Regional Satraps and the Battle for India Foreign Policy

By Kalyani Shankar

This book is a pioneering work about the growing domestic influences on India’s foreign policy with the increasing number of powerful chief ministers asserting at the state level. It investigates how and why in a coalition era with a globally integrated Indian economy, managing a parliamentary coalition and also working with Chief Ministers from the opposition-ruled States is increasingly becoming difficult and a challenge to Prime Ministers.

The study explores particularly the concerns of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Northeastern states, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other border states and the issues pertaining to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. Most of the disputes with the neighbouring countries have been on water sharing, land and security, which impinge on the state.

The study shows that there is a case for institutionalising the process of consultation and involvement of these States in foreign or security policy, trade and investment and people to people contact in the changing scenario.

• Language: English
• Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Release date: Dec 1, 2017
• ISBN: 9789386457349

Kalyani Shankar

Kalyani Shankar is a political commentator and columnist. She was Political Editor at Hindustan Times and has been its Washington correspondent. She was also a broadcast and television journalist. Shankar was a Nuffield press fellow at Cambridge University and senior fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington. She is the author of Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, India and the United States: Politics of the Sixties and Gods of Power: Personality Cult and Indian Democracy. Kalyani Shankar lives in Delhi.

Book preview

Preface

This book is different from others on India’s foreign policy in two ways. First it focuses on the influence and manoeuvrings of the regional satraps on the directions of foreign policy taken by the Union Government. It investigates whether and why the State chieftains are getting more assertive and whether their influence is growing. It also illustrates how India’s Neighbours First policy clashes with the vote bank policy of the Provincial chieftains. I have tried to project the domestic side of India’s foreign policy with particular reference to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

The second, I have tackled the subject as a journalist and not as an academician. For four decades I have followed and covered the developments in the Provinces mentioned in the book. I have excluded the two big neighbours – China and Pakistan – as they deserve individual treatment.

A number of people have helped in conducting my study and I wish to thank each one of them. I owe my special thanks to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who found time to give me her perspective. I particularly wish to thank the Indian envoys in Sri Lanka Yash Sinha and Pankaj Saran in Bangladesh and their staff for helping me meet the important leaders. It was fascinating to interact with the Bangladesh leaders like Gen Ershad, Begum Khaleda Zia, Dipu Moni, Gowher Rizvi, Asaduzzaman Noor, Farooq Sobhan, Rehman Sobhan and H.T. Imam who had been players in Bangladesh’s foreign policy. The Daily Star editor Mahfuz Anam needs a special mention. Equally fascinating was to interact in Sri Lanka with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, President Chandrika Kumaratunga, Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, Sampanthan, Karuna, Wigneswaran Regional SatRapS and the Battle foR india’S foReign policy and other Sri Lankan leaders as well as the insight given by Panruti Ramachandran, Elangovan, Nedumaran and Col. Hariharan from Tamil Nadu. Prof S. D. Muni, NCP leader D.P. Tripathi and the Nepal Prime Minister Prachanda provided an insight on Nepal. I also wish to acknowledge the help rendered by the Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, Union minister Gen. V.K. Singh, Former ministers Yashwant Sinha, K. Natwar Singh, Saugata Roy, former Speaker of Lok Sabha Somnath Chatterji, former Foreign Secretaries Muchkund Dubey, Shyam Saran, Lalit Mansingh, Kanwal Sibal, Nirupama Rao and Shiv Shankar Menon. My thanks are also due to D.R. Kartikeyan, Jayant Prasad, Shiv Shankar Mukherji and A.S. Bhasin. New York University Prof. Ralph Buultjens has provided valuable inputs. I wish to acknowledge the help rendered by my daughter Shylashri Shankar.

The importance of the book lies in the information obtained from the primary sources. Thanks to the ICWA’s support, I had also visited Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and met with the top leadership involved in their foreign policy. The conclusions are based on inputs from all these sources. Almost all the interviews are recorded. Needless to add that the analysis and the conclusions in this book are mine, and cannot be attributed to the ICWA.

The ICWA has given me all the help required in completing this book and my sincere thanks to the Director General Nalin Surie and his predecessor Rajiv Bhatia. Though this is not an academic book in view of the fact that it is based on information from the primary sources, it may be of interest to researchers on the domestic dimensions of India’s foreign policy. The analysis in this book pertains to the influence of the regional satraps and the Centre’s response till December 2015.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Independent India is a unique State where religious, ethnic and cultural entities are clubbed together by an overarching nationalism and growing economic networks. The glue is indeed the Union Government. Virtually right from the beginning some hostile forces and rival external powers have tried to unglue India by attacking and weakening the Union Government. This was attempted in various ways – by conflict, by diplomacy, by clandestine and other means.

The Central Government has been able to resist all these and defend the States to keep the Union going largely because it had full control and the wherewithal of how to respond to the external challenges. Its grip on the foreign policy was total. The three provisions of the Indian Constitution give the Union Government full powers to conduct foreign affairs. The first is that the Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India, for implementing any Treaty, agreement or convention with any country (Art 253). The second is that the Union Government has full executive powers for the implementation of its laws, treaties and agreements (Art 73). The third is to prevent the States from obstructing the administration of laws by the Union Government, the executive powers of the States are to be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union (Article 257).

The Context

It is time to look back and assess whether there was a national consensus on the government’s foreign policy making and also its evolution. Was any attempt made to involve all stake-holders on foreign policy issues? Are the States right in asserting for a bigger role in the making of foreign policy, particularly the Border States with the neighbouring countries in the changing scenario? Has the Centre taken note of the gradual and growing linkage between foreign policy and domestic policy as both impinge on each other? It is indeed a two-way channel, where domestic policies get reflected into foreign policy and in the reverse foreign policy agenda is also used to bolster up domestic policy.

There is no doubt that the State satraps are insisting on a bigger say. Why has it happened? How seriously is it affecting the making of India’s foreign policy and constricting freedom of the Union Government? Is it a temporary phenomenon or will it continue in the future? Will the Centre have to continuously negotiate its policy with these States and will the latter have a veto of sorts on Centre’s foreign policy? These are the questions that need to be probed.

The Hypothesis

1.     The Centre is likely to take unilateral foreign policy decisions even though at times it affected the States in a negative way when it is strong. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was able to steer his foreign policy the way he wanted, just informing the State chieftains after the decisions were taken.

2.     When the interests of the regional satraps and the Centre converge, they are likely to be on the same page.

This applies to Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and the North East as well as Bordering States of Nepal. Of course there are variations depending upon the issues and the context. Sometimes the regional satrap supports the Centre and at other times the same leaders oppose it. This was what happened in the case of West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee who supported the Land Boundary Agreement after being persuaded by the Centre but opposes the Teesta treaty till today.

3.     The States are likely to get their way when the Centre is weak. This has been proved in the past three and more decades, in the coalition era. This was more so in the last decade when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to bow to the wishes of the Dravidian parties on the Sri Lanka policy and West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee on the Teesta treaty.

The study will also go into when the regional satraps are powerful enough to influence the national foreign policy and when they are not. It is clear that there are at least three areas of concern for the State Chieftains. Most of the disputes with the neighbouring countries have been on water sharing, land and security, which impinge on the States. Water sharing is a dispute with almost all the neighbours. Security on the border also more or less concerns all Border States and so is land. Immigration from the neighbouring countries also causes problems. The point to note is that while the States may not have direct control over India’s foreign policy, three important subjects – water, land and law and order fall under the purview of the States.

I would like to study under what conditions these regional satraps play their role in supporting or opposing the national policy. The study also investigates whether the role of the regional satraps in the making of India’s foreign policy has not only increased but also will continue to grow. Political pulls and pressures, demands and influences particularly from the States, which border on the neighbouring countries, constrict the Centre’s authority in the making of India’s foreign policy over the decades. A look at India’s map shows that barring Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Haryana, almost all Indian States have borders with a foreign country or share international waters.

It is also due to the advent of coalition politics in the past three decades since the regional parties had become partners not only at the Centre but also in some States. The Centre had come under the grip of the powerful regional satraps (most of whom have founded their own parties) playing a consistent role limiting the freedom and flexibility of the Centre in dealing with the neighbours. Will their number increase because of the splintering of the polity, as the national parties are not able to meet the aspirations of the people? Will they come together and form a pressure group? The study will also go into these aspects.

It should also be noted that the regional chieftains are strong in their own right because of their electoral strength. The present Modi government has emerged with a single party majority after 30 years but it is too early to predict whether coalition politics has ended. The next elections may again throw up a coalition government. The spectacular performance of the Aam Admi Party (AAP) in the 2015 Delhi Assembly elections proves that even after a stellar performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls the Bharatiya Janata Party could be routed. The downslide has continued for the BJP in the 2015 November Bihar elections where it lost miserably to the Janata Dal (United), the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Congress Party combine.

Has the Union Government understood the importance of the growing influence of the Provincial Chieftains while formulating the foreign policy? To a certain extent it has. This was evident in the present National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government taking the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on board to sign the long pending Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with Bangladesh in June 2015. This could develop into a new long- term element in the making of the neighbourhood policy of the Centre.

In the Indian federal setup, States play a key role in implementing the economic reforms and social schemes while the Centre makes the broad policies. Since the opening up of the Indian economy in the nineties, many States are vying with each other to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). States benefit from foreign aided projects in socio economic sectors. They can use the money for development of their respective States.

If one looks at India’s neighbourhood, two main challenges are clear. One is with its big neighbouring adversaries – Pakistan and China – as both are major countries with nuclear weapons with large standing armies and have had major wars with India. Both support each other and have strong international allies inside and outside the region. In dealing with the Pakistan – China challenges, New Delhi still had complete authority in making and executing foreign policy.

The second is that India’s neighbours perceive it as selfish and overbearing. They resent what they perceive as India’s ‘big brother’ or some even call it a ‘big bully’ attitude towards its smaller neighbours. However, remarkable changes have recently taken place in the second area of concern in the neighbourhood particularly with regard to engagement with countries bordering India- Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal.

Ambassador Satish Chandra, Dean, Centre for National Security and Strategic Centre points out that most of our neighbours suffer from a deep sense of neglect due to the absence of sustained linkages particularly at the political level. Exchange of high level visits between India and its neighbours on a frequent and regular basis related to the entire gamut of national activity would help alleviate this feeling of neglect and also foster closer understanding and cooperation. It would, in addition, minimise misperceptions about India and promotes mutual trust. He suggests that in its exchanges with each of its neighbours India must not hesitate in spelling out its expectations and laying down red lines that should never be crossed in relation to its core interests. In this context, while India could be relatively relaxed about the linkages developed by its neighbours with other regional or extra regional powers it should certainly frown upon such linkages being used against its interest.

Moreover proactive steps need to be taken to resolve at the earliest long-standing political and economic disputes with each of India’s neighbours. Joint management of waters, connectivity, energy grids, easier movement of peoples etc. could all form part of this exercise. India’s implementation record in fulfilment of political and economic understandings solemnly undertaken leaves much to be desired. Time bound fulfilment of its promises is essential if India is to command respect.¹

The Northeast is a particularly a sensitive region of India. These States called ‘Seven Sisters’ have international borders and have a special significance for India’s security, connectivity and prosperity. They have huge stakes on India’s relations with the neighbouring countries. Northeast is also a key element of the India’s Look East policy, which involves relations with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now talking of Act East policy, an improvement on the Look East policy. An increase in the connectivity between ASEAN, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and the Northeast has the potential of transforming the region fundamentally.

The Role of Union Government

The Indian Constitution clearly defines the powers to the Centre and the States and also some concurrent powers. Unlike the United States of America all the residuary powers are vested with the Centre and not with the States. Despite all these, they are extremely important and are gradually beginning to take more assertive role. For example Washington overruled Hudson Harmon’s argument absolute sovereignty over natural resources in conceding Mexico’s claims for compensation on the Rio Grande and Ottawa has deftly managed Quebec’s unceasing efforts to tilt the country towards the Francophone by categorically asserting its right to Treaty making powers, former Foreign Secretary Krishnan Srinivasan points out.²

It is pertinent to note that no formal structure exists in India, where the States can interact with the Ministry of External Affairs. Further, they are not allowed to have direct dealings with foreign countries nor are they allowed to establish offices abroad, as is the practice in some countries like Canada and Australia. The States have been involved only at the implementation level. It is the Union Government, which has the powers of Treaty making. Article 253 of the Constitution excludes the States as well as the Parliament from the exercise of Treaty making. The Parliament comes into the picture only in case a law is required for the implementation of a Treaty, while the States are totally excluded.

Border States and Provincial Leaders

In the past three decades regional parties have been increasingly trying to exercise some influence over foreign policy especially with regard to India’s neighbouring countries. In certain cases, they have even intervened on issues what previously would have been considered the exclusive domain of the Union Government. This is mainly because of the increasing clout of the regional parties and the fracturing of the polity as well as the weakening of the Centre.

In recent times the States as well as Parliament are also becoming assertive claiming some influence in the power of Treaty making. The classic example was how the Left parties, which were national in character supporting the United Progressive Alliance 1 (UPA) coalition, opposed the Indo – US nuclear Treaty in Parliament and outside and even withdrew their support in 2008 when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went ahead with it. Ironically it was a regional party headed by Mulayam Singh (Samajwadi Party), which came to the rescue of Dr Manmohan Singh in getting the measure passed in Parliament. In the early nineties some States like the Communist-ruled West Bengal opposed the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Treaty when they felt that it impinged on their right as they felt that it affected agriculture. In recent times some States like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu opposed the proposal for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail sector. In September 2011, at a bilateral summit meeting between the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina a number of agreements were signed, but the Teesta River water- sharing accord was deferred due to West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee backing out at the last minute. However, she came on board later and accompanied the present Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he visited Dhaka in June 2015 to sign the other important Land Boundary Agreement, which was finally endorsed by Indian Parliament after 41 years. These examples are suggestive of how federalism in India is gradually undergoing a change.

The Ascendency of Regionalism

The ascendancy of regionalism in recent years has come about in a natural way. Just as the social map of India is complex its political map is also changing with the growing regionalism. The traditional notion of foreign relations has also changed remarkably over the years. The nature of the diplomatic relations too has undergone changes, as they are no more limited to the earlier concept of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and nationality. Foreign policy included economic and cultural diplomacy apart from the normal diplomatic dialogue. It has now come to include security, social, environment, trade, investment another aspects. That is why the Indian government has started setting up separate wings in the embassies abroad to specifically deal with these issues. Although India is a diverse country with diverse culture many still debate whether it matters when it comes to foreign policy.

Economic Diplomacy

As the globalisation becomes the order of the day the economic diplomacy too has become a major part of India’s foreign policy. Now broader issues of international affairs like the foreign trade, foreign aid, external investment, bilateral and multilateral economic negotiations, resolving trade disputes, and technological exchanges have become key ingredients of international economic affairs. Also unprecedented developments in trade and the industrial sector in recent decades have made involvement of the diplomats in the promotion of trade and business in the overseas market.

The economic cooperation in the region has become focused and growing, as most countries have realized the real importance of the economic clout. A shining example is how the United States and China are dealing with each other keeping aside their political and ideological differences. Interestingly, it is on the economic diplomacy that New Delhi has been able to achieve progress even with Pakistan and China.

Former Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey observes, "India’s neighbours are its best and natural partners in economic cooperation. Geographical proximity, common languages, religion and consumption patterns and the inheritance of common institutional and physical infrastructures from its colonial past, confer on India, by way of reducing transaction costs, competitive advantages over countries outside the region, in trading and forging other links of economic cooperation with neighbouring countries.³"

Yet another factor was the overwhelming technological revolution, which has shrunk the world. Above all, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disenchantment with the ideological battles have also combined to give a higher profile to economic diplomacy. World over there is a new realisation that it is not power politics or war but the economic muscle and the economic ascendency, which yield results. China is a classic example of this awareness. From the nineties even India has acquired some economic muscle because of its attractive market and liberalisation. There is a growing realisation that war is becoming costly and avoidable.

During the Cold War days there were two blocks in the world, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. The non- alignment movement also saw some countries including India remaining neutral but this movement is no more relevant in a Uni -polar world as after the end of the Cold War in the nineties things had changed. Even countries like India are now leaning towards the United States of America.

South Asia had one of the highly regulated economies outside the Communist Bloc. Among the South Asian nations, Sri Lanka was the first country to liberalize its economy in 1977. Bangladesh followed in 1980, Pakistan in 1989, and India in 1991. Since then India has begun to use its economic card. New Delhi has been giving substantial amounts of money as aid and soft loans and entered in to trade pacts to serve dual purpose of market access as well as part of its security strategy with neighbouring countries. The Ministry of External Affairs too has realised the importance and allocates sizeable money for this purpose from its budget.

On August 3, 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Kathmandu announced $1 billion (Nepalese rupees 10,000 crore) as concessional line of credit to Nepal.⁴ News Portal First Post reported on June 7, 2015 Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a credit line of 2 billion US dollars during his visit to Dhaka.⁵

New Delhi has also given aid and grants to other neighbours like Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan. New Delhi has spent a substantial amount of money on Bhutan to secure India’s strategic interests. Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with the appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimpu. India’s Political Officer in Sikkim looked after the diplomatic relations earlier. The basic framework of India-Bhutan bilateral relations was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1949 between the two countries. This was updated and signed during the visit to India of His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wang chuck in February 2007. This special relationship has been sustained by the tradition of regular high level visits and extensive exchange of views at the highest levels between the two countries. In recent times, there had been some high level exchanges including that of His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wang chuck, the King of Bhutan to India in 2013 as the Chief Guest to the 64th Republic Day celebrations. The young Bhutan King paid an official visit from January 6 to 10, 2014 at the invitation of President Pranab Mukherji. It has been the practice that India’s External Affairs Ministers choose Bhutan for their first foreign visit.

The track record shows that most Indian Prime Ministers have left their imprint on India’s foreign policy depending on their personality, their interest and their capacity to influence, manipulate and persuade the States. However, increasingly the Union Government has also seen that it has to take into account the special interests of the States. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj points out "You have to take those concerns. When you say they are shaping it, it looks as if the States are hijacking the foreign policy of India. That is not the case. The Centre will decide the policy but the concerns of the States expressed by the various Chief Ministers have to be addressed amicably. That is the thing.⁶"

Limitations of Regional Satraps

The Centre – State politics aside, there are limitations for the powerful regional satraps as carrying out an alternative foreign policy at their level is not possible without the Centre. The foreign countries also know their limitations. As former Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia observes, The principal focal points for bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India will have to be the capitals of the two countries. This is a universal principle. Foreign policy decisions are made in Dhaka and New Delhi and they are implemented accordingly. There is however nothing to prevent close cultural and social ties with the people of the Indian States that are in our immediate neighbourhood. A degree of engagement may also be cultivated with the governments of these federal units. The key contacts, however, will have to remain between the capitals of the two countries. At the same time it must be ensured that bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India transcend narrow regional interests and be seen in the larger bilateral context.⁷

The age-old practice of the Chief Ministers, Ministers and other trade and industry delegations taking clearance from the Centre to visit abroad still continues in India. Sometimes the Prime Minister includes some Chief Ministers in his delegation when he makes important visits abroad, which sends a healthy signal. For instance, Dr Manmohan Singh took Chief Ministers of North-eastern States during his visit to Bangladesh in 2011. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also sent a good signal by including the opposition chief minister like Mamata Banerjee in his delegation to Bangladesh in June 2015,

Under the present system, the communication between the External Affairs Ministry and the States is on an ad hoc basis. Sometimes the Centre refuses permission, as it did in the case of Narendra Modi when he was the Gujarat Chief Minister to visit Sri Lanka. Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar was denied permission to visit Nepal to attend the post- death rites of former Nepal Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in April 2010. India’s then Railway Minister and former Chief Minister of flood-plagued Bihar State Lalu Prasad Yadav had to scrap his intention to visit Nepal after the External Affairs Ministry advised him against it. In 2015, Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Nara Chandrababu Naidu was denied permission to participate in the funeral of the Singapore doyen Lee Kuan Yew as the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was representing the country. When such a thing happens, the affected Chief Ministers try to make political capital out of it. On the contrary, the then Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, when he launched economic reforms in the nineties encouraged them to seek foreign investment for their respective States. Even non-Congress Chief Ministers like Lalu Prasad Yadav, (Bihar) Chandrababu Naidu, (Andhra Pradesh) Jyoti Basu (West Bengal) and others utilized this opportunity to project their States abroad and attract the much-needed foreign investment. However one should not lose sight of the fact that the increasingly pro active role of the provincial chieftains in foreign policy is not always obstructionist.

Secondly quite often it is not only the opposition parties but also the allies in the coalition, who had become troublesome. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, in the United Progressive Alliance and the Shiv Sena in the NDA are examples of this pattern. The DMK and the All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Trinamool Congress are examples of a trend where the coalition constituents and States are bringing water and security issues to the bargaining table. The DMK had demanded that the UPA should pilot a resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Council demanding an international probe into the alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka. The other Dravidian parties joined the populist stand demanding a boycott of the Commonwealth Heads Of Governments Meeting in Sri Lanka, a ban on Sri Lankan cricket team in the Indian Premier League matches in Tamil Nadu, and also a resolution in the Tamil Nadu assembly asking the Centre to get the UN to create a separate Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka. Thirdly it is time that smaller Border States like Nagaland and Manipur also have a say in India’s neighbourhood policy than merely feel its impact

Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy

To understand the growing influence of the regional satraps one had to understand India’s foreign policy evolution in the last 70 years. Indian federal character has passed through evolutionary phases and it is still evolving. The first 17 years belonged to India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He was a stalwart and a world-renowned leader who held the External Affairs portfolio with him until he died in May 1964.

The second was the post-Nehru phase, which was a transition from a single party rule to a system dominated by a few national parties. The past three or four decades have witnessed the decline of the national parties, emergence of the coalition politics and the ascendency of some 49 regional parties. Although the 2014 Lok Sabha elections have brought a single party rule, the regional players continue to dominate. This shows that the federal spirit has asserted itself. The question is whether it turns aggressive and confrontational, or constructive and cooperative. All these will depend on how the players at the Centre and the States handle it. There is no denying the fact that among such mixed determinants of foreign policy, the domestic factors are particularly important. Indeed, the domestic sources of foreign policy are so varied that the task of tracing the way in which they guide that policy would pose a challenge.

Nehru and India’s Foreign Policy

During India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s regime, foreign policy was seen as an elitist exercise. Whatever Nehru decided was accepted as national consensus as no one contradicted him. Nehru found a way of dealing with the Chief Ministers by befriending them with his frequent interactions and by corresponding with them and sharing his thoughts on various issues including foreign policy regularly. In his letters to the Chief Ministers, Nehru often took them into confidence on aspects of the foreign policy, but it was more to educate them and inform them rather than to consult or discuss with them. The Provincial leaders also responded to him with respect. Senior Congress Party leaders like Sardar Patel and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were national leaders but even those who drew their power from their regional bases like Govind Ballabh Pant (Uttar Pradesh), Dr Bidan Chandra Roy (West Bengal), Morarji Desai (erstwhile Bombay presidency) or Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (Tamil Nadu) had a broad national outlook. In any case, as former Union Minister Saugata Roy (Trinamool Congress) observes that during Nehru’s time all the States were ruled by the Congress and great stalwarts were State Chief Ministers. "Now stalwarts are not there either at the Centre or in the States. You can’t impose from the Centre foreign policy directives any more.⁸"

In India the foreign policy has always been top down and not bottom up. Nehru generally ignored the foreign office because those who were influencing him were from outside the Ministry of External Affairs. Nehru set the benchmark and his word was final, as former Foreign Secretary Lalit Mansingh observes. He notes that diplomats were accustomed to not taking part in the evolution of the policy earlier assuming that those at the top would take decisions.

Indian polity has matured now and they don’t need a Prime Minister to open their eyes, observes another former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal. "Communications Revolution with the contacts we have with the rest of the world and economic integration has changed all this. Our free trade agreements and strategic partnerships and also have changed the world.⁹"

During the Cold War days there was a split in the Ministry of External Affairs between those who sought better relations with the West including senior bureaucrats Lakshmi Kant Jha and M.J. Desai and those who had links with Moscow belonging to the pro -Soviet group diplomats like K.P.S. Menon (Kumara Padmanabha Sivsankara Menon) and Triloki Nath Kaul even though India was pursuing non-alignment policy. For instance Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, popularly known as Sardar K.M. Panikkar and the then Defence Minister Krishna Menon mostly influenced India’s China policy. Nehru too had a positive view of China. Menon strongly argued in favour of India joining the Commonwealth. There were senior Foreign Service officers with South Asian Countries like Girija Shankar Vajpayee and Badruddin Tayyabji, who advised Nehru on having good relations with Southeast Asian countries?

Several factors were instrumental in shaping Nehru’s foreign policy. He had a definite worldview and a vision for India. The period of initial fashioning and formulation of the Indian foreign policy ended with Nehru’s death on May 27, 1964. Since India’s independence Nehru’s foreign policy had moved from its idealistic and equitable rational place to more realistic moorings as he progressively adjusted the emerging realities of world politics. The adjustments made were a response to the pressures born out of these trends in India.¹⁰

As eminent political scientist Prof Sumit Ganguly of the Indiana University notes that in the initial stages Nehru’s foreign policy could be defined fewer than three things. "First, India played a significant role in multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Second, it also emerged as a critical proponent of the non-aligned movement. Third, as a leader of the non-aligned movement it also made a significant contribution toward the process of decolonization.¹¹"

New Delhi took lead in the Non- Aligned Movement and participated in several multilateral fora including setting up of the United Nations and Asian Development Bank. As Sumit Ganguly points out, there was a change after the 1962 Chinese aggression, which shocked Nehru and India. Nehru was committed to a million- man army, a 45 squadron Air Force and a modern Navy. His Panchsheel (five principles) concept failed after the Chinese aggression. Even his Non -Aligned policy came under strain, as he had to request the U.S President John. F. Kennedy for military help to deal with the Chinese aggression. The United States of America promptly gave him help to meet the situation as the Americans were trying to contain communism.

Nehru Faces Pressure on Goa Liberation

Although Nehru was an undisputed tall leader he also faced some pressure from the States. These include the proposal concerning the ceding of a part of the Berubari Union No 12 to Pakistan in 1958, transfer of 900 sq. km of the Rann of Kutch to Pakistan in 1958, the Liberation of Goa (1961), and the status of Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Nehru faced pressure from Maharashtra and Goa for the Goa liberation. While the French transferred their settlements to Indian Union after India’s independence in 1947, the Portuguese held on to their territorial possessions claiming them as part of Portugal and holding on to Goa for 14 years after India’s independence. Nehru initially hesitated to use force to evict the Portuguese but ultimately abandoned his diplomatic efforts in favour of liberating Goa inviting international criticism.

‘Operation Vijay’ was the code name given to the military operation in December 1961 to liberate Goa. The armed action was a decisive victory for India, ending more than 450 years of Portuguese rule in India on 19th of December 1961. Thirty-four Indians and thirty-one Portuguese were killed in the conflict. The brief war drew a mixture of worldwide praise and condemnation. While India