Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her granddaughter Avishag Sterman on her Bat Mitzvah! Today's daf is sponsored by Susannah & Bernie Goldstein in honor of their children Eliana & Benny who went back to Camp Ramah in the Poconos this week, for the summer. "We’re so proud of you! Wishing you & all the tzevet and chanichim a fun, safe, & healthy summer. Does one need to be concerned that there are two people with the same name when accepting testimony that one has died. Rava and Abaye disagree. Rava's proof was from a case of collecting money from a promissory note. Abaye explains why Rava's proof is irrelevant as the cases are not comparable. A case is brought regarding a get in which both Rava and Abaye rule in an opposite manner to what they held about the case of testimony regarding death - why? It seems that Rava is concerned in a case where it is known that there are two people with the same name; when it is not known, one need not be concerned. The Mishna had stated that a woman is not believed to testify that her husband died when it is known that there was a disagreement between them. What is considered 'a disagreement'? If they have a disagreement, is one witness believed to say he has died? Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with the rabbis and believed a woman's testimony about her husband's death only if she showed outward signs of mourning, such as crying, rending her garments. The rabbis explain why they think Rabbi Yehuda's opinion is incorrect. What was the case that on account of that case the rabbis realized that they needed to institute a law to accept a woman's testimony about her own husband's death? Based on that case, in what situations did they permit it (debate between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel)? There is a similar debate regarding a rabbinic decree about moving red heifer waters and ashes on a boat that was instituted after a particular event. Is that debate the same as here?