Who Is Winning the War in Afghanistan?

By Sayed Zia Sais

Who Is Winning The War In Afghanistan? A pro - Communist coup, the impact and aftermath of the Soviet (1978-79) invasion and 30 years of war have demolished the social life, cohesion, integrity, solidarity, trust, capacity, and economy of Afghanistan. Millions of people have migrated to foreign countries, houses and villages have been destroyed, the countrys economy and infrastructure has been utterly destroyed, millions of young civilians and children have been deprived of education and thousands of women have been widowed. The conflict in Afghanistan has also had a great impact on security, economy and the political prosperity of other parts of the world. The 9/11 incidents which shocked the world, once again drew international attention back to the forgotten Afghanistan. The Bonn conference (2001), the NATO led invasion, the collapse of the Taliban regime and the promises of the international community to build a democratic Afghan government with a solid institution and strong security force, created great hopes amongst the Afghan population for a better future. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the violence and insurgency began to increase. Despite all international efforts and an increase in troop numbers from 10,000 in 2002 to around 140,000 in 2010 and the spending of 50 billion in aid, the Afghan government is still weak and does not have control over the whole country; the armed forces are not strong enough; violence continues to rise and last year was the deadliest year in nearly nine year of war; additionally, the security situation across the country looks increasingly bad. The lasting war has had little success in Afghanistan, the pressure of insurgents, increasing casualties, unpopularity of war among the population of NATO-led countries and enormous war costs in a worsening economic climate have caused the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by US President B. Obama in 2011 and the UK Prime Minister D. Cameron by 2015. This book aims to determine the answer to the question of whether the Coalition Forces are winning the war in Afghanistan.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris UK
• Release date: Oct 25, 2011
• ISBN: 9781465366139

Sayed Zia Sais

Sayed Zia Sais was born in a very well educated and middle class family in Afghanistan. His father was a highly respected judge. Sayed Zia Sais started to go to school from the age of six at Mahmod Hotaki School in Kabul- Afghanistan then he went for higher education to Naderia High School in Kabul. After passing the university entry exam (admission test) in 1980, he succeeded in gaining admission to the Faculty of Economics at Kabul University. At the end of 1984, he successfully fi nished his education and got a BSc diploma and started his career at the Ministry of Commerce in Afghanistan. Soon he got promotions and he went through different positions in the Foreign Trade Department of Ministry of Commerce. He worked as Commercial Attaché in Pakistan and also In Iran. Because of the terrible political and security situation in Afghanistan, he had to leave his beloved country in 1998 for Holland. In Holland he learned the Dutch language, studied accounting and computers. Because of his ambition to learn more, he moved to Great Britain in 2007. After learning English he started his study at master level at Coventry University in the United Kingdom. After two years, in November 2010, he fi nished his study and achieved a Master Diploma in Terrorism, International Organised Crime and Global Security from that university. During his master studies he carried out research in the modern method and wrote a number of short and long essays and a dissertation which he wants to publish as a collection of his work for academic use and for whom is interested in modern research, referencing and interesting on the topics which are relevant to Afghanistan’s confl ict. [e-mail]

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Copyright © 2011 by Sayed Zia Sais.

Library of Congress Control Number:      2011916548

ISBN:         Hardcover   978-1-4653-6612-2

                  Softcover      978-1-4653-6611-5

                  Ebook            978-1-4653-6613-9

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Rev. date: 02/05/2014

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgement:

Abstract:

Are The Coalition Forces Winning The War? Evaluating Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan From 9/11

Acronyms:

Introduction:

Chapter 1:   Contextual

1.1-Recent History:

1.2-Who Are Insurgents?

1.3-Afghanistan After 9/11:

Chapter 2:   Military Campaign

2.1—Us Policy In Afghanistan:

2.2—Nato—Led Members’ Policy:

2.3—Security Development And Challenges:

Chapter 3:   State Building/ Hearts And Minds

3.1—State And Institutions Building/Developments:

3.2-Disarmament And Security Forces:

3.3—Winning The Hearts And Minds:

Chapter 4:   Economic Diminutions To Conflict

4. 1—Aids And Poverty:

4.2—Corruption:

4.3—Drug Trade:

Conclusion:

References:

Appendix (1):   Afghan Troop Map: Us And Nato Employments

Appendix (2):   Nato/Isaf Contributing Nations

Appendix (3):   Coalition Military Fatalities By Year

Peace Cannot Be Built On Humanitarian Intervention, Which Is The Language Of Big Powers’

Intervention In Afghanistan

Introduction:

Intervention:

Intervention In Afghanistan:

Achievements:

Challenges:

The Reasons Of Intervention:

Conclusion:

References:

‘Does Terrorism Work?’

1-Political Influences

2-Media Attention And Publicity

3-Accepting Demands And Power Sharing

4-Casualties, Intimidation And Economic Impact

5-Conclusion

Reference:

Globalisation & Organised Crime

Introduction:

The Impact Of Globalisation On Crime:

Conclusion:

References:

Evaluate And Analyse The Development Of Women’s Human Rights In Afghanistan Over The Last Two Decades, With Particular Reference To The Standards Of International Human Rights

Introduction:

Women’s Human Rights 1990-2001:

Women’s Human Rights From 2001 Onward:

Conclusion:

References:

‘Which Poses The Greater Threat, Al—Qaeda Central Or ‘Grassroots Terrorism’?’

Al—Qaeda Central Or ‘Grassroots Terrorism’?

Conclusion:

References:

Migration And Global Security

Introduction:

The Impact Of Migration On The Human Security Of The Host Societies:

Conclusion:

References:

Drug Smuggling In Afghanistan

Drug Smuggling In Afghanistan

References

Do Women Need Special Or ‘‘Particular’’ Rights As Laid Out In Cedaw (The Convention On The Elimination Of Discrimination Against Women) Or Is This Special Treatment?

Introduction:

Women’s Rights:

Conclusion:

References:

Private Security Companies In Afghanistan

Introduction:

Recommendations:

References:

IN THE NAME OF

GOD

This work is dedicated to the great spiritual soul and memory of my father Sayed Mirza Khan who risked and gave his life for his believe and independence of his country. He was everything for me and now after 30 years his place is still empty in the depth of my heart and I miss him a lot.

Acknowledgement:

This book would not have been completed without the continuous support, advice and guidance of my supervisor Dr Simon Massy. I would like to thank him for all his help and encouragement throughout my research. He taught me how to layout the research structure and helped me in identifying different approaches to write a good dissertation. I would like also to thank other members of the Department of International Studies and Social Science of Coventry University, Professor Bruce Baker, Professor Neil Renwick and especially Dr. Salvatore (Rino) Coluccello Senior Lecturer of Department of International Studies and Social Science who provided me advice, persuaded and encouraged me to finish the course.

My special thanks go to my wife Hadjera Mansoerie who took the most responsibility of looking after our children and created the opportunity in to accomplish my study on time and provided me with delicious meals throughout the course of my studies.

Last but not least, I thank my family: my mother, Biby Hajie who despite of losing her husband in (1978) and suffering from tremendous economic and social situation and pressures let me, my brothers and sisters to educate and thanks again for her continuous prayers that always have been with us and thanks also to my brothers and sisters who encouraged me to finish my study.

Sayed Ahmad Zia Sais

Coventry University, United Kingdom

2011

Abstract:

A Communist coup, the impact and aftermath of the Soviet (1978-79) invasion and 30 years of war have demolished the social life, cohesion, integrity, solidarity, trust, capacity, and economy of Afghanistan. Millions of people have migrated to foreign countries, houses and villages have been destroyed, the country’s economy and infrastructure has been utterly destroyed, millions of young civilians and children have been deprived of education and thousands of women have been widowed. The conflict in Afghanistan has also had a great impact on the security, economy and the political prosperity of other parts of the world.

The 9/11 incidents which shocked the world, once again drew international attention back to the forgotten Afghanistan. The Bonn conference (2001), the NATO led invasion, the collapse of the Taliban regime and the promises of the international community to build a democratic Afghan government with a solid institution and strong security force, created great hopes amongst the Afghan population for a better future.

After the fall of the Taliban regime, the violence and insurgency began to increase. Despite all international efforts and an increase in troop numbers from 10,000 in 2002 to around 140,000 in 2010 and the spending of £50 billion in aid, the Afghan government is still weak and does not have control over the whole country; the armed forces are not strong enough; violence continues to rise and last year was the deadliest year in nearly nine year of war; additionally, the security situation across the country looks increasingly bad.

The lasting war has had little success in Afghanistan, the pressure of insurgents, increasing casualties, unpopularity of war among the population of NATO-led countries and enormous war costs in a worsening economic climate have caused the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by US President B. Obama in 2011 and the UK Prime Minister D. Cameron by 2015.

This paper aims to determine the answer to the question of whether the Coalition Forces are winning the war in Afghanistan.

ARE THE COALITION FORCES WINNING THE WAR? EVALUATING COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 9/11

ACRONYMS:

(ANA) Afghan National Army

(ANBP)Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme

(ANDS)Afghanistan National Development Strategy

(ANP)Afghan National Police

(ANSF)Afghan National Security Forces

(CFC-A, called Coalition Forces)Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan

(DDR)Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

(DIAG)Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme

(ECC)Electoral Complaints Commission

(FAO) United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation

(FEFA)Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan

(GDP) Gross Domestic Product

(ICOS) International Council of On mastic Sciences

(ICRC)International Committee of the Red Cross

(ISAF)International Security Assistance Force

(ISI) Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence

(NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NCPJ) National Consultative Peace Meeting ‘Jirga’

(NDS) National Directorate of Security

(NGOs) Non-Governmental Organizations

(NRF) NATO Response Force

(NTM-A) NATO Training Mission Afghanistan

(OEF) Operation Enduring Freedom

(PRTs) Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(UNMACA) UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan

(UNODC) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNAMA) United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Introduction:

Those who make war on the United States have chosen their own destruction. The US response would be a conflict without battlefields or beachheads (Rashid 2001:1-10). Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with terrorists; these were the words used when George W. Bush declared a ‘war on terror’ in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11. Bush’s close ally, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on 16 September 2001 the fact is that we are at war with terrorism… it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism (Gani and Mathew 2008). The 9/11 incident, when nineteen suicide bombers hijacked four planes and targeted the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, changed the world forever. America blamed the Al-Qaeda organisation led by Osama Bin Laden, which was based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. George Bush chose Afghanistan as the first battleground for his ‘‘war on terror’’ (Rashid 2001:1-10). Bush in May 2003 announced an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan (Jackson 2009).

After nine years G. W. Bush and Tony Blair are no longer in power but Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their leaders are still a live and active force; even more so than in the past challenging, the west politics and security.

B. Obama, while announcing his new policy for Afghanistan on 27 March 2009, said The terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks, are continuing to devise plots designed to kill as many of our people as they possibly can (Washington Post 2009a).

Afghanistan is currently the most important and hottest issue in the world’s security and politic arena. Therefore this paper tries to find an answer to the question Are the Coalition Forces Winning the War in Afghanistan? Because Afghanistan is a daily subject and every day there occurs some military and political improvements, study mainly evaluates counterinsurgency measures from 9/11 until Afghan’s Second Presidential Election (2009). This article will not touch on the relation or impact of the regional politics in the Afghan conflict but mostly focuses on the UN, US and NATO-led Mission and its outcome in Afghanistan.

To find an answer, this article is divided into four chapters. Chapter one is more contextual and covers in brief the recent history of the country, which in one on another way is linked with the current conflict; introducing the insurgents involving in the conflict and the political transformations in Afghanistan after 9/11.

Chapter two is more analytical and relates to the main subject of this paper which analyses the US and NATO-led allies’ policies, their disintegration and the impact of that on the military campaign and the security situation in Afghanistan.

Chapter three is focused on improvement of state and institution building, which was one of the key points from the Bonn conference (2001); disarmament and collecting illegal weapons; provincial reconstruction and the evolution of Afghan security forces, and the impact of all the above on winning the hearts and minds of the country’s population.

Chapter four evaluates an economic dimension to the conflict, the distribution of aid and its impact on reducing poverty and corruption and the drug trade as well as the impact of this on the success of the Coalition Forces operations in Afghanistan. At the end, based on the issues discussed a conclusion will be reached.

Chapter 1:

CONTEXTUAL

Afghanistan, with a population of about 30 million people, is one of the poorest countries in world. It is situated along the Hidu-Kush Mountain with great ethnic diversity, including Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkish and other small ethnic minority groups. There has not been an accepted comprehensive census as yet in the country. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Turkmenistan and China. During its 6000 years history with its very sensitive geo-strategic and geo-politic location at the crossroads between Iran, the Arabian Sea and India and between Central Asia and South Asia, has always made it unstable and a battlefield between powerful countries (Rashid 2001:1-10).

This chapter will not describe the long-term history of the country but focuses rather on the last thirty years of development the country which relate to the main part of this article, introducing key insurgents groups and the impact of the 9/11 incidents on the political life of Afghanistan.

1.1-RECENT HISTORY:

In the twentieth century, after forty years of a relatively stable monarchy, the long-reigning King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan, in 1973. Daoud (1973-1978) was a reformist; who initially had good relations with the Soviet Union and national communist parties receiving significant support from the Soviet Union, whilst depressing non communist links. The communist parties rose up to achieve important and key positions in Daoud’s government. When Daoud wanted to write a new page in his relationship with the west and the Arab world, this led to strong dissatisfaction from the Soviet Union (Jackson 2009). Consequently on 27 April 1978, with a military coup the PDPA Communist and pro-Soviet party took power (Saur Revolution) and president Daoud and most of his family were killed. The two communist factions Khalq and Parcham were united and Nur Muhammad Taraki was chosen as president (Cooley 2002: 1-10).

The Soviet Union has had a long relationship with Afghanistan historically. The diplomatic ties between the Soviets and the Afghans date from 1919 and since then the Soviets have played a significant role in military, political, economic and cultural developments in Afghanistan (Nawaz & Grau 1995). Nur Mohamad Taraki, as the new communist president, announced a large extensive program of land distribution, the destruction of old Afghan cultural and social structures and the liberation of women. He, like his successor Hafizulla Amin, implemented restrictions, aggression and violence including torture, execution without prosecution, mass arrests, mass killing and socialist reforms. Ten thousands of well educated, elites, students and religious leaders were the primary targets of the communist regime. In September 1979, Taraki’s Prime Minister, Amin, after killing the president seized power. The Soviet Union was present, watched and observed the new state improvements closely and was keen to avoid destabilisation of the new communist regime (Rashid 2001:1-10).

The unpopular and unstable new government was immediately challenged by armed national resistance fighters around the country. The Army of the communist regime began to disintegrate, and because of unpopularity and the dictatorial nature of the regime by the end of 1979 the number in the army decreased from 90,000 to about 40,000. More than half of the army officer corps had leaved, purged, killed or arrested (Nawaz & Grau 1995).

To survive and protect the communist regime, the Soviet Union officially invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 with 120,000 highly equipped troops (Katzman 2010). The occupation by the Soviets, which saw the beginning of a tragic period of conflict in Afghanistan, lasted about ten years (1978-88) during which time Afghans suffered considerably with eighty percent of their economy and infrastructure totally demolished and over a half of the country destroyed. 1.3 million people were killed and five and half million forced to leave the country as refugees, with a further two million forced to migrate within the country. The Soviets used disproportionate force and took advantage of modern weaponry, such as fixed-winged aircraft, artillery, helicopters, various types of rocket launchers, modern tanks and armoured vehicles (Nawaz & Grau 1995).

During the cold war, after a number of successful Soviet military interventions in the Ukraine (1945-1951), East Germany 1953, Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and military pressure on Poland it emerged that the Soviet Union used their strong military capability as an irresistible instrument of political power (Nawaz & Grau 1995). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 appeared to be an attack on Czechoslovakia and until four months after the invasion the world’s military and political experts believed that Afghanistan was now forever part of the Soviet Empire; regarding the previous experiences there was little to question that assumption. There was fear and a prediction that Soviets would not stop in Afghanistan and would go further toward Persian Gulf to challenge or disrupt the Western strategic interests by accessing Middle Eastern oil (Nawaz & Grau 1995).

The cruelty of the regime and the Soviets provoked resistance from Islamic parties, who would later become known as the Mujahideen, which began to motivate the country by initiating a series of public uprisings in the spring of 1979 (Jackson 2009).

Soviet and communist government forces, in an attempt to kill Mujahideen used brutal tactics that did not just contravene international law but was also became a kind of genocide; they bombed villages, driving out civilians, launched airstrikes on civilian areas, conducted violent acts and lay mines in rural areas. People that were arrested as collaborators were badly tortured, killed and disappeared (Jackson 2009).

The Afghan freedom fighters came from a very brave and traditional society and were successful in their guerrilla fight against the Soviets. Day by day the Mujahideen morale grew; they became better equipped with modern weapons taken from discouraged Afghan soldiers or purchased from across the national border (Nawaz & Grau 1995).

Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia and other countries helped the Mujahideen and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence played a significant role in arming the Mujahideen. Between 1980