Hitler's Last Levy: The Volkssturm 1944-45

By Hans Kissel

An in-depth account of the formation Nazi Germany’s militia army as a desperate attempt to delay its defeat during the waning days of WWII.
 
A companion volume to the very successful In a Raging Inferno—Combat Units of the Hitler Youth, Hans Kissel’s study offers a highly detailed account of the German Volkssturm, or Home Guard. Formed from men unfit for military service, the young, and the old, this ad-hoc formation saw extensive combat during the desperate defense of the Reich, 1944–45.
 
The author describes the Volkssturm’s training, leadership, organization, armament, and equipment, in addition to its active service on both the Eastern and Western fronts. The text is supported by an extensive selection of appendices, including translations of documents and many fascinating eyewitness combat reports. This edition also includes over 150 previously unpublished black-and-white photos, and four pages of specially commissioned color uniform plates by Stephen Andrew.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 19, 2005
• ISBN: 9781908916174

Book preview

CHAPTER ONE

Territorial Militias

The past provides countless examples of militia armies. Examples of these should serve as an introduction, and in the following brief sections of the many sided forms of such military units are examined.

Kolberg 1806/07

In 1806 the surrender of the Prussian fortresses without a fight had much embittered the population and caused the great mass of them to be deeply suspicious.¹ The population’s attitude allows one to understand why in Kolberg Joachim Nettelbeck, acting as representative of the town’s population, turned to the military commander of the town, 65 year-old Colonel von Lucadou, and instructed that the Commandant should come to an understanding with them over the defences of the town. The townsmen had resolved that the fortress would not be handed over, especially as they had been, from time immemorial, the natural and lawful defenders of the town.²

The Colonel, who until then had no visible belief that a successful defence of the town was possible, and who lacked the power to take steps necessary for such a defence³ eventually, albeit unhappily, placed the fortress in a state of defence, following the intervention of the townsmen.

However, Nettelbeck failed to receive any intimation of the role to be fulfilled by the five companies of townsmen available to him. Lucadou was completely imbued with the spirit of the Ancién Regime, and believed that the defence of the town was solely a matter for the military. I do not wish to utilise the citizens.⁴ He merely allowed the townspeople to lay out, on their own initiative, some defensive works outside the town, to prepare the flooding of selected areas, to improve the provision of firefighting equipment, and to stockpile supplies. At the end of March 1807, some months later, he finally approved their participation in ‘inner fortress duties’, by which the townsmen served as sentries and guards on the inner walls and towers, as well as replacing fallen artillerymen. It was not until Gneisenau replaced Lucadou at the end of April that the wishes of Nettelbeck were realised, and the citizens were planned to be deployed as soldiers. However, such a deployment was not carried out as the changing circumstances did not allow it. It was scarcely possible to continue to hold the fortress, and when the surrender was signed their besiegers did not have to take weapons out of their hands.

Tyrol 1805

In Imperial Austria stood the so-called military border, in which volunteer formations in the Tyrol, militia from the earliest times, held the first line of defence of the homeland, and thereby considerably increased the fighting strength of the regular army without demanding too much financial or personnel support from the state.

Thus in 1805 the Tyrolean militia, throughout the year, carried the burden in battle of the membership of their land as part of Austria. The first battle at the beginning of November 1805 for the Scharnitz defile on the Bavarian-Tyrolean border affords an illustrative example.

The Austrian commander occupied not only the Scharnitz defile with militia, but also fieldworks at Leutsach, which lay to the northwest of it. The men fought courageously. In addition he protected his right flank with a levy of women and girls, as well as older members of the militia, utilising the steeply overhanging precipices below the Brunnstein to employ prepared avalanches of stones to halt the enemy advance decisively.⁵

With the Imperial Commission of 8 June 1808 the Landwehr, an institution aimed at strengthening the regular army, was called into being throughout all Habsburg lands. In the main its organisation remained restricted to battalion-sized formations. Training occurred on Sundays and holidays, as well as once a month when larger manoeuvres took place, during which locations were selected on the basis that no man should have to march more than three miles to return home. In 1809 the Austrian Landwehr, with 153 battalions, finally came into action, and acquitted itself very well.

The Tyrol and Vorarlberg 1915

A particularly noteworthy territorial militia was created in the Austrian territories of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg as soon as the First World War broke out, the so-called Standschützen. In late 1914, when signs of the breakdown in the alliance with Italy began to manifest themselves, and regular defences were deemed insufficient to defend the land borders with Italy, the Standschützen was created from members of the traditional Schützen groups. Membership was on a voluntary basis, and in consideration of the conditions of the territories in question, the troops were organised by valleys and districts into companies and battalions. The volunteers belonged to various age groups – from 15 years of age to more than 70 – and degrees of fitness for service. Officers and NCOs were, in the old Tyrolean custom, chosen by the Standschützen themselves.

On 18 May 1915, only six days before Italy’s declaration of war, an Imperial decree called the Standschützen to the colours. They hurried to their shooting galleries, where, so far as this had not yet happened, the battalions were formed, and the elections of the officers and NCOs were undertaken. Within 24 hours the battalions were transported to the border area, although many of the men were still attired in national dress. In this manner 53 battalions containing about 40,000 volunteers were called up and sent to the border.

On 23 May the commander of the Tyrol’s defence could thus send the battalions into their improvised positions. A shortfall in military training, in particular the instruction in the use of machine guns of mainly Russian origin, would have to take place in situ. Above the actions of many other brave soldiers shone the unforgettable iron determination of the Dreizinner, Sepp Innerkofler, who hastened tirelessly through positions and appeared on the most difficult peaks, his paths and footprints giving the enemy the impression that the positions were defended by much larger numbers of men than was the case. Innerkofler finally met a brave death on his mountain.

The army commanders were full of the highest praise for these militia units and their men. Their readiness for action, founded on their love for their homeland and the Emperor, combined of course with their abilities as marksman, meant that on the Tyrolean front during the first crisis-filled months of the war, they halted the Italian army and retained their positions, sometimes even being able to launch attacks themselves.

Britain 1940

In mid-June 1940 Britain found itself in a very serious situation, following the overthrow of France, possessing only relatively few badly-equipped divisions for the defence the country. Thus it was convenient that as early as 14 May 1940 Britain had begun to organise Local Defence Volunteers, who later received the designation the Home Guard.

By September 1940 one million men had been enrolled, men who were either too old or too unfit for service in the regular armed forces, or men in reserved civilian occupations, or who were too young for active service. The officers were mainly retired regular officers or Territorial Army officers. When men of such experience were not available, other men with suitable military experience were employed.

The principal weapon was the rifle. However if in short supply other weapons were utilised – sports or hunting rifles, pikes, lances, swords or even golf clubs. Uniforms were initially unavailable, so only armbands were worn. By mid-1941 all members of the Home Guard were uniformed and mostly armed with rifles, many units also possessing light machine guns.

Normally the members of these units continued in their civilian occupations. Their military duties and training were fulfilled in their spare time or when an alarm was raised. They did not receive any wages.

One of the basic tenets of the Home Guard was that in every street of every town, in every factory or school, in every village or industrial complex, a group of local men would stand resolutely in defence, killing or otherwise disabling all enemies that appeared to them. Enemy movements would be impeded by road blocks, barricades, craters, ditches filled with burning oil, or mines. The tactics of these groups was defensive – they were trained in the art of delaying tactics, sabotaging equipment and particularly in the destruction of enemy transport. Special units would operate in woodland or other isolated spots where the enemy may bivouac or spend the night.

Britain was not invaded, and the Home Guard was not seriously tested; however, their training exhibited two principal purposes – to fight with the greatest determination, causing the attacker’s heavy casualties, and to cause confusion amongst the enemy.⁶

Soviet Union 1941

In the summer of 1941 the Soviet Union created a ‘People’s Army’, alongside the mobilisation of its regular armed forces. These militia divisions were aimed at supporting the Red Army in their fight against the advancing Germans. As in the 17th Century, when militia units under the command of Minin and Posharskij fought against Russia’s enemies, and as in 1812, when formed in response to Napoleon’s invasion, so also in 1941 the entire population was mobilised in a defensive role.

In Leningrad:

20 divisions of Red Militia were created from 300,000 workers, in order to prevent the entry of the enemy into the city. At the same time workers in the factories were organised in such a way that at any time the maximum number of troops could be employed in the defence of the city, without the rhythm of armaments production being interrupted.⁷

In Moscow 11 militia divisions were created, although they were sent into action against the German tanks with little more than mess tins on them at times. Workers militia units were sent into battle in many other places as well.

The divisions of the People’s Army fully and completely fulfilled our hopes, and courageously and steadfastly fought the enemy. Some divisions formed from Moscow workers were rewarded with the title ‘Guards Division’ for their bravery.⁸

Definition

Based on these various examples we should now finally propose a definition of the term ‘Territorial Militia’. In all cases were available regular forces too weak for an adequate defence of their homeland, so that supplementary militia formations were required to reinforce them.

‘Militia army’ and ‘regular army’ are alternatives. When units of the regular army are available under arms, even during peacetime, units of the militia are normally only available latently, really only existing on paper. Militia units normally only assemble in peacetime for training purposes or in a state of emergency, taking up arms, so long as due notice is given, in time of war.

The distinguishing features of the two forms of an army, militia army and regular army, are defined by the terms ‘temporary’ and ‘standing under arms’. Both can be recruited via conscription or on a voluntary basis. Similarly, the length of training required is without importance; a militia army can be assembled for specific training or merely on a transitory basis due to the situation prevailing at that time.

So-called enlisted cadres, which usually only retains small cadres of command and specialist troops permanently under arms, and whose units only increase to full strength in time of war following a levy or call-up, thus belong to the category of militia units.

Finally, the localised purpose of most militia forces awards them the character of a ‘Territorial Militia’.

A fascinating photo showing armed German civilians before the official formation of the Volkssturm – members of the Wehrappelle (lit. ‘armed roll-call’) created by Gauleiter Hartmann Lauterbacher of Hameln at a march past, 11 August 1944. They appear to be wearing completely plain white armbands. Lauterbacher can be seen at far left. He managed to escape from Allied captivity twice, finally reaching Argentina in 1948. Museum of Modern History, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Members of the Tiroler Standschützen, November 1944. Nearly twenty battalions of Standschützen had been formed during the summer 1944 as a preliminary home-defence measure, drawing on the long-standing shooting clubs that already existed in the region. Museum of Modern History, Ljubljana, Slovenia

CHAPTER TWO

Creation

Following the successful offensives of the Soviet armies during the spring and summer of 1944, combined with the invasion of France by the Western Allies, the problem of the defence of the Reich’s borders had to be considered.

The events of 20 July 1944 had shown that not only was there a civilian opposition to the Nazi regime, but that one also existed in the senior ranks of the Army’s officer corps; one which considered the overthrow of the catastrophic leadership of Hitler and the termination of the senselessly continuing war necessary, and was prepared to remove the Führer, whom the majority of the population in 1933 had voted into office.⁹ However, the bitter consequences following the Armistice of 1918, the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 with its demand for unconditional surrender, the Quebec Conference with the Morgenthau Plan, and not least the failure of the Allies to fully co-operate with the German resistance movement, in combination with the German people’s lack of expectation that the Nazi regime could be successfully overthrown and a bearable peace concluded, meant that the German population felt itself ‘cast adrift in a boat’. Unconditional surrender, said the US General Wedemeyer in the Wedemeyer Reports, meant that, significantly, both the Germans who opposed Hitler and the vast majority of the population had no choice but to continue fighting to the end.¹⁰

If one did not wish for unconditional surrender, then one must continue to fight. There were at least two reasons for believing that to continue fighting was not hopeless. Firstly, people placed great hope in the announcement of secret ‘wonder weapons’. Based on the albeit limited evidence seen, it was not believed that such weapons were simply propaganda and lies. Secondly, it was perceived that the relationship between the Western Allied democracies and the Communist military autocracy was strained to say the least, and that one had only to hold on long enough in order for this alliance to fall apart. The serious differences of opinion over the Balkans between London and Moscow were evidence of the strained relationship.

Consequently, if the senior military command busied itself with the problem of the defence of ‘Fortress Germany’, despite the hopeless situation, then they will fulfilling their duties as soldiers.

From a military point of view it was evident that there was a question as to whether the availability of personnel and materiél made it possible to form a front beyond the borders of the Reich, in addition to defending the Reich itself, particularly due to the weakness of the infantry arm. Should such an eventuality come to pass, it was hoped that the enemy penetration into the Reich could be delayed as long as possible in order to allow sufficient time for the deployment of the ‘new weapons’ or for political developments to take place.

It is now unfortunately impossible to say whether the consideration of such military possibilities was discussed in the highest levels of command, because the relevant documents are lost, and the people in question are no longer alive. The following picture emerges from documentation still available, including literature produced since the end of the war as well as questions asked of the various people ‘in the know’.

Generaloberst Guderian’s book Erinnerungen eines Soldaten reveals that as soon as he took over the office of Chief of General Staff of the Army following 20 July 1944, approval was received from Hitler for the restoration of the German defensive fortifications in the East. These included the so-called Heilsberg Triangle, the fortifications in Pomerania, the fortified front of the Oder-Warthe bend, and permanent positions along the Oder.

Together with the General of Engineers at OKH, General Jacob, I provided a construction plan. I ordered the reformation of my former disbanded Fortress Detachment of the General Staff under Oberstleutnant Thilo to oversee the construction.¹¹

Alongside the repair and renewal of the existing fortifications along the western and eastern borders being carried out by trained personnel – which by the sixth year of the war naturally moved along at a very slow pace, and whose armament could only be regarded as inadequate – the land lying between the permanent fortifications where no kinds of defensive positions existed had to be prepared for defence. To oversee the construction of such defensive measures – in the East the construction of the so-called East Wall – Hitler nominated the Party Gauleiters, who at the same time became ‘Reich Defence Commissioners’, responsible for the area of a Gau. The Gauleiters, who were entrusted with making defensive measures, and accordingly could call up personnel to support their work, had received an order to give the necessary instructions from the leader of the Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann, acting on a directive from Hitler of 1 September 1944 (see Appendix I).

The workforce that the homeland could still provide consisted of women, children and old men, equipped with shovels, spades and pickaxes to fortify the borders.

The Hitler Youth hereby provided the greatest service. All of these valiant German men worked with the greatest zeal and understanding, despite the weather soon changing for the worse, in the belief that their homeland, for which they had the greatest love, would provide some protection for their soldiers, some support in their bitter defensive battles.¹²

With the repair and garrisoning of those positions already constructed, and the continuing construction of additional fortifications, in an Order of the Party Chancellery of 27 September 1944, sent from Bormann "on the orders of the Führer", the Gauleiters were entrusted with the continuation of the construction plans. (Appendix I). Following the same order of 27 September, thus four weeks before the creation of the Volkssturm was officially authorised, Bormann ordered the creation of security detachments in the manner of the Volkssturm, who were to occupy these defensive positions on the approach of the enemy, and to defend them until a coherent defence line could be established by regular forces. All these measures were carried out in concordance with the relevant military authorities.

During the consideration of measures to be taken for the defence of Fortress Germany, the question of which troops should occupy these positions arose, in addition to the problems of the fortifications themselves. Defensive positions without the provision of defenders are useless. That is why even before the decision had been made to fortify the borders – the precise date cannot be determined due to the unavailability the relevant documents – the decision was taken to provide fortress troops from sources other than regular combat troops. The then acting Chief of Operations Staff in the OKW, General Warlimont, who at the beginning of September 1944 had been removed from his post, could not remember any more particulars. His replacement, General a. D. Freiherr Horst von Buttlar, whose similarly could not supply any further details from his few personal notes, wrote the following in a letter of 20 November 1959:

The fact is that during the initial phase of thinking regarding the defence of ‘Fortress Germany’, fortress troops were to lend support to the defence of larger locations and junctions on the transport network in support of regular Army forces. It was envisaged that these units were to be deployed in defensive positions – thus in a similar fashion to those peacetime fortress troops in the West – and would be confined to such a role after training and equipping. Initially, these measures were particularly envisaged taking place in the East, to be followed later in the West – the reconstructed West Wall.

Generaloberst Guderian wrote regarding the problem of ‘fortress troops’ in his book:

Initially 100 fortress infantry battalions and 100 batteries were created. Fortress machine gun, Panzerjäger, engineer and signals units were to follow. However, before the first of these units was fit for service, 80% of them were sent to the Western Front.¹³

These remarks certainly conflict with the views of General von Buttlar, who wrote in the above-mentioned letter:

Because of the fluent development of events in the East, these fortress troops were, as far as I can recall, not left at the disposal of the Army General Staff, but were supplied with their agreement to plug gaps in the frontlines, despite the fact that their unsuitability in a war of movement was clear. It was an undesirable event, but the situation on the Eastern Front made it unavoidable.

Nevertheless, the fact was that shortly before the newly-created fortress troops were to occupy the ‘fortifications’ and take up duties on the borders, they had been used elsewhere, and the problem was now a pressing one.

Generaloberst Guderian had the following to say regarding the problem of replacing these fortress troops:

When the supply of fortress troops to me was, for the most part, taken away, I recalled that a time ago proposals had been made by the Operations Department of the OKH under General Heusinger, which at the time had been dismissed by Hitler, for the creation of a Landsturm in the threatened Eastern provinces. I envisaged that it could draw on personnel fit for service, who were however prevented from fulfilling their military duties by their wartime occupations, and commanded by Landsturm officers. It would be something that was only called-up when a Soviet breakthrough threatened. I went to Hitler with this proposal and asked for the task to be entrusted to the SA, insofar as it was composed of dependable people. I had already obtained the cooperation in principle of the Chief of Staff of the SA, the understanding and pro-military Schepmann. Initially, Hitler agreed to my proposal, however the next day he contacted me to tell me that he decided he did not wish the SA to be responsible for this levy, but intended to use the Party, with Reichsleiter Martin Bormann in charge, and that he had given the organisation the name of the Volkssturm.¹⁴

In relation to the above comments made by Guderian regarding General Heusinger, the latter responded to me in a letter of 2 October 1956 that in June 1944 he had merely made the suggestion to Hitler that they could:

begin by evacuating the civilian population from East Prussia. I did not make a proposal for the creation of a Volkssturm in East Prussia in connection with this, as I was convinced that a proposal of this sort in modern warfare could only lead to unnecessary casualties. Guderian has cited my proposal for the evacuation of East Prussia in a false light.

Regarding the question of the replacement of the fortress troops General Freiherr von Buttlar wrote in his letter of 20 November 1959:

As far as I can remember, a wide variety of possibilities were aired regarding the replacement of the fortress troops. The Replacement Army, SS, SA and Party were all mentioned in connection with this, particularly who would prove the most effective in not only organising localised evacuations but also in taking the necessary defensive measures. If my memory serves me correctly, it was concluded that the prevailing situation admitted only one organisation to be involved, as the state of the economy would allow only one group the necessary means to support the requisite number of men, and sufficient materials for clothing and equipping a new organisation were no longer available.

Hitler believed that the Party occupied first place in such considerations, as it possessed the necessary administrative and economic powers, accompanied by additional responsibilities for short-term training programmes, and abilities to provide localised defences in the event of emergency, in order to take on the main duties of organising such a force, supported by the Wehrmacht, SS and SA. The decision in favour of the Party was, in my opinion – without considering Hitler’s personal reasons – probably the correct one, because it was felt that only the Party, due to its influence, could effectively cope with the administration and organisation of such a force, compared to the SA, and that because of this influence it should stand to the fore, coping with the difficulties expected from all sides.

The idea of a Landsturm again arose in the discussion mentioned above. According to the Defence Statutes of 21 May 1935, Section 6, the Reich Minister for War could in time of war and during particular emergencies empower "the Kreis to consider expanding the criteria for the fulfilment of compulsory military service amongst German men." The statutes stated that those men called up as a result of Section 6, above the ages of 45, would form a Landsturm.

Although these empowerments were designed to allow timely measures, the fact was that countless members of the younger age groups from all parts of the armed forces had been sent to the front with the Army, and particularly in the infantry, so that since the winter of 1941/42 a rapidly increasing weakness in battle strength was discernible. This shortage could not entirely be ascribed to the catastrophically worsening military situation. The knowledge that throughout military history numerical inferiority was the most frequent cause of defeat was familiar to the greatest soldiers all epochs and nations. Not for nothing did Napoleon hold that victory smiled on the side with the biggest battalions; and not for nothing did Clausewitz state that the best strategy is: always be very strong.¹⁵

Why no use was made of the above-mentioned law is not up for discussion here. Anyway, in the summer of 1944, for a variety of reasons, it was too late to enforce it, especially when one considers the task involved in creating, mustering, training and meaningfully organising the draftees. Additionally, if Landsturm units had been created purely in the Eastern provinces, they would have been but a drop in the ocean of manpower on that front.

In order to stem the entry of the enemy into the Reich, considerably more than the relatively few men who fell within the Landsturm age groups would be required. An indication of the numbers required is provided by examining the number of young men liable for military service – even allowing for people in reserved occupations, the number far exceeded the men falling within the age groups of the Landsturm. For instance, in 1944, the number of men falling within the age groups born between 1895 and 1925 exceeded 5 million.¹⁶ The strength of the entire field army in the same year amounted to only 4.4 million men. Of those men falling within the given age ranges, many received military training, and of these, a proportion was sent to the frontline.

Militia units from these young men and from older men unfit for frontline service could, in times of crisis, be organised and employed under the direction of the Wehrmacht in active defence of the land. It was hoped that the situation would provide sufficient time to employ these units to stem the enemy’s advance in order to allow the deployment of the new weapons or for a political solution to be found. That the creation of such an organisation required the provision of training and equipment to occur in a very short period of time, must be borne in mind.

The final decision to create the Volkssturm came about on 6 September 1944, presumably emanating from Hitler’s closest circle. The date

Reviews for Hitler's Last Levy

[Thomas E Ost · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

A very excellent book on the little
understood improvised militia. Very surprising in that the author uncovered just how successful these units were in very difficult circumstances. Great book.