The Torah in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:31) forbids accepting a “Kofer” (“ransom”) from a convicted murderer in lieu of capital punishment. This establishes a prohibition against receiving payment to absolve somebody who was convicted of a capital offense. Once a court ruled that the defendant is guilty of such an offense, money may not be accepted in lieu of execution. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if people were able to pay to escape punishment, there would be little deterrence against criminal behavior. Anybody with wealth, or with connections to wealthy people, would allow themselves to do what they pleased, even severe offenses, and the fabric of society would unravel. The Torah therefore forbids accepting money in lieu of punishment. This prohibition applies even if a murder victim’s close family members publicly forgive the killer and express their wish that he not be put to death. Even then, the court should not accept money to suspend the execution, and the convicted killer must be put to death. This prohibition applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the courts were authorized to administer capital punishment, and it is binding upon both men and women alike. Although only men serve as judges, nevertheless, this command is relevant to women, as well, forbidding an influential woman from accepting money from a convicted offender to use her influence and connections to suspend his punishment. One who accepts money for the sake of suspending a convicted offender’s execution is in violation of this command. This prohibition is not punishable by Malkut, because it falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – violations which can be reversed through payment. The violator who received the money can simply give it back, and therefore, he is not liable to Malkut. In the next verse (35:32), the Torah introduces a similar command – not to accept payment to excuse somebody from relocating in an Ir Miklat (city of refuge). A person who accidentally killed somebody is required to flee to one of the designated cities of refuge and remain there until the Kohen Gadol’s death. The Torah here forbids accepting payment from such a killer for the sake of allowing him to remain in his hometown without moving to a city of refuge. The reason, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because this “exile” serves as an incentive to exercise care and caution to avoid accidentally killing people. If people with wealth could excuse themselves from this exile, they would not have the same level of motivation to act cautiously in order to avoid fatal accidents. The Torah formulates this command by stating that money may not be accepted from an accidental killer “La’nus El Ir Miklato” – which seems to mean, “to flee to his city of refuge.” Syntactically, this verse seems difficult to understand. The Sefer Ha’hinich explains that the word “La’nus” in this verse means not “to flee,” but rather “for the one fleeing” (in other words, “Nus” is a noun, not a verb, referring to the individual who flees). Money may not be accepted from such a person who seeks to excuse himself through payment from the obligation to relocate in an Ir Miklat. As in regard to the previous Misva, this command applies in the times when the courts have the authority to administer capital punishment, and is binding upon both men and women.