The Falaise Pocket. World War II Allied Encirclement Of The German Armies.: Failure Or Success Of The Allied Leadership And Planning?

By Major Braden DeLauder

By Aug. 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early Aug., Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the ‘Ultra’ intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton’s Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar’s First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket.
To the north, Montgomery’s forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton’s Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of Aug., Bradley stopped Patton’s forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army’s movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket.
I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn’t Eisenhower get involved?
The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket’s gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Aug 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781782897927

Major Braden DeLauder

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Text originally published in 2002 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

The Falaise Pocket. World War II Allied Encirclement of the German Armies. Failure or Success of the Allied Leadership and Planning?

by

Major Braden DeLauder, United States Air Force

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Illustrations 7

Preface 8

The General Situation 10

Air Superiority for the Invasion 16

Intro of Pete Quesada 17

Operation COBRA 17

Clearing of Brittany 24

The Turn East 25

Mortain counterattack 25

The Stop Order 28

Sorties in the pocket 29

Analysis 31

The Northern Pincer 38

Bomb line removed from the pocket 40

Conclusion 42

Doctrine, Command Structure, or Commander Personality 43

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 45

Bibliography 46

Primary Sources 46

Secondary Sources 46

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thesis: The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.

Discussion: By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the ‘Ultra’ intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton’s Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar’s First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket.

To the north, Montgomery’s forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton’s Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton’s forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army’s movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket.

I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn’t Eisenhower get involved?

Conclusions: The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket’s gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.

Commander personalities can overcome any obstacle. With the right personality, a poorly organized command structure results in inefficiency that can bog down an operation. While this can be a major hurdle when leading large organizations to push towards a single objective, commander personalities can unite armies to form effective teams towards achieving a common objective. Commander personalities can overcome inefficiencies in a command structure. Additionally, a commander’s personality must demand open communication lines up and down the chain of command. Subordinates must feel the ability to state their case without suffering the backlash of presenting a dissenting opinion. All these traits are even more important when dealing with coalitions due to the fact that national pride can become a large hurdle.

Illustrations

Allied Command Structure (January-August 1944)

Allied Command Structure (Fully Developed)

Basic Plan for France

German Command in the West (January-August 1944)

German Order of Battle in