The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:2), “Ahareh Rabim Le’hatot,” establishing the rule that we must follow the majority view among the Rabbis. When disagreements arise among the scholars, Halacha is determined based on the majority position. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this applies only when the Rabbis involved in the dispute are of equal caliber. It would be insensible, he says, to think that we should follow the view of a group of ignoramuses – even if they are, in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “as numerous as the number of people who left Egypt” – over a small group of learned scholars. Only when Rabbis of equal scholarly stature argue does Halacha require following the majority. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that although the majority may at times issue a mistaken ruling, one should nevertheless follow the majority with confidence, as this is what the Torah requires. If the ruling turns out to have been incorrect, it is the Sages who bear accountability and need to atone for their mistake. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further explains that the Torah required following the majority “Le’hazek Kiyum Datenu” – “to strengthen the upholding of our religion.” If everyone acted in accordance with his or her opinion, without deferring to the majority, then every individual or group of individuals will follow different practices, and our nation will divide into several different religions. In order to ensure that we all follow a single set of laws, the Torah required following the majority view among the scholars. This command, of course, applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who violates the law by disregarding the majority view, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, will be severely punished, because of the particular importance of this command for maintaining our religion. This Misva also yields two other Halachot involving the concept of “Rov” – following the majority. The first is a rule known as “Kol De’parish Me’ruba Parish,” which means that we must assume something originated from the majority unless we have reason to believe otherwise. The classic example is a piece of meat that was discovered on a street which has both kosher and non-kosher butcher shops, and it is unknown from which of these shops the meat originated. If the majority of the shops are kosher, then we may assume that the meat is kosher, and it may be eaten. Conversely, if most of the shops are not kosher, then the meat may not be eaten. The second Halacha that stems from this command is that of Bittul, or “negation.” The classic example is where two pieces of kosher meat and one piece of non-kosher meat become mixed together, and they are indistinguishable from one another. The law of Bittul establishes that the minority is considered negated by the majority, such that all three pieces may be eaten.