General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs

By Edward Porter Alexander

In the narrative of the Civil War, Edward Porter Alexander has loomed larger in death than in life. Just 25 years old when the war broke out, Porter Alexander had already served as an engineer and officer in the U.S. Army, but the native Georgian resigned his commission in May 1861 and joined the Confederacy after his home state seceded. 


Though he had served with distinction during the Civil War, it was Porter Alexander's memoirs that have kept his name alive today. While many prominent officers on both sides wrote memoirs, Porter Alexander's were among the most insightful and often considered by historians as the most evenhanded. With a sense of humor and a good narrative, Porter Alexander skillfully narrated the war, his service, and what he considered the successes and faults of others, including Lee, when he thought they had made good decisions or mistakes. As a result, historians continue to rely heavily on his memoirs as a source for Civil War history. 


Porter Alexander played his biggest role at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the third day, Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Lee’s decision necessitated a heavy artillery bombardment of the Union line and attempting to knock out the Union’s own artillery before beginning the charge that would cover nearly a mile of open space from Seminary Ridge to the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Lee tasked Porter Alexander, in charge of the 1st Corps’ guns, to conduct the artillery bombardment. What resulted was the largest sustained bombardment of the Civil War, with over 150 Confederate cannons across the line firing incessantly at the Union line for nearly 2 hours, but as Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Krill Press
• Release date: Nov 25, 2015
• ISBN: 9781518310591

Edward Porter Alexander

General Edward Porter Alexander (1835-1910) was Robert E. Lee’s artillery commander for most of the Civil War. After the Confederate surrender, he served as an executive at various railroad companies and became a respected author. He died in Savannah, Georgia.

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GENERAL EDWARD PORTER ALEXANDER AT GETTYSBURG: ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE FROM HIS MEMOIRS

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Edward Porter Alexander

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Copyright © 2015 by Edward Porter Alexander

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 16: Gettysburg: the First Day

Chapter 17: Gettysburg: Second Day

Chapter 18: Gettysburg: Third Day

General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs

By

Edward Porter Alexander

General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs

Published by Firework Press

New York City, NY

First published 1904

Copyright © Firework Press, 2015

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INTRODUCTION

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IN THE NARRATIVE OF THE Civil War, Edward Porter Alexander has loomed larger in death than in life. Just 25 years old when the war broke out, Porter Alexander had already served as an engineer and officer in the U.S. Army, but the native Georgian resigned his commission in May 1861 and joined the Confederacy after his home state seceded.

Porter Alexander spent 1861 as an intelligence officer, and he served as part of a signal guard, but he soon became chief of ordnance for Joseph Johnston’s army near Richmond. Half a year later, Johnston would be injured during the Peninsula Campaign at the Battle of Seven Pines, after which he was replaced by Robert E. Lee. Over the course of 1862, Porter Alexander took on more roles in the Army of Northern Virginia’s artillery branch, particularly under Longstreet’s 1st Corps.

Though he participated in several battles, Porter Alexander played his biggest role at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the third day, Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it.

Lee’s decision necessitated a heavy artillery bombardment of the Union line and attempting to knock out the Union’s own artillery before beginning the charge that would cover nearly a mile of open space from Seminary Ridge to the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Lee tasked Porter Alexander, in charge of the 1st Corps’ guns, to conduct the artillery bombardment. What resulted was the largest sustained bombardment of the Civil War, with over 150 Confederate cannons across the line firing incessantly at the Union line for nearly 2 hours.

Unfortunately for Porter Alexander and the Confederates, the sheer number of cannons belched so much smoke that they had trouble gauging how effective the shells were. As it turned out, most of the artillery was overshooting the target, landing in the rear of the Union line. Reluctant to order the charge, Longstreet commanded Porter Alexander to order the timing for the charge.

As Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

CHAPTER 16: GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY

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High tide.

— OPPORTUNITY OPEN. — SUGGESTION made. — invasion. — special feature. — feature impossible. — reorganization. — armament. — Lee moves. — Brandy Station. — Ewell in Valley. — captured property. — Hooker moves. — Lincoln suggests. — Lee in Valley. — Stuart proposes raid. — conditional consent. — Stuart’s raid. — Carlisle. — results of raid. — across the Potomac. — Hooker relieved. — Chambersburg. — return of scout. — orders. — chance encounter. — Hill to Gettysburg. — Meade’s movement. — Reynolds to Gettysburg. — battle Opens. — Archer captured. — Rodes Arrives. — Early Arrives. — Lee orders pursuit. — Ewell stops pursuit. — Lee Confers. — the enemy’s line. — best Point of attack. — Longstreet’s arrival. — Federal arrivals.

A pause of four weeks after the battle of Chancellorsville to prepare for an aggressive counter-stroke, was, perhaps, the period of highest tide in Confederate hopes among all the vicissitudes of the war. The campaign which ensued, culminating at Gettysburg, is generally accepted as the turning-point of Confederate fortunes. I think it may be held that each summer campaign in Va. marked a Confederate crisis. That is to say, that defeat in any one of them would have been followed by the collapse of its government, within less than another 12 months, while a victory would assure it only of that much of life. More than that was impossible as long as the war spirit ruled the North, and this was certainly the case in 1863.

A year later, however, there did come a period of very great Federal discouragement, due to a succession of severe losses. At the same time, there occurred a crisis in the military situation, which threatened an ignominious termination to Grant’s campaign, the greatest campaign of the war. This was saved by a brilliant piece of Federal strategy, which is to be told of in due course. In it will be found the real crisis — the story of the passing of the last hope of Confederate success. It was not [364] lost upon any field of battle, either of offence or of defence. It was a victory of strategy and not one of arms.

It was now for Lee to take the offensive — a role appealing strongly to his disposition. The defensive was to invite the enemy to accumulate his resources to the point at which their very weight would crush us. But, for a brief period, we enjoyed a choice of the field of action. It was a fatal mistake that in this choice we failed to utilize the single advantage in the game of war, which the Confederacy enjoyed.

We occupied the ‘Interior Lines,’ and could reinforce from one flank to the other, across our country, more quickly than the enemy could discover and follow our movements by roundabout routes. Only by such transfers of her armies could the South ever hope to face her adversaries with superior, or even with equal, numbers— by demanding double duty of her regiments, fighting battles with them alternately in the east and in the west. In Lee we had a leader of phenomenal ability, could this policy have been once adopted under his direction. Here in May, 1863, was presented a rare opportunity to inaugurate what might be called an ‘Army on Wheels’ within the Confederate lines, as distinguished from an Army of Invasion beyond them. The situation was this. Grant was investing Vicksburg with 60,000 men, and we were threatened with the loss of the Mississippi River, and of 30,000 men at Vicksburg under Pemberton. At Jackson, Miss., Johnston, with scarcely 24,000 men, was looking on and begging vainly for reenforcements.

At Murfreesboro, Tenn., Bragg, with about 45,000 Confederates, confronted Rosecrans with about 84,000. Neither felt strong enough for the aggressive, and the whole spring and summer passed idly. At Knoxville were about 5000 Confederates under Buckner, and there were also scattered brigades in southwest Va. and eastern N. C., from which reinforcements might be drawn. In this state of affairs, Longstreet, with Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions, arrived in Petersburg, under orders to rejoin Lee at Fredericksburg. Hooker had just been driven across the Rappahannock, and his army was soon to lose largely from the expiration of terms of service of many regiments.

Nothing aggressive was probable from him for many weeks. [365] Longstreet’s veteran divisions, about 13,000 strong, could have been placed on the cars at Petersburg and hurried out to Bragg, via Lynchburg and Knoxville. Johnston’s 25,000 from Jackson, and Buckner’s 5000 from Knoxville, could have met them. With these accessions, and with Lee in command, Rosecrans might have been defeated, and an advance made into Ky., threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. If anything could have caused Grant’s recall from Vicksburg, it would have been this. Surely the chances of success were greater, and of disaster less, than those involved in our crossing the bridgeless Potomac, into the heart of the enemy’s country, where ammunition and supplies must come by wagons from Staunton, nearly 200 miles, over roads exposed to raids of the enemy from either the east or the west. In this position, a drawn battle, or even a victory, would still leave us compelled soon to find our way back across the Potomac.

Longstreet¹ tells of his having suggested to Secretary Seddon such a campaign against Rosecrans, and he also suggested it to Lee on his arrival at Fredericksburg. Mr.