Trappings of Power: Political Leadership in Africa

By Z Allan Ntata

Why is it that by his death, having solved the countrys hunger problems and set an example for Africa on how to deal with foreign donors and international aid organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, Mutharika was regarded as a pariah both in Malawi and internationally? Mutharika had overseen the expansion of the transport infrastructure, presided as Chairman of the African Union and helped Malawi achieve rapid GDP growth. How is it that he also left Malawi with serious economic problems particularly relating to nonexistent foreign exchange reserves and the inability of the country to import fuel? Why is it that that when he died, he had become the most hated man in Malawi, at least aside from his staunch party followers?
This book analyses the presidency of Bingu wa Mutharika from the inside, his love-hate relationship with foreign donors and international aid agencies and his political successes and failures to show how power and political success in Africa is a trap that ensnares African leaders to easily forget their mission to serve the people. The role of patronage and culture, and the tendency of advisors in contributing to their leaders feelings of infallibility is also highlighted. The book uncovers lessons on the inner dynamics of power and politics in Africa that will be enlightening to all interested in African politics specifically, and third world political development in general.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse UK
• Release date: Nov 29, 2012
• ISBN: 9781477238424

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© 2012 by Z Allan Ntata. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse 10/16/2012

ISBN: 978-1-4772-3841-7 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4772-3840-0 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4772-3842-4 (e)

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Contents

About the Author

PREFACE

Introduction

CHAPTER 1      A Brief History of Mutharika’s Time

CHAPTER 2      Ascending to Power

CHAPTER 3      True Colours

CHAPTER 4      Stubborn Streak

CHAPTER 5      A Modern Moses

CHAPTER 6      The Road Well Travelled

CHAPTER 7      The Work of My Hands

CHAPTER 8      Trappings of Power

CHAPTER 9      The Siege Mentality

Chapter 10      The End Game

Epilogue      Beyond Mutharika

For ChimChim, whom I know for sure I don’t deserve.

About the Author

Z. Allan Ntata is a Barrister at Law and worked as Legal Counsel to the President of the Republic of Malawi and Executive Secretary to the Malawi National Advisory Council on Strategic Planning. He was appointed soon after Mutharika’s re-election to the Presidency in 2009 and held this position at the time of his death in April 2012. Ntata has also worked in the United Kingdom as Legal Advisor, as Law Lecturer in Australia, and as Prosecutor for Malawi’s Anti-corruption Bureau.

Ntata holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Westminster, a Master of Laws degree from the University of Huddersfield, and a post-graduate Diploma in Professional Legal Skills from City University, London. He currently lives in the United Kingdom

PREFACE

This book is not a biography of Bingu wa Mutharika. It is in part a documentation of history and in part my memoir of the time I spent in Malawi working as Legal Counsel to President Mutharika and for the Malawi Government. My intention in writing the book is to provide an account of the whole of the Mutharika presidency from my perspective, and open-mindedly to analyse it, not to indict or exonerate it. A lot of questions have been raised regarding why, in the eyes of critics, Mutharika’s first presidential term was so good, and his second term was riddled with controversy. In speculating on the reasons for what are seen as the failures of Mutharika’s second term, many suggestions have been proposed, from corruption to the bad choices he made in choosing his advisers. As one of those advisers, my intention is to provide the necessary contextual ammunition and insider information upon which the Mutharika presidency may be better understood or analysed.

In this book, I present the facts as I know them, having been associated with the Mutharika presidency from it’s beginning to the very end. Having had the opportunity to observe Malawian power in action, it is my submission that absolute power has its own peculiar perils and has a tendency to to exact vengeance from those who handle it carelessly.

I progressively grew close to Mutharika, his ministers and close aides, and his administration in general, immediately before and especially after his election into a second term of office. We spent long moments on the phone and he continually extended our one-to-one meetings to talk about politics in general. During these times he often became informal and stepped away from his business persona to share his personal experiences in Malawian politics. I had the privilege then of knowing the side of Mutharika that one might not have known within the confines of a formal context. My knowledge of Mutharika which I share in the book is therefore derived from the exceptional moments that I spent with him, which enabled me to become more at ease around him and able to offer advice on a wide spectrum of issues.

Mutharika often required my presence in many meetings with his ministers and foreign officials, sometimes just to observe the proceedings. This gave me the opportunity to know many of the workings of the government as well as the background for the matters about which the president needed my legal advice. He often directed ministers and government officials to include me in foreign delegations to discuss pertinent issues regarding the country’s economy and other international relations issues. I had of course first come to his notice as a political strategist, and as such, Mutharika continued to entrust me with assignments on political strategy and with the politics and the inside processes in government and insisted that I should be readily available to provide input on various political issues. However, being officially a legal legal advisor, my official role was strictly advisory and I only implemented my suggestions with the authority of the president. In the final analysis, an advisor can only advise. He is not an implementor and cannot force the principal to adopt the advice. I therefore understood very clearly and was constantly mindful of the fact that I was essentially one voice among many and that the decisions that the president made were often personal or influenced by his many other official and non-official advisors.

I am enormously grateful to the late Bingu wa Mutharika for granting me the opportunity to be involved in his presidency where I learned so much about modern Malawian politics. I am particularly grateful to Bright Msaka, who throughout my employment in the Malawi Government was Chief Secretary in the office of the President and cabinet. Mr Msaka never stopped having faith in me, and without him I probably would not have been introduced into the upper echelons of the Malawian Civil Service. I also pay tribute to Bright Malopa, formerly the Director General of Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, for introducing me to the leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, to Chikumbutso Mtumodzi for his genuine and unwavering friendship and support as we worked together in the Malawian Civil Service, and to all the colleagues that I worked with at the State House and at the Office of the President and Cabinet.

Dr Pierson Ntata and Chimwemwe Ntata looked at the initial text of the book and offered invaluable comments and advice. I thank them and the whole extended Ntata clan for the encouragement and for putting up with me when I must have surely been antisocial.

Introduction

The Case for Trappings of Power

There is no dispute that the first term of Bingu wa Mutharika’s Presidency in Malawi was a resounding success. Indicators such as arrested inflation, rapid economic growth and a hunger free Malawi were acknowledged by numerous international accolades and personal recognition on the global political and economic platform. They all testified to the fact that Mutharika had succeeded where others had failed. He had guided Malawi from a hopelessly hungry country to a nation that could feed itself and even have some food left over to export to its neighbours. The anger that followed the decline of the Malawi economy towards the end of 2010 was the result of the high expectations that Mutharika had instilled in Malawians and further underlined the fact that Mutharika’s performance had been so unprecedented that Malawians had begun to believe that the heavens were reachable.

At the end of his first term as president in 2009, Mutharika was able to report to the Malawian parliament in his State of the Nation address that as a result of sound macroeconomic policies and the tough decisions he had taken to institute strict fiscal discipline, he had managed to put Malawi’s once impoverished economy back on track.

Malawi’s economic performance had continued to be remarkable throughout the period 2004 to 2009. In Mutharika’s first 5 years, Malawi achieved a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rate averaging 7.5 percent. In 2008, the economy recorded a robust growth in real GDP of 9.7 percent, compared to 8.6 percent achieved in 2007. This growth rate was above the target of 6 percent for Sub Saharan Countries.

Under Mutharika’s guidance, Malawi had also done very well in ensuring stable macroeconomic conditions. In 2008, the economy maintained a single digit inflation rate of 8.7 percent mainly due to increased food availability on the local market, coupled with a stable exchange rate and lower fuel prices on the world market later in 2008. Interest rates that had once reached a high figure of 35 percent in 2003, closed at 15 percent in 2008. As a result, credit to the private sector increased from 30 percent of total credit to over 60 percent.

At the beginning of 2003/2004 financial year, donors had withdrawn critical budgetary support to Malawi following the International Monetary Fund’s decision that the country’s management of public finances by Mutharika’s predecessor, Bakili Muluzi, was unsound. In response, the Mutharika administration instituted new economic policy reforms and the country managed to win back the confidence of donors. Donor confidence in the Government of Malawi continued to grow and aid flows from cooperating partners steadily increased from MK28 billion in 2004/2005 financial year to MK90 billion by 2008/2009 representing an increase of more than 220 percent.

Total public debt as a percentage of the GDP decreased from 123.9 percent in 2004 to only 19.9 percent by 2008. Malawi also managed to reduce its domestic debt from 25 percent of GDP in 2004 to 11.5 percent in 2008. During the same period, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP reduced from 112.6 percent in 2004 to only 16.5 percent in 2008. This was as a result of the country’s qualification under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) that freed the country from its massive debt burden, thereby releasing the much needed resources for poverty reduction initiatives. Similarly, the budget deficit that had been as high as 7.8 percent of GDP in 2003/2004 averaged less than 3 percent of GDP in Mutharika’s first 5 years.

By the time the next presidential and parliamentary elections came around in 2009, Mutharika was flying high and was able to effectively milk the successes he had achieved for all their worth during the campaign. Goodwill towards his presidency was overflowing and the opposition parties quite simply had no alternative message to offer malawians. With the support of both the media and the civil society on his side Mutharika won an overwhelming 66% of the vote. It was a loud and clear message from the electorate that his first term had met with their approval.

Everything changed following that landslide electoral victory of 2009. Power and success proved a distraction and Mutharika’s behaviour suddenly grew increasingly erratic. Mutharika began to pick fights with critics both domestic and foreign. He isolated himself and refused to listen to sound advice from his professional advisors and technocrats, preferring instead to take his advice from self-serving opportunists that he had put together as a back-room administration clique, comprising entirely of homeboys that came from his own tribe. Continuing to become increasingly isolated and with his administration, now full of his relatives and kinsmen, committing one mistake after another, he railed against western donors and harassed critics and the opposition.

Mutharika’s ego was given a further boost when he he was elected as chairman of the African Union for the 2010/11 term. Oblivious of the fact that the economy he had managed so well was going into a nosedive, he travelled the world as Chairman of the African Union in his private jet with large entourages, and purchased luxury vehicles such as Hummers and Mercedes limousines.

It was the trappings of absolute power and the failure to make bold political reforms that led to the unravelling of Mutharika’s Presidency. It is quite telling that the first criticisms of the Mutharika presidency were not about unimpressive or flawed economic performance but about wrong political decisions. Mutharika’s response to political criticism was wrong on two levels. First, he never fully analysed what was the necessary political environment for sustaining the economic gains that he had achieved in his first term. Having elevated the expectations of Malawians with the successes of his first term, Malawians expected much more success from him. Mutharika, however, seemed settled in the belief that that his initial success gave him the mandate to govern in the second term in any way he pleased, and never came to terms with the fact that his contract with the Malawian public was based not on previous successes but on continued effective performance.

Secondly, while the political and economic situation was deteriorating, system servants continued to praise him and he was made the subject of hero worship by the Mulhako wa Alhomwe tribesmen. As such, he began to listen to their flattery and self-promoting advice as it was pleasing to his ears instead of listening to his professional advisers and technocrats that had helped him make his first term a success. Unfortunately, the advice he listened to, while perhaps good for maintaining the Lomwe advantage, was desperately unhelpful and incapable of addressing the problems Malawi was facing. In the Northern region, the chiefs of the Ngoni Tribe bestowed the title of Ngwazi (Hero or Conquerer) upon Mutharika apparently for achieving victory over hunger, and in 2010, the East China Normal University made him an honorary Professor. While in his first term he had been the subject of public doubt and incredulity, and this had spurred him to perform in order to prove his doubters wrong, in the second term, Mutharika took the various praise he was receiving to heart, and as the political environment deteriorated and criticisms grew, power and its trappings distracted him from focusing on the economic policies that had made him successful. Instead, he began to concentrate on engaging his enemies politically and justifying his politics. Inevitably left unattended, and as donors and allies dwindled because of the hostile political environment he had created, the economy also deteriorated.

By 2011, as public dissatisfaction and outrage began to find its voice via civil society and the local private media, all of which had seemingly overnight turned against him, Mutharika became arrogant and perpetually abrasive and disdainful, and responded by pointing to his first five years as the source of his entitlement to govern, suggesting that since he had got it so right in the first term, not one critic could tell him what to do. Mutharika began to believe that only he and he alone had the solutions to Malawi’s problems, and that because of the overwhelming majority with which the electorate had sent him back to the State House, no one was justified or even entitled to question or criticise him.

In his first term, Mutharika had had his back against the wall, with his cabinet composed of individuals he could not trust and a parliament that was itching to impeach him. His powerlessness provided him the incentive to perform and win over his critics, who saw him as an ungrateful opportunist and a traitor to the United Democratic Front. Having won over most of his critics because of his bold economic reforms, he was given a resounding approval by the electorate demonstrated by the 66% majority he achieved in the 2009 elections. With the power to govern firmly endorsed by the electorate, however, Mutharika succumbed to its trappings and neglected the economic reforms that had made him great. He opted instead to focus on petty politicking and became vulnerable to the opportunism of those around him.

It is the assertion of this book that this trend is all too familiar with Malawian and indeed African politicians and that the trap is a result of the flaws in the African political systems, which are heavily influenced by historical traditions, certain aspects of aspects of African culture common throughout the continent, and most importantly, the connection between politics and poverty. While most leaders coming to power in Africa come with good intentions and a genuine desire to serve their people and help develop their mostly fledgling economies, the trappings of power inevitably become too alluring to resist and result in changes in attitude and perceptions that ultimately lead to arrogance, corruption, dictatorship and even a total failure to achieve the noble goals that were set at the start.

How This Book is Organised

Although the focus of this book is the personality and political character of Bingu Wa Mutharika and how that determined his success, the dynamics of his presidency, and ultimately, his perceived decline, without a proper background, such a discussion would be difficult to follow and lacking in perspective. I have therefore drawn largely on conversations I had with Mutharika himself, and with other prominent politicians in Malawi to provide the background that is necessary to establish the right and proper perspective.

Between 2004 when Mutharika came to power, and 2009, when he was elected for a second term of the presidency, I was in Malawi working as Prosecutor and Legal Officer with the Malawi Anti-corruption Bureau. I was, however, also working unofficially as Political Strategist for Mutharika and the Democratic Progressive Party. During this period, I had conversation with the President and with many people working deep inside his administration.

Much of the background information provided in chapters 1-3 comes from first hand information that I obtained from Mutharika himself, and also information gathered from conversations with so many of his trusted aides, advisors and confidants.

When Mutharika won his second election campaign in 2009, he appointed me to be his Special Legal Counsel. I operated in the Office of the President and at the State House. Mutharika also appointed me to be Executive Secretary to the National Advisory Council for Strategic Planning. In these roles, I attended countless meetings and had countless communications with Mutharika, both verbal and written, and with virtually everyone who dealt with the President in his second term. Much of the material presented from chapter 4 onwards comes from personal knowledge of the matters from the experience that I had while dealing with them.

The narrative style of the book therefore reflects these facts. Chapters 1 to 3, which provide the background and cover the period before I was officially a member of Mutharika’s administration, are presented in the second person narrative. Chapters 4 to 10 cover the period after I became an official member of Mutharika’s administration and therefore have elements of first person narrative in areas where the description follows matters about which I had personal experience and involvement.

CHAPTER 1

A Brief History of Mutharika’s Time

The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections marked ten years since Malawi’s first democratic elections and the transition away from Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s thirty-year dictatorship. Much had changed, for better and for worse, since the advent of the multi-party system of government in 1994. The mental and political euphoria of the change, however, made it almost impossible for Malawians to fully appreciate the true meaning and significance of the multi party system of government. The coming to power of Bakili Muluzi in the 1994 multiparty elections had been followed by a wrong understanding of its meaning and ushered in a strange era of weak social standards.

With the days of domestic intelligence officers monitoring social functions, and the capricious jailing of political activists long gone and replaced by a remarkable openness among Malawians, both in person and in public, the small private media became vibrant and enthusiastic. However, because of the weakness of accountability and oversight institutions, a level of lawlessness also thrived and the society soon became corrupt and socially insecure.

By the time the 2004 elections that made Bingu wa Mutharika President of the Republic of Malawi came about, Malawi could only be described as freer but poorer. The average Malawian was materially worse off than in 1994. Per capita GDP had stagnated at $180. Seasonal food shortages persistently haunted the rural areas, and the manufacturing sector had shrunk severely. Corruption, both official and petty, was on the rise. Maternal mortality had become significantly worse with nearly half of children suffering chronic malnutrition resulting in stunting, and HIV/AIDS and other diseases had lowered life expectancy from 45 (in 1987) to 39 years.

Although there had been some progress in addressing health concerns, behaviour change was still elusive, anti-retroviral drugs to treat those with AIDS had only recently become available to a tiny fraction of the HIV-infected, and the challenges of delivering effective care were daunting. Too often resigned to their economic and health fates, people were showing up to political rallies to receive cash handouts so they could buy some soap and perhaps a bit of sugar for their tea.

The lifting of decades of repression, deteriorating living standards, and HIV/AIDS’s rending of the social fabric led to a rise in crime and a certain lawlessness in political, economic, and social life. Inevitably, addressing this feeling of freedom without responsibility—which poked through at all levels of society—was to be a major challenge for Mutharika’s next ten years of democratic development, as was to be the task of rebuilding the economy. Additionally, just like all those before him, Mutharika’s success would largely be rooted in finding an effective formula for operating in a volatile political climate shaped by African culture and tradition.

Malawi’s Political Landscape

Democratic institutions and traditions in Malawi are fragile, and the transition to democracy is still very much a work in progress. It was more so in 2004. The executive branch exercised, just as it does now, considerable authority over the legislature and judiciary; Parliament had trouble focusing its attention on pertinent and timely legislation. Regional and personal loyalties trumped ideas in party-building; and only some judges exhibited any real independence.

With that said, Malawi’s democratic consolidation has engaged civil society and the media, and human rights and freedoms are generally respected. When Mutharika came to power, more Malawians were actively participating in political and civic life, and popular support for the idea of a national democracy was strong although it was not coupled with a grass-roots understanding of institutions or expectations of performance.

REGIONALISM

President Mutharika aimed to try and reverse Malawi’s longstanding tradition of regional politics by building the first political party with a truly national base. Regionalism has always been a major factor in Malawian politics, and shapes the prism through which modern political life must be seen. Dr. Hastings Banda’s one party dictatorship struggled to maintain the veneer of regional balance and when it failed to achieve it, decided to simply gloss over the issue. After the advent of multi-party politics in 1994, regional alliances began to take centre stage on the political scene. When he later left the UDF and formed his own party, Mutharika recognised that in order for the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to succeed long-term, it needed to reverse the tide of regionalism, and transcend geographical associations.

For a long time going way back to before independence, regionalism has always played an important role in Malawi. The reasons for regionalism include the absence of ideology in politics; the lack of a dominant tribe; and the growing confidence of second and third generation Malawians in the southern region. Regionalism has been harnessed by the fact that over the years, tribal groupings in the various regions have recognised cultural threads that are common to those groupings that are adjacent to each other. In the Northern region, the Tumbuka and Ngoni are in the majority, with the other tribes such as the Tonga and the Nkhonde being in the minority. Although the cultures in these tribes are different, there are inherent similarities that make them consider themselves related. The same applies to the Central region, which is dominated by various clans of the Chewa tribe. The various tribes in the Southern region are grouped by default, as they see themselves as being cut off from the seemingly larger groupings of the North and Central regions. The negative effects of regionalism have had the greatest impact in the northern region, as it is the smallest of the three regions.

Dr. Hastings Banda’s one party dictatorship was able to mask regional inequality, as he gave senior appointments in his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and in government to politicians from all three regions. However, this relative equality at higher levels was not duplicated with the general public. Thus,