National security law: does Hong Kong's Journey to the West have a happy ending?

Back in July last year when the anti-government and anti-Beijing mass protests in Hong Kong were at their peak and turning increasingly violent, George Yeo, Singapore's former foreign minister with a deep knowledge of China's culture and politics, made an intriguing analogy between Hong Kong and the Monkey King Sun Wukong in the great Chinese classic Journey to the West.

In the classical novel, the Monkey King is rebellious in nature and possesses magical powers, including the ability to travel tens of thousands of kilometres in one somersault. But in the end, he fails to escape the Buddha's palm in an encounter.

"Hong Kong cannot leave the Buddha's palm. If one day, the Buddha decides to put a ring around the forehead of the monkey, then the monkey will have to take note," Yeo said in a talk, according to Singapore media reports.

According to the classic, Sun Wukong wore such a golden headband around his head which he could not take off. His master the Buddhist monk Tang Sanzang could recite a particular spell to constrict the band to cause searing pains to punish the monkey and bring him under control.

Alas, Yeo has proved prescient with his analogy.

The Monkey King, as depicted in the film Journey to the West 2: The Demons Strike Back. File photo alt=The Monkey King, as depicted in the film Journey to the West 2: The Demons Strike Back. File photo

Nearly one year later, the constricting headband for Hong Kong came in the form of the national security law Beijing directly imposed on the city, just hours before July 1, the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule.

All sides have agreed that the introduction of the law marks a turning point for Hong Kong as it is nearly halfway through the 50-year contract that allows the city to maintain its capitalist way of life under the "one country, two systems" formula.

For the pro-democracy people in Hong Kong and their supporters in Western countries, the city has taken a turn for the worse and the promulgation of the law means the advent of one country, one system.

For others in Hong Kong and officials in Beijing, the introduction of the law is a turn for the better, resulting in smoother implementation of the one country, two systems concept and freeing the city from political chaos and violent protests, which they believe have stunted its development and made it a base for Western countries to subvert the central government on the mainland.

Beijing's promulgation of the law has certainly come fast and furious, and is much tougher than expected in terms of its scope and reach.

Crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces are punishable by a maximum penalty of life in prison.

Officials in Hong Kong and Beijing have argued that there is nothing wrong with the legislation, not only because all countries " including Western democracies " have such laws to protect national security, but also because it is a timely and necessary move to restore stability after six months of often-violent protests.

They say that most national security cases will be tried in Hong Kong's own courts and the law will target only a very small number of people who endanger national security. Most people's basic rights and freedoms will be safeguarded, they say.

But what has caused most worries are the provisions in the law that give Beijing a direct and strong hand in policing the city and upholding its authority.

The law empowers Beijing to set up its own national security apparatus in Hong Kong staffed by its own law enforcement personnel, none of which would come under the city's local jurisdiction.

Moreover, the law effectively allows the mainland Chinese authorities to try "serious" or "complex" cases on the mainland.

This is one of the most worrying bits, given fears that Hong Kong people could be extradited to the mainland for trials under the now-withdrawn extradition bill which triggered last year's mass protests in the first place.

The way the law was enacted and imposed on Hong Kong was regrettable but inevitable.

Ever since the city failed to legislate its own version of a national security law in 2003, as required by the Basic Law, the city's mini-constitution, missteps and mistrust by both the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong and officials in Beijing have gradually but surely led to a point of no return.

On the one hand, many people in Hong Kong believe the central government has tried to tighten controls over the city while officials in Beijing think they are losing control of the city.

A ship in Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, celebrates the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty. Photo: Xinhua alt=A ship in Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, celebrates the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty. Photo: Xinhua

Finally, the Chinese government hardened its resolve to impose the national security law on Hong Kong after last year's demonstrations, which were initially against the extradition bill but soon morphed into an anti-Beijing political movement. In particular, the authorities were humiliated and incensed by a small band of rioters who not only went on a rampage for weeks wreaking havoc and destruction but also openly called for the independence of Hong Kong and begged US President Donald Trump to liberate the city. From Beijing's perspective, Hong Kong has become the first Chinese territory where Washington could compete with Beijing openly for influence and Beijing was not on the winning side.

There is no doubt that Beijing intends the tough law to instil fear and deter the kind of unrest that happened last year, making it crystal clear that one country takes priority over the two systems.

It has shown an immediate deterrent effect. Political activists, including Anson Chan, the city's former chief secretary and a target of fierce attacks by the Chinese state media, have announced they are quitting politics, and some have fled overseas, fearing the repercussions of the law.

Still, just hours after the legislation took effect, thousands of people took to the streets on July 1 in open defiance and clashed with the police who arrested about 370 people, including 10 for breaching the new national security law.

Meanwhile, Beijing's move has drawn condemnation from the United States and its Western allies. The US has already decided to remove its special trading privileges for Hong Kong and sanction Chinese officials responsible for the law while Britain and Australia have indicated they will offer qualified Hong Kong people the chance of settling in their countries. But those announcements will hardly have any impact on Beijing.

Perhaps a more important question for the people of Hong Kong and the international community is how frequently and how far the new law will be applied to the city.

Recent remarks from Chinese officials and legal experts seem to suggest the law will primarily serve as a deterrent and they have repeatedly stressed it will target only a very small group of people.

Zhang Xiaoming, deputy minister of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Photo: Simon Song alt=Zhang Xiaoming, deputy minister of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Photo: Simon Song

Zhang Xiaoming, deputy minister of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, has dismissed worries that the imposition of the law will mean Hong Kong ends up with one country, one system. If that were Beijing's intention, he said, it would have been much easier for it to impose mainland Chinese laws directly on Hong Kong, instead of going through all the effort of tailor-making the law for the city.

Precisely because of the worries the new law has caused, it makes every sense for Beijing to help Hong Kong to continue to thrive as Asia's premier financial and commercial centre, a status that is underpinned by the city's capitalist system.

If that is indeed Beijing's intention, then it needs to apply the constrictive headband to Hong Kong with extreme caution, just as Tang Sanzang did with Sun Wukong.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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