The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (19:16), “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” – “Do not stand idly by your fellow’s blood.” This command forbids inaction when one’s fellow Jew faces physical or financial danger, and he is in a position to assist his fellow in some way. If one’s life, wellbeing or property is at risk, and we are able to save him or his property, then it is forbidden to refrain from doing so. The Gemara states that even if one is unable to personally save his fellow, he is required to summon somebody who can. For example, if somebody requires urgent medical attention, and a person who is not a physician is present, that person must call an ambulance. Another example of this prohibition is a case where somebody witnessed an incident and is eligible to testify on his fellow’s behalf in court. The Torah command of “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” requires him to come and testify in order to save his fellow from a financial loss. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah issued this command so that all people will be concerned for one another and be prepared to help, as this facilitates a stable and secure society. G-d wants the world to be settled and society to function properly, and so He commanded us to help one another when necessary, for the benefit of us all. This Misva, of course, applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who refrains from rescuing his fellow’s life or property when he is in a position to do so has transgressed this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is violated through inaction, and not by committing a sinful act. One of the obligations that fall under this Biblical command in Pidyon Shebuyim – rescuing captives. As the Rambam discusses in Hilchot Matenot Aniyim (8:10), Pidyon Shebuyim takes precedence over all other forms of charity. He explains that captives are generally deprived of food, water and clothing, and their lives are threatened, and thus the Misva of Pidyon Shebuyim encompasses all forms of the Misva of charity, as well as the obligation to rescue an endangered fellow Jew’s life. The Rambam goes so far as to say that there is no Misva greater than Pidyon Shebuyim. Nevertheless, the Sages forbade paying an exorbitant price to ransom a Jewish captive, meaning, more than “Kedeh Damav” (the price for which the captive would be sold on the slave market). The Gemara brings two reasons for this prohibition: that it is intended either to avoid financially crippling the community, or to avoid encouraging the captors to take additional captives by showing that the Jews are prepared to pay any price for ransom. The practical difference between these two reasons arises in a case where the captive has an exceptionally wealthy relative who offers to personally pay the exorbitant ransom demanded by the captors. If the reason for the prohibition is to avoid crippling the community, the family would be permitted to pay the ransom, as this would not affect the community. If, however, the reason is to ensure that the captors are not encouraged to continue kidnapping Jews, then this would be forbidden. The Rishonim debate the question of which reason is accepted as Halacha. An exception to this rule is the case of an imprisoned Torah scholar, who may be ransomed from captivity at any price. It is well-known that the great German scholar Rav Meir of Rottenburg (“the Maharam” of Rottenburg, 1213-1293) waived this privilege when he was captured and imprisoned by the German authorities. The Jewish community succeeded in raising an exorbitant sum for the ransom of their beloved Rabbi, but he did not allow them to pay it, lest this lead to the imprisonment of other Rabbis. The Maharam of Rottenburg remained in prison until his death, and even after his passing, the authorities kept his body for approximately fourteen years, until it was released for burial. He was buried alongside the Jew who paid for the ransom of the body. The command of “Lo Ta’amod Al D