The Arab-Israeli War of Attrition, 1967-1973: Volume 2: Fighting Across the Suez Canal

By Bill Norton

The Arab-Israeli conflict persisted through two wars and ongoing border tensions. However, the Six-Day War of June 1967 was a cataclysm. Israel emerged victorious in a war with neighboring Arab states and in possession of occupied territory. The Arabs were furious at this outcome and determined to regain their lands and dignity by again making war with Israel. Added to the mix was a resurgent Palestinian liberation movement. Renewed fighting began within weeks. It became a period of sustained combat, casualties, fiscal outlay, and diplomacy on the world stage unlike anything experienced previously. All involved militaries remained very active over these years with more consistent mobilization, intensive training, and action than ever before. Each side deepened their dependence on superpower arms supply. The geopolitical stakes rose and Israel found itself fighting the Soviets indirectly on the borders and terrorists internationally. Adversary forces grew in size, adopted more complex weapons, and trained in new tactics, all in the tumult of combat of escalating intensity. The air forces of especially Israel and Egypt, then Syria, became particularly active, grew in size and capabilities. They employed some of the most advanced weapons the USA and the USSR arrayed in their Cold War confrontation. The air war grew to extensive air defenses and long-range bombing plus deep photo reconnaissance. The danger of this sparking another general war with potential superpower involvement was high. This period is collectively referred to as the War of Attrition.

The named War of Attrition on the Suez Canal began on 8 March 1969 and ended with a ceasefire 17 months later. However, combat began even before this period. Egypt built up forces opposite the canal to harass the Israelis and in preparation for an offensive to liberate the Sinai Peninsula. The harassment included heavy shelling, airstrikes, and commando raids. Israel became even more determined to hold the line on the canal east bank and built a string of fortifications supporting this strategy and expanded available forces. Protecting these assets required responding artillery fire and bold commando raids until Israel felt compelled to unleash its air force. Bombing and air-to-air combat grew in intensity and eventually extended to the Egyptian heartland. The Soviet Union assisted Egypt materially until finally intervening with an air defense division consisting of the latest surface-to-air missiles and fighters, operated by USSR combat personnel. Undaunted, Israel fought on in a continuing and dangerous escalation. Both sides approach exhaustion before a ceasefire was arranged.

It was an extraordinary time of confrontation, irregular warfare, rising terrorism, and national struggles seldom seen before or since. It became the world’s most violent, costly, and dangerous conflict after that in Southeast Asia. At the center of it, Israel found herself engaged on all sides and isolated as never before. The struggle altered the geopolitical landscape and set the stage for the October 1973 war.

Volume 2 focuses on the fighting across the Suez Canal in a manner never before presented in print. Richly illustrated with photographs, maps, charts and tables, the reader will find new details and correction of previously published ‘facts.’ This is the most focused and clear account of the fighting on the Suez Canal during 1968–1970.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: May 11, 2023
• ISBN: 9781804515235

Book preview

COVER

American supply of the F-4E Phantom II fighter-bomber to Israel was a tremendous addition to the Israel Air Force’s strike capacity, both in tonnage of bombs and delivery accuracy. It significantly tilted the aerial balance in Israel‘s favour, although perceived as compensation for Arab superiority in other arms. Here one of the jets is being prepared for a heavy strike mission, the squadron badge on the tail was obscured for photography in the common practice of the period. (Albert Grandolini collection)

CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Foreword and Acknowledgements

1Resumption

2Escalation on the Canal

3Asserting Airpower

4Going All In

5The Missile War

6Endgame

Bibliography

Further Reading

Endnotes

About the Author

Plates

English spelling of Hebrew and Arabic words have many variations depending upon translator. Names, locations and geographic references are as provided in The Times World Atlas or other traditionally accepted major sources of reference at of the time of the described events. Similarly, Arabic names are Romanised and transscripted rather than transliterated and the spelling usually follows that in Wikipedia. Any errors of fact or interpretation are those of the author.

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Published by Helion & Company 2023

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Text © Bill Norton 2023

Photographs © as individually credited

Colour artwork © David Bocquelet, Luca Canossa, Tom Cooper & Anderson Subtil 2023

Maps drawn by Tom Cooper & Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, tensions on the new borders soon flared anew. All the involved militaries remained very active over the next six years with more consistent mobilisation, intensive training, and action than ever before. As the combat grew in scope, the cost escalated in lives, materiel, and treasure. Each side deepened their dependence on superpower arms supply and mediation. The geopolitical stakes rose, and Israel found itself fighting the Soviets indirectly on the borders, and terrorist internationally. Adversary forces grew in size, adopted more complex weapons, and trained in new tactics, all in the tumult of combat of escalating intensity. Fallout from the conflict affected all the Arab states given the acrimony, public desire to punish Israel, and guerrillas acting from national territory bringing Israeli retaliation. These factors were destabilising to varying degrees with Arab-on-Arab violence growing and a shift to more radical policies.

This period is collectively referred to as the War of Attrition. It was an extraordinary time of confrontation, irregular warfare, rising terrorism, and national struggles seldom seen before or since. It became the world’s most violent, costly, and dangerous conflict after that in Southeast Asia. At the centre of it, Israel found herself engaged on all sides and isolated as never before. The struggle altered the geopolitical landscape and set the stage for the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The named War of Attrition on the Suez Canal was begun by Egypt on 8 March 1969 and ended with a ceasefire 17 months later. While the ‘eye of the hurricane’ was on the Suez, these volumes will examine the inter-locking Arab-Israeli conflict across the entire period with all combatants. Arab-on-Arab violence and Palestinian internecine struggles, tangential ‘fallout’ of the Arab-Israeli conflict, are addressed only as far as they affected that broader conflict. No attempt is made to document every military action on all the fronts. Such would fill many books. Being a book on war, deep excursions into national politics are also avoided. Given that concurrent events on the separate fronts are discussed in separate volumes and chapters, a timeline is presented in the final volume to help the reader appreciate the scope of the broad conflict.

I am well aware of the lingering animus regarding these events, with aspects of the conflict persisting to the present day. I do not have any personal connection to the events or participants, then or now. I have worked for an honest and impartial account avoiding stereotypes and loaded labels or phrases. That I would still offend was understood, but it is not intentional.

I would like to thank E.R. (Ted) Hooton for his research on the Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian and Syrian armies which is incorporated in this work.

Bill Norton ([e-mail])

Tehachapi, California, 2022

1

RESUMPTION

In fall 1968 the United Arab Republic (UAR) resumed engaging the IDF on the opposite bank of the Suez Canal. These provocations brought predictable Zahal responses. Artillery exchanges, commando raids, and airstrikes soon became weekly then daily occurrences. As casualties rose the Israelis debated the best means to hold their positions at water’s edge. They adopted a hybrid of fortifications, able to withstand the Egyptian shelling, backed by armoured forces and patrols.

VEXATIONS

After nearly a year of army reorganisation, rearmament, and training (this later called The Period of Defiance), with no substantive diplomatic progress, Nasser decided in April 1968 to move to the Confrontation phase of the nation’s strategy. His army had formed 10 divisions, including two armoured and three mechanised, together with the equivalent of another two divisions in independent brigades, all supported by 16 artillery brigades. By June the field army totalled 180,000 men of whom up to 70,000 were on the canal front with 540 guns and 40 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). In addition, the Kuwaiti and Palestine Liberation Army brigades remained on the front while the Algerian presence had been reduced to a battalion attached to the 16th Division. The IDF, by contrast, had a little more than 2,000 soldiers and 20 mobile artillery tubes on the line, estimating 25:1 Egyptian advantage in artillery and 13:1 in personnel.

General Fawzi had to confess that the armed forces were still not in a condition to launch a general offensive across the Suez. Egypt’s initial strategy remained to increase the cost to Israel for holding the defensive line on the waterway along with its hard negotiating position. Sacrifices in Israeli lives, hardware, and a negative impact on the economy would hopefully compel a withdrawal or political pressure leading to that end. Lacking this, the renewed combat would be a precursor, eventually, to war against the weakened IDF. Even on a modest scale this would build troop experience and confidence towards the invasion operation. The leadership wanted soldiers to observe that their IDF counterparts were not supermen and that Egypt possessed potentially decisive advantages.

Soviet weapons supply had drawn to a trickle by spring 1968 despite outstanding orders, and entreaties could not induce delivery. There was then the crisis following the USSR’s occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.¹ Moscow retained materiel to meet any NATO reaction and did not resume deliveries until late in the year, and still failed to satisfy Egyptian needs.² Spares were also conveyed in a measured manner as an apparent means of holding Egypt and Syria on tight reins. Through at least summer 1969, the USSR assessed that Egypt had sufficient equipment for defence, but items needed to sustain a major offensive were inadequate. Nasser travelled to Moscow in early July 1968 seeking arms and additional advisors to support a surge. This followed an unsuccessful trip in June by Ali Sabri, party secretary. His hosts assessed that the Egyptians were still absorbing the weapons already supplied and were only fit to repel an Israeli crossing. The army was working up slowly for the Sinai invasion but confidence of the advisors was scant.³ The USSR urged more attention to diplomacy, though Nasser had already concluded this was pointless. He did accept a proposal that the USSR negotiate on his behalf since he would not speak directly to America or Israel. However, he was determined to press on militarily.

Egyptian Army recuperation had emphasised the artillery arm which would be the spearhead of all offensive operations. Gunners were trained on their new equipment and ammunition stores built up. The corps had lost up to 46 percent of its weapons in June 1967 and even by late 1968 the 16 artillery brigades were still short of men and weapons. There appears to have been only 600 guns on the canal and these could fire 650 tonnes a day based upon Soviet units of fire. At the peak in the coming two years, the IDF batteries at the front never approached even 100 guns. The IDF preferred to employ selfpropelled guns (SPG) on the front so that repositioning in response to enemy action could be relatively swift.

Israeli defensive measures included fencing and mining the entire length of the east bank. This was aided by a road that ran the length of the canal, 1–5km (0.5–2mi) back and unpaved north of Qantara, that the IDF called Lexicon. Egyptian sniping was cause for Israel to erect a sand embankment along the water’s edge. A partial embankment had already existed from the original excavation of the canal and subsequent dredging, with the spoil thrown up on the east bank; bulldozers were used to heighten this to several metres. The Egyptians did likewise to preclude easy observation of their activities but went higher to better observe the opposite shore.

BACK TO SHOOTING

The first year following the war had seen an average 27 fire incidents per month. This increased by a factor of 17 during the next year (see Volume 3, Appendix II). Initial Egyptian activity consisted of small arms fire, artillery barrages, tank shelling, and commando forays harassing the IDF. Egyptian artillery brigades sought to exploit their superiority with individual batteries commencing harassing fire on 14 June 1968, and more a week later.⁴ Whenever Israeli personnel or vehicles appeared they drew fire. Israeli casualties rose such that additional S-58 helicopters had to be deployed to Refidim AB to handle the growing medical evacuation demand. The Israelis responded in kind, although their volume of artillery fire was always less by comparison. Helicopters and light planes began to be used by both sides for artillery spotting.

A scene repeated may times on both sides of a canal – a young soldier’s comrades assisting him to an aid station or evacuation point. Casualties built steadily in the IDF ranks throughout 1969 before Israel set out to deliver the same to those on the opposite bank of the Suez. (Albert Grandolini collection)

More frequent Egyptian dark night commando operations began in earnest during spring 1968 with approximately weekly raids. These were principally intended to sow dismay in the enemy ranks and force them to keep additional reservists in uniform while also gathering intelligence and bolstering Egyptian martial spirits. These were typically two-or three-man teams rowing across the waterway in rubber dinghies and then traversing just a few kilometres on the east bank.⁵ They grew to platoon-size missions and from one night to days behind enemy lines. The raids encompassed ambushes of patrols, capture of prisoners for interrogation, mining, cutting telephone lines, collecting target data for artillery fire, and intelligence gathering. Their mines restricted enemy movement and caused patrols or convoys to bunch up and become better artillery targets. Some two-or three-man teams remained in the field for 15 days collecting intelligence.

Sometimes these forays went well, sometimes not so well. When word came of an intrusion, fighter jets were launched from Refidim to drop flares in the area to assist Israeli teams attempting to intercept the raiders. In early 1968 the Egyptians had a platoon-size force penetrate deeper into Sinai while a 150-man force served as a diversion. With effort, the IDF repelled the diversion and tracked down then destroyed the platoon.⁶ The IDF did not reciprocate with small-unit raids into the west bank owing to manpower limitations.

An example of an Israeli position near the canal consisting mostly of sandbags and corrugated sheet steel over a dugout. This was demonstrably vulnerable to shelling with even near misses causing the collapse of sandbag walls and injuring personnel. (IDF)

A group of Egyptian Saiqa commandos stand in formation before UARAF Mi-8 helicopters. Groups of these men would more commonly cross the Suez Canal in rubber boats during operations against the IDF. The size and frequency of these raids grew over time and even came to daylight missions. (Albert Grandolini collection)

By fall 1968, Egypt was ready to assert itself with even more vigour. This was marked on 8 September with an unprecedented bombardment. Hundreds of guns and mortars rained over 10,000 shells on the Israelis, initially around Qantara but soon extending along the entire length of the canal for 3.5 hours. Soviet sources reported that 150 batteries expended 415 tonnes of ammunition in three hours. The observers felt that Egyptian estimates of the losses inflicted were exaggerated.⁷ Zahal did note the effectiveness against dug-outs of 160mm mortar bombs with delayed-action fuses, but still reported just 10 dead and 18 wounded. The IDF responded with more shells flying across the canal. Neither side appears to have used their aerial spotters extensively, and so counter-battery fire was largely shooting blind. Within months the growing air defences would make such spotters impractical.

On 8 September there was also a commando penetration and assault on an IDF patrol resulting in deaths and captured Israeli personnel. The realisation that they could become prisoners of the Egyptians, reported to torture their captives, was disturbing to those on the line. Heavy shelling was repeated on the 10th. The improvised Israeli posts were unable to withstand a direct hit and were vulnerable to near misses. Collapses of the works were accounting for many of the casualties.

More shelling followed, though on a smaller scale, until 26 October when the entire line got the UAR artillery treatment with nine hours of firing consuming 320 tonnes of ammunition. Zahal personnel were caught in the open during a football match and 15 soldiers were killed, 34 injured. These were heavy casualties by IDF standards, and they initially responded with further shelling of Suez’s oil works as well as Ismailia. The refineries rebuilt by the Soviets following the October 1967 shelling were hit again and several tanks set afire. (Egypt subsequently built distributed oil storage facilities away from the front.) From November 1967 the barrages became the principal Egyptian means of engaging the Israelis, the gunners permitted to shoot with no specific authorisation. The Egyptians would typically begin shelling in late afternoon in expectation that imminent nightfall would preclude Israeli airpower intervention.

The Soviet advisors remained unimpressed with their hosts’ operations. They blamed the failure of Egyptian artillery on inadequate reconnaissance, poor fire plans and inadequate fire direction. They did not wish the cannonades repeated until deficiencies in planning and preparation were overcome.

Reconnaissance flights along and across the seam line by both sides were usually escorted by fighters, or they were moments way. The United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF), angered by aggressive IAF (formally IDF/AF) tactics, tried to draw opposition aircraft into ambushes to be engaged by superior numbers. In one battle on 23 October, Egypt claimed four Mirages downed, but Israel recorded no loss or even that an engagement had occurred. There was another reported air battle on 3 November with more disputed results. Although most likely contrived victories, the Egyptian