1 Recce, volume 2: Behind Enemy Lines

By Alexander Strachan

1 Recce: Behind Enemy Lines takes the reader into the 'inner sanctum' of one of the sharpest, most versatile and deadliest specialist units in the former South African Defence Force. In their own words, Recce operators recount some of the life-threatening operations they conducted under great secrecy in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique during the late 1970s. Operators sweat in aircraft or in submarines deep below the ocean's surface. They brave crocodile-infested rivers in the dark of night. Recces place explosives in a train tunnel deep inside enemy territory and transform a large fuel storage facility in an Angolan port city into a fiery inferno. There were intense firefights, victories, but also losses . . . Those who were there give first-hand accounts of the tension, anticipation, fear, adrenalin, exhaustion, thirst and grief they experienced, but also of the humorous moments and the close bonds of friendship that were forged in situations of mortal danger. 1 Recce: Behind Enemy Lines is the award-winning author and former Recce Alexander Strachan's sequel to his bestseller 1 Recce: The Night Belongs to Us.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tafelberg
• Release date: Mar 10, 2020
• ISBN: 9780624085249

Alexander Strachan

Alexander Strachan is op 9 Junie 1955 in die distrik Ladysmith in KwaZulu-Natal gebore. Hy matrikuleer in 1972 aan die Hoër Landbouskool Tweespruit. Ná studie in tale aan die Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat (en later in literatuur-wetenskap aan Unisa) word hy professor in Zoeloe aan die Universiteit van Zoeloeland. Ná sy bedanking skryf hy voltyds en sit sy wildboerdery voort. Alexander is ’n vlot Zoeloespreker en hou hom deeltyds besig met industriële teater wat hy volledig via die medium van die inheemse tale aanbied. Alexander se debuutbundel kortverhale, ’n Wêreld sonder grense (1984), is met die Eugène Marais-prys bekroon. ’n Wêreld sonder grense maak saam met die werk van ander skrywers (soos JC Steyn, Etienne van Heerden en Koos Prinsloo) deel uit van grensliteratuur. Daarna verskyn die romans Die jakkalsjagter (1990) en Die werfbobbejaan (1994). Hiermee wen hy De Kat en Antenne se Groot Romanwedstryd, en vir laasgenoemde word hy bekroon met die WA Hofmeyr-prys. Met sy derde roman, Dwaalpoort (2010), wen hy wéér die W.A. Hofmeyr-prys. In 2015 verskyn sy mees onlangse werk, Brandwaterkom.

Book preview

Alexander Strachan

1 RECCE

BEHIND ENEMY LINES

Tafelberg

Dedicated to all the operators

and support personnel of 1 Recce

Author’s note

During the writing of 1 Recce: The Night Belongs to Us it soon became apparent that there was too much material to fit into a single book. That book was therefore written with the idea that other volumes would follow in order to provide a more comprehensive account of the history of the reconnaissance unit 1 Recce.

Whereas the first book deals with the period from 1966 to the late 1970s, 1 Recce: Behind Enemy Lines starts in 1977 and covers events up to the end of 1980.

This is not an academic work or a military treatise. The book is a narrative of the ups and downs of 1 Recce’s operators and support personnel who took part in special operations. In short, then: What it was like being a Recce in those days. The reader gets an insight into this extraordinary group of people’s day-to-day experiences in tough situations.

1 Recce was the mother unit from which the current Recces originated. Today (2020) they are strong in number and exceptionally active. In typical Recce fashion, the present-day group still wear the maroon beret with the compass rose as well as the same operators’ badge on the chest. They are subjected to rigorous training and continue the Special Forces tradition under great secrecy in the new era, deployed clandestinely and under cover in foreign countries.

Some of the operations dealt with in this volume may be known, but with this story the reader is taken into the actual aircraft or submarine and exposed to the finer details of a Special Forces operation. The focus is specifically on the Recces’ exploits and especially on how the individual experienced the war. The accent falls on the particular and not on the general – thus the aim of the book is not to place or to discuss this unit’s role in a wider military context. The objective is rather to take the reader into the Recces’ ‘inner sanctum’ by not only providing information about special operations, but also sharing anecdotes and personal and humorous moments.

Nearly all the erstwhile team leaders kept notes during operations that also served as a journal of their experiences as Special Forces operators. These personal notes are the main source they drew on during interviews about specific operations.

I took cognisance of existing operational reports, but found that the personal notes compiled during operations provide a more accurate version of the ‘smaller’ things. In some military reports, people are mentioned as operational commanders when they were not at all part of the operation. That is not to say that operational reports do not still provide a good overview of the operations. But the personal notes give the reader insight into the tension, anticipation, fear, adrenalin, exhaustion, thirst and grief experienced by the operators. They allow the reader to share in the smell of the battlefield and the bonds of friendship that were forged.

In 1 Recce: Behind Enemy Lines I rely on these personal interviews with those who were involved. In addition, the information was submitted for verification to different people who had been part of an operation. Hence in each case consensus was reached about facts before I incorporated them in the book.

The first book, 1 Recce: The Night Belongs to Us, contained several references to the Rhodesian Bush War – in this second volume this topic is covered in greater detail. In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the Recces were involved in so many operations on the so-called Russian Front (in Mozambique’s Gaza province) that not all of them could be included. Therefore only a few operations are highlighted. These accounts will give the reader a good understanding of how 1 Recce executed these operations on foreign soil.

Given that considerable attention was devoted to the formation of the unit in the first book, it was not considered necessary to revisit that history. In 1 Recce: Behind Enemy Lines the emphasis is largely on the operations, and the reader is given fewer expositions and more narrative descriptions of the Recces’ operational deployment.

In the period in question in this volume, the conflict gained in intensity and clandestine specialist operations were carried out seaward, landward and airward. The Recces were no longer engaged in infantry work or base attacks. The objective now became reconnaissance and sabotage tasks. The focus was on strategic operations, inter alia the shooting down of aircraft, demolition of bridges and rail tunnels, and sabotage of fuel storage depots. New operators came to the fore, and great strides were made in respect of advanced technology, including modern equipment, radios and weaponry.

Angola remained an important factor in the Border War. Accordingly, the book starts off in that country with a search for the Unita leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, in the wooded and remote eastern part of Angola. Then the focus shifts 2 000 km away to Rhodesia, and a variety of bush operations are covered – all part of the over­arching Operation Acrobat. 1 Recce’s Alpha and Bravo groups served rotational tours of duty in top-secret conditions in Rhodesia. From their operational base at Mabalauta, they conducted military raids against Frelimo and Zanla in the Gaza province of Mozambique. The Recces shared this base with the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS).¹ They had limited air support, and were occasionally also deployed with the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI).

The Rhodesian deployments were characterised by heavy firefights, victories and also losses. In December 1979, with that country’s first democratic election around the corner, the Recces started to withdraw from Rhodesia just as quietly and covertly as they had arrived. While the war on the Angolan front was never suspended during the Rhodesian phase, after their withdrawal the Recces again focused fully on Angola.

With all the operators back in Angola, there were a number of unique bush operations in this region that feature in the story told in this book, inter alia the shooting down of enemy aircraft and the sabotage of strategic targets. The book concludes with an epic seaborne operation on the west coast of Angola – a raid in which the Recces had to rely on their versatility under conditions that were poles apart from those they faced in the Rhodesian Bush War. The Recces’ reconnaissance team was transported to the target by submarine, after which the raiding teams infiltrated in strike craft. Known as Operation Amazon, it was a mission that demanded exceptional perseverance and initiative.

ALEXANDER STRACHAN

Glossary

Introduction

Recces snatch Savimbi away from the enemy’s grasp

‘It was around 23:00 when the pilot said we were approaching the area where we were due to jump out. The plane switched over to the Unita frequency, and Unita actually replied and said: Roger, get ready to drop the jumpers. They said they could hear the plane and would light the fires … And, sure enough, far below us we saw the triangle of fires suddenly starting to burn brightly.

‘We were slightly out of line, and the pilot had to make a minor adjustment to his approach. Then all three of us went to stand at the rear of the plane, on the ramp. The loadmaster was hanging out of the door, his thumb up in the air. At that moment the green jump light went on and he turned his thumb downwards – the signal we were waiting for. We held on to each other and went out in a linked exit.’

Moments after the jump, Hennie Blaauw glanced down and saw they were virtually opposite the three fires – they could not have jumped more accurately.

‘We let go of each other, moved apart and opened the parachutes. Next time I looked down, I saw, yes, we were still directly above those three fires.’

It was a clear moonlit night, and Blaauw and his comrades – Amilcar Queiroz and Gert Eksteen – landed without problem close together in the shona where the fires had been lit. They quickly regrouped and sorted out the parachutes.

‘So we stood there in the moonlight. Before long, we saw figures coming towards us out of the darkness.’

Queiroz, an Angolan, spoke Umbundu fluently and he challenged them. Umbundu was spoken in Unita circles, while the governing MPLA’s soldiers spoke Kimbundu. The group turned out to be the three Recces’ escort that had been awaiting their arrival.

‘The group took over our parachutes, and we set off. We had only our backpacks because our parachutes were being carried for us.’ They walked out of the shona in a northerly direction, into the bush. About two hours later, between 02:00 and 03:00, they reached the Unita base where they were given a place to sleep and unpacked their backpacks and equipment.

At that stage of the war Unita did not know where their leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, was. The three Recces had been instructed to conduct a search-and-rescue mission under extremely risky conditions and track down Savimbi. This was the second attempt to find him after the first one had been called off because intelligence indicated that Savimbi was not in the Cuando Cubango province.

The next day they met the base commander, Gen. Samuel Chiwale, the then chief of Unita’s armed forces. Chiwale was a tall, imposing man, very muscular, and a pleasant person. He made a good impression on them and could speak some English, enough for them to understand him.

‘He told us that they still didn’t know exactly where Savimbi was, but he was on his way to them from the north. So we just hung around in the base, did some washing and so on. The last few days things had happened very quickly. On the Sunday we were still in Durban, on Monday evening we jumped in, and on Tuesday morning we woke up in a Unita base.

‘That evening Chiwale invited us to dinner in a beautiful place they had prepared in a large hut. And the strangest thing of all was the two electric bands there in the jungle, in the middle of nowhere. They took turns to play. There were women too, all dressed up, and they let rip with gusto on the dance floor. I couldn’t believe all of this was happening right here in the bush.

‘After dinner we sat down again, but they said: Oh no, now you guys have to dance! That was quite a story. And the Boere danced and I said to Gert: If our forefathers had to see us now, they would be spinning in their graves!’

* * *

After Operation Savannah² the last South African forces were withdrawn from Angola by 27 March 1976, with the result that the governing MPLA and its defence force, Fapla, drove the resistance movement Unita out of all the towns and areas that had been under their control.

The South African Defence Force (SADF) had also lost all contact with Savimbi. Even Maj. Isaías Samakuva, Unita’s liaison officer at Rundu in the then South West Africa (now Namibia), had no idea where his leader was. He asked the SADF at Rundu to urgently help find Savimbi and get him out of Angola for his own safety.

In the wake of Operation Savannah the South African government was totally on its own in the SWA-Angola conflict, says Maj. Gen. Chris Thirion, the then Deputy Chief of Staff Military Intelligence (MI) in the SADF. Nothing came of the expected American support. There was only international condemnation of all military action in Angolan territory.

South Africa was therefore urgently in search of military allies. With Portugal’s withdrawal from its African provinces in the mid-1970s and Angola and Mozambique having gained their independence, the situation in southern Africa had changed radically. Angola’s neighbouring states (with the exception of South Africa) recognised the MPLA as the country’s new legitimate government. It meant that the two Angolan resistance movements, the FNLA and Unita, were soon left isolated. The MPLA immediately announced its continued support of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo) and its military wing, Plan.

The neighbouring states’ support of the MPLA government cut Unita off from its resources. With the Russian and Cuban-supported MPLA as a common enemy, South Africa and Unita therefore had shared interests, says Thirion. ‘The conclusion of a military treaty was a logical consequence of this – my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’

Only a few months earlier South Africa had still supported the Portuguese in Angola, and Unita had been the enemy. ‘But in the world of international politics and conflicts there are no permanent enemies or permanent friends – there are only own interests. It suited South Africa that Unita controlled the vast and remote Cuando Cubango province north of the SWA-Angola border.’

According to Thirion, a ‘strategic type of military cooperation agreement’ was then mooted. The problem, however, was that Savimbi could not be located. He was fighting a battle for survival somewhere in eastern Angola, and not even his own people had contact with him. This led to Maj. Samakuva’s request that the SADF help find their leader and rescue him.

‘The search-and-rescue operation, conducted under extremely risky conditions by a small group of Special Forces operators from 1 Recce, was a significant event,’ says Thirion. ‘It was the first step in the formation of a military treaty that would offer the SADF essential tactical elbow room that was to last for more than a decade.’

* * *

Specific procedures were followed before the instruction would be given to conduct such a rescue operation outside South Africa.

Special Forces was under the direct control of the Chief of the SADF and not the Chief of the Army. The Chief of Staff Military Intelligence (MI) had to submit requests to the general officer commanding (GOC) Special Forces, who would then decide whether it was a job for Special Forces and whether it was doable. If so, he would make recommendations about how it could be executed. These were then submitted to the Chief of the Defence Force for comment and final approval.

Only after this process had been concluded could the joint planning between Special Forces and the client proceed, after which Special Forces would carry out the operation. The client in this case was MI, which controlled the SADF’s and, in effect, South Africa’s support to Unita.

In the Savimbi case, 1 Recce’s commander, Cmdt. Jakes Swart, received instructions from the Special Forces HQ to activate a small team. The team members were Maj. Hennie Blaauw and two Angolans, SSgt. Mourão da Costa and Sgt. Amilcar Queiroz. All three were stationed in Durban.

They immediately departed for Pretoria. At the Special Forces HQ they were briefed to fly to Rundu. There they had to join the MI liaison officer who cooperated with Unita’s liaison officer. The team would then receive further instructions and proceed with the planning of and deployment for the operation.

But the stumbling block was that Unita had no idea of Savimbi’s whereabouts. The Unita liaison officer suggested that they start searching for him in the east of Angola, in the Cuando Cubango province, which borders on Zambia. Unita’s secretary-general, Maj. Nzau Puna, was also at Rundu at that point.

They drove to Bagani where they crossed the Okavango River via the bridge, and then went deeper and deeper into Angola on an old Portuguese bush road.

Amilcar Queiroz had an interesting history. An active Unita member in an early stage of Operation Savannah, he had left Unita later in the conflict and joined the South African Special Forces. He was an exceptionally valuable member for, besides his other qualities, he could also speak Portuguese and French.

In his early war days he had walked on the same bush road the small group now followed in their search for Savimbi. During Operation Savannah, Fapla and the Cubans had laid an ambush on that road. He survived the attack, but one of his comrades, Little Robbie Ribeiro, died there.³ After the attack Queiroz had walked southward along the river to the village of Dirico, and from there to the SWA border where he rejoined the South Africans. When the Recces now reached the site of the ambush, Queiroz pointed out the remains of the trenches to Blaauw.

Hunters and woodcutters had previously used the road to go north to Coutado do Mucusso in the Cuando Cubango province. ‘It was a sandy two-track road that was almost overgrown and reminded one of the cutline,’⁴ Blaauw recalls.

The three Recce operators were accompanied by a small Unita escort on two Unimogs that MI had made available. The escort also served as a bodyguard of sorts for Puna, who had come along.

It took them the whole day to cover the distance of about 120 km to Coutado do Mucusso – a tiny Portuguese settlement on the Luiana River – which they reached by late afternoon. ‘There was a small Unita element that didn’t really look like a military organisation. We couldn’t get any information from them,’ Blaauw recounts, ‘because they had no idea where Savimbi was. In fact, they didn’t even know what we were doing there.’ Puna tried to talk to them but failed to learn anything; they were totally uninformed.

The team spent the night there and set off the next morning in a north-westerly direction, moving up along the Luenge River. As it was winter, the river consisted only of pools of water that they managed to cross with relative ease. ‘Despite it being winter, the days were incredibly hot. And on top of that, there were flies – tsetse flies and mopani flies. Everywhere around you and all over you, flies and yet more flies. It was a terrible business.’

Towards noon they stopped and decided to stay there for the rest of the day. They made a nice pot of curry, ate their fill and then relaxed under the trees. They had just finished eating when Puna came up to the Recces and said they were going to start walking, still on the same route but now on foot.

At one point they came upon a pool of water in the river the size of half a rugby field, and there was a hippo in the water. Puna had an American military rifle with him and wanted to shoot the hippo. ‘Every time the hippo’s head popped up, he shot at it. And then the hippo would dive. We probably spent an hour there while we wondered why he was doing it. Maybe he thought the Unitas could eat the hippo.

‘It made me livid because we had been chased out of the base in the heat of the day, and now we were standing here at a pool of water and he was shooting at a hippo. The river didn’t flow at all there, and the pool was still. And for the life of him Puna couldn’t manage to hit the hippo. After numerous shots he gave up, and we continued walking.’

They then went along the river to where it turned north in the direction of Mavinga, which was the closest town. ‘But it was still a good 100 km away from us.’

The next day they were joined by a small group of Unitas. They were from the vicinity of Mavinga and had a commander, Col. Francisco, with them. Blaauw suspected that Puna had known about the group’s presence all along. There was no enemy in the area as it was far too remote.

‘The commander then asked through Puna if we could help him. This was after the two of them had first had a long conversation.’ The group intended to attack Mavinga, and wanted to know if the Recces could assist them with the operational planning.

‘So Mourão, Amilcar and I sat there under the trees and listened to the commander’s plan. Fortunately, I had a map of the whole Cuando Cubango area with me. There were a number of things I wanted to know: What type of forces did he have, where were they, what was their logistical capability, and with what weapons were they equipped? I also wanted to know who the enemy was, and how strong they were. The commander was extremely vague about the enemy, and I couldn’t establish whether it was Fapla or perhaps another force. All he could say was that there were Faplas in Mavinga.’

Though the commander did not know where Savimbi was, he did confirm that the leader was not in the Cuando Cubango province. There was therefore no point in staying any longer. The team turned around and walked all the way back to their vehicles. The trip had not produced anything, except that they now knew Savimbi was not in the province.

They reached the vehicles after about a day and a half and spent the night there. The next day they returned to Coutado do Mucusso, and again followed the old bush road and crossed the river at Bagani. Finally, two weeks after their departure, they were back at Rundu.

‘The only notable intelligence we had gathered was that Savimbi was not in the Cuando Cubango province. I briefed Unita’s liaison officer, Samakuva, as well as MI’s liaison officer.’ The three Recces then returned to Durban, but first landed in Pretoria where Blaauw reported back to Special Forces HQ. He also mentioned that Unita had decided it was the end of the matter because they had no further information. ‘If the situation changed in the future, we would hopefully be redeployed.’

They arrived at the Bluff in Durban late on the Friday afternoon. Early on the Sunday morning Cmdt. Swart phoned and told Blaauw to come to the headquarters immediately. The other two team members were already there. The team had to return to Pretoria as soon as possible because the operation that had been called off was now going ahead again.

Mourão da Costa, however, had already been earmarked for another operation. So it was decided Gert Eksteen would go in his place. They had to depart that same day still in some or other way. Swart liaised hurriedly with the air force base in Durban, and luckily there was a Dakota that had to fly to Pretoria. Since the matter was so pressing, the Dakota would already leave on the Sunday afternoon.

Everyone rushed to get their kit ready again. Their washed camouflage clothing was still hanging on the washing lines. The new three-man team flew to Pretoria in great haste. At the Special Forces HQ they learnt the reason for the urgency: Unita had received intelligence that Savimbi was somewhere north of the Benguela Railway and moving southward in the direction of the Cunene province. Unita had a base there in the Chimpolo highland. He was probably on his way to this base and would arrive there within two days.

Blaauw and his team had to make sure that they awaited Savimbi’s arrival at the base. Unita wanted the Recce team to help Savimbi get across the border to the safety of Rundu. The intelligence officer made no mention of the suspicion that Savimbi was being followed. Hence Blaauw was unaware that a strong group of Swapo, Fapla and Cuban