Why Fight On? The Decision To Close The Kursk Salient

By Lieutenant Colonel Christian Cunningham

The Battle of Kursk in July of 1943 was a pivotal battle in the Russian-German conflict, 1941-1945. After the German attack failed, the Russians responded with a major offensive and gained the strategic initiative. From then on, the German army was only capable of a series of defensive stopping actions in failed attempts to thwart the advancing Red Army. The inevitable outcome was the fall of Berlin in May of 1945. There were a number of options Hitler and the German high command could have chosen in lieu of attack. The decision to choose offensive action becomes even more interesting upon examination of Germany’s strategic situation. Tunisia, the last vestige of the German occupation of North Africa, was lost and Allied offensive action on the European continent was a real and imminent threat. There were also attrition issues, production problems, and differences of opinion between Hitler and key German generals. Finally, the northern and southern shoulders of the Kursk salient, the chosen points of attack, were heavily defended. What compelled Hitler and the German High Command to take such a gamble? What were the strategic issues that guided this decision? Was the outcome decisive? And finally, what other actions might have altered the outcome of the conflict?

• Language: English
• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Release date: Aug 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781782897132

Lieutenant Colonel Christian Cunningham

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Text originally published in 2002 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

NO QUARTER GIVEN: THE CHANGE IN STRATEGIC BOMBING APPLICATION IN THE PACIFIC THEATER DURING WORLD WAR II

By

MAJOR JOHN M. CURATOLA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

LIST OF ACRONYMS 7

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 8

LIST OF TABLE 8

PART I: BEGINNINGS 9

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 9

Doctrinal Foundations 11

Air War-Planning Document-1 16

CHAPTER 2 — BOMBING APPLICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 18

Aiming 19

Overlord Support 22

Attitudes 23

Ancillary Influences 29

Legacy for the Pacific Campaign 31

PART II: APPLICATIONS 34

CHAPTER 3 — NATURE OF TARGET 34

Meteorology 34

Japanese Manufacturing Organization 40

Japanese Urban Construction and Organization 43

Summary 49

CHAPTER 4 — NATURE OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM 51

Design Origins 52

Expediency and Risk of the Design 54

Engineering Problems 55

Operational Implications of the Design 57

Summary 61

CHAPTER 5 — HUMAN NATURE 64

Avoidance of Casualties and Expedience 65

Race and Revenge 70

Arnold’s and LeMay’s Agendas 76

Summary 80

CHAPTER 6 — CONCLUSIONS 81

The Synergy of Factors 82

Theoretical Implications 85

Legacy 87

GLOSSARY 90

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY 94

Published References 94

Unpublished References 95

Periodicals 97

Documents 97

Electronic References 98

ABSTRACT

European airpower theorists of the 1920’s and 30’s envisioned the deliberate bombing of civilians in order to affect an enemy nation’s wartime production capabilities and national morale. However, American proponents of airpower were more exacting in their approach to the use of the airplane. The US Army Air Corps developed the idea of precision bombing as a means to destroy an enemy’s ability to prosecute war through the targeting of only an enemy’s means of production and state infrastructure while avoiding civilian casualties.

World War II provided the US Army Air Force (USAAF) the opportunity to prove the effectiveness of this theory. However, as the war progressed, the USAAF targeted not just centers of production, but political targets as well as civilian populations. Thus, USAAF bombing came to resemble the type of application that was initially proffered by European theorists. Large-scale bombing of cities and populations became the mode of operation for the USAAF in the Pacific. Despite its policies and doctrine, the USAAF deliberately bombed civilian populations in conjunction with the Japanese means of production. Why did this targeting change take place? How did the USAAF eventually come to conduct indiscriminate area bombing of civilians despite the perception that it was contrary to our national mores?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my parents, Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. Carl Curatola USAF (Ret.) who gave me life, love, and the ability to stand on my own two feet. Additionally to my wife Deb, and daughters Jenny and Katie, who provide me with an infinite amount of patience and support to all of my endeavors.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACTS—Air Corps Tactical School

AWPD—Air War Planning Document

CBI—China, Burma, India

CBO—Combined Bombing Offensive

COA—Committee for Operational Analysis

CWS—Chemical Warfare Service

ETO—European Theater of Operations

HE—High Explosive

RAF—Royal Air Force

USSBS—United States Strategic Bombing Survey

USAAF—United States Army Air Force

USSTAF—United States Strategic Air Forces

VE—Victory Europe

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1.—H2X Radar Set

2.—Japanese Winter Weather Pattern

3.—Japanese Summer Weather Pattern

4.—APQ-13 Radar Return of Osaka

5.—M69 Incendiary Bomb

6.—Comparison of B-29 to B-17

7.—B-29 Climb Control Chart

8.—Excerpt from Leatherneck Magazine

9.—20th Air Force Organizational Chart

LIST OF TABLE

1.—Area Destroyed by 20th Air Force

PART I: BEGINNINGS

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

While there have been a number of military aviation developments during the twentieth century, World War II was arguably the single most important event leading up to the formulation and development of contemporary military aviation. Paramount to the aviation events occurring during World War II was America’s strategic bombing campaign against the Axis nations. For three years, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), in conjunction with its British allies, conducted an exhaustive and expansive effort to defeat the Axis nations by strategically bombing their war-making and industrial capacities. This air assault forever changed the way the world viewed airpower and created an entirely new dimension in the execution of war.

While conducting this bombing campaign, the USAAF professed an adherence to a doctrine that was uniquely American--precision daylight bombing. This doctrine was based upon the premise that a sufficiently defended bomber, in daylight, can conduct a precision attack on an enemy’s war-making production and industrial capabilities. This doctrine, which emerged from the U.S. Army’s Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in the 1930s, envisioned that bombers would fight their way to the industrial and administrative centers of the enemy and destroy the means of making war, thereby avoiding a long and bloody campaign aimed at defeating the hostile army.{1}

While this doctrine was the initial premise for the American bombing effort, as the war progressed it became apparent that the USAAF had strayed from its professed doctrine of precision bombing. By the end of the war in 1945, and concluding with the dropping of the atomic bomb, it was obvious that the USAAF had transitioned from high altitude precision bombing to practicing low level area and fire-bombing against entire population centers. This area bombing effort stood in stark contrast to the beliefs of the American men who first developed the idea of precision bombing. Ironically, many of the men who designed the American concept in the 1930s were the same ones who lay waste the German and Japanese cities in the 1940s.

How a nation conducts war is often a reflection of the societal values it holds. America has long been a nation that prides itself on a sense of fair play and moral virtue. However, given America’s military history, this pride may or may not be justified. Regardless of its validity, this professed allegiance to a sense of fair play and morality is a perception most Americans have about their nation and the way in which it prosecutes Despite America’s self-professed moral proclivity, area and fire-bombing civilians eventually became the mode of operation for the American bombing campaign. The shift in American bombing applications originally began in the European theater of operations (ETO) and reached its culmination in the Pacific theater against the Japanese. In the ETO the change in American bombing application appeared to occur gradually and over a considerable period of time. While the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe certainly did conduct area bombing on German populations during the later months of the war, it had initially attempted to execute precision bombing in accordance with prescribed methods. The reasons for this change in bombing application by both the 8th and 15th Air Forces were many and were unique to that theater of operations.

However, the 20th Air Force in the Pacific theater abandoned daylight precision strikes in a much more expedient manner than its European counterparts. American bombing applications in the Pacific theater embraced area and fire-bombing after only four months of subscribing to established USAAF doctrine.

The focus of this study will bear on the Pacific theater. The main questions to be discussed are: Why did this transition in the Pacific bombing campaign take place, and what was the impetus for it? How did the 20th Air Force come to the practice of low- level night-time fire-bombing of Japanese cities when only a few years before the idea of targeting a population was repugnant to American military planners? Why did the USAAF eventually conduct indiscriminate area bombing despite the fact that even Lieutenant General Laurence S. Kuter, Chief of the Air War Plans Division, stated that it was contrary to our national ideals to wage war against civilians?{2}

The answers to these questions are not necessarily only military ones, but ones that speak to American moral, legal, and cultural values. Through a study of the American bombing effort in the Pacific theater during World War II, the reasons for the transition provide insight into not only the military applications of