Reading The Enemy’s Mail:: Origins And Development Of US Army Tactical Radio Intelligence In World War II, European Theater

By Major Jeffrey S. Harley

This thesis traces the development of American radio intelligence at the operational and tactical levels from its beginnings in World War I through the end of World War II. It shows that signals intelligence is useful to the tactical and operational level commander. The study recommends the Army rethink signal intelligence support to the various echelons, primarily through changes to tables of organization and equipment.

The thesis covers the initial appearance of radio intelligence units on the battlefields of France in the first world war, identifying specific instances where radio intelligence played a role in a command decision. It also looks at training and doctrine in the period between the two world wars. The thesis also covers the organization, doctrine, and training of radio intelligence units as they prepared for combat. It provides a glimpse into the intelligence support provided to the corps, army, and army group commanders during World War II through examination of actual intercept operations. Where possible the study compares and contrasts German radio intelligence units and operations with their American counterparts.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786254092

Major Jeffrey S. Harley

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Text originally published in 1993 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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READING THE ENEMY’S MAIL: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ARMY TACTICAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II,

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

by

MAJ Jeffrey S. Harley, USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 7

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION 8

World War I (1914-1918) 10

Germany 10

United States 11

Inter-war period (1918-1938) 14

Germany 14

United States 16

CHAPTER TWO—ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE 19

Organization and Doctrine—1940 20

Organization 20

Doctrine 21

Doctrine and Organization—Post 1940 23

Training 25

Doctrine and Organization—German Forces 30

CHAPTER THREE—WARTIME OPERATIONS 32

Intercept Operations 33

Direction Finding Operations 34

Traffic Analysis 36

Monitoring Allied Nets 37

Unit Case Studies 38

3250th Signal Service Company (RI) 38

114th Signal Radio Intelligence Company 40

113th Signal Radio Intelligence Company 41

Observations 42

CHAPTER FOUR—INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 43

Third United States Army 43

3254th Signal Service Company 46

German Intelligence 47

German Codes/Ciphers 53

Observations 55

CHAPTER FIVE—CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS 57

Analysis 57

Conclusions 61

APPENDIX A—3250TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY—RESULTS OF INTERCEPT 64

APPENDIX B—TABLES OF ORGANIZATION—SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANIES 67

ARMY RADIO SECTION, SIGNAL CORPS T/O 232—1918 68

RADIO COMPANY, SIGNAL CORPS T/O 211W—1925 69

RADIO COMPANY, SIGNAL CORPS T/O 211W—1930 70

SIGNAL COMPANY, RADIO INTELLIGENCE T/O 11-77—1939 71

SIGNAL COMPANY, RADIO INTELLIGENCE T/O 11-77—1940 72

SIGNAL COMPANY, RADIO INTELLIGENCE T/O 11-77—1942 73

APPENDIX C—DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT 74

Loop Antenna DF Systems 74

Adcock Antenna DF Systems 75

Accessories 76

APPENDIX D—UNIT CITATION AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION 77

113th Signal Radio Intelligence Battalion [First Army] 77

113th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [First Army] 77

114th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [12th Army Group] 77

116th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [12th Army Group] 77

117th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [Seventh Army] 77

118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [Third Army] 77

121st Signal Radio Intelligence Company [ETOUSA COMMZ?] 77

124th Signal Radar (Radio?) Intelligence Company [ETOUSA COMMZ?] 78

129th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [6th Army Group] 78

135th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [12th Army Group] 78

137th Signal Radio Intelligence Company [Ninth Army] 78

3250th Signal Service Company [V Corps] 78

3251st Signal Service Company [VII Corps] 78

3252nd Signal Service Company [XIX Corps] 79

3253rd Signal Service Company [XV Corps] 79

3254th Signal Service Company [VIII Corps] 79

3255th-Signal Service Company [XII Corps] 79

3256th Signal Service Company [XX Corps] 79

3257th Signal Service Company [XVI Corps] 79

3258th Signal Service Company [XIII Corps] 79

3259th Signal Service Company [III Corps] 79

3260th Signal Service Company [VI Corps] 79

3261st Signal Service Company [XXI Corps] 80

3262nd Signal Service Company [XXII Corps] 80

3263rd Signal Service Company [XXIII Corps] 80

Signal Security Detachment D [12th Army Group] 80

3201st Signal Intelligence Service Detachment [6th Army Group] 80

TACTICAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS—EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 81

APPENDIX E—SEQUENCE OF COLLECTION OPERATIONS 82

APPENDIX F—RADIO INTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT 83

APPENDIX G—GLOSSARY 84

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 85

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 86

PRIMARY SOURCES 86

Unpublished Works—Documents 86

Published Material—Official Records 87

Published Material—Books 88

Published Material—Articles 89

Published Material—Field Manuals 89

SECONDARY SOURCES 90

Unpublished Material—Manuscripts 90

Published Material—Books 91

Published Material—Articles 92

ABSTRACT

This thesis traces the development of American radio intelligence at the operational and tactical levels from its beginnings in World War I through the end of World War II. It shows that signals intelligence is useful to the tactical and operational level commander. The study recommends the Army rethink signal intelligence support to the various echelons, primarily through changes to tables of organization and equipment.

The thesis covers the initial appearance of radio intelligence units on the battlefields of France in the first world war, identifying specific instances where radio intelligence played a role in a command decision. It also looks at training and doctrine in the period between the two world wars. The thesis also covers the organization, doctrine, and training of radio intelligence units as they prepared for combat. It provides a glimpse into the intelligence support provided to the corps, army, and army group commanders during World War II through examination of actual intercept operations. Where possible the study compares and contrasts German radio intelligence units and operations with their American counterparts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to take this opportunity to thank those who assisted me in completing this thesis. Thanks to LTC Connelly and Dr. Lewis for guiding and instructing me in the ways of historical research, and keeping me on track throughout the entire process. Thanks to LTC Sower for reminding me to keep the focus of so what up front as I researched.

I thank COL Dickson Gribble for implanting in a young captain the spark to delve further into a chosen profession. His example inspired me to learn more about the Army and the Military Intelligence branch.

Finally, my deepest thanks to my wife and children, who probably often wondered how this could possibly have been the best year of their lives.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Doctrinal Signal Radio Intelligence Company organization

Figure 2. 3250th Signal Service Company Intercept Results for July 1944

Figure 3. 3250th Signal Service Company Intercept Results for August 1944

Figure 4. 3250th Signal Service Company Intercept Results for January 1945

Figure 5. Tactical Radio Intelligence Units—European Theater of Operations

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION

In late August 1914 the majority of the German Army attacked into Belgium and Northern France. Left to defend the eastern front was General Max von Prittwitz and the German Eighth Army. Two Russian armies, the First under General Pavel K. Rennenkampf and the Second under General Aleksandr Samsonov in the north and south respectively, attacked into German territory. Failing to halt the Russian First Army, General von Prittwitz contemplated evacuating East Prussia, withdrawing across the Vistula River. The Kaiser consequently replaced him with General Paul von Hindenburg.

Von Hindenburg adopted a plan to entrap and destroy Samsonov’s Second Army. Leaving a screen to confront Rennenkampf’s army, von Hindenburg began to concentrate his forces in the south. Five days later he halted, then encircled and destroyed the Second Army near Tannenberg. The Second Army broke and lost nearly 125,000 men and 500 guns from 26 to 31 August. Von Hindenburg then turned his attention to the north, concentrated against the First Army, and drove it out of East Prussia. In this campaign, the Germans lost about 10,000 men while inflicting losses that exceeded 250,000 for the Russians. General von Hindenburg fought a brilliant defensive campaign using aggressive offensive tactics. The United States Army still uses the Battle of Tannenberg as an example of achieving a defensive goal through use of aggressive offensive tactics.{1} The Battle of Tannenberg also illustrates the importance of radio intelligence in operational maneuver. Without prior knowledge of the enemy’s intentions, it is doubtful General von Hindenburg would have been willing to take the risks that he did.{2}

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of radio intelligence at the army, corps, and army group level in World War II. How was radio intelligence used at the operational and tactical levels during World War II? How did American radio intelligence compare to German units and operations? What lessons did we learn, and what is the effect of those lessons on today’s forces?

At every echelon, division, corps, and theater army, there are military intelligence (MI) units with the sole purpose of providing signals intelligence support to the commander. One Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalion directly supports a division; two MI battalions (the Technical Exploitation and the Aerial Exploitation) support a corps; and two MI Battalions (SIGINT) support theater armies worldwide. The roots of these units can be found in the radio intelligence and signal service companies from World War II.

No classified material was used in the thesis. While simplifying research, classification problems arose in an unexpected arena. It appears that few operational records (those with actual intercept logs, message contents, etc.) were saved after the war. Two units, after writing their after action reports, destroyed their operational logs because of security reasons, but also to reduce the amount of baggage to take home. This created a gap in tracing how any intercepted material became intelligence briefed to a commander.

Adding to this gap was the lack of discussion concerning signals intelligence in World War II until the late 1970’s. People directly involved with radio intelligence, whether with ULTRA or at the operational level, kept quiet for over 30 years. In his book, Brigadier General Oscar Koch, Patton’s