Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon (1968–1988)

By Bassil A. Mardelli

Take a journey through the Middle East, examining the dynamics that made it a lightning rod for political controversy, religious dissension, and violence between 1968 and 1988.

Born in Egypt and educated there and in Beirut, Lebanon, author Bassil A. Mardelli has a unique perspective on the issues that continue to affect the region. He explores the region, from the deserts of Sinai to the highlands of the Golan, before moving on to Lebanon, which is in the eye of the storm. Drawing upon his own experiences, Mardelli establishes his Lebanese views. Learn about the complex conditions of the Middle East prior to Lebanons destruction, including the Six Day Wars demoralization of the Arab cause. Mardelli also shares his view that the main underlying cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven by violent extremists from multiple sides.

To understand the Middle East and the challenges it faces, it is essential to learn about this relatively small but vital country. Without knowledge, the steady quest for power will continue, and the results will be horrific.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: Jul 24, 2012
• ISBN: 9781475906738

Bassil A. Mardelli

Bassil A. Mardelli a native of Egypt, grew up and was educated in Cairo-Egypt and Beirut- Lebanon. His fascination with the Middle East prompted him to share his observations in interviews, lectures, on television, and through his writing. He lives with his wife in Beirut, Lebanon.

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Copyright © 2012 Bassil A. Mardelli

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ISBN: 978-1-4759-0672-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4759-0671-4 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4759-0673-8 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012907570

iUniverse rev. date: 7/16/2012

Contents

Prologue

PART ONE: 1968 – 1973 

CHAPTER 1 ‘Zajal’ Between Statues 

CHAPTER 2 Nasser In Search Of Suez Symptoms 

CHAPTER 3 Israel Knew 

CHAPTER 4 ‘Wheelus’! Was it The Perfect Lie?

CHAPTER 5 Two Enigmas 

CHAPTER 6 Amer’s Army 

CHAPTER 7 The Eccentricities of the

Field Marshal And His Men 

CHAPTER 8 A Deadly Poison That Left No Trace 

CHAPTER 9 Nasser’s Rough Roads 

CHAPTER 10 Lebanon: Sailing the Hazy High Seas. 

CHAPTER 11 A Region Between Purgatory and Hell 

CHAPTER 12 The Cairo Agreement 

CHAPTER 13 Bursting under Guerilla Pressure 

CHAPTER 14 Where could Lebanon Voice Its Demands? 

CHAPTER 15 The Murder of Security 

CHAPTER 16 Changes in Egypt and Syria 

CHAPTER 17 Forty One Years Later 

CHAPTER 18 Conversation With Sadat 

CHAPTER 19 ‘Zajal’ Between Sadat and Nixon 

CHAPTER 20 Desperate Agenda 

CHAPTER 21 The New Pharaoh 

CHAPTER 22 Lebanon: Intimacy With The Terrain 

CHAPTER 23 Weakening Pulse All Over 

CHAPTER 24 Lebanon: Fertile Ground for All 

CHAPTER 25 The Gathering Storm 

PART TWO: 1974 – 1981 

CHAPTER 26 The Yom Kippur War 

CHAPTER 27 Changes in War Tidings 

CHAPTER 28 Oil and Prosperity… Politics and Blood 

CHAPTER 29 Foreign Assignment in France 

CHAPTER 30 France: A Pageant 

CHAPTER 31 Fedayeens Attack at Random 

CHAPTER 32 Petro-Dollars 

CHAPTER 33 The Kissinger Doctrine 

CHAPTER 34 Lebanon In Flames 

CHAPTER 35

Out of Focus 

CHAPTER 36 Lebanon: Escalation and Anarchy 

CHAPTER 37 Lebanon: Kissinger’s Rough Analysis 

CHAPTER 38 A People Between Purgatory and Hell 

CHAPTER 39 Herculean Figures 

CHAPTER 40 Assassination And Mission Impossible 

CHAPTER 41 Numbers, Challenges and Murder 

CHAPTER 42 A Reign Of Terror Inaugurated 

CHAPTER 43 Clouds Over France 

CHAPTER 44 Lebanon: The Power of Resilience 

CHAPTER 45 Schism 

CHAPTER 46 Noble Ideas in Dark Days 

CHAPTER 47 Two Cities 

CHAPTER 48 A Culture of Intolerance 

CHAPTER 49 Go for it Alone 

CHAPTER 50 Arms and Threats 

CHAPTER 51 Anarchy in All Camps 

CHAPTER 52 Bashir 

CHAPTER 53 Unlimited Ambitions 

PART THREE: 1982 – 1988 

CHAPTER 54 Lebanon: Israel Invades Again 

CHAPTER 55 Crossing, Checkpoints and Hazards 

CHAPTER 56 Speedy Evacuation 

CHAPTER 57 Fading Hopes 

CHAPTER 58 Sabra and Shatila 

CHAPTER 59 Fingers On The Trigger 

CHAPTER 60 Abrogation or Partition 

CHAPTER 61 Passports Without Visas 

CHAPTER 62 Instability In The Army 

CHAPTER 63 1984: Lebanon’s Army Disintegrates 

CHAPTER 64 Today, Yesterday, Tomorrow 

CHAPTER 65 1984: Lebanon Fragmented. 

CHAPTER 66 Piety and Impiety 

CHAPTER 67 Unorthodox Segregation 

CHAPTER 68 More Complex Situations 

CHAPTER 69 The Bid For More Force 

CHAPTER 70 Friendly Enemy Intelligence 

CHAPTER 71 Clash of the Titans 

CHAPTER 72 In Search of Balance

Between Speed and Safety 

CHAPTER 73 Iran vs. Iraq Fighting on Speculations 

CHAPTER 74 Cutting Ties With The Past 

CHAPTER 75 Laugh Until You Cry 

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO MY WIFE, MONA

Prologue

This book covers the story of the Middle East during the twenty-year time span between 1968 and 1988. I have the opportunity of explaining, in general terms, regional and domestic ordeal, going as far as possible into details of the information now available. A journey that will take us from the deserts of Sinai to the highlands of the Golan it will inexorably draw us into Lebanon, a country that unwittingly found itself in the eye of the storm.

Writing about the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular, is not easy. Addressing all the challenges condensed in one book requires comprehensive and coherent knowledge to compile related reminiscences from beginning to end. No moment could be worse than the present one to advocate drastic analysis of what happened. From my perspective as a contemporary observer, I recorded how the warlike spirit openly roused chauvinistic behaviors, to a feverish heat, against Israel as the first objective, with Lebanon becoming the arena of unbridled violence. I still do not claim to be a historian. I simply have keen interests in what Lebanese perceived to be accomplished facts that may take years to refute. Still, an in depth examination of certain details of two decades of Lebanon’s history should prove more decisive, calling for equal analysis until the key players within this region are brought to their senses, rather than allow all the sacrifices of many wars to be lost in vain and Lebanon go down with it in economic ruin. We should regard the contemporary events in this country as useful experiences from which peoples of the region could learn valuable lessons.

The story continues. The Middle East is still coming to terms with its recent independence from colonial forces and the defeat of Arabs in the face of Israel.

Some moments of intrigue warrant further consideration, for instance, when Nasser vehemently claimed that the forces of imperialism saw him as their number one enemy, he retorted that it was the Arab nation, and not just him, that was targeted. Perhaps he had in mind what he had perceived to be neocolonialist machinations against the new Arab awakening. The mind of the United Kingdom was not prepared for Nasser’s audacious actions. Anthony Eden, Britain’s Prime Minister, promised, The Moslem Mussolini must be destroyed. Eden added, I want him removed and I don’t give a damn if there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill had fueled Eden’s fire by counseling him about the Egyptians, saying, Tell them if we have any more of their cheek we will set the Jews on them and drive them into the gutter, from which they should have never emerged.

Perhaps there are certain similarities here between King Farouk’s stance and that of Nasser. Both dithered to overwhelming pressure when they felt their presence was dispensable amid troubled times. Their departures did not cause substantial material damage to their countries. Neither did the departure of many more, as if history had repeated itself. Were Amer and Farouk liquidated? Had Nasser lost his touch after 1967? Without allowing its mask of inscrutability to slip, there now appeared little doubt about a war scenario between Sadat and Dayan, born after Nasser’s death.

One after the other, by browsing through its themes, the force of events turns the pages of history; Arabs versus Israel, secular Arab regimes versus the Jewish State, Assad’s Ba’ath versus Saddam’s Ba’ath, Iraq versus Iran, Arafat’s PLO versus Assad’s Syria, until it finally settles in Lebanon to shape its predicaments. Always a peaceful country that never assaulted its neighbors, Lebanon gradually became the main issue, not Israel. Lebanon, the Arab’s darling, would soon become the arena where all Arab grievances (and many international ones) are expressed, where all ambitions are pursued, and where all tragedies are played.

Prior to 1975, the inflow of petrodollars presented both challenges and opportunities for Lebanon, as an Arab country of mosaic inclinations, to manage a considerable share of the new Arab riches.

The timing was fatal. Fedayeen operations surfaced on Lebanon’s arena just as Nasser’s shield and de-Gaulle’s umbrella over this country were waning.

I endeavored to demonstrate that 1975-1988 proxy-war (or wars) in Lebanon was a force to be reckoned with in regional politics, but not a body of beliefs to be taken seriously. It was a war fought by others for others on the Lebanese arena, and one of its main purposes was to settle the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, something that both Palestinians and Lebanese always rejected. However, in fact, it was not Lebanese Christians fighting Lebanese Moslems, or vice versa, as the international media harped on the confessional side of the story. The media created unusually bitter mood, any refutation at the time thought to be a betrayal of one’s religion, which would result in worse bloodsheds than ever before.

The silent majority in Lebanon continues to defeat the theories that 1975, and subsequent years, is no more a civil war than the disturbance of 1958 was a revolution. Full of whims, soon the combatants in Beirut and the beautiful mountains would condemn the older generation as secretly treacherous and heads would have to roll before they put things right. These young men must have believed themselves strong enough to conquer the world. Inasmuch as they would be the victors, international law had no sanctions that could apply to the customs of their armed conflicts. The proxy-wars in Lebanon have established not just a new government, but also a multitude of regimes with differing agenda. I, like so many, could see every ‘duchy’ starting to organize the ‘subjects’ of the new glorified chieftains, claiming they were trying to move towards democracy within their autocratic princely mini-states. I, like so many, observed university students with no prior professional military training turning into colonels and generals. An era in which the Lebanese Army, bisected along sectarian lines, still refused to transform itself into a militia under the pressure of recent events. What then was to be the Army’s attitude?

In low spirits, long lines of young men and women seeking immigration visas were beginning to multiply. Executives, lawyers, engineers, academics, doctors, technicians, students, and even disgruntled militiamen began to flee.

The killing of a charismatic leader of Kamal Jumblatt’s caliber and its dire consequences had aroused the consciousness of an entire ‘nation’ for days, months and years.

The disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr during his trip to Libya also comes under focus. Al-Sadr and Qaddafi were obviously of uncompromising attachments. The latter conceived himself fully safeguarded, ‘the chosen’ pan-Arab leader after Nasser, living in an environment of a Sunni majority, whose adherents outnumber members of all other Christians, Druze, Alawites or Shia combined.

The assassination of Bashir Gemayel and its aftermath then come to the forefront. Ariel Sharon warned him two days before the fateful event Then Bashir insisted on personally driving me to the beach where the helicopter was waiting, Don’t, I told him, you have plenty of people around who can drive. You have to be much more careful, especially now. Anything can happen."

No jurisdiction of any court or international bodies was approached to investigate and bring the culprits into justice. All the above and many more remained unchecked.

The story of Lebanon is the story of the Middle East, and might be a precursor of what will engulf the countries around us. In 1984, in particular, Lebanon reflected the core issues regarding the current turmoil in this region. Reading (and hopefully understanding) the key challenges in this tiny country of 3 million inhabitants and 18 sects, one would appreciate the contentious issues among rival factional leaders claiming full and comprehensive delegacy of their sects. Even the machinations that went within and through the contenders under the pretext of the protection of fair confessional representation – power sharing, made Lebanon sit on the trigger finger because they were not in a position to offer any lawful resolution by themselves. Some chieftains had learned that to continue sharing the spoils they had to create the illusion that they represented their respective confessions and perpetuated the myth of ‘a genuine cause.’ Once again, history is repeating itself in the slow and steady quest for power, with few learning from the tumultuous past events.

The narration is interspersed with citations from unnamed sources, always shown between quotes. Who are they? one might ask. During the disturbances and temporary lull, in spite of the diversity of opinion which existed most of the time, civilians, with or without megaphones, often assumed the main task for organizing their environs. These are the jangle and dissenting voices that I heard from the past; thoughts manifested from diaries I kept, but awkward to reject in this book. Any plural first-person usage is meant to refer to the Lebanese people as a whole. Having said that, I, in no way, dissociate myself from the responsibility of views they expressed and urged strongly in their contents and meanings, nor am I urged, or publicly asking the reader to endorse them.

At every level, it has been a pleasure to be able to intercept this delicate subject and offer a book that gives the reader an all-encompassing picture of the Middle East from historical, philosophical and sociological vantages, based on personal recollections of the area, which, more than ever before, has become the fulcrum of world powers.

Bassil Adel Mardelli

Beirut, May 10, 2012

PART ONE: 1968 – 1973 

CHAPTER 1

‘Zajal’ Between Statues 

In April 1957, King Hussein’s chief of staff, Major General Ali Abu Nuwar, led his rebels unsuccessfully against army troops loyal to Hussein. To Israel and to Hussein’s cousin, King Faisal II¹ of Iraq, it was a grave political setback; to the ardent Nasserites, there was but a futile venture. The rebellious general later took refuge in Egypt. Other plots against Jordan were despairingly directed from outside. Working with the British, the newly founded CIA pointed the finger at Colonel Abdul Hamid Serraj as the leading exterior plotter. Serraj was the Chief of Syrian Intelligence and a staunch patron of Nasser. According to CIA information, he impatiently directed the long period of terror bombing in Jordan after the failed coup of 1957. The bombings lasted until Hussein, again with British aid, uncovered and jailed a few of the bomb throwers. The situation in Jordan had been tenuous a year earlier, during the Suez debacle of 1956. Britain’s influence had caused King Hussein to withdraw his request for military assistance from the Kingdom of Iraq, and the British did their best to persuade Israel not to attack the Kingdom of Jordan under the pretext of uprooting the growing influence of the Moslem Brotherhood. Super power Intelligence agencies were counter-fighting, not against a nation or a race, but against sudden deviations in Egypt’s politics, which had seduced inexperienced lieutenants into folly. British Intelligence MI6 used all possible means including espionage and bribery diplomacy to retain control over Jordan. Then again, that was another folly. Having seen their relations with Nasser foundering over Suez Canal, Britain was seeking to use Islam to maintain its influence. MI6 promoted permanent alliance with King Hussein. He is a ‘Sharif’, and a symbolic governor of Mecca. His family is descended from Prophet Mohamed. Even prior to 1955, MI6 had already approached the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria to agitate the new government² that showed strong left-wing inclinations and a thrust to merge with Egypt. The long period of terror by pro-Nasser Arab nationalists in opposition to King Hussein came in retaliation to what they had seen as neocolonialism machinations against the new Arab awakening. The mind of the United Kingdom was not prepared for Nasser’s audacious actions. Anthony Eden, Britain’s Prime Minister promised, The Moslem Mussolini must be destroyed. Eden added, I want him removed and I don’t give a damn if there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt³. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill had fueled Eden’s fire by counseling him about the Egyptians, saying, Tell them if we have any more of their cheek we will set the Jews on them and drive them into the gutter, from which they should have never emerged⁴. In October 1956, David Ben Gurion was speaking of strengthening his position in Jerusalem⁵; the Jordanians had heard of this and London warned Israel’s Ambassador that the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty still held. With Britain’s support, Hussein worked hard to keep his throne, but surviving the avalanche of Nasserism would require a willingness to respond to the aspirations of his grassroots that the Jordanian monarch had not yet shown.

Ten years later, in 1967, no one could have guessed that the story of the tragedy that followed the June war was so complex. The Arabs’ lack of foresight was aggravated by Israel’s own, characterized by its steadfast and carefully hidden determination to invade three Arab countries: Syria, Egypt and Jordan. The Arab region was firmly engulfed in the grandeur of Nasserism, a trend that threatened to eclipse Arab national leaders. Hussein, and other Arab rulers like him was caught between envy to Nasser’s patriotic and populist appeal and their need for his strong arm to rest upon in times of military hardships. On May 30, 1967, the Jordanian monarch flew to Cairo and concluded a mutual defense pact with Egypt. Nasser and Hussein announced that Jordan will form a joint military command under an Egyptian general on the Jordanian front. Now King Hussein absolved President Nasser from what Nasser’s followers had done to him ten years prior. The calamity of 1967 had behind it the gusty approach to hollow Zajal⁶ between statues. Even these, strange fierce, controversies should have raised admirably cautious attitude some three weeks before the 1967 war, when Egypt’s Field Marshal Amer deployed, on May 19, six army divisions to Sinai to ‘fight the Jews.’⁷

It was difficult to overlook the fact that throughout the preceding winter, while Arab eyes were distracted away from Israel’s serious field preparations, their mouths were engaged in a long and deadly battle of words. President (Doctor) Nureddin el-Attasi of Syria gave a troubled commentary in February 1967: It is our duty now to move from a defensive position and enter battle to liberate the usurped land of Palestine. Everyone must face the test and get into the battle to the end.⁸ The rising verbal tempo of words in support, shone resonated in everyone’s mind. Doctor Attasi added the following statement in May of the same year: We want a full scale popular war of liberation to destroy the Zionist enemy. Syria’s defense minister, Hafez al-Assad, reportedly made a commentary that was his most bellicose yet: Our forces now are entirely ready not only to repulse any aggression, but to initiate the act ourselves, and to explode the Zionists presence in the Arab homeland of Palestine. The Syrian Army, with its finger on the trigger, is united. I believe the time has come to begin a battle of annihilation.⁹

The most ill-sounding and ominous cue was the one made by the USSR one week before Amer positioned his forces into Sinai. On May 13, 1967, twenty-four days before Israel attacked, Moscow delivered to Anwar el-Sadat¹⁰, misinformation of "an Israeli invasion of Syria immediately after Israel’s Independence Day on May 15 with the aim of overthrowing the Damascus regime. Sadat was on a visit to North Korea in early May 1967, and before he returned to Egypt, Nasser asked him to stop in Moscow. Nikolai Podgorny (then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) passed a message to him warning Nasser of Israel’s intention to deploy nine to eleven battalions on the Syrian border. Adnan Bajehji testified, The Israeli Mossad penetrated the Soviets’ Intelligence (KGB), and fed them with false information that Israel was planning a war against Syria. The purpose was to drag Egypt’s feet into premature military confrontation"¹¹. During Sadat’s visit to Moscow, the Kremlin conveyed spurious information based on intelligence of 1) Israeli troops movements on the Syrian ‘borders’ with Israel (which was later proved nonexistent) and 2) Americans’ nefarious intentions in the region.

In the end, why, exactly, the Soviets acted as they did proved less important than the way the Egyptians reacted. Sadat returned to Cairo after mid-night on May 14 and hastened to Nasser’s house. There, he found the president and Field Marshal Amer already discussing the Russian report. Further details of the Israeli mobilization had also been furnished to the Foreign Ministry by Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Pojidaev, and to Egyptian Intelligence chief Salah Nasr through a local agent of the KGB. Then a similar message – the first of many – had arrived from Damascus We have learned from a dependable source that, 1) Israel has mobilized most of its reserves and 2) it has concentrated the bulk of its forces on the Syrian border. The estimate force strength is 15 brigades. 3) The Israelis are planning a large-scale attack on Syria, including paratrooper drops; all was to take place between the 15th and the 23rd of May.¹²

Thus, on May 16, in a written request to the commander of the UN observation posts in Gaza (UNEF), Nasser reiterated, "I gave my instructions to all UAR¹³ (Egyptian) forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out an aggression against any Arab country. Based on these instructions, our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our Eastern border. For the sake of the complete security of the United Nations Emergency Force, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all troops immediately. Moreover, Radio Cairo, the government’s mouthpiece and one of the authors of the ensuing calamity, went on with this one: the existence of Israel has already continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression (against Syria). We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The fight has come in which we shall destroy Israel. Voice of the Arab went on … as of today there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel; the sole method we shall apply against the Zionists is total war, which results in the extermination of their existence… In addition, the Radio ‘Voice of the Arabs’ began harping on the theme: absher ya samak el-Qirsh lakad ataka el ta’am" (O’ Sharks, glad tidings, soon you shall be fed).

019TheTiranStraits.jpg

The Tiran Straits

In Lebanon¹⁴, we were less noticeable, maybe because of the vibrant economy and near-full employment, which was not the case elsewhere in the Arab region. We felt that if ever an Arab-Israeli war broke out and the Israelis stood in danger, the Americans would never stand by and see Israel driven into the sea. Equally, if the Israelis were winning could the Soviet Union stand aside while Egypt and Syria, the countries they support, suffered defeat. Would Lebanon remain off the hook, only acting as a moral support to Egypt, Syria and Jordan? Since the 1948 wars for Palestine, Lebanon had been the free domain of the usual vicissitudes in the political and security developments of the Levant. This time our public concluded that Israel would only recover passage through the Straits by sheer military might. The greater risk was that of an Arab-Israeli war escalating so far as to endanger the flow of oil to the world. The Israelis would refrain from an immediate military operation, to reopen the Straits of Tiran, if assured of an international settlement that kept the narrow sea passage open for at least their oil supplies from Iran. However, Israel knew that time was not on its side. Ironically, so did Nasser. The Israeli cabinet was under severe criticism for two reasons: having not reacted as soon as Egypt struck, on May 16, to remove the United Nations’ units at the Straits and before Field Marshal Amer had had time to assemble his now-substantial forces.

Egypt’s ambassador to Syria sent an urgent cable to Cairo of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria on May 22-26, 1967. Thus, Moscow and Damascus brought Nasser consistent news. In a time span of ten days before the Jordan-Egypt pact, on May 20, Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN) received ominous information that Nasser had recalled three Egyptian brigades from Yemen. The same day, Egyptian forces entered Sharm al-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. On May 22- 23 at midnight Nasser announced the closure of the Strait of Tiran at the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, thus sealing-off Israel’s only shipping route through the Red Sea (which Israel uses relatively rarely). Levi Eshkol, third prime minister of Israel, immediately considered this move as casus belli; the United States urged restraint. The Israeli cabinet held a briefing, with the participation of AMAN director Yariv. It concluded that because of the Egyptian bellicose actions, threatening a blockade of Israel’s sea route to the South, it was now merely a matter of time for the military response. CIA by now became more interested in Egypt when its president showed perceptible indications of leaning more on the Soviet Union. The Americans needed all the support they could muster against the Pro-Soviet Nasser-inspired Arab nationalism. There was a sense of urgency from the international community to keep the Straits open. France had proposed a four-power initiative to reduce tension in the Middle East, concerning the right of free passage by sea through the Gulf of Aqaba, but the Soviets were neither prepared nor willing. The western nations dreaded involvement in an Arab-Israeli war outside of mandated United Nations peacekeeping units. They also felt that even if they managed to avoid military involvement, their interests would suffer merely from being identified with Israel’s throughout Arab and Soviet propaganda. Britain’s dilemma was even thornier. If the USA became involved, it would face the agonizing choice between damage to its regional interests from supporting the Americans and damage to its relation with America from letting it down at a pivotal juncture. On the other hand, appeasing Nasser with a negotiated settlement would afford him a diplomatic victory and gambling with detrimental long-term consequences, not the least of which could lead to the toppling of King Hussein.¹⁵ Other regimes friendly to the West, as the Kingdoms of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya and the Gulf Emirates, will be open to Nasserite and Soviet penetration. The West’s interests in oil will be jeopardized, and a war to destroy Israel will become inevitable. There were fears that if the pendulum sways towards the Soviets, Iraq would act abruptly to nationalize its oil resources. Syria was taking a somewhat softer line and merely urged Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) executives to be somewhat more forthcoming in their response to the demands of Syria and Iraq¹⁶.

Hence, in this looming conflict, the West found itself in a lose-lose situation. The political option open was, for Western powers, to act in unison through the United Nations Security Council to ensure that Nasser’s action would not lead to a further series of Arab victories, which would endanger Israel’s sheer existence. In a sincere display of goodwill, and with an eagerness to erase the ill reputation collected because of the 1956 episode, de Gaulle communicated to the Arabs that there was little doubt as to the military superiority of the Israeli army. Unless the Knesset could be brought to believe that the right of passage by sea through the Gulf of Aqaba would be assured by diplomatic means, the generals in Israel were likely to take early military action to secure it. General Dayan also knew that the window of opportunity was exceptionally narrow and that he would need to act fast before Arab military positions were consolidated. There was little doubt that Nasser had violated freedom of passage, yet the French president did not want to violate etiquette by trespassing on Egypt’s political hunting ground of Arab-Israeli matters. Scoring equally high on the discretion scale, Britain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson¹⁷, discussed in Washington a program of diplomatic and possibly military action with the United States Government designed to safeguard Israel’s right of commercial passage. The British Government welcomed this approach and took it up with Kosygin in Moscow. Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Wilson had been in touch with Presidents Charles de Gaulle (France), Lyndon Johnson (USA) and the Soviets about speeding up such discussions. Except that the Kremlin demurred again, they were not ready for any immediate meetings concerning concerted military action by the super powers. In addition, the June-1967 story transpired that the CIA, with its worldwide intelligence gathering capabilities, realized that the Soviets would be reticent to interfere in force, if it came to ‘real war’. The Americans had drawn a literal line in the sand beyond which the Israeli army should not trespass in its eventual wars with Egypt. This being USA principle, CIA sensed de Gaulle would almost certainly be arraying himself against whoever strikes first.

The Arab masses listened to sermons of words coming from Iraq, Syria and the Palestinians, like inviting Zajal between statues. President Abdul Rahman Aref of Iraq succinctly spelled it aloud: The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy, which has been with us since the war of 1948. Our goal is clear: to wipe Israel off the map. Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of PLO, asked in a news interview, on June 1, 1967, in Jerusalem (Jordan), What will happen to Israel if there is war, Shukairy replied, Those who will survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will survive. In Zajal poetry, every time one Arab radical made a warlike statement, another reverberated with a tougher one and on and on it went, crescendo. Even those optimistic makers of promises thought it would be extraordinary difficult to wage a war with Israel, although they characteristically offered to try, if supplied with enough weapons. Each Arab ruler had been anxious to rush the enemy’s trenches to show his initials in the carved panels over an imaginary triumphant arc, and they stumbled over their own words, believed their own propaganda and took us down with them.

On the other side of the demarcation line, unfolded another type of Zajal; this one was that Israel had been looking for an Arab leader or chief to negotiate a settlement and could find none. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol gave a speech in which he spoke in a defensive tone soaked up in feelings of compassion for the rule of reason: In view of the fourteen incidents of sabotage and infiltration perpetrated in the past month alone, Israel may have no other choice but to adopt suitable countermeasures against the focal points of sabotage. Israel will continue to take action to prevent all attempts to perpetrate sabotage within her territory. There will be no immunity for any state which aids or abets such acts.¹⁸

CHAPTER 2

Nasser In Search Of Suez Symptoms 

Happy at the quantity and quality of damage inflicted on the Egyptian army in Yemen, Israel knew that Amer’s troops there are depleting themselves, notably in the last couple of years. Should Nasser improvise a mobilization in 1967, "he has to rely on poorly-trained fellah flocks good enough to swell the number of Amer’s army, but not of impressive caliber. The masses needed not to understand but to believe: if only Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer could advance, into Sinai, this could give them faith that the liberation of Palestine was forthcoming, they would accept the illusion mountains are moveable and thus a fantasy may become reality."

On the other side, like legendary Trojan horses, the Israelis portrayed their condition to world opinion as fearing the Arabs in their midst, after all the Jews are minorities that would soon be devoured by the majority of their neighbors. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol said, We want to make it clear to the government of Egypt that we have no aggressive intentions whatsoever against any Arab state at all.¹⁹ Mr. Eshkol was attempting to make voided all those Arab claims that his cabinet was full of the most irrational men in the world.

In the meantime, at home, Ben-Gurion and his henchmen were working on the stiffening of Israeli youth. They knew that sitting back to watch and lament what befell their people in the past has been a disease of the psyche, an epidemic they must always cure by action, not psychology. Eshkol’s supplications vitiated by preaching of senseless virtues of resignation and cowardice; whereas the new Israeli youth’s morality should also celebrate violence and rebellion.

Israel took tender delight in all this. The more giddily hawkish the Arabs turned in their statements, the more placidly dovish Israel grew in its own rhetoric. The Israelis charmed the world portraying their country as a child caught within the claws of a rabid tiger. These trying times are among the most challenging in our history, Israel Radio reportedly said. As if, Israel and the Arabs were engaged in a cat and mouse contest. We did not hear, or read, bellicose commentaries coming from the Israeli Broadcasting Station espousing war with the Arabs; we are peace-loving people, they told us. In contrast to most local analysts, Israel’s intelligence agencies knew that the balance of power was tipped in their favor, not by numerical advantage, but by sheer tactical superiority and agility. Israel’s generals grinned from ear to ear when the battle was fast approaching. America was behind them with an open bank account. Moshe Dayan simply waited for Nasser to fall into the trap, the mouth-trap of Egyptian propaganda machinery and the bulging-drum noise of Sawt-el-Arab.

Sawt-el-Arab stands for ‘The Voice of the Arabs’ a radio broadcasting station in Cairo. The station was built during the mid-1950s, the years of seduction, using powerful transmitters and communication experts sent by CIA director Allen Dulles to Nasser. The main purpose was to beam Nasser’s voice to the Arab world. At that time, the Americans trusted him as a staunch opponent to both communism and British imperialism. On the contrary, in 1967, the world was a different place. There was no wisdom for Britain to seek the overthrow of Nasser as Anthony Eden had done in 1956. Briefly, at that time, the Soviet leaders arrived at the belief that no serious world problem could be settled any longer without their agreement and that, in some cases, they could now impose their own solutions. This belief derived from reasonable confidence in their strength, and a doctrinal assessment of post-WWII Western weakness. It resulted in a militant conception of peaceful co-existence, reinforced by the knowledge that the Chinese, and other communists within and outside the Soviet Union, had considered their policy up to date over softly.

At the same time, a Nasserite victory would be contrary to Britain’s interests in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf and to its wider position in the Middle East. Nor would the western nations ignore the strengthening of Soviet influence in this region, which an Arab victory war would automatically bring forward.

What we did not see many months before June 1967 was that Nasser aspired to move mountains, both with Egyptians and Arab masses. I always questioned the true meaning of the term ‘Arab World’. Ecstatically it is no more than two joyful words. Practically, did it exist, which is to me the greatest happiness that I could wish for in this region, and indeed, I would have been so overjoyed about it. Evidently, the term had deluded the Arabs into rather hero-worship for any charismatic leader who could do his best to impress. In Arab controversies, Nasser could not impress on the Saudis with his prudent dispositions to the capitalist West and more energetic approaches to the communist East. The Saudi climate of opinion had always been favorable to notions of United States and British massive military aid for the Arabs, leading one to suppose that the oil countries’ quest for arms was more luxurious than essential. Unlike Nasser, they seemed to have petrodollar-driven inclinations to the West. Arab Sheikhs wanted to be patient; they could not make progress on the Palestine-Israel issue until they understood Nasser’s views and knew how far he was prepared to go. They were in search of an Arab strategy. Magnificent but substantial rewards of new richness seem to have plucked no chord of sympathy in Egypt’s forced continuous dependency on the communists. Saudi Arabia, deeply worried by instability in the bitter war, in Yemen²⁰, was notably disturbed that Nasser, by embracing the Soviet side all the time, will inspire these atheists to ask for more. Despite the material well-being, the people of Arabia did not neglect the need for more spiritual attainments. The Saudi family pride was enormous. King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud’s²¹ sense of dynasty on a larger scale offered him, with pure and clean heart, the choice of the supreme rank as the keeper of the Moslem holy land in Mecca. This came in spite of internal rivalries in his kingdom; by the bond of blood, the Saudi king felt more entitled. Irrespective of spiritual values, Nasser and Faisal looked upon each other with suspicion. In addition to the bloody episode in Yemen was an accumulation of rivalries between the two Arab states that went back to the days of Ibrahim Pasha, stepson of Mohamed Ali Pasha – the great-great-grandfather of King Farouk I.²²

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King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud’s sense of dynasty on a larger scale offered him the choice of the supreme rank as the keeper of the Moslem holy land in Mecca.

The Saudi king, on the other hand, was anxious to conciliate the Egyptian President with the Americans believing that this would lead to a reduction of the savagery of the Israeli onslaught on Egypt, Syria and Jordan where public and private ruin was clearly to be foreseen.

In 1967, Nasser hoped²³ of meeting symptoms indicative of similar American political dispositions as those of ten years prior. In 1956, Edgar Faure and Guy Mollet, France’s premiers, delivered military equipment and, in association with Israel,²⁴ occupied Egypt’s hinterland. The Israeli generals must have hailed how the French had dealt for three years with the Algerian rebellion in 1957. French generals, admirals and politicians at that time were declaring, The only thing the Arab understands is force! Eisenhower gave them his firm orders to withdraw. ‘Par chance’, El-Rayyess mistook the 1956 Suez debacle as his most popular truth. In the first place, although no hint of this reached Nasser’s ears, he felt secure about America’s designs and his (miscalculated) impression that they would repeat the 1956 bailout again. However, 1967 was untimely for the Americans to bail him out politically again, at least not for an unusually long time. Unusual of him, a few days before June 5, Nasser must have placed much hope in a message sent by United States President Lyndon B. Johnson urging all parties to cooperate with UN Secretary General Mr. U Thant in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis between Egypt, Syria and Israel. Because of this overture from America, Nasser thought that Johnson would soon adopt identical political lines to those Dwight Eisenhower had pursued in 1956, and which should end in another political victory for el-Rayyess. Prior to the war, Johnson and Nasser had agreed to a June 6 meeting with Egyptian Vice President Zakaria Mohieldin in Washington. It was also evident to Nasser that France had such intentions to play a positive role. French President Charles De-Gaulle sent him a message recommending: not to fire the first shot. As a strong executive, rarely snubbed by his assistants, Nasser had serious reasons to suspect a military strike will come out on June 5, but he did not deliver the first punch. USA staff at the national security must have prepared the mind of Lyndon Johnson for his audacious strategy. His National Security team engaged themselves with a moving rendition. They had speculated on June 5 that as Nasser had agreed to send vice president Mohieldin to Washington to negotiate: this is a ruse the Egyptian leader is using to carry-out a surprise attack. From now on, there were disquieting providences, the meaning of which was not obvious to Nasser and his team.

Even if Nasser wanted to change his mind and reject LBJ’s advice to cooperate with U Thant, he retained the belief that the present American warning was nothing but an echo of the wider concern of the international community and not a sentiment that was genuinely American, especially in a global context hungry for Arab oil. In the absence of another American political intervention, Nasser perceived that Soviet military assistance would soon be coming. He preferred heeding the climate of opinion that Shams Badraan had brought over from Moscow: Egypt had been ‘promised’ all possible support from the Soviets.²⁵ That was not in line with Nasser’s cautious notion of Russia’s aid for his country. With all the relish of a newcomer, who mixed between words of ceremony and those of commitment, Badraan, so closely loyal to Amer, saw no harm getting Nasser on his side. Whatever his motives, he must have been sure that war was not likely to happen, and that it will not hurt if he had gained el-Rayyess by telling him what he has been longing to hear; anyway, for Badraan it will not be untoward if he briefed Nasser of the atmosphere of his visit to the Soviets. Some mystery hangs over the contradictory approaches between Soviet politicians and their military. The former espouses restraint, while the latter promises ‘unlimited’ support. Notwithstanding the real motivations behind his actions, Badraan estimated that Nasser had lost much influence in the national military establishment and weapons industry. Shams Badraan believed the Egyptian army was entirely behind his boss, Amer.

However, Badraan did not have the luxury of recent experience that el-Rayyess had gathered within the nine years time span 1958-67 about the priorities and dependability of the superpowers. In the summer of 1958, Nasser had no illusion that the Soviets would give him anything that he desired. The arrival of American Marines at Beirut (July 15, 1958) had come as a surprise to Nasser. He seemed to be under the impression that the United States was not capable of independent action and would not provide military aid for a friendly nation. He thought Americans could be counted upon only to talk at the United Nations. Nasser happened to be in Yugoslavia at a meeting with Marshal Tito when the American forces landed, and he went immediately to Moscow, apparently expecting there would be strong retaliation by the Russians. When such measures failed to materialize, I believe that Nasser revised his exaggerated notions about how much he could depend on Russian protection and support. Our successful demonstration of American power, skillfully used without casualties, had a salutary effect upon Nasser, a professional soldier.²⁶ Here, he was again, in the summer of 1967, lured by the words of Shams Badraan into making a gesture of good faith towards the Soviets. Unfortunately, it was all a sad encounter. If there had been any doubt about the Soviets’ caving-in to the Americans in 1958, it must have been vividly demonstrated to Nasser in 1967.

On the theme of lack of worldwide steadfast strategy on the Middle East turmoil, Mourad Ghaleb²⁷ bore permanent witness to the hybrid Egyptian-Soviet meeting, one week before June 5. In this meeting, Badraan felt stymied, at times confident of where he was going, which produced a mishmash of contradictory interpretations, a sure sign that both sides were not effectively communicating²⁸:

Signs of the approaching war began to haunt the Egyptians. I sent information to Nasser and assured him that there is thorough intelligence obtained from the US ambassador (in Moscow) that war is imminent on 5 June. In addition, the Yugoslavs briefed Nasser of the intelligence they got that the war will erupt on 5 June. Nasser was also inclined to believe in the words of Shams Badraan… Unfortunately, he anticipated that the same situation prevailed in 1956 will repeat itself Ghaleb continued… On May 28 (1967 - on the heels of skirmishes between the Fedayeen guerillas and the Israeli forces) one week before the war, Shams Badraan flew to Moscow. He met Premier (Alexei) Kosygin and Marshal (Andrei) Grechko. This visit was too valuable because the situation was becoming acutely tense at the front; we closed the Straits (of Tiran) and as Nasser announced its closure, the United Nations withdrew its forces; the clouds of a forthcoming war began to shroud the region. True! We could not accept Badraan to be Minister of War and the second man after Abdul Hakim Amer. That person was void, nothingness! Nevertheless, Badraan scheduled to meet extremely influential people there, like Minister of Defense (Soviet) Marshal Grichko. Ghaleb went on … Grichko is one of the heroes of World War II - I mean his CV is brimful because full of bright history of courage; he led the (Russian) armies towards victory and expelled the Germans from the south of Ukraine and raided up until he reached Berlin. He, of course, freed Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Shams Badraan was only an ordinary layperson in the employ of Abdul Hakim Amer… The meeting with Kosygin (Alexei) – premier of USSR – did not progress as well as Badraan had anticipated. He could not obtain concrete commitment from the Soviet politician concerning the extent of their support in the event war broke out; instead, ‘Kosygin advised restraint’. However, Badraan had a prior ‘notion’ that the Soviets’ negotiating tactics were strange: they never give immediate promises but rather prefer to wait until the last minute before releasing the good news. Later, as Badraan was bidding farewell to the Soviets before departing to Cairo, on the ladder platform leading to his plane and as they were hand-shaking ‘goodbye’, Marshal Grichko gave him ‘words of inspiration and encouragements like ‘we are by your side, as always’… etcetera. However, the inexperienced Badraan misinterpreted this ‘courtesy goodbye’ words as meaning the Soviet leadership were now committing itself to support Egypt. This is ridiculous; I think so; it would have been gratifying had it been true." ²⁹

The mountain of confusion that prevailed during May and June 1967 did not involve France. El Rayyess related General de Gaulle is warning with all the relish of an ‘old enemy’ of the Arabs ‘turning into a friend’ who knows that the future is now theirs. Egyptian analysts ran a series of articles through a whole summer of thesis writing. It was Nasser’s dearest wish that he and de Gaulle should become friends. Egypt will be France’s gateway to the Arab world and France will be Nasser’s into Western Europe. It was indeed almost prophetic for the aging French general, and his steadfast resolve received the immediate attention of the Egyptian government. Regarded as captivating by his admirers, de Gaulle was to change the course of France’s relationship with the Egyptians. Amazingly, with a few words and little effort, the French president was able to accommodate France to the Arabs in a manner that would smooth the path of economic cooperation. It brought its promising consequences for many years to come.

Reacting to the misinformation given to Sadat in Moscow, Nasser dispatched the senior General Mohamed Fawzi to visit the Syrian front on his behalf; he reported no Israeli build-up. They could almost feel Shams Badraan pain, when General Fawzi contradicted what he reported as Moscow’s credible information of IDF³⁰ activities. Thus far, Nasser, in his heart of hearts, put more faith in the feedback that Badraan gave him.

It was a week of cloudless skies for the Israelis and a fierce sun for the Arabs. By June 1967, the Syrian bait had worked, in truth, a feature of extreme controversy with age.

CHAPTER 3

Israel Knew 

On the morning of Monday June 5, 1967,³¹ Israel launched a full-scale attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In three hours, Egypt lost as many as 304 of its 430 combat aircrafts, all on the ground as most of their pilots did not have time to take off. Fifty-three of Syria’s 112 fighter planes were also taken out; Jordan’s entire 28-plane air-armada was wiped out. Per eyewitness accounts, the attacking planes did not destroy mockup jet fighters; the Egyptians had almost obligingly parked their planes side by side so closely to each other that a single hit would spread like wildfire. Israeli ground troops started a blitzkrieg strike into Sinai and, by June 8, had reached the Suez Canal. On that day, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a ceasefire. By June 10, the Arab defeat was total; Israel now held all of historic Palestine, including the Old City of Jerusalem,³² the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as Sinai and part of the Golan Heights of Syria. By a surprise attack, the Jews had turned a minor reverse in morals into a catastrophic defeat for the Arabs. The die was cast; the Arab world would again be humiliated in the span of 120 hours ending like a vapor on the afternoon of Saturday June 10, 1967. In the ultimate irony, the similar setbacks experienced by Great Britain in Dunkirk, France in Verdun and America in Pearl Harbor, were cited in hopeful consolation by the vanquished camp. What the Egyptian propaganda machine did not understand was that Jerusalem, Islam’s third holiest shrine, embodied the sanctity of immigration to Israel for the Jews who saw it as their birthright. An Israeli is mostly like an Egyptian the very apostle of the righteous path for an ardent Jew is to be in Jerusalem, as it is for a Moslem to visit Mecca.

In this atmosphere, Arab radical newspapers that began to express their pleasure at the prospect of the imminent war of liberation of Palestine, only to blame the catastrophe shortly thereafter on the deflation of the military schemes of Field Marshal Amer.

General Murtaga³³ said the reason for the ‘catastrophe’ was that, on the night of June 6, 1967, Amer gave orders to the armed forces to withdraw from Sinai, and to do it in one night, all at once and in one stroke. That is to say, they asked about 170 to 180 thousand human beings together with their equipment to pullback. Immediate steps of this nature created a considerable catastrophe no one had anticipated. We can now read the Israeli war archive documentations and discover that their plans on June 5 were limited to occupying Jebel Lubna and destroying the Egyptian forces gathering there… Consequential to our improvised withdrawal the Israelis of course advanced more than they had originally plotted to do. They penetrated deeply in the Sinai terrain more than they had ever been contemplating, thinking, or projecting, because they found the ‘road’ to the Suez Canal wide open in front of them.³⁴

Despite the informality of the language and the political considerations, which had prompted his protagonists to hurry forward towards Sinai, Amer’s troops do appear to have felt genuine affection for fighting. They saw the guidance of Palestinian affairs in this confrontation would fall to them. They were wrong.

The decisive battles would not be fought between armies alone, but also between intelligence. On this score, Israeli Mossad has had the upper hand. We never doubted that Israel was tapping the phone lines of the posts linking classified communication between key generals and field commanders. IDF success seemed assured. As they did in 1947/48, Israeli Intelligence agencies, and their cronies, were able to listen to telephone conversations between the leaders and the army chiefs, and got wind of the precise timing when Amer’s aircraft would be in the air on a routine ‘check’ mission; at that time, his fellow officers had received strict orders to hold fire. One of the advanced technological ruses that the Egyptians lacked was Mossad breaking into the Egyptian military code enabled the Israelis to confuse the Egyptian army and airforce with false orders. IDF officers directed an Egyptian MiG pilot to release his bombs over the sea instead of carrying out an attack on Israeli positions. When the pilot questioned the veracity of the order, the Israeli Intelligence officer gave the pilot details on his wife and family. The pilot indeed dropped his bombs over the Mediterranean and parachuted to safety. The deflection of the war aims marked the second turning point of the Middle East.³⁵ Right away, it was established among other things, that the United Nations would no longer be able to woo the Palestinians with words. Both sides, the Israelis and the Arabs would have to resort to different ideals and ideologies replacing the nascent and widely accepted secular ones. In this situation, the Republic of Iraq placed an embargo on supplies from the Kingdom of Iran passing through its territorial waters. Prospects for oil supplies to the Western nations in the immediate future were not clear. Shipments to Britain and the USA were interrupted. The Arab governments had done no more than put an embargo on tankers leaving for ports of Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia, but the production of oil had been stopped through actions by jingoists. The Republic of Iraq, whose forces were sent to shore up the June battles had been mauled by the Israelis, had now put an embargo into effect. If this situation were to continue, it would have serious effects on world economies. Britain began printing ration books. In the USA, the government declared a state of emergency, which was legally necessary to enable their oil companies to take collective action in the face of anti-trust legislation to meet prospective shortage. France was an exception. From the beginning, the French sought to avoid becoming involved in a further dispute with the Arab countries.

Egypt’s losses in the war were enormous: approximately 10,000³⁶ soldiers and 1,500 officers killed, 5,000 soldiers and 500 officers captured, 80 percent of military equipment destroyed or seized. Sinai was entirely under Israeli control, and the Suez Canal was closed to shipping.

When the Israeli army thrust itself upon them, the Egyptian troops hastily withdrew from their positions; in the absence of air coverage, many commanders had to flee followed by entire brigades after casting down their weapons. At that juncture, Amer displayed none of the qualities of leadership necessary to hold an army together. The result of the aerial and land attacks against these courageous but scarcely disciplined troops – most of which were hurriedly recruited fellahin - was a horrifying rout for the Arabs. While the Lebanese were stressing their sympathy for Egypt’s plight, they wondered who would be admitting his share of responsibility for the defeat. The public hurried back to international analysts in the press to see whether the Americans had any hand in what had happened. Lebanese could not appreciate the fact that Israel could do it alone, and very few resigned themselves to the bitter truth.

For a few days since the start of hostilities, Arab warring players had been hoping that Soviet and American leaders would accept change of policy to make their countries’ domination of this conflict unassailable. However, by leaving their leading posts so dramatically, the Soviets had given away their best card. The natural reaction of the Arab masses was to doubt both their sincerity and socialist ideas and the powers of their political analysis. Egypt and Israel both seem to have seen the religious angle of the conflict: the Arabs lauded the name of Allah in their cities; in Israel, parallels with David and Goliath were cited.

Pressure groups³⁷ in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, indeed felt they could effectively threaten Israel. The work has to be done fast, and utmost severity will expedite it. The generals in Israel, however, had one serious worry: to prevent the body of Fedayeen from establishing itself in their country.

When the June war ended, we were in a state of appalling mental anguish, exacerbated by worry over the fate of the multitude of refugees from Jerusalem and the West Bank (of Jordan). Moreover, the Arabs lacked not courage, but endurance; they discerned the hand of Allah in their discomfiture. A new bond was not slow to come between ultra Islamists and Arab radicals; it augured a brisk, serious and devoutly alliance. The militants framed their reason by taking the Vietcong cue, a stimulus that only guerrilla warfare, away from their homes, could pursue long hit-and-run operations. After all, foreign media broadly indicated that, in June 1967, the Arab regular armies cast their weapons aside and fled. In Beirut, the public held its breath while Egypt, Syria and Jordan were striving to face their destiny. Lebanese commentators observed that this military setback ‘Naksah’³⁸ was due to a coalescence of three reasons.

The main culprit was identified as the flamboyance of Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer and his clique. Before the war, he came to be seen as a gregarious host in a complex world that darned few among his army constituency could comprehend. By the middle of June 1967, the charm of personality had largely been consumed amid troubled times. The corruption in the management of the army became more flagrant than ever and delivered grave public scandals without precedent in the history of Egypt. This was an admitted fact by high and low throughout the length and breadth of the country.

The second is due to ‘American-Soviet’ political machinations and direct American military assistance to Israel.

The third, and perhaps most prominent one, is that Egypt was helpless; it lost so much during its ill-fated war in Yemen. The Yemeni adventure had diverted Egypt’s attention and dispersed its focus, as many elite officers were absent from the June 1967 Theater.

We heard comments, in Beirut, that the Egyptians knew that the key generals who took part in the June 1967 war lacked individual initiative and adhered strictly to scripted methods of fighting. Field Marshal Amer, a great admirer of western weapons, was over rigidly against the Soviets.

In another mood of his, Amer cast his personal preferences aside and went with the Soviets simply because Nasser said so, a move probably not devoid from political calculations, as well. Egypt began an aggressive campaign of heavy weapons build-up, impressing on the masses a sense of the emergency facing them; the country became deeply indebted to the Kremlin in the process.

Many Egyptian commanders like Murtaga, Shazli, Riad and Mohamed Fawzi were trying to get away from Soviet-style doctrine, but their appeals to get Nasser to change his reliance on Soviet tactics and to adopt combined arms and western-style methods were not heard. Veering exclusively towards the USSR, the Egyptian military fell as prey to the intrigues of power politics. The Syrian commanders understandably refused to pursue any attacks without Egypt by their side. Again, inferior quality of weapons was the formidable excuse brought to us by military fanatics from every corner of the globe. The denial of one’s own fighting credentials as the main pillar of victory had been an Arab trait as far back as 1948.

This time, the result of what happened in June 1967 was a matter of much concern to all Arabs to the point of wishing the erection of scaffold platforms from which faulty generals will be shot because we are humiliated by their defeat. Perhaps to the Israelis, such a rapid and comprehensive victory should have triggered circumspection and reflection. What they did not realize was that this situation increased the confusion of both belligerent parties still further. Here are the healthy, rich and powerful Arabs losing the war to the timid and sickly Israel, the state whose viability had always been a matter of much debate behind our closed doors. "It came into being by