The BEF in 1917: Arras, Vimy, Messines, Passchendaele and Cambrai

By Bob Carruthers

This new volume in the long-running Images of War series features the actions of the British Army at Passchendaele. The book is comprised of rare photographs illustrating the years of fighting on the northern sector of the Ypres salient, which finally culminated in the capture of the ridge at Passchendaele, accompanied by a powerful text written by Official War Correspondent Philip Gibbs, who was an eyewitness to the events. Photographs from the battlefield illustrate the terrible conditions, which the British forces on the battlefield endured in the notorious engagement, which has become synonymous with mud and squalor.This book incorporates a wide range of images, encompassing the actions of the British infantry and their supporting artillery. Also featured are images which depict the almost incomprehensible state of the waterlogged trenches. Portraits of the British troops are contrasted with German prisoners of war and the endless battle to get the supply columns through to the front.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 30, 2015
• ISBN: 9781473889361

Bob Carruthers

Bob Carruthers is an Emmy Award winning author and historian, who has written extensively on the Great War. A graduate of Edinburgh University, Bob is the author of a number of military history titles including the Amazon best seller The Wehrmacht in Russia.

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The BEF in 1917

Arras, Vimy, Messines, Passchendaele and Cambrai

Following the almost intolerable pressure exerted on the German armies by the Anglo-French Somme offensive that had dominated the second half of 1916 on the Western Front, there was little option for the numerically inferior German forces other than to save manpower by eliminating the resultant salient by straightening their lines. As a result, the Hindenburg (or Siegfried) Line of defences was constructed some thirty miles behind much of the German front line. On 9 February 1917 German troops gradually began the withdrawal to the new line, completed on 5 April 1917. They left behind a swathe of devastated territory, with advancing allied troops having to tackle numerous booby traps that, combined with judicious use of a rearguard, meant that the allied advance had to be very cautious. This withdrawal also had a considerable impact on the proposed French grand strategy for 1917, which had anticipated attacking both flanks of the Noyon salient.

Despite the doubts over the operational value of the Somme offensive, the British concluded, with some justification, that the German withdrawal resulted directly from the casualties that the Germans had suffered during the Battle of the Somme. This pointed towards the fact that, strategically, a policy of attrition could be a war-winning strategy on the Western Front; a viewpoint that was shared by all the major combatants. In consequence, a series of major offensives, which rippled gradually northwards towards Ypres, were conducted by the British throughout much of 1917. These offensives were to culminate in the Battle of Cambrai.

In 1917 the idea of a campaign in Flanders was certainly controversial and has remained so ever since. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, opposed the offensive, whilst the French approved but made clear their own problems with morale in the army after the relative failure of the Nivelle Offensive. The British commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, championed the idea of a Flanders offensive, but crucially did not receive approval for the full Flanders operation from the War Cabinet until 25 July 1917. The controversy has continued since the war, with a key argument being that the decisive offensive should be delayed until the arrival of the Americans in force in France (which rather assumed that the Germans would wait as well; their own strategic options were widened by the political turmoil in Russia). Flanders competed with other options put forward for 1917, such as a renewed offensive in Picardy or even a shift to the Italian front. The choice of General Hubert Gough and his Fifth Army to conduct the offensive was and continues to be controversial. The time that was allowed to elapse between the Battle of Messines and the opening attack of the Battles of Ypres has also been a source of criticism; although the realities of logistics (for example the shortage of railway stock and the need to re-lay lines for the offensive, not to mention political indecision, goes a long way to explaining the delay).

Nivelle’s grandiose offensive plan opened the campaigning season; by 1917 the size of the British Army on the Western Front had grown to two-thirds the total numbers in the French armies, yet the French still largely called the shots of allied grand strategy. Somewhat reluctantly, Haig agreed