the dark they secured alongside the Portuguese corvette NRP General Pereira D’Eca. Except for a few selected members, the crew remained below deck whilst the boat was refueled and seven passengers embarked, six familiar faces from the many weeks of exercising and a dignified elder gentleman, Maj Gen Fritz Loots (Ret), the Second World War veteran and ex-Director of Military Intelligence, who had been recalled to establish Special Forces. It was now plainly apparent to the entire crew that this was not just another exercise and that ‘something was up’. A few cases of Portuguese beer, a couple of bottles of Portuguese Port and fresh bread of an unusual shape followed them down. Alcohol was normally forbidden aboard so this was obviously a special occasion. A few hours later after refueling was completed, EHB sailed and was soon heading north again. The beer, although warm, was enjoyed, as was a small tot of Port per crew member with a meal. Then all of the bottles were carefully gathered and, once accounted for, ditched over the side.

The Landing

On Sunday 11 June the submarine closed the port of Dar es Salaam to conduct a periscope reconnaissance and establish navigational points and shipping movements. That night after dusk she commenced her approach at periscope depth using Kinondoni light as a visual reference. Due to the dangerous reefs off the coast and the need for accurate navigation, the normal restrictions on radar were briefly relaxed and as the ranges and bearings were being called out, the course was plotted on overlays on the plotting table but secrecy was maintained as all the points and landmarks had strangely familiar names such as ‘de Wet Light’ and ‘Sadler Point’ amongst others, in place of those normally found on a chart, de Wet and Sadler being the names of the First Lieutenant and Operation Room Supervisor respectively whilst only the Navigator and Captain were allowed to see the actual chart. Owing to the presence of fishing boats and coastal traffic, a very careful watch was kept from the periscope and when about 5 miles off, the submarine slowly surfaced, still closing the landing position, considerably closer than that authorised by the Chief of the Navy.

Missimbasi Bay in Dar es Salaam where the raiding team came ashore

Lt Cdr Woodburne at the attack periscope of SAS Emily Hobhouse

In the forward mess a special team, having partially assembled the kayaks and laid out all the remaining equipment, began removing the two strong-backs below the torpedo hatch, a difficult task as the two heavy steel beams were a tight fit and clumsy to handle. The special casing party waited close to the conning-tower hatch, ready to follow the bridge team out on surfacing. At about 2130C (East African Time) the boat surfaced and the well-practiced teams sprang into action as they continued to close the coast just south of Ras Kankadya to the north of the city. About 20 minutes later all was ready and EHB was in the landing position about three miles offshore and to the north east of the appropriately named Daphne Reef and clear of the anchorages. With the lighthouse now providing an ideal run-in to the beach on Misimbasi Bay, the operators climbed into their boats as the casing team went below and two minutes later were floated off as the submarine slowly opened the coast. The raid had begun.

The Raiders Ashore

On reaching the beach the three kayaks were quickly hidden, with the two naval members, each armed with a Thompson sub-machinegun, left to guard them and ensure a safe withdrawal. The four operators, in their civilian clothing and carrying their heavily laden hold-alls, moved up to the road and their first target, the Salander bridge over the Msimbazi Estuary that linked the residential north of the city with the commercial centre and harbour. Their carefully applied black make-up had been splotched by the water and spray during the paddling and was washed off. In spite of the lateness, there was still considerable traffic and few passersby seemed concerned about these Europeans. After laying their charges on the bridge, the team set off to look for further targets, and a power pylon was the next to get their attention. The members had now walked down Independence Avenue, where a black Rolls Royce, resplendent with flag staff on the bonnet, stood in the road unattended. Placing a mine under the engine, the team now withdrew back to the rendezvous point (RV) on the beach.

Back at the beach, the boats were retrieved and all was going to time as the three kayaks slowly headed out to meet up with the submarine. With an offshore wind at their backs progress was good but when in the estimated RV position for pick-up, all was very quiet with no sign of EHB, their safe passage home. Anxiously scanning the sea around them and slowly drifting eastwards in case they were too close in, the six men waited and by 0430C with sunrise only 2 hours away, they began to prepare themselves for Plan B, which was to hide up during daylight hours on one of the isolated and uninhabited islands amongst the reefs and try to RV the next night. Should they still not meet up, as a last resort they would paddle some 250nm south to the Mozambique border, a rather daunting task. These thoughts were going through their minds when they heard a strange intermittent ‘hollow banging’ sound approaching from seawards. Initially preparing for a confrontation, they were relieved to discern the dark and welcoming shape of EHB surface nearby. The sound that they heard was the air operated snort head valve, closing due to waves washing over it as the submarine approached at periscope depth with the diesels running to compensate for the resultant heavy discharge of the batteries following an unexpected delay approaching the RV. Twenty minutes later, all were below and the equipment stowed with the relieved raiding team and submarine complement heading out to sea where they would loiter for the day to monitor the local radio nets to evaluate the results of their night’s work.

The Delayed RV

Once aboard, the now relaxed raiding team discovered the reason for the late RV. The submarine was at periscope depth and on her way in to recover the team when the starboard propulsion motor suddenly started to labour, with the revolutions and amperage fluctuating, requiring it to be shut down quickly to avoid damage. The Captain quickly made the decision to surface as it became apparent that something had fouled the shaft or propeller. This was an extremely dangerous situation, because the submarine carried no fixed external weapon that could be used in a confrontation. So the Captain was followed up by the ship’s 7.62 FN light automatic rifle (known as the R1 in South Africa) ‘just in case’ as well as the Action Officer of the Watch and lookout. Little could be seen in the dark but after the submarine was stopped, an inspection from the aft casing revealed that they had fouled a fishing net and been dragging a small but now waterlogged and partially submerged fishing boat for a distance. The situation was extremely serious as not only had they been forced to surface off a potentially hostile coast and close to a major harbour but the six operators of the raiding force would be in dire trouble if not recovered before daylight – national security was at risk. Divers were quickly summonsed and the boat was sunk by rifle fire.

Lt Cdr Hartz and the two junior divers aboard, LS Swanepoel and AB Diedericks quickly prepared themselves and with safety lines and only torches to work by, set to cutting away what they could. The shaft was then locked and the boat, now restricted to a single shaft, made her best speed to reach the RV. It had been a nerve-wracking time, and, for the members who worked over the side in the dark, a dangerous undertaking. However, they had eventually made the RV in time and all was well. During the course of the day, monitored radio broadcasts confirmed that explosion had caused some panic in the capital and the last bomb had effectively destroyed the British High Commissioner’s official vehicle.

Transit Home

On the 14th, once well clear of the coast and well to the south in case of being observed from the air, WO Brewin, one of the SA Navy’s most experienced divers went down to survey the starboard shaft and clear away any further material. Entering Durban to refuel and quietly drop off their seven weary passengers, they were met by a very concerned Senior Officer Submarines. Another underwater inspection that morning confirmed they could continue their passage home and it was a very happy complement that returned to Simon’s Town after an epic six weeks away.

The Results Achieved

The first indication of their success appeared in the Stop Press section of the afternoon newspapers on Monday 12 June, and the report in the Cape Argus of that date stated ‘3 BLASTS AT BRIDGE Dar es Salaam: Three explosions, believe caused by time bombs, rocked main road bridge here, Three detained for questioning. One believed to be European. Blasts caused no damage to bridge’. The claim that no damage was caused to the bridge was of little concern as the aim of the operation was not to destroy any infrastructure, or, indeed, cause any casualties, although the Rolls Royce was a write-off, a victim of circumstances by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Military Intelligence thus considered the operation to be a success and proceeded to plan the next operation, which, as planned, would see an incremental increase in the significance of the target and its effect on the population.

Planning for Further Operations

The target identified for the next operation was a considerable escalation as it was to be the TIPER Oil Refinery to the south east of the harbour and neighbouring the TPDF’s Naval Base. This was not likely to be ‘a walk in the park’ as it was a strategic target with security and not as easily accessible from the beach. Thus considerable intelligence would be needed before serious planning could commence. Most critical was the requirement for up-to-date aerial photographs of the target and the surrounding area and these were not available from any of the few, friendly, international sources still available to Defence Intelligence. Thus the South African Air Force (SAAF) was to be drawn into the covert planning.

The then Chief of the Air Force, Lt Gen R.H.D. (Bob) Rogers, was briefed on the strategic plan which necessitated a photo reconnaissance of the airport and harbour area, which included the oil refinery. He approved the tasking of 12 Squadron stationed at AFB Waterkloof to conduct the mission. The squadron was equipped with English-Electric Canberra B(I) Mk 12 light bombers which were ideally suited for photo reconnaissance missions. The Director of Operations at Air Force HQ, Brig ‘Wally’ Black was placed in command for the mission. Due to the distances involved, the reconnaissance missions were to be conducted from the Portuguese Air Force Base at Nacala. In early July, Brig Black, his communications operator and the ground crew for the photo-recce aircraft were flown to Nacala in a Transall 160, where they awaited Canberra 451, the ‘Ship’ for the mission. The pilot for the task was Maj Errol Earp with Maj Jerry Coetzee to do the en-route navigation and Capt ‘Knoppies’ Coetzer as the photo navigator.

Considerable effort went into the planning and especially the safety of the team with the Portuguese corvette General Pereira D’Eca on standby for Search and Rescue during deployments, while Shackleton Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft were available for an air search, should it be necessary. Due to the very nature of the task, advanced and accurate weather reports were important and, after a week of unsuitable weather predicted over the target area, the teams and aircraft returned to Pretoria. The next attempt took place in early September 1972 with Maj Coetsee in command of the mission. One of the problems experienced was that weather reports were only received in the late morning. To overcome this problem, and to keep the team exercised, the aircraft took off each morning for three days, flying north until within VHF range of Dar es Salaam airport, where they could listen in to the weather reports passed to inbound aircraft – by far the most accurate weather report available. It was still clear that the weather was unsuitable.

On the fourth day, the 8th of September, the aircraft developed a problem, which delayed take-off and was still on the ground when the report came in, indicating clear weather over the target. Luckily, the ground crew were able to rectify the defect and, by midday, the aircraft was airborne and flew north parallel to the coast. Off Dar es Salaam, air traffic control confirmed the clear weather to an incoming flight. Just as the Canberra started its photo run at 30,000 ft, an aircraft requested urgent clearance to take off for an undeclared emergency, raising fears that the SAAF Canberra had been spotted. This was quickly dispelled by the ATC, who denied permission due to a Presidential flight landing and the welcoming parade, which was duly recorded by the cameras. It later turned out that the mission had been conducted on the same day that Heads of State were arriving for an OAU meeting. Once the run had been completed, the Canberra opened the coast to 150nm and headed back to Nacala … mission accomplished.

Although much of the desired intelligence was now available, it became apparent that the only relatively safe means of infiltration would again be from the sea. Notwithstanding the success of STARLIGHT, the Chief of the Navy, possibly as a result of the incident with the fishing boat, was unhappy to risk a submarine for further operations off the Tanzanian coast and whilst the Chief of the Army pressed for the attack on the refinery to go ahead, the newly appointed Chief of the Defence Force, Adm H.H. Biermann, felt that the potential value of such an operation did not warrant the risks involved and should the SADF involvement be compromised, the political consequences would be dire.

Epilogue

In April 1973, in a very classified medal parade held at the Castle in Cape Town, the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, bestowed a number of awards on members of the Defence Force, who had participated in the operation and the preparations for its follow-up. The team leader, Cmdt Breytenbach, and the Captain of SAS Emily Hobhouse, Lt Cdr Woodburne were each awarded the Van Riebeeck Decoration (DVR) for distinguishing themselves by outstanding resourcefulness, perseverance or personal courage or by their outstanding leadership or responsibility and personal example against an enemy in the field. This was the first (and only) time the DVR had been awarded since its institution in 1952. The DVR was rendered obsolete by the Honoris Crux Decoration in 1975. The Van Riebeeck Medal (VRM), which was awarded for the same attributes as the DVR, but to Warrant Officers, NCOs and Men, was bestowed on WO Floyd, WO Moorcroft, WO Brewin and SSgt Conradie. The Air Force’s part in the gathering of intelligence was recognized by the award of the Southern Cross Medal to Maj Pierre le Clus and Maj Gerrie Coetsee, the Pro Merito Medal to WO Wagenaar of the ground crew and Chief of the Defence Force Commendation Medals (superseded by the Military Merit Medal in 1993) to Maj Earp and Capt Coetzer.

In November 1972, the British Air Attaché to South Africa paid a visit to 12 Squadron and in a discussion over a cup of coffee, casually asked Maj Coetzee, the guide for the visit, whether they had carried out a photo reconnaissance of Dar es Salaam. This was laughed off but did indicate that the aircraft had not gone unnoticed and not long afterwards an AA Missile Battery was established at Kigamboni Point to the east of the harbour entrance.

Operation STARLIGHT was the first external combat operation undertaken by the SADF since the Second World War and, notwithstanding a few hiccups, was considered a success. Although there were no follow-up operations, the concept of seaborne infiltration and Special Forces for the conduct of strategic operations was firmly established. Also remarkable was that the operation had been conducted ‘on a shoe-string’ with basically obsolete equipment and borrowed personnel. On 30 August 1972, a letter authorizing the creation of a new Permanent Force unit to be known as 1 Reconnaissance Commando was signed on behalf of the Chief of the Army and barely a month later on 1 October 1972 1RC was formally established with Cmdt Breytenbach appointed as Commanding Officer. Although this unit was to be based on the concept, functions and organisation of the British and then Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS), the choice of the name Reconnaissance Commando was chosen to hide its true purpose. The unit was placed under control of Military Intelligence but remained at Oudshoorn.

The letter of establishment stated that the unit would be lead by handpicked officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs and that all candidates would be subject to strict selection with ‘particular attention paid to characteristics such as a member’s courage and daring, his physical and psychological tenacity, initiative, loyalty, ability to form part of a team, discipline, judgment, responsibility, moral standards, etc’ – a tall order indeed. The need for a professional Special Forces capability in the SA Defence Force had finally been formally recognised and just in time, for, although the country was already involved in a guerilla war in the northern region of then South-West Africa (now Namibia), an ideal training ground for this new unit, it would be merely three years before the real test would come with the fall of the Portuguese administration in Angola and Mozambique and the resulting chaos in an independent Angola. With both these former Portuguese Provinces under Marxist domination, South Africa and the then Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) now needed their specialist skills and they were able to prove they were up to the task.

Historical Precedent – Operation Z

Whilst the Union Defence Force and later the South Africa Defence Force had no history of Special Force units, a fair number of South Africans had served in the various British Special Forces units during the Second World War. Of more interest, however, was a rather fascinating combined landward and seaborne operation planned and exercised for in the early war years, which could have had the hallmarks of a Special Operation had the authorities shown professional interest, initiative and perseverance at the time. This operation known as Operation Z, which was on hold from early 1940 until the end of 1943, was in fact never officially cancelled! What made it remarkable was the rather protracted planning process with a lack of any urgency or defined orders and the inappropriate equipment available – the very antithesis of the SA Special Forces born some 30 years later.

Operation Z was one of a number of mainly landward operations planned by Britain, South Africa and the then Rhodesia early in the war to occupy the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, should they become hostile. Only Operation Z got beyond the paper stage and was the planned occupation of the port of Lorenzo Marques (LM – now Maputo) in Mozambique. With a reported 2,000 organised Germans there, who were in contact with sympathizers in South Africa and the possibility of Germany invading Spain to gain access to Gibraltar, actual planning and preparations for this operation went ahead, the main impetus being the possible loss of access to harbour facilities, which could be sabotaged. Further sabotage could be inflicted on two German cargo vessels, Aller and Dortmund and the Italian passenger liner Gerusalemme, which were ‘interned’ there. Whilst the main force, with air support, would come from landward, the cutting out of the three vessels and protection of the quays were the responsibility of the navy, using army troops.

One rather unique and pioneering part of this plan was to airlift troops to occupy Lourenco Marques without advance warning. The first exercise was conducted in late June 1940 using the SAAF Junkers Ju-52 taken up from South African Airways and carrying a company of the Transvaal Scottish to seize an airfield. This was successful and a week later secret instructions were issued to train up two infantry battalions as air assault troops. What makes this plan rather innovative is the fact that it was only six weeks after the very first operational airborne envelopment of a similar target, when German paratroopers landed on Aalborg airport in Denmark (9 April, 1940), and, a month later, when paratroopers and glider-borne troops landed in Belgium!

The First Efforts

On 28 August 1940, the Chief of General Staff (CGS) instructed RAdm Hallifax, the Director of the Seaward Defence Force (SDF – the predecessor of the SA Naval Force and later the SA Navy), that the preparations for Operation Z should be advanced a stage further and the vessels and personnel concerned should be moved in accordance with plans made but temporarily suspended. This was the first written reference to the operation; all previous communication was done verbally for reasons of secrecy. By 6 December, six SDF converted whalers assembled in Durban, four having arrived from the Cape after uplifting special equipment such as machine guns and fire-fighting apparatus as well as a number of Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (SA) members from Simon’s Town. Placed under command of the Royal Navy, the ships exercised various landing and boarding procedures, with the Pretoria Highlander providing the landing teams, until 25 October when three vessels were sent back to the Cape and routine operations resumed. It was assumed by the SDF that the planned operation had been abandoned, much to their relief as the vessels were most unsuitable for the purpose.

The Next Attempt

The Union Government, however, had decided to take over this operation and a month later Cdr Dalgleish, Commanding Officer of the Cape Town Detachment, was summonsed to Pretoria and told that he would now be in charge of the naval side with Maj Gen I.P. de Villiers in overall charge. RAdm Hallifax, reacting to rather vague instructions but understanding that it was urgent, then withdrew the six ships of the Mine Clearance Flotilla from Cape Agulhas so as to arrive in Durban on 7 December 1940. For this he was berated for ‘acting without orders’, as the intention of CGS had apparently been to use the Durban Flotilla, which consisted of smaller and less reliable ships, which were heavily involved in keeping the port open! Although training commenced, no naval order had been drafted and eventually the Director and Cdr Dalgleish did their best on the basis of incomplete information received. In fact, at no time were the army orders or indeed any written instructions sent to him by Defence Headquarters! On 6 January, on instructions from Pretoria, the Flotilla returned to Agulhas to continue sweeping duties.

Initially, it was given to understand that it was unlikely the Operation would take place and it was a shock to be told that by Officer Commanding Cape Command that it was merely suspended and that only 72 hours notice would be given before Zero hour. The vessels were a good four hours sailing time from LM without taking the loading of boarding parties, equipment and fuelling them into consideration. The thoroughly frustrated Director of the SDF thus asked Defence Headquarters for more definite information but heard nothing more on the matter. Operation Z remained forgotten for another six months.

The Revival

In early June 1941, Cdr Dalgleish, now Director of the SDF after RAdm Hallifax had been killed in an air accident, was instructed to prepare for the operation again and duly sent the Mine Clearance Flotilla from Agulhas back to Durban, arriving there on 9 June. This time more attention was given to planning with the Officer Commanding of the Military College, Col H.S. Cilliers, appointed as Staff Officer Planning for the operation, and the Officer Commanding Durban Detachment (SDF), Cdr H.R. Gordon-Cumming, appointed in charge of training and all naval activities with direct contact to Pretoria. At last, some progress could be made, with a proper assessment of the coastal defences in LM and proper training for the task. The main threat to the ships was seen as the four 4 coastal guns in the harbour and the four 4.7 guns on the Portuguese sloop NRP Alfonso de Albuquerque, which lay at anchor off the harbour entrance when in port. To counter this threat, it was planned that SAAF bombers would attack the ship and gun positions just before the ships arrived. Should the SAAF not be able to assist, it was planned that the formation would split and approach the sloop on both sides to board and capture her!

As the Pretoria Highlanders had been transferred, the 1st Battalion of the Witwatersrand Rifles would provide the six sea-going platoons of 25 men each and training began in earnest with the ships conducting gunnery practice. In July, Cdr Gordon-Cumming was back in Pretoria for discussions and it became apparent that a lot of confidence was being placed in his sea-borne force as it had been decided to decrease greatly the land force and rely on the 150 strong force from the Wits Rifles. In addition, it was decided that they would also occupy and hold the aerodrome until relieved by an airborne force. It was patently obvious that the force was too small and another 200 men would be required, as well as some mode of land transport once ashore, even if only motorcycles – a new challenge. To meet this, a small merchant ship and tug were added to the plan, although it was decided that it was not justifiable to hold such vessels at immediate availability. Thus plan A would be to use whatever vessel that was available in Durban at the time or, if none available, plan B would press all the remaining SDF vessels in Durban into service as a transport flotilla! This made training extremely difficult, but the 200 man force, mainly those of the battalion prone to seasickness and not suitable for the seaborne platoons on the six converted whalers, exercised landing on a wharf and occupying strong-points.

The seaborne platoons, in the meantime, continued their training in the rigging of ladders, understanding the layout of larger merchant vessels and boarding drills. The vessels each carried six 20 ft ladders with hooks at the top end and heavy grappling irons for holding the whalers alongside the target vessels. Practicing on merchant vessels in port was valuable and it quickly identified a difficulty not realised by the planners – the gap of some 20m between the low freeboard of the whalers and the much higher sides of the larger ships. Also discovered was the fact that even the bridges of the SDF vessels were too low to cover the upper deck of the target during boarding. Training went on until middle March 1942. During the first few months there was considerable enthusiasm but by November 1941 this enthusiasm began to evaporate as some of the best men in the battalion were transferred to technical or other units heading for the front, necessitating replacements. Training became rather repetitive for those initial members. It was seldom that as many as 100 men were fully trained.

No orders were ever received to cancel or even postpone the preparations but in March 1943, a merchant vessel was mined some 18 nm to the west of Green Point and just outside the swept channel to Cape Town. The Mine Clearance Flotilla was thus recalled from Durban and Operation Z faded from the minds of all involved and the War went on. In late 1941, Cdr Gordon-Cumming had visited Lourenco Marques and reported that the four 4" coastal defence guns were in a remarkably good condition. Circling the three anchored enemy vessels, he found them in light condition and too high out of the water to be boarded from the whalers, unless secured alongside at certain positions, a doubtful evolution on account of the strong current running. Yet the training in Durban continued unabated until the six vessels sailed home.

It was a rather inauspicious attempt at what could have been South Africa’s very first ‘special operation’. Looking back, it certainly underlines the need for a specialist organisation manned by highly trained and well equipped professional soldiers.

The Inspiration and Those Who Went Before

Operation STARLIGHT, as mentioned above, had a number of remarkable similarities with the first operation executed by the Special Boat Section (SBS), which was formed in Scotland in July 1940 but sent to the African Theatre in early March 1941. This new section was conceived by a big-game hunter and canoeist from East Africa. Capt Roger ‘Jumbo’ Courtney, who had once paddled his flimsy craft down the Nile from Lake Victoria to the Egyptian border, became its first Commanding Officer. Formed with an initial complement of only 12 volunteers, it was initially equipped with frail recreational collapsible canoes known as ‘folbots’ (folding boats!) which were soon replaced by more robust kayaks designed to carry heavier loads. Soon after its arrival in Egypt, the SBS established its unique and very valuable capability on its first seaborne reconnaissance mission.

The Special Boat Section

In January 1941, Gen Wavell, the British Commander in Chief Middle East was planning to capture the island of Rhodes, which lay 10 miles off the coast of Turkey and, at the time, was Italian territory. On his planning staff as senior navigator for the landing operation was Lt Cdr Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott, who had seen action off Narvik, where half the British ship losses were caused by floundering on rocks and who thus decided to make a thorough survey of intended landing points. Whilst a periscope recce by submarine revealed the necessary state of the waters and currents, it could not show what lay beyond the beach, such as guns, other defences or even marshes. He needed to get ashore for this but the use of a vessel inshore would not only risk a valuable resource but also alert the enemy to their interest. A meeting with Capt Courtney resolved the issue.

Rehearsing together in handling the kayak, silent swimming and communication techniques, they were soon ready and at the end of March were embarked in the submarine HMS Triumph en route for Rhodes. Diving to avoid aircraft and shipping by day, she conducted a periscope recce of the coast and then spent a night recharging batteries before landing the two canoeists the following night. The boat surfaced to bring the folbot and equipment up before being trimmed down to the saddle tanks to allow the canoe to be launched safely. With a Thompson submachine-gun, grenades and a top secret infra red RG signaling light stowed aboard and with Jumbo in the paddler’s seat astern, a P8 aircraft compass secured to the floorboard and Nigel in the front seat, both in heavily greased clothing, they set off for the beach some 2.5 km away. About 100m off, the swimmer slipped into the sea and swam to the shore to carry out a beach reconnaissance. Voices indicated the presence of sentries but he swam parallel to the beach and once they moved off carefully moved ashore noting all details with a chinagraph crayon.

After three hours, he slowly swam back to the canoe, which after he had flashed the letter ‘Romeo’ on his hooded torch a few times, appeared out of the darkness to uplift him. Once in the pick-up position the RG lamp was flashed, sending out an infra red beam to be picked up by a lookout on the submarine scanning the sea with a camera-like receiver. As the beam fell on the lens, a green spot could be seen in the eyepiece against a background of green sparkling stars and the RV would follow. Four more similar operations were conducted and all intelligence needs were covered. However, it was all in vain, because German bombers reached the South of Greece in late April 1941 rendering any shipping movements in that area too hazardous, as proven during the evacuation from Crete.

The operations had, however, established the SBS and ensured their rapid expansion and the increasing importance of their raiding capability. An indication of their strength and influence in the Balkans was that by 1944 some 2-300 men were holding down six German divisions. A number of South Africans served in the SBS and it can be said that this section and its successors provided the template for 4 Reconnaissance Commando. During the turbulent war years, a large number of Special Forces organisations and units were formed and as the fortunes of war changed were reorganized or amalgamated with name changes or operated in parallel. Thus the SBS was at various times a Section, Squadron or Service and went from being an independent unit to sections in larger SAS units. At the end of the war in 1945, however, it was only the then Special Boat Section, which was continued as its title, role and function were taken by the Royal Marines. In 1977, it became the Special Boat Squadron and finally, in 1987, the Special Boat Service, formally part of the UK Special Forces.

Those Who Served

One of those who served with particular distinction in the SBS during the Second World War was Lt Cdr M.E. ‘Andy’ Anderson MC, who joined the Union Defence Force in 1937 and was commissioned in the SA Artillery in 1939. In August 1943 whilst serving with the 6th SA Armoured Division, he relinquished his rank as Major to join the SBS as a Capt. He participated in many amphibious and parachute operations in Crete, the Aegean Islands and Greece, during which he greatly distinguished himself and was awarded the Military Cross. At the end of the war he resumed his duties in the SA Artillery before transferring to the SA Corps of Marines. With the disbandment of the Corps in 1954, he transferred to the SA Navy, serving as a staff officer at Naval HQ until his untimely death in 1960. He was known for his approachability and having an above average mind as well as willingness to assist in any task – he would have been proud of the operators who came after him and who followed the traditions and standards he helped establish.

SBS raiding team operating under a flag of ruse in the Balearic Islands

Elements of the SBS underway by traditional and proven means – inflatables

Capt ‘Andy’ Anderson MC – a member of the SBS, wearing the distinctive wings and cap badge of the SAS

Behind the lines – Lt Balsillie with Z Patrol displaying an extraordinary selection of allied and captured German weapons

Also serving with Capt Anderson in the SBS were Lt (later T/Maj) Keith Balsillie and Sgt Priestly, the Intelligence Sergeant whose Afrikaans was extremely valuable when interrogating prisoners and, according to a unit history, ‘whose insistence on the truth was firmly persuasive, albeit without physical violence.’ Balsillie made a remarkable escape from the island of Leros after it was overrun by the Germans. Although ill, he and seven others escaped in a 12 foot rowing boat. Another South African serving behind the lines in Greece and Albania was Lt Tommy Renfree, a member of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). As soon as the war in Europe ended, he joined Special Operations Australia, which was also known as the Z Special Unit or Services Reconnaissance Department, the joint Allied special forces unit similar to the SBS formed to operate behind Japanese lines in South East Asia. After the war, this unique soldier continued to serve and became the first 2iC of the 1st Parachute Battalion in 1961, retiring as a Colonel.

Others served in the Special Air Service, the Long Range Desert Group and the Raiding Support Regiment with one even serving as a patrol commanding officer in the legendary Popski’s Private Army, which only fielded some 100 men at the height of its success. Service in the special units was not restricted to army members and Lt John Terry-Lloyd SANF was made a Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire for his service in the Royal Navy’s X-Craft, a hazardous occupation when borne in mind that only eighteen were engaged on operations and earned four Victoria Crosses.

Many more South Africans, mainly army officers volunteered to serve in the various special force units of the British Forces with over 74 being transferred to the Royal Marines for special duties during the invasion of Europe or for service in the Commandos. Two of the former, Capt Lyle McKay and T/Lt Cecil Bircher, were awarded the Military Cross for gallantry on D-Day. Maj Gideon Jacobs was made an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his achievements in parachuting into occupied Sumatra with four NCOs to accept the surrender of 80,000 Japanese troops when Japan capitulated a few days later. Not only did ‘Pik’ van Noorden lead his platoon ashore on D-Day, but was subsequently dropped behind enemy lines in Europe and later over Rangoon (Burma/Myamar) at its capture. After the war he continued his service in the SA Army, retiring as a Major General.

X-5 – the X-Craft submarine in which Lt John Terry-Lloyd SANF served

Probably the best example of broad special forces service and achievement was Lt Victor Pieter Chatillon de Kock of the SANF. Seconded to the Royal Navy, where he volunteered for Combined Operations, he initially served as the Captain of a Combined Operations assault landing craft, which was engaged in the clandestine landing of commandoes as well as the supply of Tobruk. He took part in the evacuation of allied troops from Greece and then Crete before volunteering to serve in the Combined Operation Pilotage Parties, which conducted clandestine beach reconnaissance from kayaks launched by submarine. In early March, 1943, he and a fellow South African, SLt Crossley, and two others were inserted by the submarine HMS Unrivalled to recce one of the invasion beaches in the south of Sicily. Whilst the other two members were captured, the two South Africans were never seen again. Lt de Kock was the most highly-decorated member of the SANF having been awarded the MBE for ‘courage, determination and fine seamanship in rescuing men from a torpedoed merchant ship when the weather was rough and the enemy near’. He was also awarded the DSC as well as a ‘mention in dispatches’ for his achievements during the Tobruk run. He thus epitomised both the role of the SA Navy during years covered in this book as well as the ‘Recces’, who risked their lives ashore.

Thus South Africa had long possessed excellent material in terms of high quality officers and men, but, for some strange reason, bearing in mind its well-known past in irregular warfare and the fame of its ‘commandos’, seemed to disregard the value of Special Forces for another 25 years. It was only in 1969 that a spark of fire struck by one of the most unconventional and persistent, albeit stubborn officers in the post war SADF, kindled by a wise and innovative general, eventually started smoldering and after three more long years finally burst into flame just in time to meet the approaching conflict. Even then, the potential of this capability was not understood and it took the return of the by now retired Maj Gen Loots to bring it back on course. Fortuitously, this occurred just as the SA Navy was emerging, albeit slowly, from years of apparent dedication to remaining a small but faithful sister of the Royal Navy, heralded by the acquisition of a new, discrete and offensive capability – submarines!

2

South Africa’s Special Forces

Background to the History and Development of SA Special Forces

The Early Days

The roots of South Africa’s Special Forces lie in a small element established by the Defence Force at the Army’s School of Infantry in Oudshoorn in 1969. This Special Research Section – later renamed the Alpha Group – was tasked with research into special operations and the required forces and training. This group formed the core of what became 1 Reconnaissance Commando and, finally, the extremely effective Special Forces that included 5 Reconnaissance Commando, which specialized in pseudo operations and working with allied guerrilla forces, and 4 Reconnaissance Commando, a dedicated maritime special operations unit.

The Army had previously decided to develop a paratroop capability, establishing 1 Parachute Battalion at Bloemfontein in 1961. Originally intended as a special operations force, it in fact developed into a conventional airborne unit. That left a gap in the Defence Force’s capability to deal with the type of irregular warfare then clearly emerging in several parts of the world.

Perhaps a first impetus towards developing a less conventional capability came in 1966, when a detachment of paratroops under Captain Jan Breytenbach was deployed to support a Police Security Branch team tracking the first group of guerrillas to enter South-West Africa (now Namibia). That culminated in Operation BLOUWILDEBEES in August 1966, after weeks of tracking and intelligence gathering had pinpointed their location, with the paratroops providing the combat power and the cut-off groups.

One result was that Breytenbach and twelve paratroopers were sent to Rhodesia in 1967 for six months training with C Squadron SAS. Other small groups followed, some going into the field on operations with the SAS and South Africans later forming a de facto D Squadron that conducted independent operations together with the Rhodesian forces. In the meantime, 1968 had brought an unexpected request for help from Biafra during a visit to Angola by the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Loots. With an eye to developing relations with the African and European governments supporting Biafra, he recommended the provision of assistance despite not seeing much hope for Biafra, and the government agreed. A small team led by Breytenbach, was sent with communications equipment and light infantry weapons, to train and to observe.

After that deployment, he was tasked with establishing the Special Research Section, before being sent with a small group to France for specialist training. He returned in March 1970 and was sent to Simon’s Town to attend a 12 week diving course with the Navy and then back to France for attack diving training in Corsica. A second group went to Simon’s Town and Corsica in 1971. Those courses were the first step towards a formidable maritime capability. The SRS had, meanwhile, become the Alpha Group and then the Operational Experimental Group, now reporting to the Director of Military Intelligence, who had become convinced of the value of a true Special Forces capability.

Beginnings – the first Special Forces (OEG) diving course. Four of the course graduates participated in Op STARLIGHT (Note CPO Dewey has been incorrectly named ‘Verwey’)

The first operational deployment came not long after, in the context of a combined operation with Portugal to undermine Tanzanian support for FRELIMO guerrillas based in that country. A first effort took the form of clandestine pamphlet drops carried out by SA Air Force crews in two light aircraft flying over a stadium outside the capital at last light, then using a DC4 for another drop in the interior. The first concrete operation of what became South Africa’s Special Forces was, in fact, a maritime one – the insertion of three two-man teams from a submarine to strike targets in Dar es Salaam as described in the opening chapter.