The Great Patriotic War And The Maturation Of Soviet Operational Art 1941-1945

By Colonel David M Glantz

This report examines the development of the Soviet Army’s operational art against the Germans during World War 2. It examines the reconstruction and reorganization of the Soviet military forces after Hitler’s invasion, the development and coordination of military tactics on the various fronts and the deployment of forces for defense or attack in several battles.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786250445

Colonel David M Glantz

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Text originally published in 1987 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND THE MATURATION OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ART: 1941-1945

Colonel David M. Glantz

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

Tragedy and Rebirth of an Army (1941-1942) 5

An Army in Transition (1943) 38

Triumph of Arms (1944-45) 73

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 112

Tragedy and Rebirth of an Army (1941-1942)

On the morning of 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany unleashed a sudden and massive offensive aimed at destroying the Soviet state. The ambitious German undertaking, based on the premise that the bulk of the Red Army could be annihilated in the immediate border regions by use of blitzkrieg conducted on a large scale, caught the Soviets only partially prepared for war. Force reconstruction and re-equipment programs were underway but incomplete and although the Soviets had ample warning, for as yet inexplicable reasons, Stalin forbid the Soviet military to take prudent defensive precautions—thus granting the Germans the equivalent of strategic, operational and tactical surprise. The German hammer blows staggered the Soviet armed forces and almost resulted in its destruction. By Soviet admission:

our pre-war views on the conduct of armed struggle in the initial period of war did not investigate the possibility of concealed timely deployment and simultaneous enemy armed forces operational on the land, in the air and at sea. Mistakes in theory had a negative effect on resolving the practical questions of covering the state borders and deploying the armed forces which along with other reasons caused serious misfortunes in the war.

There were many problems in working out command and control and organizing communications with operational large units. The assertion that the defense found fullest expression only in the realm of army operations was incorrect, as was the view that the struggle for air superiority must be realized on the scale of front and army operations. The complicated views at the beginning of the war concerning the organization of the army and forces rear did not fully answer the demands of the theory of deep offensive operations and battle. Operational and forces rear services remained cumbersome and immobile.

There were also serious deficiencies in the theoretical training of commanders and in the combat training of forces.…{1}

These Soviet admissions, as frank as they were, understated the scale of the problem. In the initial months of the war, Soviet commanders at higher levels displayed an ineptness only partially compensated for by the fervor of junior officers and the stoicism of the hard pressed troops. Front and army commanders, unable to construct coherent defenses against the German armored thrusts, displayed an alarming propensity for launching costly uncoordinated counterattacks predestined to failure. Only looming disaster drove the Soviet high command to action in a war which quickly became one of survival.

Ultimately, the Red Army successfully met this second great challenge and triumphed, but only after years of death, frustration, and an agonizing process of military re-education conducted during wartime. Throughout the war new generations of commanders emerged, new equipment was developed and fielded, and military theories matured after their late 1930s hiatus. In essence, the concept of deep operations, in fact if not in name, became the focal point of Soviet offensive theory and the means of converting tactical success into operational and even strategic success. By late

Reviews for The Great Patriotic War And The Maturation Of Soviet Operational Art 1941-1945

[Glenn Abson · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Fantastic read, detailed analysis of the progressive development and refinement of the Red army on it's road from defeat to victory.