Notes on Guerrilla War: Principles and Practices

By Col. Virgil Ney

This book on Guerrilla War, by an American Officer, a student of and an operator in the field of Unconventional Warfare, is most opportune and timely. For the first time, in many instances Principles are identified and explained by historical examples. Colonel Ney holds to the belief that AMERICANS have a tradition of successful GUERRILLA WAR operations from the earliest days of the Nation’s history. Rogers, Marion, Boone, Mosby, Morgan, Quantrill, Ferguson, Andrews, Mackenzie, Funston, Pershing, McCoy, Fertig, Volckmann, Blackburn, Parker, Praeger, Calyer, McGee, Cushing, Anderson, Calvert, Ramsey, Straughn, Thorp, McLish, Childress, Lapham, Barnett: these and others have led or countered GUERILLAS. MARX did not invent GUERRILLA WAR, it was a military phenomenon centuries before his birth; but it has been seized and converted into a comfortable vehicle of Cold-War combat by International Communism. To defeat it, we must know what it is and how it works; to wage it we must understand its PRINCIPLES. That is why this book was written!

• Language: English
• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Release date: Jan 12, 2017
• ISBN: 9781787209121

Col. Virgil Ney

Colonel Virgil Ney (February 19, 1905 - May 14, 1979) was a career U.S. Army officer, military historian and teacher who saw combat in World War II and the Korean conflict. Born in Omaha, Nebraska in 1905, he attended Omaha University before entering the Army in 1926. He was sent to the Pacific in the latter part of World War II as a battalion commander in the Philippine. After the war he remained there as a historian on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur, and was also on MacArthur’s staff in Japan. In 1947, Col. Ney was sent to Nanking, China to establish a school for combat historians for the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek. During the Korean conflict, he organized a psychological warfare school for the Korean army and participated in anti-guerrilla operations in Cholia Namdo province. Back in the United States, he went on to graduate from George Washington University in 1953. Whilst earning a master’s degree and doctorate from Georgetown University, he also served as a planning specialist with the Civil Defense office in Washington, taught at American University, was assistant director in the Army War College program at George Washington University and was with the Special Warfare school at Fort Belvoir. He retired from military service in 1957 after a tour of duty in the office of reserve training at Fort Myer and was a senior military analyst and historian with Technical Operations Inc. from 1964 to 1972. He was a fellow of the Company of Military Historians, a member of the Council on Abandoned Military Posts and the D.C. Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, and a 32nd degree Mason. He had also been a contributing editor to National Defense Magazine. His last published book in 1978, “Fort on the Prairies,” told the story of garrison life in the frontier days at Fort Atkinson, Iowa. Col. Ney passed away in Washington, D.C. in 1979, aged 74.

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Text originally published in 1961 under the same title.

© Arcole Publishing 2017, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

NOTES ON GUERILLA WAR

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

BY

COLONEL VIRGIL NEY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

PREFACE 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 8

CHAPTER I 10

CHAPTER II—GUERRILLA WAR AND MODERN STRATEGY 13

CHAPTER III—GUERRILLA WAR, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 26

CHAPTER IV—THE ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA 43

CHAPTER V—THE WORLD WAR II ERA 56

Europe and Soviet Russia 56

Greece 58

France 60

Soviet Russia 64

CHAPTER VI—THE WORLD WAR II ERA 70

The Philippines 70

CHAPTER VII—THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA 88

The Korean War 88

CHAPTER VIII—COUNTER-GUERRILLA TACTICS 98

CHAPTER IX—GUERRILLA WAR UNDER NUCLEAR and CBR CONDITIONS 108

CHAPTER X—CONCLUSIONS 115

TRAINING BIBLIOGRAPHY 130

BIBLIOGRAPHY 134

Books 134

Public Documents 138

Report 138

Articles 139

Unpublished Material 139

APPENDIX 139

GUERRILLA SAFE-CONDUCT SURRENDER PASS LEAFLET 143

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 144

PREFACE

IN THEORY and practice, civilian resistance of military forces takes many forms. The principal methods of resistance are: sabotage; espionage; assassination; terror; kidnapping; subversion; propaganda; guerrilla war. The latter operational format may be considered the spearhead or the militant phase of resistance. These patterns are dictated, to a great extent, by the modus operandi of the attacking or occupying hostile force. The status quo of the moment will indicate the overall situation relative to the presence or absence of a favorable or unfavorable climate for the initiation of resistance warfare of any or all of the patterns previously mentioned. How this is to be determined, who makes the decision as to the resistance method to be employed and who directs the effort—is not often established before the hostile invasion is well-organized and committed within the nation concerned. Historically, it can be shown that the making of pre-invasion resistance plans is feasible—but that they are not made generally. Such plans are made on the spur of the moment, this is at the same time, a strength and a weakness.

Unconventional warfare has of recent years come into its own as a force to be reckoned with by the military as well as the political branches of modern governments. That certain governments have recognized the great potential in this form of warfare is demonstrated by their operations within this area of conflict. Reference, in this connection, is made specifically to the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Communist camp has long been a true believer in the efficacy of unconventional war as an instrument of national policy.{1}

With the general, but somewhat reluctant acceptance by the military, that civilian resistance has a place as a weapon in the arsenal of war, planning for this important activity of national survival must be included in every conventional war plan extant—within the Free Nations of the world. That the Communist Nations have such plans has been demonstrated. World War II proved beyond a doubt that the Soviet Union had prepared plans for the conduct of civilian resistance years before the Nazi attack. In this respect, the Satellites of the Soviet Union have conformed to the patterns set by Moscow.

When the Germans occupied a town, the head men among the inhabitants dug up buried rifles and machineguns, got away to some rendezvous in a forest or gorge, joined or organized a guerrilla band, and made sudden forays on oil tanks, railroads and supply dumps. The other inhabitants, living in squalor and misery and on the verge of starvation, were their accomplices and turned many a trick on their own account.{2}

In a comparative sense, guerrilla war bears the same relationship to civilian resistance that formal battle bears to conventional warfare. From the practical point of view, guerrilla war is the most ambitious and complex form of civilian resistance. This is so because of its almost military requirements of planning, recruiting, propaganda, supply, leadership, training and organization.

It is the concept of the author that resistance war is governed by specific principles—as is conventional warfare. The principles which are deduced in this work, in accordance with this concept, apply equally to all the facets of civilian resistance previously indicated herein. The relative importance of each in the prosecution of resistance warfare is great. However, it must be noted carefully—that there is considerable overlap and much interdependence within the framework of these activities. Throughout this work, the author emphasizes the fact that the principles essential to the conduct of Guerrilla War are equally applicable and necessary to Resistance Warfare of which Guerrilla War is the spearhead. The paramilitary aspects of the Cold War are almost exclusively carried out by guerrilla actions. In view of this fact, the military policy of the United States has been modernized to include Guerrilla War as an important tactic. Conversely, Counter-guerrilla action is receiving a considerable amount of attention on the part of the military professional.{3}

Within the context of the cold war being waged, in many instances by Guerrilla means, between the forces of communism and the Democratic Nations, counter-Guerrilla tactics and techniques have assumed a position of primary importance to the military professional. How to defeat the guerrilla in the pressing question not only to the soldier, but to the planners of both political and military policy.

"...IN MOST AREAS of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare must rest on local populations and forces. But given the great likelihood and seriousness of this threat, we must be prepared to make a substantial contribution in the form of strong, highly mobile forces trained in this type of warfare, some of which must be deployed in forward areas, with a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and pre-stocked overseas bases..."

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

in Budget Message to the

Eighty-Seventh Congress,

28 March 1961

One of the most successful modern counter-guerrilla campaigns was achieved in the Philippines after World War II and its attendant Hukbalahap Communist Guerrilla Movement. The methods utilized by Ramon Magsaysay, at that time the Philippine Secretary of Defense, and later President, were marked by combination of the Direct and Indirect approach to the guerrilla problem. By skilful and courageous leadership, beginning at the top, the Filipinos were able to destroy eventually the power of the Communist Huk Guerrilla movement. How this was done is told in a most succinct manner by the following extract:

In 1949 the movement changed its name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan, or the People’s Liberation Army. Its leaders stated that their objective was the overthrow of the Government and the establishment of a Communist regime. The Huks then undertook large-scale raids in the vicinity of Manila and captured several important provincial towns. The movement spread rapidly, and by 1950 the Huks boasted a force of 10,000 armed men under disciplined Communist leadership.

At this juncture President Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay Secretary of Defense. Magsaysay realized that the Huk movement involved much more than a simple military threat and that there were important social and economic reasons for its successes. The Filipino people, for example, had come to distrust the national army which was supposed to protect them, and they resented its undisciplined behavior and the high-handed techniques used in obtaining supplies from the population. One of Magsaysay’s first steps was to reform the army, restoring its morale and efficiency and regaining the confidence of the people.

While carrying out vigorous offensive military measures against the Huks with the reinvigorated armed forces, Magsaysay also instituted measures to induce the rebels to surrender. Realizing that many of the rebels knew little or nothing of communism as an ideology but had been forced into desperate action by an apparently hopeless poverty, Magsaysay offered the Huk guerrillas a new way of life. He set aside government land in sparsely settled areas for the rebels. This land was cleared, basic community facilities were constructed with government help, and surrendering Huks were resettled. Large-scale surrenders of rank and file guerrillas, together with effective military and police drives against the "hard core" of Communist Huk leadership, led eventually to the disintegration of the movement. Today it has virtually disappeared.{4}

In his treatment of the subject, the author has utilized a technique of immediate subjective notation by historical example. While this method may have the effect of appearing to break the continuity, such effect is not intentional. It is believed that by this method of rapid and specific citation—certain facts of guerrilla war will be understood more readily.

Resistance warfare and its para-militant arm Guerrilla War have by their past achievements gained a place in the tactics and technique of war. With the future of warfare a matter of professional conjecture, due to weaponry inhibition, civilian resistance may become suddenly the only workable context for the conduct of present and future operations.{5}

With the threat of nuclear war always a clear and present danger, and Limited Conventional Warfare a tried but not satisfactory solution; it is conceivable that Guerrilla War may be the last method of warfare capable of being operated by man without destroying himself and the world as we know it.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THE AUTHOR wishes to express his appreciation to the Graduate School of Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., for permission to publish certain portions of this work.

Thanks are due to the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania for permission to include Guerrilla War and Modern Strategy which appeared previously in ORBIS.

Major Charles K. Nulsen, Jr., of the Counter-Guerrilla Operations Department of the U.S. Army Special Warfare School devoted a considerable amount of time to reading and commenting upon the manuscript. For his assistance in this instance and others, I am most grateful—and I extend my thanks.

Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger of the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, has been most helpful in permitting the author to quote from his work Psychological Warfare and for this he expresses his thanks.

Appreciation is expressed to the following publishers, who were most gracious in granting permission to print quotations from their published books. In, all cases full credit to each author and publisher is given in the footnote accompanying the quotation concerned:

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

University of Oklahoma Press

Doubleday Company

W. W. Norton and Company

Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc.

Institute of Pacific Relations

The Viking Press, Inc.

Macmillan & Company, Ltd.

G. P. Putnam’s Sons

Simon & Schuster, Inc.

Harper & Brothers

Houghton-Mifflin Co.

Froben Press

Bodley Head

Little, Brown & Co.

George Allen & Unwin

John Murray

Duell, Sloan & Pearce

ORBIS

Victor Gollancz, Ltd.

Frederick Muller, Ltd.

Macmillan Company

E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.

Penguin Books, Inc.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY REVIEW

Frederick A Praeger

The author wishes to thank Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Dr. J. D. Atkinson and Captain Victor Gondos, Jr., Editor of MILITARY AFFAIRS and Lt.-Col. Miner L. Weems, USA for their constant encouragement of and interest in the eventual publication of this book. Mr. George J. Stansfield, Librarian of the National War College was most helpful with suggestions and comments. Mr. Harry E. Brown of the Merkle Press rendered critical advice in the matters pertaining to printing and publication problems.

To Mrs. Rhea Williams, who did the type-script so well and with such skill, I take this means of expressing my sincere appreciation.

Lastly, for the opinions expressed and speculations advanced, the author assumes that responsibility, which can be his, and his, alone.

GUERRILLA WAR

CHAPTER I

THAT guerrilla war is based upon definite principles, as is conventional war; would seem to be a logical deduction, or observation after consideration or study of its operational patterns. Throughout military history, guerrilla or irregular bands have appeared to harass, delay and often defeat weapon wielders of more professional mold. That the non-military, untrained civilian, armed only with the most basic weapons, can frustrate regular military formations has been proven in innumerable, deadly and bitter struggles between the protagonists of the two types of war.

How guerrilla war commences and continues to function is a puzzle, which has not, as yet, been solved by the conventional and professional soldier. Further, the nature of the current revolution caused in military science by the introduction of nuclear weapons of mass destruction make necessary the dispersion and independent operational patterns of the guerrilla, if military formations are to survive and function. In order for the regular soldier to defeat the guerrilla he must understand how he operates and when required be able to function in counter-guerrilla missions and operations.

Obviously, the Principles of War, as enunciated by von Clausewitz, are applicable to guerrilla war. These Principles of War are: The Objective, Offensive Operations, The Massing of Force, The Economy of Force, Mobility, Surprise, Security, Communications, and Coordination, (part of Communications). Certain of these principles are applicable to guerrilla war in a general way; others, are applied specifically, as the situation develops. An example: Surprise! The others may be applied, or rejected governed by tactical and strategical requirements. Broadly, they must not be overlooked, or neglected. Specifically, they must be replaced operationally by the principles deduced herein,—as those directly applicable to the special field of guerrilla war. However, and this is most important, guerrilla war by its nature calls forth additional principles. These are required specifically and categorically for its successful operation and conduct. It shall be the purpose of the author to show by historical example, the identity, applicability and workings of the Principles of Guerrilla War. These Principles are: The Environment. Community Security, Community Support, Propaganda, Proximity, Deliberate Delay, Personal Security, Part-Time Function, Full-Time Function, Modus Operandi, Organization.

The place of guerrilla war in the military art is an assured one. It has become a distinct branch of the art of war. The following quotation will explain its present position in the overall picture of warfare:

To stir up strife behind an enemy’s lines is a stratagem as old as war itself; but in this last war new techniques of wireless transmission and airborne-supply made possible the long-range preparation and support of revolts in occupied territories on a scale unexampled in history. The organization of resistance has thus become a distinct branch of the art of war, of comparable importance as an instrument of national policy to the traditional arms and the new weapons of the atomic age.{6}

Guerrilla warfare principles and practices have become important adjuncts to the conventional wars of the twentieth century. The possibility of the limited war or brush-fire war calls for guerrilla tactics and techniques. Historically, when regular warfare collapses, or it cannot be waged successfully by those, whose primary, or professional task it is, non-military and military individuals have combined to resist the enemy.

The recognition, gaining and retention of the principles necessary to the successful waging of guerrilla war are major accomplishments to be achieved by intelligent, deliberate actions. The interdependence of the principles of guerrilla war each upon the other, makes each and every one essential to operational success. The possession of one and the lack of others will call for the development of a proper climate for them all, or the guerrilla movement will be doomed to fail. In this matter, the Principle of Propaganda is paramount. Without some form of persuasion, men may not be convinced of the justice of their cause. A guerrilla movement must propagandize and be propagandized in order to make operable certain of these principles and to attract and to retain an effective number of followers. This is well-illustrated by the following quotation:

From their long talks and analyses a simple strategy emerged: to lie low, but at the same time to spread the word that a guerrilla force was being organized and that recruits were wanted; to build slowly but soundly with an efficient communications system so that all units of the expanding force would mesh their movements and gain the greater power given by coordination; to avoid open conflict with the enemy until the guerrilla army was well-organized, disciplined and equipped; to strike only after plans had been made that would, if possible forestall enemy retaliation against innocent bystanders.{7}

Careful study of successful guerrilla movements, especially in the field of organization and operations, will reveal the presence of a majority of the principles herein enunciated. Conversely, those guerrillas who failed, will be found in the main, to have lacked those principles essential to their existence and functioning. By means of information collected, collated and converted into intelligence, it should be possible to deduce whether or not in a given country guerrilla war may be conducted profitably.