A Companion to the U.S. Civil War

By Aaron Sheehan-Dean

A Companion to the U.S. Civil War presents a comprehensive historiographical collection of essays covering all major military, political, social, and economic aspects of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

• Represents the most comprehensive coverage available relating to all aspects of the U.S. Civil War
• Features contributions from dozens of experts in Civil War scholarship
• Covers major campaigns and battles, and military and political figures, as well as non-military aspects of the conflict such as gender, emancipation, literature, ethnicity, slavery, and memory

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wiley
• Release date: Feb 5, 2014
• ISBN: 9781118802953

Book preview

Part I

CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES

Chapter One

VIRGINIA 1861

Clayton R. Newell

On April 12, 1861, Confederate artillery in Charleston Harbor fired on the Union garrison at Fort Sumter and opened hostilities in the Civil War. But the first significant land battles occurred further north in Virginia. The war in the Old Dominion in 1861 took place in three phases. In May, Union forces launched an invasion into western Virginia that eventually kept that section of the Old Dominion in the Union as the state of West Virginia; in July, a Confederate army scored a major success against the Union at Bull Run; and in August, Confederate President Jefferson Davis dispatched Robert E. Lee to western Virginia in what turned out to be a failed attempt to regain control of that part of the state. Of the three, Bull Run or Manassas is well remembered as a Confederate victory that sent Union forces hightailing it into Washington. However, unlike the events in western Virginia that led to the formation of a new state in the Union, the battle outside Washington had no long-lasting consequences. In 1965, Richard O. Curry in his book A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West Virginia noted that The strategic importance of Northwestern Virginia to the Northern cause, however, has not been appreciated by most students of the Civil War (1964: 65).

Curry was not the first to examine the political events that led to the state of West Virginia. The earliest book-length studies of the formation of West Virginia were by Granville D. Hall. In 1901, he published The Rending of Virginia, a study of the political events that led to statehood. He followed that with Lee’s Invasion of Northwest Virginia in 1911 which focused on some of Lee’s military actions in the western counties. In 1963, George E. Moore published A Banner in the Hills: West Virginia’s Statehood, which, as its title implies, explains how West Virginia became a state. More recently there have been two more books on the subject, each of which integrated the military and political activities that formed the foundation for creating West Virginia. In 1996, I wrote Lee vs. McClellan: The First Campaign in which I tried to show how the various battles in western Virginia provided the opportunity for pro-Union activists to take the political actions necessary to form the new state. W. Hunter Lesser’s Rebels at the Gate: Lee and McClellan on the Front line of a Nation Divided, published in 2004, provides additional details on the military actions and carries the story well past 1861.

Although there are relatively few books that focus on western Virginia, there are a wide variety of sources for the Civil War in Virginia in 1861. The first great Confederate victory of the war at Bull Run or Manassas has been widely studied to the extent that it has all but pushed the Union successes in western Virginia out of sight. The two most recent books on western Virginia, Lee vs. McClellan and Rebels at the Gate both combine the military events with the political activities that cemented the Union’s hold on one-third of Virginia in the first few months of the war. That made the military leaders on both sides instrumental in the results of the campaign. This essay therefore focuses on the two men most responsible for planning and conducting the campaigns in western Virginia: Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan. This approach offers wider opportunities for examining what happened in western Virginia and why.

Lee and McClellan had many things in common. Both men were graduates of the Military Academy at West Point where they graduated second in their respective classes and were commissioned into the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War they observed first-hand the battle at Cerro Gordo where Winfield Scott won a decisive victory by avoiding a frontal attack on a fortified position. It made a lasting impression on both men. When the army added two cavalry regiments in 1855, both men received promotions: Lee to lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry, McClellan to captain in the 1st Cavalry. Here their careers took different courses. McClellan left the army in 1857 to pursue a railroad career while Lee stayed in the army. Their military careers intersected again on April 23 when Virginia Governor John Letcher appointed Lee to command the Virginia militia, and Ohio Governor William Dennison appointed McClellan to command that state’s militia.

They did not face each other on the battlefield in 1861, but their respective preparations charted the course of the campaigns in western Virginia. What they did later in the war has had a significant effect on how historians have rated their efforts in western Virginia. Because Lee became an icon of the Confederate cause after the war, his failures have been largely overlooked or explained away. However, McClellan’s accomplishments in western Virginia have been largely overshadowed by historians, who, with the benefit of hindsight, use his shortcomings as indications of his future failures in the war.

Both men enjoyed very high reputations at the outset of the war. Although he had left the army to pursue a civilian career, McClellan was considered one of the most knowledgeable military men in the north. In his article War Preparations in the North written after the war, Jacob D. Cox, McClellan’s second-in-command in Ohio, explained that: McClellan’s report on the Crimean war was one of the few important memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army (Cox [1887] 1956: 90). McClellan’s biographer Stephen Sears, author of George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, written a hundred years after Cox’s observation, agreed that McClellan’s reputation put him in high demand. The variety of his assignments, particularly his year of observation of Europe’s armies, had ranked him as one of the military intellectuals of the prewar army (1988: 66). In addition to his reputation as a knowledgeable student of war, McClellan appealed to the troops he commanded. A newspaper correspondent reported in 1861 that he is personally extremely popular, army officers and men and everybody seem to have entire faith in him (New York Gazette, June 19, 1861). Sears wrote that He made it a point to be seen often by the men, and on horseback he was an impressive martial figure (1988: 71).

For his part, Lee, who had resigned from the U.S. Army after Scott offered him a position of high command, had the confidence of Confederate president Jefferson Davis and the citizens of Virginia. In his monumental biography of Robert E. Lee, R.E. Lee, Douglas Southall Freeman noted that As soon as the news of Lee’s appointment and acceptance reached the larger public, it aroused high enthusiasm and evoked much praise (1934: 468). Writing sixty years later, Emory M. Thomas, in Robert E. Lee: A Biography, also mentioned Lee’s popularity with the public. On the evening he arrived in Richmond and accepted . . . command, a large crowd of local citizens gathered before the Spottswood House to cheer him. Thomas went on to describe Lee’s military presence: Lee certainly looked like a soldier, and that was important at this stage. He acted like a soldier too; after all, he began learning how soldiers act at West Point almost thirty years ago (1995: 192–193). Although both men enjoyed wide popular support in their respective parts of the country and had proper military bearing, neither had held high command nor had they commanded troops in combat. They would get their first tests in western Virginia.

Shortly after taking command in Ohio McClellan proposed a strategic plan to lead 80,000 men through the Kanawha Valley in western Virginia and then on to Richmond to bring the war to an early end. Sears gives him credit being one of the first strategic planners in the war. McClellan’s plan is noteworthy for being the first recorded attempt at overall strategy for prosecuting the war. In light of his reputation in the old army as a first-rate intellectual, however, it was surprisingly impractical on the face of it, as General Scott [commanding general of the Union Army] was quick to point out (1988: 75). Although he rejected McClellan’s plan, shortly thereafter Scott put forth his own idea for winning the war which became known as the Anaconda Plan. In spite of ignoring his strategic plan, when the War Department organized the Department of the Ohio in May, McClellan received command with the rank of major general in the U.S. Army. The new department included the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois along with the western part of Virginia, which gave him wide-ranging authority over a wide area along with the forces included therein. Even though President Abraham Lincoln forbade any invasion of western Virginia until the state’s secession referendum on May 23, McClellan prepared to take the war to the Confederacy by launching an offensive into Virginia.

McClellan planned to move into Virginia along two routes, one in the north, the other in the south, to secure the region for the Union and create a climate that would provide pro-Union political forces in the area with the opportunity to gain control of the population. He planned to first occupy Grafton in the north followed by Gauley Bridge in the south. Grafton was the junction for the railroads that connected Wheeling and Parkersburg with the eastern part of the state. It was also located on the Northwestern Turnpike near a good secondary road that ran south to join the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike. Gauley Bridge was on the James River and Kanawha Turnpike near the confluence of the New and Gauley rivers where they formed the Kanawha River. An important secondary road ran north from Gauley Bridge that intersected with the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike. Control of these two transportation hubs meant control of western Virginia. McClellan explained his rationale to President Lincoln in a letter on May 30, 1861: By occupying Grafton & Gauley Bridge we hold the passes thro’ the mountains between Eastern and Western Va. . . . By that means I hope to secure Western Virginia to the Union (Sears 1989: 29). McClellan gave his views on the campaign in western Virginia in a report with the lengthy title of Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac: To Which Is Added an Account of the Campaign in Western Virginia ([1864] 1979). The report is a detailed and straightforward account of how he conducted the campaign in western Virginia. It includes his proclamations to the civilian population and the addresses gave to his soldiers which illustrate McClellan’s understanding of the relationship between strategy and politics.

Meanwhile, back in Richmond, Lee was preparing for the defense of Virginia. Walter H. Taylor, his aide through four years of war, recalled in his memoir Four Years with General Lee: Being a Summary of the More Important Events Touching the Career of General Robert E. Lee, in the War Between the States that Under the direction of General Lee . . . the Virginia volunteers were in a wonderfully short time organized, armed, equipped, and sent to the front . . . thoroughly organized and ready for work (Taylor 1877: 13). Unlike McClellan and practically everyone else in the North, however, Lee apparently did not expect a quick end to the war. Taylor claimed that While the politicians, and indeed, the vast majority of the people, anticipated but a very short and decisive struggle, General Lee took a different view, and stands alone . . . as having expressed his most serious apprehensions of a prolonged and bloody war (1877: 11).

Lee had to consider four potential routes for a Union invasion into Virginia and occupation of the state capital, Richmond. The shortest led from Washington to Richmond, a distance of only about a hundred miles. There were two other avenues that allowed Union troops to occupy the state and threaten the capital. One led from western Maryland into the lower Shenandoah Valley and then through the passes of the Blue Ridge mountains; the other led from Hampton Roads up the peninsula between the James and York rivers. Loss of the lower Shenandoah would also deprive Virginia of the food produced there and offer a base of operations for a movement against the capital from the west. Union control of the peninsula and the two rivers would expose Richmond to attack from the east. A fourth, longer and more difficult route ran from the Ohio River, the state’s western boundary with Ohio, across the mountainous terrain of western Virginia and into the Shenandoah Valley.

Lee organized the defense of the Old Dominion along the three avenues he deemed the most likely. As Steven E. Woodward explained it in Davis and Lee at War, He had troops raised, trained, equipped, and stationed at such key points as Norfolk, Manassas Junction – guarding the direct overland rail route from Washington to Richmond – and Harpers Ferry, at the lower (northern) end of the strategic Shenandoah Valley, just across the Potomac River from Maryland (1995: 16). Former U.S. Army officers Joseph E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard commanded the Confederate forces at Harper’s Ferry and in northern Virginia respectively, while John B. Magruder commanded the forces east of Richmond between the James and York rivers.

In the western part of the state, however, Lee left the defense to local forces in the mistaken belief that they held the same loyalty to the Old Dominion that he did. In Lee vs. McClellan I suggested that in making his assumption that local forces would be willing and able to defend the ­western counties, Lee did not understand the great differences that existed in the Old Dominion between him, holder of a great eastern Virginia name, and the residents of the northwest (Newell 1996: 50). In my view his privileged Tidewater upbringing as a member of one of Virginia’s first ­families left him uninformed about the more democratic view of life in the west where accomplishments held more value than a great name. Many of the people in western Virginia were not ready to fight for a state government centered far away in Richmond that they regarded as not particularly interested in them. When stories of disaffection in the west reached Richmond they were largely discounted by state government officials, including Lee, because the threat of a Union invasion did not seem imminent there. As Freeman rather ponderously concluded in 1934, In the larger view of strategy, the disposition of the forces, as mobilized, was sound otherwise than as respected western Virginia. He goes on to say that one turns the pages of the correspondence regarding western Virginia with the feeling that the import of the loss of that section was not foreseen, or else that Lee yielded more readily than was his habit to obstacles which were bad enough yet scarcely more serious than others his energy and ­strategic sense elsewhere overcame (1934: 522–523). Clearly it was ­difficult for Freeman to offer any criticism of Lee. By disregarding the early signs of discontent in the western part of the state and choosing not to appoint a proven military commander to oversee the preparations for defense, Lee had sown the seeds of future failure.

The Virginia referendum on secession was held on May 23. Although the residents of the state voted overwhelmingly to leave the Union, in the western counties the results were mixed. As Curry reported in A House Divided, The Rebel minority ran as high as 40 per cent in some Union counties; but the reverse was also true. Therefore, a 60–40 split favorable to Unionists appears to be accurate in gauging the loyalties of inhabitants included in this State (1964: 53). The day after the referendum Scott sent McClellan a telegram informing him that Confederate troops were occupying Grafton and asking him to counteract the action. McClellan understood the political implications of his advance into western Virginia and issued a proclamation to explain that Union forces were there to support the loyal citizens who wanted to remain part of the Union. In so doing McClellan connected political goals with military action. Sears noted in The Young Napoleon that the proclamation served notice that here was a general who saw in army command something more than simply obeying orders and dealing in purely military matters (1988: 80).

On May 27, the vanguard of McClellan’s invasion force began moving toward Grafton. Three days later the strategic railway was in Union hands. Moving south from Grafton, on June 3, a Union attack at Philippi surprised the Confederate defenders, who quickly withdrew. The affair at Philippi, sometimes billed as the first land battle of the Civil War, can hardly be called a battle. Neither side fired more than a few shots, and while the Confederate troops were indeed surprised, the retreat was not a spontaneous reaction to the Union attack, since they had previously planned to evacuate the town. Nevertheless, it was billed by the press in both North and South as a Union victory. At this early stage of the war, the public was hungry for news of any military action.

In May, when the governor of Virginia turned command of the militia over to the Confederacy and President Jefferson Davis arrived in Richmond, Lee’s situation changed. He no longer had troops to command, although Davis did make Lee a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. Davis expressed his confidence in Lee and, as Woodward describes in Davis and Lee at War, the president and Lee exercised a sort of co-leadership in Virginia, Davis directing the areas that most interested him and Lee taking the remainder (1995: 24). As it turned out, Lee focused on the coastal area of Virginia while Davis dealt with Manassas; Both men would take part in overseeing Confederate efforts in West Virginia (Woodward 1995: 30–31). The informal arrangement further divided Confederate command in western Virginia.

The military debacle in Philippi prompted action in Richmond where it was becoming more apparent that residents of western Virginia were not going to rise up and oppose the Union occupation as Lee had hoped. Reinforcements and strong leadership would be needed if there was to be any hope of Virginia holding on to its western counties. To provide the necessary leadership Lee directed his adjutant, Robert S. Garnett, a former U.S. Army officer, to go west with the mission of holding the passes through the Allegheny Mountains into the Shenandoah Valley. However, unlike McClellan, who had command of all the Union forces in western Virginia as well as Ohio and Indiana, Garnett was but one of several Confederate commanders in the region.

Davis, without consulting Lee, commissioned John B. Floyd, a former Secretary of War, a brigadier general in the Confederate Army, and authorized him to raise a brigade of riflemen to conduct independent operations in the Kanawha Valley. At about the same time Lee sent Garnett to western Virginia, Davis, again without consulting Lee, made Henry Wise, a former governor of Virginia, a brigadier general with the mission of raising a legion of men to conduct operations in the Kanawha Valley. With Floyd, Wise’s one-time political rival, already in the valley, Davis had unwittingly created a situation that would lead to a spectacular personal feud between the two men. Floyd and Wise, neither of whom had any military experience, were both capable of strong leadership. Their independent commands had the potential to bolster the sagging Confederate defenses if they could work together and coordinate their efforts. Unfortunately, they were not the least bit interested in cooperating with one another or anyone else for that matter.

Garnett planned to block the Union advance toward the Shenandoah Valley by establishing defensive positions on the western edge of the Allegheny Mountains, one at Laurel Hill and one at Rich Mountain. The two positions effectively blocked the routes through the mountains, but they were nine miles apart and incapable of providing mutual support. While Garnett prepared his defenses, McClellan assumed personal ­command of the campaign in western Virginia. On July 2, he ordered Jacob D. Cox to organize a brigade and move into Virginia to counter Wise’s advance in the Kanawha Valley. At the same time, he prepared to attack Rich Mountain. Recalling Scott’s victory at Cerro Gordo, McClellan wanted to avoid a frontal assault at Rich Mountain, so he organized his forces into two brigades. William S. Rosecrans led one brigade around the Confederate left flank, while the second one moved into position in front of the Confederate defenses. The sound of gunfire was the signal for McClellan to order his second brigade forward, but McClellan convinced himself that Rosecrans had been defeated and withdrew his forces even as Rosecrans consolidated his position on Rich Mountain. When Garnett, waiting at Laurel Hill, learned of the defeat he ordered a withdrawal. Union troops pursued and caught up to the Confederates at Corrick’s Ford on July 13, where there was a brief skirmish that left Garnett dead.

When the news of Rich Mountain and Garnett’s death reached Richmond, Lee moved to repair the damage. He sent orders for Floyd to go into the Kanawha Valley to join forces with Wise who was retreating in the face of Cox’s advance. Lee also dispatched Brig. Gen. William W. Loring, a former U.S. Army officer and veteran of the Mexican War, to organize a proper defense, hold the mountain passes into the Shenandoah Valley, protect the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton, and prepare to conduct an offensive to regain the ground lost to McClellan. The Confederacy now had three brigadier generals in western Virginia, none of whom were in charge.

After Rich Mountain, McClellan turned his attention to Cox and the Kanawha Valley. Unlike the northwestern part of the state, the residents of the Kanawha Valley maintained close ties to the Shenandoah Valley. The James River and Kanawha Turnpike provided an economic link with the rest of Virginia, and the people living in the area had mixed feelings about the war. In response to McClellan’s orders, Cox began moving into the valley on July 6. In the meantime, Floyd and Wise were taking two different approaches to defending the Kanawha Valley. Floyd planned to organize his brigade in the Shenandoah Valley and then lead it into the Kanawha Valley to repel a Union invasion. Wise sought to raise a partisan force from pro-Confederate residents to defend the valley.

The news of McClellan’s victory at Rich Mountain quickly made national headlines across the north, but the battle was soon overshadowed by a Union disaster outside Washington. As part of the defense of Virginia a Confederate army of about 23,000 men commanded by P.G.T. Beauregard assembled outside Washington by early July. At the same time, two other smaller Confederate armies deployed on the two other areas that Lee had earlier identified as possible invasion routes into Virginia: 5,000 on the peninsula east of Richmond and 11,000 in the Shenandoah Valley under Joseph E. Johnston.

As the Confederate forces assembled in front of Washington, a Union army of some 35,000 troops under the command of Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell, encouraged by popular opinion, prepared to begin an advance into Virginia. On July 16 the green Union army began to ponderously move. Two days later it reached Centreville, twenty-two miles from its start point and six miles from Manassas Junction and Beauregard’s smaller army. When he reached Centreville, McDowell learned that the road network in the area would not support his plan of attack, so he spent the next two days pondering what to do. The two days proved fatal. McDowell’s army outnumbered Beauregard’s at the outset of the march, but the delay gave Johnston the opportunity to move his troops from Winchester to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas Junction, depriving McDowell of any numerical advantage.

Both sides stepped off to battle in the early morning hours of Sunday, July 21, each side planning to attack the other’s left flank. For much of the day the two sides attacked and counterattacked with neither gaining a decisive advantage. During the afternoon, Confederate pressure increased on the Federal right, and late in the afternoon the green Union troops began to give way. As more troops moved back to Washington, McDowell ordered a general withdrawal, which turned into headlong rush to the rear by the green Union troops. Only a rearguard action by a small regular army contingent kept the Confederates out of Washington. By any reckoning, McDowell’s army had been whipped in the war’s first big battle. In his 1887 article McDowell’s Advance to Bull Run, James B. Fry assessed the results: The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three-month men went home, and the three-months chapter of the war ended – with the South triumphant and confident; the North disappointed but determined (Fry [1887] 1956: 193).

Although most historians generally agree with Fry that Bull Run was a decided Confederate victory, there was some criticism of Beauregard for not pursuing the Union troops into Washington. Lee’s biographer, Freeman, wrote that Lack of transportation was one of the chief reasons the Confederates did not pursue the Federals after the first victory at Manassas (1934: 500). Beauregard himself, writing after the war, complained that The military result of the victory was far short of what it should have been. He went on to complain that a false alarm checked the pursuit before it could achieve the true immediate fruits of victory . . . the dispersion of all the Federal forces south of Baltimore and east of the Alleghenies (Beauregard [1887] 1956: 219). Johnston, on the other hand, believed that The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantry and artillery can be (Johnston [1887] 1956: 250). Beauregard and Johnston offered their respective views on the battle in lengthy articles published in From Sumter to Shiloh: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume I.

In his study of the relations between Davis and Lee, Steven Woodward describes a meeting at the end of the battle in which Davis proposed an immediate pursuit of the retreating Union army but was convinced by his generals that nothing more could be done, and the result was that Davis told Beauregard to issue an order for a modified pursuit in the morning, consoling himself with the reflection that by now it was so late that delay until morning was really not so much of a delay after all (Woodward 1995: 44). However, in his 1986 study of the battle, Glenn Robertson concluded: By no stretch of the imagination could the exhausted Confederates have pushed aside the remaining Federal units in the darkness and marched across the Potomac into Washington. If the losers of the battle were only too human, then so were the victors. Green troops, no matter how elated, could do only so much (1986: 103).

The results of the battle elated the South and dismayed the North. Confederate generals were hailed as heroes; Union generals were disgraced. Russell Weigley summed it up in his history of the Civil War: The Confederacy took from Manassas a legend of Southern prowess in war. The Union took from Bull Run the humiliation of defeat but also a renewed determination that the war must be won so that the stain on the record of Federal arms would not be permanent (2000: 63). But the triumph at Manassas did not erase the series of Confederate military setbacks in western Virginia, where the command structure remained fragmented among inexperienced generals. For the North, the defeat meant the war would not end quickly. There have been many books and articles written on the First Battle of Bull Run. Two in particular offer comprehensive coverage of the battle and its results. In Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War, a book generally considered the first major work about the battle, William C. Davis provides a balanced narrative that discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the leaders on both sides. He concludes that while the battle was clearly a Confederate victory, it gave most people in the Union a renewed sense of purpose. National pride and honor had to be avenged (1977: 255). A more recent book, Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861 (2004), by David Detzer, also offers an unbiased account of the battle, with details from the men who did the fighting. He examines why events unfolded as they did and discusses the political implications of the results on both sides.

In the gloom of defeat at Bull Run there shone a small, bright light of military success in the mountains of western Virginia, where McClellan had proclaimed a great victory at Rich Mountain. On July 22 McClellan received a telegram instructing him to report to the War Department.

Historians have generally assessed McClellan’s performance in western Virginia not on what he accomplished there, but on what he failed to do after taking command of the Army of the Potomac. In a 1944 article in West Virginia History, Joseph W. Thomas wrote that McClellan in western Virginia showed the weaknesses that later wrecked his career. Had the War Department and High Command followed events here more closely, they might not have had such high hopes for him (1944: 308). In Banner in the Hills, Moore concluded that

As commander of the Department of the Ohio McClellan early displayed those traits which later hampered his success as General of the Union Armies. He concerned himself with matters far beyond his jurisdiction, went over the head of his immediate superior, corresponded directly with cabinet officers, bewailed the lack of men and equipment, and denounced his subordinates for alleged incapacity. (1963: 69)

In a 1993 article Warren Wilkinson damned McClellan with faint praise: With such decisive – but greatly exaggerated – victories in quick succession, George McClellan became a national hero in the North and was called to Washington to assume greater responsibilities (1993: 1704). McClellan’s biographer, Stephen W. Sears, was a bit more positive, writing: The campaign also revealed in McClellan a penchant for aggrandizement. He then went on to say, Just then no one cared about such conceits, for overnight he had become the North’s first battlefield hero. Detaching strategically important western Virginia from the Confederacy was recognized as a major achievement (1988: 92–93). Some years later, in his essay Lincoln and McClellan Sears addressed the issue of judging McClellan’s success in western Virginia. McClellan’s advancement from head of the Department of the Ohio to Head of the Department of the Potomac at Washington, following the First Manassas debacle, can be criticized only with the benefit of hindsight. McClellan outranked, and had clearly outshone, McDowell and lieutenants in the eastern army (1994: 10). For his part, in his 1887 autobiography, McClellan’s Own Story, McClellan somewhat uncharacte­ristically wrote that It would probably have been better for me personally had my promotion been delayed a year or more (1887: 56).

In accordance with Lee’s instructions issued before Bull Run, Loring and a small staff departed Richmond the day after the battle to take command of the Confederate forces in northwestern Virginia. Although the Confederates had a tough, experienced commander in Loring, command of Southern forces west of the Shenandoah Valley remained fragmented. Loring commanded only the troops holding the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike. Wise and Floyd continued to operate independently of Loring and each other. By the time Loring arrived, McClellan had passed ­command to Rosecrans, but the Union plan remained the same: keep western Virginia in Union hands. However, the situation facing Rosecrans had changed.

There was turbulence in the Union order of battle as several regiments which had enlisted for only three months went home and were replaced by three-year units. At about the same time Rosecrans also received word from both Scott and McClellan that Lee was on his way to western Virginia with reinforcements. In the words of William Lamers, in his biography of Rosecrans, Threat of Lee’s invasion set Western Virginia nerves aquiver (Lamers 1961: 41). Rosecrans feared the beginning of a Confederate offensive to retake western Virginia. He erroneously believed that the various Confederate armies facing him were acting in concert, and considered pulling Cox out of the Kanawha Valley. But Wise was withdrawing his legion and Cox believed that he would not return, so Rosecrans directed Cox to go on the defensive in the Kanawha Valley. At the same time, Rosecrans established a strong position on Cheat Mountain to prevent Confederate forces from moving from the Shenandoah Valley. The move to take up defensive positions ended the Union threat to occupy the Shenandoah Valley.

Lee, now a brigadier general in the Confederate Army, had been given no direct authority over the other three brigadier generals already conducting operations in western Virginia, Floyd, Wise, and Loring; he was simply supposed to inspect and consult them on their plans. Floyd and Wise were political appointments with no military experience. Loring had considerable military experience and had seen more combat than Lee. None of the three were about to surrender any of their authority. Unless Lee could convince them to cooperate in planning and executing the hoped-for Confederate offensive against the Union troops in western Virginia it would remain a divided effort, just as it had been during the ineffectual defense of the area.

Although Lee’s departure for western Virginia had attracted considerable attention from Union commanders, it was little noticed in the South. Beauregard and Johnston, victors at Manassas, had the public eye. Lee headed west with no fanfare, no staff, and an uncertain mission. His biographers point out the ambiguity in the instructions he received from Davis. Freeman writes that His mission was to co-ordinate rather than to command – not to direct operations in person but to see if rivalries could not be suppressed and united effort against the enemy assured (1934: 541). Woodward’s assessment is that Davis had sent Lee over the mountains with uncertain authority and an ill-defined mission (1995: 59).

Lee arrived at Loring’s headquarters in Huntersville in early August, where he received a less than enthusiastic welcome. When faced with the confrontational Loring, Lee, who preferred to seek harmony and suggest options, tried to temper the situation by simply confirming that Loring was in command and then stepping out of the picture. Meanwhile Floyd and Wise continued their feud. Floyd, the senior officer of the two men by virtue of receiving his commission as a brigadier general less than two weeks before Wise, assumed command of all Confederate forces operating in and near the Kanawha Valley, including Wise’s legion. But Wise consistently ignored Floyd’s orders, and their rivalry resulted in both men abandoning the Kanawha Valley. Davis could do nothing about the situation from Richmond. His only hope was that Lee could reconcile the differences between them.

Lee wanted to quickly take the offensive by pushing the Union forces off Cheat Mountain and assuming control of the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike. But Loring appeared to be in no hurry and Lee was reluctant to push him. He therefore turned his attention from the unpleasantness with Loring and opened his own headquarters, from which he focused on scouting and reconnoitering the area around Cheat Mountain. In so doing, however, he did nothing to get Loring moving or settle the dispute between Floyd and Wise. Lee fell back on his experience in the Mexican War, when he had found a route around the Mexican army at Cerro Gordo that led to a successful flanking attack by the American army. On August 31, things improved a bit when Lee became a one of five full generals in the Confederate Army thus making him clearly senior to Loring, who became much more amenable to Lee’s suggestions.

Lee finally found a route around the Union position on Cheat Mountain, and a local surveyor found a second trail that led to a position overlooking the Union defenses on the mountain. The Union troops held two positions, but they were not mutually supporting. Lee had about 15,000 Confederate soldiers in the vicinity of Cheat Mountain in two different locations. He opted to attack and developed an extraordinarily complex plan that would have to be executed by commanders and troops new to the chaos of battle. He organized his forces into six brigades that would move in five separate columns from two different locations to conduct a surprise attack against two different Union positions of unknown size.

Lee’s plan would have been a challenge even to experienced leaders and he had virtually none of those. To complicate matters he had agreed to a request from an untested regimental commander, Albert Rust, to lead the forces slated to turn the Union flank at Cheat Mountain. His brigade was to surprise the Union troops, and sound of gunfire would be the signal for the other brigades to launch their assaults. The plan resembled McClellan’s at Rich Mountain, but Lee had Rust while McClellan was blessed with Rosecrans. It made a significant difference.

In what was nothing short of a miraculous performance by the brigade commanders, all five columns were in position before daybreak with no sign that they had been detected. Everyone waited for the sound of Rust’s attack. However, several captured Union pickets had convinced Rust their positions were too strong for his force, so he withdrew with no further action. As the morning wore on with no sound of gunfire from Cheat Mountain, Lee finally ordered an attack on the Elkwater position, but the tired, wet Confederates failed to accomplish anything. With that, Lee’s first battle as a commander was over before it had even started.

There has been a long tradition of excusing Lee for the failed attack. In his Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, Long concluded that Cheat Mountain was not Lee’s fault. The failure of this well-devised operation was due to one of those errors of judgment to which all warlike movements are liable, and through which many a neatly-laid scheme has come to naught (1886: 124). Writing for Blue & Gray Magazine about a hundred years later, Martin K. Fleming echoed Long: The Cheat Mountain attacks failed due to mud, rain, sickness, hunger, and bungling by subordinates (1993: 124). Blaming the failure on Cheat Mountain on weather, failure of subordinates, or ill-defined errors of judgment is insufficient. My assessment of Lee’s first battle in Lee vs. McClellan is that he must bear the lion’s share of the responsibility for the failure.

Lee’s performance at Cheat Mountain must be faulted on several counts. His first failure was his reluctance to push Loring into action in early August. When Lee finally brought the Confederate forces to battle, his inexperienced subordinates managed to execute the most difficult part of his elaborate plan. But Lee erred grievously in allowing Rust to lead the most critical part of the attack. (Newell 1996: 232)

At the time of the Cheat Mountain attack, Lee had been in western Virginia for about six weeks and had nothing to show for his efforts. The Confederates held no more ground than when he arrived. During the same time, Rosecrans had consolidated his defenses in the Alleghenies and opened lines of communication between the two Union columns holding the region. At the end of October, Lee returned to Richmond with little to show for his efforts. Although McClellan was long gone when Lee arrived in western Virginia, it was his plan that led to Union control of the area. It was a decisive victory that led to the formation of the state of West Virginian in 1863.

In sharp contrast to the accolades Lee received in April when taking command of the Virginia militia, the popular press was quick to criticize his efforts in western Virginia. Long, a firm supporter of Lee, expressed his views in his 1886 Memoirs: The campaign had been pronounced a failure. The press and the public were clamorous against him. No one stopped to inquire the cause or examine into the difficulties that surrounded him. Upon him alone were heaped the impracticability of mountains, the hostility of the elements, and the want of harmony of subordinate commanders (Long 1886: 130). Freeman’s view in 1934 was that in spite of the overall failure of the campaign, The contemporary criticism of the campaign was more general. It was that Lee was too much of a theorist and that he had been overcautious (1934: 576). Lee biographers have offered a variety of reasons for the failure in western Virginia. Taylor, in his 1877 book, wrote that Judged from its results, it must be confessed that this series of operations was a failure. He then went on to explain that it was not really Lee’s fault:

Disaster had befallen the Confederate arms, and the worst had been accomplished, before he [Lee] reached the theatre of operations; the Alleghenies then constituted the dividing line between the hostile forces, and in this network of mountains, sterile and rendered absolutely impracticable by a prolonged season of rain, Nature had provided an insurmountable barrier to operations in the transmountain country. (Taylor 1877: 35)

As the war in Virginia came to an end in 1861 Lee was at the nadir of his Civil War career, but he would make a splendid recovery. So much so that his legions of supporters would stress that losing a third of the Old Dominion was not really his fault. McClellan, on the other hand, was at his Civil War high point, enjoying great popularity and commanding the Union Army. However, as Lee’s status went up in 1862, McClellan’s went down. After he was dismissed and sent home, his detractors ignored his triumphs in western Virginia and with hindsight focused on his faults.

Setting aside the careers of two of the war’s best known generals, the Union victory has had one of the longest lasting legacies of the Civil War. George E. Moore summed it up in Banner in the Hills: Of greater importance in the long run were the success of the Restored Government and the admission of West Virginia as a state, both of which were results of the Union victory. . . . The southern defeat was final as well as decisive, for try as they might, the Confederates were never again able to do more than stage sporadic raids into the northwestern region (1963: 98).

REFERENCES

Beauregard, P.G.T. [1887] 1956. The First Battle of Bull Run. In From Sumter to Shiloh: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume I, reprint. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.

Cox, Jacob D. [1887] 1956. War Preparations in the North. In From Sumter to Shiloh: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume I, reprint. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.

Curry, Richard Orr. 1964. A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West Virginia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Davis, William C. 1977. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Detzer, David. 2004. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Fleming, Martin K. 1993. The Northwestern Virginia Campaign of 1861, Blue & Gray Magazine, 10: 10–17, 48–65.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. 1934. R.E. Lee: A Biography, vol. 1. New York: Scribner’s.

Fry, James B. [1887] 1956. McDowell’s Advance to Bull Run. In From Sumter to Shiloh: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume I, reprint. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.

Hall, Granville Davisson. 1911. Lee’s Invasion of Northwest Virginia in 1861. Chicago: Mayer & Miller.

Johnston, Joseph E. [1887] 1956. Responsibilities of the First Bull Run. In From Sumter to Shiloh: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume I, reprint. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.

Lamers, William M. 1961. The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Lesser, W. Hunter. 2004. Rebels at the Gate: Lee and McClellan on the Front Line of a Nation Divided. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks.

Long, A.L. 1886. Memoirs of Robert E. Lee: His Military and Personal History Embracing a Large Amount of Information Hitherto Unpublished. New York: J.M. Stoddart.

McClellan, George B. 1887. McClellan’s Own Story: The War for the Union, the Soldiers Who Fought It and His Relations to It and Them. New York: Charles Webster.

McClellan, George B. [1864] 1979. Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac: To Which Is Added an Account of the Campaign in Western Virginia. Reprint. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press.

Moore, George Ellis. 1963. A Banner in the Hills: West Virginia’s Statehood. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Newell, Clayton R. 1996. Lee vs. McClellan: The First Campaign. Washington DC: Regnery.

Robertson, W. Glenn. 1986. First Bull Run, 19 July 1861. In America’s First Battles: 1776–1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (81–108). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Sears, Stephen W. 1988. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Ticknor & Fields.

Sears, Stephen W., ed. 1989. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860–1865. New York: Ticknor & Fields.

Sears, Stephen W. 1994. Lincoln and McClellan. In Lincoln’s Generals, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (1–50). New York: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Walter H. 1877. Four Years with General Lee: Being a Summary of the More Important Events Touching the Career of General Robert E. Lee, in the War between the States. New York: D. Appleton.

Thomas, Emory M. 1995. Robert E. Lee: A Biography. New York: Norton.

Thomas, Joseph W. 1944. Campaigns of Generals McClellan and Rosecrans in Western Virginia, 1861–1862, West Virginia History, 5: 245–308.

Weigley, Russell F. 2000. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861–1865. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wilkinson, Warren. 1993. West Virginia Operations, Operations of 1861. In Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, vol. 1, ed. Richard N. Current (1703–1704). New York: Simon & Schuster.

Woodward, Steven E. 1995. Davis and Lee at War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Chapter Two

MISSOURI

Jeffrey Patrick

In 1909, Union Army veteran Frederick Henry Dyer published his classic reference work, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. In his massive opus of nearly 1,800 pages, Dyer meticulously calculated the number of battles, engagements, actions, skirmishes, affairs, and other military events that took place in each state during the Civil War. He estimated that Missouri ranked third in the number of such events (1,162), a figure only exceeded by the totals in Virginia and Tennessee. Yet despite the impressive amount of military activity in the state, the appalling loss of life that took place within its borders, and the fact that tens of thousands of troops from both sides saw service in Missouri, the Show Me State has, until recently, received relatively little attention from Civil War students and scholars.

General Histories

Missouri was the scene of almost unimaginable suffering during the Civil War, with traditional set-piece battles, large cavalry raids, and brutal small-scale guerrilla skirmishes. In addition, the war profoundly affected the civilian population, with banishment, imprisonment, harassment, loss of property, and murders a common occurrence. A surprisingly diverse array of organizations served within its borders and influenced these events, including regular Union and Confederate volunteers, partisans, assorted varieties of state militias, home guards, and African-American and­ Native-American units. Although each aspect of Missouri’s Civil War story has been examined by scholars, the sheer magnitude of the fighting has deterred all but a few historians from producing a single-volume, comprehensive history of the state during the war.

A good introduction to the war in the region is The Civil War on the Border (1890), written by Wiley Britton, a veteran of the 6th Kansas Cavalry. Britton’s two-volume narrative of operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the Indian Territory is an objective account by a careful researcher and a talented writer. Jay Monaghan’s Civil War on the Western Border, 1854–1865 (1955) was the first attempt by a modern scholar to compile a broad narrative history of the war in the same area, with a particular emphasis on military events in Missouri. Although now somewhat dated, Monaghan’s well-written, engaging narrative and solid historical research make the work both interesting and entertaining. Other, more modern scholars have focused their efforts exclusively on the Show Me State. The Civil War in Missouri: A Military History (2012) by Louis S. Gerteis, the first book-length, one-volume examination of military affairs in the state, is a splendid traditional work that places the conventional battles in a national context and highlights Missouri’s significant role in the conflict. Portraits of Conflict: A Photographic History of Missouri in the Civil War (2009) by William Garrett Piston and Thomas P. Sweeney combines concise essays on various aspects of the war in Missouri with an excellent selection of period photographs. Piston and Sweeney’s photographs personalize the conflict, and their narrative highlights the complexity of Missouri’s war, particularly regarding the state’s role in Union naval operations and medical care. An older, but useful compilation of period engravings and photographs with a brief historical narrative is Missouri Sketchbook (1963) by Clifton Edom.

Other authors have produced specialized studies of particular regions of the state. Elmo Ingenthron’s Borderland Rebellion (1980) is a comprehensive history of the war along the Missouri-Arkansas border. Civil War in the Ozarks by Phillip W. Steele and Steve Cottrell (2009) is a concise overview of the fighting in that region, while Civil War Springfield (2011) by Larry Wood details the important role played by that city during the war, particularly during the 1861 Battle of Wilson’s Creek and Confederate General John S. Marmaduke’s 1863 cavalry raid through southern Missouri.

Early Battles

The second major campaign of the Civil War took place in Missouri in the summer of 1861, when Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon drove the pro-secessionist Missouri State Guard into southwest Missouri. There the State Guard received help in the form of Arkansas State Troops and regular Confederate forces. The combined force, a coalition army temporarily led by Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, went into camp along Wilson’s Creek. In the culminating event of the campaign, Lyon launched a surprise attack on the Southern encampment on the morning of August 10, 1861. During the six hours of fighting that ensued, Lyon was killed and his army was forced to retreat. The Battle of Wilson’s Creek, or Oak Hills, the first major battle fought west of the Mississippi River, has received considerable scholarly attention. Immediately after the war, former Union Army officer James Peckham published Gen. Nathaniel Lyon, and Missouri in 1861 (1866), a tribute to the general and the men who struggled to keep the state in the Union. Although his is by no means an unbiased account, Peckham conveniently assembled a large amount of data in a single volume. Union Army veteran Return I. Holcombe’s 1883 An Account of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, or Oak Hills was the first objective, comprehensive history of the engagement. Although not without factual errors, Holcombe’s work remains an important source of information on the battle. Holcombe noted that although both McCulloch and Lyon temporarily gained the upper hand during the battle, and both sides performed deeds of gallantry and heroism, the Federal situation became increasingly desperate as the fight wore on, and Lyon’s officers had little choice but to retreat. Three years after Holcombe’s work appeared, former Missouri Confederate soldier and politician Thomas L. Snead published The Fight for Missouri: From the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon (1886), a remarkably objective participant account of the events in Missouri in 1861 that includes a detailed account of the campaign and battle. Although Snead’s work paid tribute to the battlefield prowess of his fellow Missouri State Guardsmen and their commander Sterling Price, it also emphasized Lyon’s courage and determination on the battlefield, for his volunteers and Regulars faced unconquerable odds and fought desperately until overwhelmed in the unequal contest. Snead concluded his work with the belief that by wisely planning, by boldly doing, and by bravely dying, Lyon had won the fight for Missouri.

Snead’s was the last major work on the Wilson’s Creek campaign until the early twentieth century. Union veteran John McElroy’s 1909 The Struggle for Missouri, dedicated to the Union Men of Missouri, is a celebratory but useful account of events from the antebellum period to the 1862 Battle of Pea Ridge. McElroy was the last veteran of the conflict to produce a major work on the 1861 campaign.

Interestingly, toward the end of the twentieth century, three veterans contributed histories of Wilson’s Creek. Two were penned by retired U.S. Air Force officers. Rebellion in Missouri 1861: Nathaniel Lyon and His Army of the West (1961) by Hans Christian Adamson is a readable narrative of the campaign based on a relatively small number of sources. Adamson hoped to rescue Lyon from obscurity, arguing that the Union general not only paralyzed his opponents and kept them from securing Missouri, but also gave encouragement to Unionists in Kentucky, who likewise held that state in the Union. According to Adamson, Lyon enjoyed a brilliant career in the summer of 1861, had no equal in the Federal ranks, and had won a great victory at Wilson’s Creek by the time he was fatally wounded. His successor, stricken with incompetence or overcaution, fled the field. William Riley Brooksher’s Bloody Hill: The Civil War Battle of Wilson’s Creek (1995) is likewise a popular history of the campaign. Brooksher argues that the battle was probably unnecessary, as Lyon had already accomplished his strategic goals and had no compelling reason to launch his attack. The costly fight settled nothing, according to Brooksher, and had little impact on the war. Nevertheless, Lyon’s aggressive character spurred him into action, and he nearly achieved a victory. Finally, National Park Service historian emeritus and U.S. Marine Corps veteran Edwin C. Bearss’s 1975 book The Battle of Wilson’s Creek was initially produced as a National Park Service historical study in 1960, and remains an excellent tactical portrait of the battle.

As the sesquicentennial of the Civil War approached, other broad narrative works appeared in print, including the insightful Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It (2000). William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher not only consulted a large number of sources to detail the events of the campaign, but provide a rich social context, arguing that the battle’s participants closely identified with their hometowns and were determined to uphold community honor. Unlike Hans Christian Adamson, Piston and Hatcher argue that the battle was not a great victory and did not save Missouri for the Union, but Lyon’s attempt to score a decisive victory was in keeping with his desire to pursue a punitive crusade against the secessionists.

Regimental histories of units that took part in the Wilson’s Creek campaign are disappointingly few in number. The 1st and 2nd Kansas Infantry regiments are the subject of Kansans at Wilson’s Creek (Hatcher and Piston 1993), an edited collection of soldier letters that appeared in the Leavenworth Daily Times in 1861. The sole Iowa unit in the battle is the subject of two works. First Iowa Infantry veteran Eugene Fitch Ware’s The Lyon Campaign in Missouri: Being a History of the First Iowa Infantry (1907) is a valuable account presumably based on Ware’s diary. Newspaper correspondent Franc Wilkie accompanied the 1st Iowa as well, and his numerous columns about the campaign to the Dubuque Herald were compiled and published as The Iowa First (1861) and in a modern annotated edition as Missouri in 1861 (Wilkie 2001).

The other major action of the Wilson’s Creek campaign, the Battle of Carthage, Missouri, has also been the subject of a book-length study. David C. Hinze and Karen Farnham’s The Battle of Carthage: Border War in Southwest Missouri, July 5, 1861 (1997) gives readers a detailed tactical study of that battle, and argues that the clash between the Missouri State Guard and a portion of Nathaniel Lyon’s army under the command of Colonel Franz Sigel was a significant engagement that greatly influenced the course of events in Missouri in the summer of 1861.

Five days before Wilson’s Creek (August 5, 1861), at the opposite end of the state, Missouri State Guard (pro-Confederate) forces led by Martin E. Green attacked a much smaller number of David Moore’s pro-Union Home Guards in the town of Athens. After a short but intense fight and a Union bayonet charge, Green’s men fled the field. Although casualties were light, Moore’s dramatic victory helped keep northeast Missouri under Union control. Jonathan K. Cooper-Wiele describes the battle in detail in Skim Milk Yankees Fighting (2007).

Following the Southern victory at Wilson’s Creek, Major General Sterling Price and his Missouri State Guard moved north and laid siege to the Union garrison at Lexington, Missouri. The outnumbered Federals surrendered to Price on September 20, 1861. The three days of formal siege are explored in Michael L. Gillespie’s The Battle of Lexington 1861 (1995), a concise summary of both the initial movements of the armies and the siege. Lexington was the most impressive triumph of Price’s career, and his second victory in less than six weeks increased his popularity among Southerners and buoyed the hopes of the secessionist cause. On the other hand, the disaster to the Federal arms also prompted Union Major General John C. Fremont to finally take the field against him.

Forced to return to southwest Missouri by the advance of Fremont’s larger force, Price remained far beyond the grasp of the Federals and avoided an engagement. Fremont slowly moved his large army toward Springfield, hoping to give battle to the State Guard. On October 25, a cavalry detachment from Fremont’s army led by Major Charles Zagonyi routed a force of State Guardsmen camped in Springfield and captured the city. Fremont’s army settled into Springfield, but the Lincoln administration, frustrated by Fremont’s performance, relieved him of command in early November and dispersed his army. Price soon reoccupied Springfield and established winter quarters there. Regrettably, the only detailed study of Fremont’s so-called Hundred Days of command is The Story of the Guard (1862), an understandably partisan work by Jessie Benton Fremont, the general’s influential wife.

The activities of Kansas Senator James H. Lane’s Union brigade in western Missouri in 1861–1862 are analyzed in Jayhawkers (2009) by Bryce Benedict. Lane’s application of hard war, argues Benedict, included the liberation of Missouri slaves, and the September 1861 destruction of the town of Osceola, Missouri, earned him national notice and set a ­precedent for the Union Army’s adoption of such policies. The ­controversial actions of Lane’s brigade continue to be hotly debated by historians, however, who disagree as to the motives of the savior of Kansas and the terror of Missouri.

The final battle of 1861 in Missouri is expertly told in The Battle of Belmont (1991) by Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr. The November 7 Union strike against a Confederate encampment in southeast Missouri was not a clear victory for either side, but Union commander Ulysses S. Grant performed well in his first major action of the war, and the new general and his men gained valuable combat experience.

The decisive Battle of Pea Ridge (March 7–8, 1862) occurred in northwest Arkansas; the initial stages of the campaign, however, took place in Missouri. The Union’s Army of the Southwest, under the command of Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, captured Springfield in February 1862, and forced Sterling Price’s mixed force of Confederates and Missouri State Guardsmen to retreat from the state. These events and the subsequent battle are detailed in the impeccably researched Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West (1992) by William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess, an excellent campaign study of the pivotal Trans-Mississippi Theater battle. Far more than simply another success in a