The 77 th Biblical command listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch is introduced in Parashat Mishpatim (23:2): “Ve’lo Ta’aneh Al Rib Li’ntot,” a verse which the Sages interpreted in four different ways. All four interpretations are included under this Biblical prohibition, thus serving as a striking example of the precept taught by the Midrash, “Shibim Panim La’Torah” – there are numerous (“seventy”) different levels on which the Torah can be understood. The first interpretation is that the Torah here forbids judges from deviating from their own opinion in order to go along with the others. A judge might decide that although he feels one way, he will vote like his colleagues in deference to them. The Torah here commands judges presiding over a “Rib” (court case) not to deviate – “Li’ntot” – from what they feel is the correct ruling, and demands that they vote for the side which they truly feel is correct. Secondly, the Torah here commands that when judges are trying a case involving a capital offense, a judge who finds a reason to acquit should not then argue for a conviction. He should continue advocating on behalf of the defendant and arguing for an acquittal. At the end of the trial, when the judges vote, he may change his mind, but during the deliberations, once he proposed a reason to acquit he may not then argue for convicting. The third explanation of this verse is that the Torah commands the Bet Din not to begin their deliberation of a case involving a capital offense with the arguments for convicting the defendant. Rather, they should begin by hearing the reasons to acquit. Finally, the word “Rib” in this verse is written without the letter “Yod,” such that it could be read as “Rab,” alluding to the leading member of the Bet Din. The Torah here commands the Bet Din that when trying a case involving a capital offense, as the judges begin presenting their opinion, they should not begin with the greatest judge. Instead, they should begin with the lowest-level judge and conclude with the highest-level judge. According to this reading, “Ve’lo Ta’aneh Al Rib” means that no judge may give his opinion after the leading member of the court, who states his opinion last. Explaining the first command presented in this verse – that judges should not deviate from their view in deference to the others – the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah wanted to ensure that a death sentence would not be issued by a single judge. When it comes to a capital sentence, it is important that the court as a whole reaches the conclusion to convict and execute the defendant, rather than the court simply going along with the position of one judge who decides to convict. Therefore, the Torah prohibits judges from accepting another judge’s viewpoint with which they disagree, and to instead issue the ruling which they truly believe to be correct. This way, when a court convicts, the conviction will be the consensus view of the entire court, and not the opinion of one judge. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch chooses this context to address the tangentially related question of how the prophetess Debora served as a judge, as the verse tells in the Book of Shofetim (4: 4 ), given that women are disqualified from serving as judges. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives two answers, the first is that Debora did not actually serve as a formal judge. When the verse states that Debora “judged,” it means that the Rabbis would consult with her because of her great knowledge and wisdom, but not that she was appointed formally. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, Halacha allows the litigants to bring their case to somebody who is disqualified from serving as a judge if they so desire. If they both accept the judge, despite his disqualification, then that judge may try the case and his decision is binding. Accordingly, it is possible that that people respected Debora and accepted her as a judge. A Bet Din that violates any of these prohibitions transgresses this Biblical command, but t