Fire Support in the Reduction of an Encircled Force - a Forgotten Mission

By Major Joel A. Buck

Using historical analysis and survey, this study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques to support the destruction of an encircled enemy. Focus is on identifying existing weaknesses by comparing applicable lessons learned from history with the practices spelled out in current manuals. The Allied attempt to encircle and reduce the German forces within the Falaise-Argentan pocket in central France during August 1944 and the Soviet Belorussian Offensive and subsequent encirclement and reduction of German forces during June 1944 are examined. The results of a survey completed by the V and VII U.S. Corps artillery commanders on the subject are also included.

Among the shortfalls identified are: current attention is more focused on breaking out of an encirclement than on forming an encirclement; when encircling an enemy is addressed, discussion stops after the encirclement is formed and before reduction begins; field artillery procedures do not separately address this mission; friendly or enemy use of chemical or nuclear weapons has not been considered; the requirement to simultaneously support reduction and exploitation operations has not been addressed; there is a need for an artillery commander at echelons above corps.

The study concludes that the process of reducing a large encircled enemy force is sufficiently different from other operations that it should be separately addressed. Although the “doing” of the component parts of the artillery aspect of this operation are doctrinally established, tying them together into a synergetic package requires innovative attention. Resulting field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques derived are equally applicable in reducing an isolated enemy force that has broken through or been Inserted Into our rear area as they are in the reduction of an offensively encircled enemy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786250285

Major Joel A. Buck

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Text originally published in 1989 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

FIRE SUPPORT IN THE REDUCTION OF AN ENCIRCLED FORCE—A FORGOTTEN MISSION

By

Major Joel A. Buck, USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

Chapter 1 — INTRODUCTION 6

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE 6

MODERN MOBILE COMBAT OPERATIONS 8

STEPS OF AN ENCIRCLEMENT 9

Step I—Penetration 9

Step 2—Link-Up— 9

Step 3—Forming the Inner Ring Perimeter— 10

Step 4—Forming the Outer Ring Perimeter— 10

Step 5—Reduction of the Encircled Force and Exploitation- 10

ASSUMPTIONS 11

AIRLAND TERMINOLOGY 12

Encirclement— 12

Doctrine— 12

Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures— 12

Operational Art— 12

Tactical Operation— 13

Reduction (Destruction/Neutralization)— 13

PARAMETERS 13

Limitations 13

Delimitations 13

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 14

Chapter 2 — REVIEW OF LITERATURE 15

Chapter 3 — METHODOLOGY & ORGANIZATION 17

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17

CATEGORIES FOR ANALYSIS 19

Adequate fire support for committed combat units 19

Weight to the main effort 19

Facilitate future operations 20

Immediately available fire support for the commander to Influence the action 20

Maximum feasible centralized control 20

THE THREAT TODAY 20

THE SURVEY 20

U.S. FIELD ARTILLERY 21

Chapter 4 — U.S. EXPERIENCE—THE FALAISE-ARGENTAN POCKET. AUGUST 1944 22

REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL SETTING 22

THE TACTICAL SITUATION 22

TERRAIN AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OPERATION 24

THE ALLIED FORCES 25

THE GERMAN FORCES 25

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION 26

FIRE SUPPORT 28

Adequate fire support for committed combat units. 28

Weight to the main effort 28

Immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the 28

Maximum feasible centralized control 29

THE OUTCOME 29

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION 30

LESSONS LEARNED 31

Chapter 5 — THE SOVIET CONTRAST—OPERATION BAGRATION THE BELORUSSIAN OFFENSIVE. SUMMER 1944 34

REVIEW OF STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL SETTING 34

THE TACTICAL SITUATION 34

SOVIET DOCTRINE IN EFFECT 35

THE SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVE 35

SOVIET LEADERS 35

SOVIET PLANS 36

Group A 36

3rd Belorussian Front— 37

Group B 37

GERMAN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 37

GERMAN DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 37

THE GERMAN MILITARY OBJECTIVE 38

DISPOSITION OF FORCES 38

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 39

Phase I 39

Phase II 42

Adequate fire support for committed combat units 42

Weight to the main effort 43

Facilitate future operations 43

Immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the action 43

Maximum feasible centralized control. 44

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION 44

LESSONS LEARNED 44

Chapter 6 — CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS — SOVIET 46

FORCE STRUCTURE 48

Figure 6-1 Artillery Brigade, Combined Arms Army or Tank Army 48

FIRE PLANNING 49

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT 50

CONCLUSIONS 52

Chapter 7 — CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS — US 53

FORCE STRUCTURE 53

COMMAND, CONTROL & COORDINATION 55

Heavy Division Slice & General Support 56

THREAT TO ARTILLERY 57

PRESENT V AND VII CORPS SITUATIONS 58

Chapter 8 — CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 60

FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REDUCTION OF AN ENCIRCLED ENEMY 61

"Provides adequate fire support for committed combat units 62

Weights the main effort 62

Facilitates future operations 62

Retains immediately available fire support assets for the commander to Influence the action 62

Establishes maximum feasible centralized control 62

IS THE FIELD ARTILLERY PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE REDUCTION OF AN ENCIRCLED ENEMY? 64

FUTURE INVESTIGATION 65

OBSERVATIONS 66

APPENDIX A — AIRLAND TERMINOLOGY 67

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 67

Air Interdiction 67

Assigned Unit— 67

Attached Unit 67

Battle— 67

Battlefield Air Interdiction 67

Bypassed Forces—" 67

Campaign— 67

Close Air Support— 67

Combined Doctrine— 67

Combined Operation— 67

Doctrine— 68

Encirclement— 68

Engagement— 68

Joint— 68

Joint Doctrine— 68

Joint Force 68

Operational Art 68

Major Operation 68

Maneuver— 68

Procedures— 68

Reduction (destruction/neutralization)— 68

Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)— 69

Tactics—Tactics 69

Techniques— 69

APPENDIX B — MAIL OUT QUESTIONNAIRE 70

and electronic warfare assets 70

SCENARIO 71

Situation. 71

Extract from OPLAN 4-88 — 11th (US) Corps 73

Extract from OPLAN 4-88 —11th (US) Corps 75

Extract from OPLAN 4-88 — 11th (US) Corps 77

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) (EXTRACT) TO OPLAN 4-87 (CORNHUSKER)— 11TH (US) Corps 78

ANNEX B (SKETCHES) TO OPLAN 4-87 (CORNHUSKER)— 11 TH (US) CORPS 87

ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) (EXTRACT) TO OPLAN 21-87 (KAW RIVER)—10TH (US) CORPS 94

ENEMY SITUATION 94

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 98

BIBLIOGRAPHY 99

Books 99

Government Publications 100

Periodicals and Articles 101

ABSTRACT

Using historical analysis and survey, this study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques to support the destruction of an encircled enemy. Focus is on identifying existing weaknesses by comparing applicable lessons learned from history with the practices spelled out in current manuals. The Allied attempt to encircle and reduce the German forces within the Falaise-Argentan pocket in central France during August 1944 and the Soviet Belorussian Offensive and subsequent encirclement and reduction of German forces during June 1944 are examined. The results of a survey completed by the V and VII U.S. Corps artillery commanders on the subject are also included.

Among the shortfalls identified are: current attention is more focused on breaking out of an encirclement than on forming an encirclement; when encircling an enemy is addressed, discussion stops after the encirclement is formed and before reduction begins; field artillery procedures do not separately address this mission; friendly or enemy use of chemical or nuclear weapons has not been considered; the requirement to simultaneously support reduction and exploitation operations has not been addressed; there is a need for an artillery commander at echelons above corps.

The study concludes that the process of reducing a large encircled enemy force is sufficiently different from other operations that it should be separately addressed. Although the doing of the component parts of the artillery aspect of this operation are doctrinally established, tying them together into a synergetic package requires innovative attention. Resulting field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques derived are equally applicable in reducing an isolated enemy force that has broken through or been Inserted Into our rear area as they are in the reduction of an offensively encircled enemy.

 Chapter 1 — INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the adequacy of U.S. Army field artillery doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to support the reduction of an encircled enemy force. The problem can be stated by asking, is the U.S. field artillery prepared to support the reduction of an encircled enemy force on the Air Land Battlefield? This, in turn, raises the questions: How is this mission unique? What lessons can history teach us? is current doctrine adequate? How does threat doctrine address the issue? How well do existing tactics, techniques, and procedures apply to the reduction of an encircled enemy force?

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE

The Air land Battlefield will rarely maintain linear characteristics. The high speed and long range of today’s super-lethal forces will blur the lines between front and rear areas. It is also widely acknowledged that we must be ready to fight outnumbered and win. How do we do this?

The fundamental doctrine of Air Land Battle in FM 100-5, operations, is in line with the Army’s writing program spelled out in AR 600-70. It’s clear, concise, and less than 200 pages long. The resulting lack of specificity, however, has frequently been criticized. The complaint that current doctrine raises more questions about such operations as encirclement than it answers is a familiar one.{1}

The quote in Figure I-1{2} is just as true today as it was on the eve of our entry into World War II. Inflexible rules must be avoided since they limit imagination and initiative and provide the enemy a fixed pattern of operation which he can more easily recognize and counter. However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for executing the doctrine must be established.

Figure 1-1 Doctrine

Figure 1-2 below, entitled, "Family of Manuals for Doctrine, Tactics,