Walk Tall: With the 2Nd Battalion 1St Arvn Regiment

By John Peel

Australia, in 1962 committed 30 Army instructors to train the emerging Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with the aim of enhancing a military alliance with the United States of America. The training task continued for 10 years and involved 990 Australians and 10 New Zealanders as the war escalated.
This account reflects the experiences of an unlikely member of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) who became the last Australian Warrant Officer to serve with the highly regarded 1st ARVN Regiment.

With the benefit of hindsight the author describes the culture and character of the ARVN Soldier against a background of military and religious distinctiveness which characterised the 2nd Battalion of the famous Regiment.
Using readily available research through the filter of personal experience he points out that ill-informed, sometimes corrupt decisions impacted heavily on the ARVN soldier and his family as Washington and Saigon went their separate ways.
The US Army withdrawal was preceded by one of the biggest battles of the Vietnam War Lam Son 719, which had inconclusive results, even though the ARVN and the PAVN achieved their objectives. However the US Army suffered an unbelievably high loss of helicopters and equipment and the death of outstandingly brave aviators during a 45 day period. These losses were sufficient to require a total review of US Air Cavalry tactics.
For the people of South Vietnam the shock of the high casualty rate was great but even worse, for the first time ARVN soldiers bodies could not be extracted and were left on the battlefield which for family members was inexcusable. Losses for the Peoples Army of Viet Nam more than doubled the ARVN casualty rate.
Despite the fighting qualities of the ARVN it was the soldier who became the eventual victim of the political war.

The highly regarded Australian, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, KBE, CBE, DSO; wrote that members of the AATTV could walk tall in any company, so too can the members of the 1st ARVN Regiment.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris AU
• Release date: Mar 25, 2014
• ISBN: 9781493136032

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Copyright © 2014 by John (Jack) Peel.

Library of Congress Control Number:            2014904509

ISBN:      Hardcover         978-1-4931-3605-6

                Softcover           978-1-4931-3604-9

                eBook               978-1-4931-3603-2

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Rev. date: 03/17/2014

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CONTENTS

Preface

1.    At Home

2.    Selection And Training

3.    Arriving

4.    Settling In

5.    Blue One

6.    Conditions Of Service

7.    Cultural Differences

8.    Political Complications

9.    Getting The Job Done

10.    Vietnamisation

11.    The Enemy Route South

12.    Preparation And Planning

13.    Move To The Start Line

14.    Into The Valley Of Death

15.    The Advance

16.    Disengaging

17.    Consequences

18.    Conclusion

Afterword

Notes

Glossary

The Author

For Carole and my children who experienced the aftermath, and the Vietnamese soldiers who advised me in Vietnam

TABLES

Table 1. Australian Advisers to the 2nd Battalion 1st ARVN Regiment

The Cost—A Balance Sheet

MAPS

Map of South East Asia

The Ho Chi Minh Trail

The Location of Communist Base Area 604 and 611 in relation to QL 9

The Area of Operation

The First Days in Laos—Armoured, Airborne & Infantry Assaults

The Known Enemy Deployment Before LAM SON 719

Area of operations for the Assault on TCHEPONE

Attempted Relief of Fire Support Base 31

South of QL 9 Second Week in March

PHOTOGRAPHS

KAL-55B cipher wheel & signal operating instructions I Corps and MR1 1st Division July 1971.

Major Lee Kach Kha with the author at 2/1 Battalion HQ December 1970.

The author deploying from La Vang to a field location.

2/1 withdrawing from a field location. 1st ARVN Regiment was airmobile.

The 1st ARVN Division, the 1st ARVN Regiment, and battalions 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and 4/1.

The citadel in Hue in 1970 still bears the scars of the Tet battle.

B Battery 1st Battalion 39th Artillery M110 8-inch (203 mm) self-propelled howitzer.

Also known as Hill 300, FSB Barbara was located west of FSB Nancy at grid reference YD 329337. The base was moved from YD 328336 after losing a battle with the rodents, who found their way into the defences.

The light command post (2 × infantry companies) waiting for the morning orders group.

Small ship intercepted on a voyage south with a cargo of arms and ammunition.

Major Kha (white scarf) supervises construction under the watchful eye of Capt. Jandouski.

The 1st ARVN Division Tactical Operations Centre Forward under construction by ARVN Engineers.

The second stage of construction with PSP and waterproofing.

Captured during Lam Son 719 south of QL 9.

Battalion 21C, company commander, interpreter, and author at the Christmas party.

The government entertainers at the Christmas party were good, but more colourfully dressed would have enhanced their effort.

The observation tower on Fire Support Base Barbara.

The road to the coast and Fire Support Base Nancy from Fire Support Base Barbara.

Aerial rocket artillery team refuel mid mission.

Underslung gun ammo arrives at a fire support base.

Fire support from UH1D mounted with a .50-calibre machine gun.

A hot shower, clean clothes, and a cold beer in view.

The outer wall of the citadel in Hue City. Within the walls, HQ of 1st ARVN Division.

The Thien Mu Pagoda in Hue City, which is the basic element of the 2/1 Battalion badge.

The first captured 12.7 anti-aircraft machine gun on display at division HQ forward.

Captured SKS rifle from the battalion pool for trading with US Army units for essential supplies.

Photographs from the author’s collection.

Map of South East Asia

image001.jpg

PREFACE

Many have questioned the fighting spirit of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Some suggest that they were little more than a uniformed rabble representing a weak, corrupt government. Stories are told of soldiers running away from battles or clinging to the skids of helicopters to escape a fight. This view of the South Vietnamese Army belongs in most cases to the ill-informed. Many Australian military veterans who had little or no contact with the ARVN still believe this observation to be true. In consideration of the former ARVN veterans who have made their home in Australia, such stereotyping must be challenged and examined. Not only is it an overworked generalisation, it is simply wrong. Whereas Australians achieved commendable results in Phuoc Tuy province, their experience did not in most cases involve participation in operations with the United States or South Vietnamese Army. In fact, the concept of the American War is difficult to come to terms with when Australian Vietnam veterans gather. Some consider the term ‘the American War’ to be communist propaganda. The pacification of an entire province with a strong history of Viet Cong activity is a credit to the independent tactics and determination of the Australian Task Force, encouraged by the Australian government’s minimal interference in military matters. In presenting a bigger picture of the war attention is directed to the overall scheme of the war, where the Australian isolation in one province placed them in a backwater of the American influence on the conduct of the war, or the ‘American War’.

Phuoc Tuy province was selected as the location for the Australian Task Force in order to retain the autonomy of an Australian chain of command originating from army HQ in Canberra (AHQ) to Australian Force Vietnam (AFV) in Saigon. Political control was vested in a major general in Saigon while operational control was exercised by a brigadier commanding the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) in Nui Dat. On paper 1ATF answered to HQ Field Force Victor (HQFFV), but in practice the Australian brigadier operated independently. Independence from Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) operational command was a precaution intended to reduce casualty figures, but this was negated by the laying of an Australian barrier minefield, ordered by the task force commander against the advice of his senior yet subordinate infantry and engineer officers at the time. History records the enemy simply lifted the mines and re-employed them as booby traps with disastrous effect. Another reason for the choice of Phuoc Tuy province was the direct ocean passage from the Australian mainland for resupply of the Australian force through an Australian port operation at either end of the sea passage together with a short land passage by road or air to the capital city Saigon. The final consideration for the selection of the location of the Australian Task Force was that the Australians were positioned for easy redeployment to Saigon if the enemy invaded from the north through the DMZ. By design the Australian Task Force had isolated itself from foreign forces participating in the larger battles of the American War in Vietnam.

Through a lens of personal experience on the battlefield, together with his professional curiosity, the author questions the derogatory view held by many that the ARVN were found wanting by explaining circumstances which positions the 1st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on a continuum of questionable fighting ability to professional soldiers at the proven professional extreme.

This snapshot in time of life within an ARVN infantry battalion provides an insight into the operations of an infantry unit in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, including a basic description of the equipment available at that time, together with some of the battalion’s battles from the scrutiny of a ‘boots on the ground’ eyewitness.

Whereas an Australian soldier will question his officers if he perceives errors of judgement or poor decisions the influences of Confucian and Taoist cultures combine to cause the Binh Si to accept authority without question. On occasion this would result in a soldier submitting to corporal punishment. He knows he is the sharp point of the spear who confronts the enemy and does the bloody work; marching on in crushing heat with skin being rubbed raw by field uniforms stiff from sweat, or shivering and shaking at night from cold, having no way to keep warm, sometimes both. He will tolerate hunger or constantly being wet through by rain. On arrival at a planned night location on a mountaintop after walking all day, it is he who will descend into the valley with dozens of water bottles to carry the water for the evening meal. It is his feet that swell and bleed from skin diseases during high humidity, but even in pain he will soldier on stoically even when lightly wounded. His characteristic grin is infectious as is his curiosity, but during the grim business of reality, he openly sheds tears as he zips a friend into a body bag or when bags are not available, wraps his mate in a ground sheet, taking turns within the section to carry his mate to a place where the body can be recovered by his family in their village.

Members of the United States Armed Forces with whom the author served were courageous professionals. Any criticism, be it constructive or otherwise, is reserved for their political leaders, who set the agendas. The following pages contain a personal reflection of an Australian who served for ten months with fellow Australians, US Army Rangers and US Marine Corps officers who advised a Vietnamese airmobile infantry battalion. The passage of time is acknowledged as having influence on memory therefore a focus on eliminating myths from the story was recognised early in the process of research and writing. Aware that memory is influenced by social and cultural forces which can adapt over time to the needs of the culture and society, the author took great care to determine the truth of the matter. The story is written many years later from notes taken at the time, supported by interviews and confirmed by research. The indulgence of hindsight and the passage of time can also be a mellowing experience often influencing the black-and-white attitudes accepted without question by young men during intensive training.

The author has relied on published reports from the Australian War Memorial, official histories by Ian McNeill in The Team, Bruce Davies and Gary McKay’s The Men Who Persevered, and Anne Blair’s There to the Bitter End: Ted Serong in Vietnam. From America, the 1979 work of Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, who described Lam Son 719 in his Indochina Monographs, an unpublished work, was invaluable; as was the revised edition of Karnow’s (1994) Vietnam: A History, published by Random House London. Encouragement was lavishly provided by Peter Rothwell, who served with 1 RAR June 1965 to June 1966, then came back for more with the Australian Army Training Team for the period of May 1968 to 1969.

The social and cultural aspects include the published works of Robert Brigham is his book ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, together with Andrew Wiest’s Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and betrayal in the ARVN. Personal discussions, interviews with fellow team members, and many hours of research cast new light on issues which were contradictory or confusing.

Comments and opinions on the influence of international politics and their results on the ground together with descriptions of a three-division corps operation presented a challenge which intensified the learning curve in the preparation of this work but, in hindsight, was no more difficult than infantry soldiering in the Australian Army Training Team which had enviable standards. What was it like to be the last of the battalion advisers where the relationship between Australian and Vietnamese had taken on a military family ethos?

Half a world away, when Hanoi’s political influence gave rise to disturbing incidents and protests in the cities of the United States, their government decided to abandon an unpopular war. The political stratagem of ‘Vietnamization’ was introduced to save face. The application placed an emphasis on the ARVN, who at that time had been relegated to town and village defence. Military Assistance Command Vietnam insisted that the US Army Divisions fight the big war battles. The announcement that the ARVN would be taking over from the Americans was perceived as an insult in Saigon suggesting that the ARVN had not been pulling their weight. This could not be further from the truth as the statistics prove. Records indicate the South Vietnamese armed forces averaged 22,000 combat deaths per year from 1965 compared to US casualties of 1,863 or 24% of the US strength in 1965. As the US combat troops began to arrive in country, their casualties increased to 6,143 in 1966, 11,153 in 1967, to a high of 16,596 in 1968. US casualties declined thereafter to 11,616 in 1969, 6,081 in 1970, and 2,357 in 1971. Even in 1968 the ARVN casualties were 75% higher than US casualties. (1)

The Communist People’s Republic of Vietnam Army (PAVN) and the Viet Cong suffered greatly during the American War, but the lessons learned from the experience of participating in the big battles with the Americans and their allies resulted in improved tactics to the point that they were progressively adapting to the eventual mastery of artillery, missiles, and tanks tactics by the early 1970s.

In Washington, as the countdown for the 1972 presidential election commenced, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger concerned that the communists would launch a massive effort in 1972, similar to Tet 1968, and that it would be timed to influence the voters in America during the coming presidential election. Their advisers perhaps explained that in order to achieve such political disruption, a massive military logistical build-up would be necessary to sustain such an operation, and the build-up would occur along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the early months of 1971, the period just before the heavy rain set in and made transportation more difficult. Following the successful incursion into Cambodia, both Washington and Saigon considered that the logistic build-up in Laos could be disrupted to avoid the threatening 1972 offensive, by interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in PAVN Base Area 604 near the abandoned town of Tchepone and in Base Area 611, which led into the A Shau Valley providing access to the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

The Pentagon agreed to resurrect an earlier Westmoreland plan to cross the border into Laos and capture Tchepone but on this occasion modifying it for the employment of ARVN troops, with American logistic support. The aim was to raid and destroy the major logistic bases in selected areas on the Ho Chi Minh Trail to prevent the build-up for an enemy offensive at a politically sensitive time in America. The operation would have the added advantage of providing validation that the ARVN were up to the task of defending the South, thereby justifying the acceleration of the withdrawal of American combat troops to placate the anti-war movement at home, with the added advantage that this would occur in the 1972 US presidential election year.

Lam Son 719 was to be the first ARVN operation involving a force of three divisions, the largest battle of the war to date, the first without US or Australian advisers accompanying the troops into battle, and all with reduced logistical support. The author tells the story through his own experiences and research, presenting an account of some of the biggest battles of the war. The last in an Australian line of advisers to an infantry battalion of the 1st ARVN Regiment, the author records the impressive fighting qualities of the men of the regiment, notwithstanding the neglect they suffered from their own government.

The cost of Lam Son 719 is discussed along with the nagging question of who won the battles. Military scholars should note that times have not changed since T. E. Lawrence, ‘Lawrence of Arabia’, said: Better they do it imperfectly than you do it perfectly, for it is their country, their war and your time is limited. This statement is considered to be yet another lesson emerging from the war in Vietnam.

The author discovered that there were many aspects of the war which only surfaced decades later due to cultural, religious, or political influences. Such circumstances do not enter the mind of a soldier at the time but, on reflection, explain why the military effort was continually inhibited by political interference. It was challenging to work effectively as an adviser or mentor in a foreign country without a working knowledge of the culture and aspirations of the population, even after cultural awareness training mistakes were still made. Fortunately, the Australian Army Training Team members were given rudimentary cultural lessons, a smattering of colloquial language and some basic historical information to supplement their military skills, which at the rank of captain for officers and warrant officer for soldiers, although expected to be adequate, were honed and examined at the Jungle Warfare Centre Canungra on the New South Wales and Queensland border in preparation for a year in the war zone.

Some ‘forty-one’ years later, after attending the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam’s 50th anniversary reunion in Brisbane in 2012 and after reading dozens of reports and a number of books, the author discovered that he had a different perspective on the war in Vietnam in which he served as a young warrant officer. While enjoying the company of many fellow veterans at the reunion, the thought occurred that there are few left who witnessed the ARVN in action as battalions or as a corps of three divisions and fewer to tell the story of the achievements.

There is also a selfish reason for this reflection and subsequent research. Having experienced the emotions of fear, pain, discomfort, and euphoria of infantry service, many old soldiers reflect on their experiences and their comrades, in this case the Vietnamese who fought beside them in some of the battles of the northern provinces of Vietnam. The author intends to present the strengths and weaknesses of the 1st ARVN Division together with the cultural, religious, and political influences at play in Vietnam during 1970-1971.

The narrative revisits the question of why Australia became involved in Vietnam beginning with the aftermath of WWII when a number of Asian countries took advantage of the political void following the defeat of the Japanese Empire to seek self-determination from their colonial masters. Indonesia, Malaya, and Vietnam led the movement to free themselves from their foreign masters who had milked their natural resources of rubber, tin, and rice over decades. However, in Australia, national security became an issue as the superpowers of the West (led by the United States and its NATO allies) and of the communist world (led by the Soviet Union, with its satellite states) began competing for political and ideological influence following World War II. It soon became clear that the so-called Cold War was expanding into South East Asia.

In the past, Australia’s security and defence relied on the British Commonwealth co-operation, but Britain was withdrawing its colonial influence and the United States of America was distracted by its own interests to the point that it made it known that it was reluctant to enter commitments in the Pacific area, suggesting that Australia should provide for the defence of its neighbourhood. The problem this presented was, how could Australia possibly defend even itself with the deaths of 101,161 on the battlefields of both world wars and a population of only seven million in 1947? (2)

The answer was clear, at least to the politicians. They decided to develop closer ties with the United States of America, who could provide protection, while retaining traditional ties with New Zealand and Britain. In San Francisco in September 1951, the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States of America) Treaty Series 1952 No. 2 was signed into force. Although the ANZUS Treaty did not automatically guarantee that Australia would become involved in Vietnam, precedents had been set to indicate that they would. Australians had fought in Korea, which was even further away than Vietnam. Korea was not the only precedent for Australian troops becoming involved in the fight against communism. In 1955 they were deployed in Malaya to help the British put down a communist insurrection, so involvement in Vietnam was not an isolated piece of foreign policy. (3)

Whether Australia was formally requested to support South Vietnam by the Americans or the South Vietnamese was of little interest or consequence in retrospect, even today there remains speculation that the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, well versed in international conspiracy, commented on the danger of the communists establishing a strong hold in Vietnam to the Americans immediately following World War II. The only reason the United States of America sought Australian assistance was to have another allied flag beside theirs to prevent an outcry from the communist block at the height of the Cold War. The request from the USA was for the provision of an Australian infantry division together with a contingent of military advisers. Their request was, of course, impossible as Australia did not have an operational division (10,000 to 20,000 personnel) at the time. To meet the American request would require the formation of a minimum of three Australian divisions: one being inducted, another in training, and the trained division deployed. The best the government could do was to introduce conscription to commit three infantry battalions by rotation (more than 3,000 personnel).

Nevertheless, army headquarters selected thirty advisers who arrived in Saigon on 3 August 1962. The