International Human Rights in Post-Colonial Africa: Universality in Perspective

By Santino Ayuel Longar Dau

This study advances three interrelated claims for international human rights standards (IHRS). First, that post-colonial African societies are bureaucratic modern states and capitalist societies to which IHRS are suitable for application, pursuant to the Modified Modernisation Theory. The sweeping vicissitudes that have taken place in post-colonial Africa since colonial eras necessitate a paradigm shift: we must change our assumptions about the structural and socio-politico-economic systems of post-colonial Africa and their impact on individual and group rights. Second, that extant pleadings for cultural relativism in post-colonial Africa are fixated on reified assumptions about the minimal role of the individual. Today, however, every state relies on its individual subjects for its institutional and socio-politico-economic development, just as every individual relies on the state for a more secure, fulfilling and dignified human existence. Finally, the book advances legal and moral justifications for the universality of human rights standards, notwithstanding global cultural heterogeneity.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of Wales Press
• Release date: Jan 15, 2024
• ISBN: 9781837720682

Book preview

INTERNATIONAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

Series Editors

Diane Marie Amann

University of Georgia

Yvonne McDermott

Swansea University

Editorial Board

Simon Chesterman

National University of Singapore

Fiona de Londras

University of Birmingham

Fionnuala Ní Aoláin

Queens University, Belfast and University of Minnesota

Ryszard Piotrowicz

Aberystwyth University

Volker Roeben

Durham University

Carsten Stahn

Leiden University

INTERNATIONAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

Universality in Perspective

SANTINO AYUEL LONGAR DAU

© Santino Ayuel Longar Dau, 2024

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any material form (including photocopying or storing it in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some other use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright owner. Applications for the copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the University of Wales Press, University Registry, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3NS.

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British Library CIP Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-83772-066-8

eISBN 978-1-83772-068-2

The right of Santino Ayuel Longar Dau to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 79 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To my parents.

My late Father: Dau, Deng, Agieu, Kur, Adoor, Looi, Tiir, Wien (Winjog), Goj, Aywel, Longar, Jieldid. And my Mother: NYanayul, Ayweldid, Legnyang, Aywel, Kiir, Akwei, Jwaj, Padool, Ngoor.

To the World University Service of Canada that gave me the opportunity to pursue post-secondary studies in Canada and to all the champions who strive to create a world that is more equal, inclusive and just for all, this book honours your unwavering commitment to humanity and promotion of an undivided and more equal world.

Series Preface

The International Law series aims to give a platform to dynamic and cutting-edge research in international law, with a strong focus on legal theory in international law. In this work, Santino Dau brings an exciting new perspective to the universalism versus cultural relativism debate in international human rights law. Through a theoretically ambitious and wide-ranging analysis, Dau makes a strong case for the universality of human rights in Africa and for a more nuanced understanding of the debate in the contemporary context. This fascinating book is an outstanding addition to the International Law series. We continue to welcome proposals for books that bring new and exciting perspectives on diverse areas of international law.

Professor Diane Marie Amann

University of Georgia

Professor Yvonne McDermott

Swansea University

Contents

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgements

Figure

List of Abbreviations

1Universalism versus Cultural Relativism in the African Debate on International Human Rights

1.1 Introduction

1.2 The Problem Statement and Conceptual Framework

1.3 The Working Definition of Human Rights

1.4 The Focus of the Book

1.5 The Role of Human Rights in Nation-State Building in Postcolonial Africa

1.6 The Structural Organisation of the Book

2Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism: Unpacking the Key Concepts

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Universalism

2.3 Cultural Relativism

2.4 Synthesis: Critique and Commentary on African Arguments for Cultural Relativism

3Application of the Modified Modernisation Theory to Explain the Relevance of Human Rights to Africa

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Governance Legacy of Colonial Rule: Deformation and Transformation of Precolonial African Societies into Modern Nation-States

3.3 Modernisation Theory and its Nexus to the Universality of Human Rights

3.4 Synthesis and Conclusion

4International Human Rights as Sui Generis Moral and Legal Rights: A Justification for Universality

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Early Philosophical Justifications for Human Rights

4.3 Postcolonial Moral Justifications for the Universality of Human Rights Standards

4.4 Human Rights as Sui Generis Universal Moral and Legal Rights

4.5 Synthesis of the Relationship between Ratification and Universality

5Conclusion

5.1 Universalism versus Relativism Debate: Strengths and Limitations

5.2 Practical and Theoretical Justifications for Universality of Human Rights Standards

Bibliography

Notes

Foreword

There has been a long-running conundrum in the field of international human rights (IHRs) that African states’ current institutions and structures that are custodians of these rights may be Western in form and content. On the one hand is the claim that IHRs are universal and should be upheld by all states. On the other hand is the argument by governments and some researchers in the Global South that the concept of ‘rights’ is geographically specific and historically and culturally Western, and therefore should not be expected to apply everywhere. Who should determine this in the African context: the ordinary people who find themselves in need of protection; the African government that rejects the universality of IHRs when called on to uphold the rights of citizens; or the legal experts who might be expected to dig into history to answer this question? One of the most challenging views is the claim by some African governments, public officials and certain scholars, that IHRs do not apply to Africa because of the difference in culture. This view serves dictatorial and autocratic governments more than it serves ordinary people. There are also some Western scholars who hold the view that human rights originated from Western culture and are therefore, by nature, Western constructs; that they are not universal and should not be imposed on societies in Africa that cannot understand them. This is racist for anyone to think that there can be people living under a modern state – a construct that is rooted in colonialism – who cannot absorb a philosophical or cultural idea from the West.

This debate has not only complicated the efforts to protect human beings who find themselves in need of protection, it has also made it more difficult to teach students who are interested in this aspect of the human rights genre. As things stand, human rights activists and legal scholars are frustrated by self-serving claims often made by political leaders in Africa, that ‘human rights’ as a concept and practice are culturally and historically specific to the Western world, that they are primarily imperial impositions. This is frustrating because African postcolonial states/governments quickly find themselves in a paradox, rejecting Western human rights but living within a nation-state that is largely a Western structure.

This book, by a young scholar from South Sudan, a country that has been deeply embroiled in this debate because it is new and at war, is timely and as provocative as it is educative. It is a book that will be enjoyed by teachers of IHRs law and by field practitioners, and it will enlighten laypersons wishing to chime into this discussion. I have not read many other works of scholarship in this field that have moved me as this book has in terms of its accessible language and clarity of arguments on such an important topic of our time. The book has convincingly shown how the resistance to the universality of IHRs flies in the face of the reality that Africans now define themselves in terms of political identities, professional associations and socio-economic status, just as much as there is a strong place for indigenous cultures in identity formation of an African community. Both ‘Western’ and ‘African’ cultures have mixed in the context of the postcolonial African state. African political structures and their social order, as they stand today, must reckon with the fact that they are heavily influenced, if not direct products of colonialism, and as such, have to accept that their ‘socio-politico-economic structures’ are a mixture of Western and African historical experience. This means that Africans who object to IHRs on the account that they are foreign, but embody other aspects of Western culture, are simply being selective. But it is untenable for Africans to pick and choose, accept to come to terms with the colonial state but reject abiding by its historical reality of being subject to universal notions of human rights in the context of community of nations.

This is not to mechanically impose any argument on Africans, but to insist on pointing out that Africans, with or without Western influence, do organically pursue human rights protection with the same fervour with which those rights are pursued in the West. To illustrate, there are not a lot of people living in global northern countries, such as, say Norway or Canada, who have dedicated their lives to and risk their lives in the pursuit of human rights in the last decades since the Second World War, but I know and have read of many Africans who have perished in this endeavour. This shows the degree to which indigenous Africans have come to view IHRs as inherently African. Whether such dedication was learned through the adoption of the colonial state structures or was innate to African local cultures is immaterial, so long as upholding IHRs is done in service of society and not its destruction.

African traditional communities may not have used the phrase ‘human rights’ prior to colonisation and the rise of the modern state, but they are every bit aware and do adhere to expectations that could easily be described as human rights. For an African government to justify certain actions against citizens on account that they are not protected by the culture of IHRs is almost to think that African bodies can be violated and do not deserve protection because the concept is foreign. Looking at precolonial African societies, the rights of the individual, along with duties and obligations to one’s community, are abundantly prevalent in indigenous cultures. African states, as they stand today, cannot deny that they have been colonised and that they were restructured into entities that mirror the West, and, as such, cannot escape the application of Western notions of rights to them. The institutions and structures that are custodians of these rights are Western in form and content but find themselves caught between the desire by the officials of the state to get away with violations of these rights on account of being ‘African’ and the ubiquitous reality that they are part of the global system.

International Human Rights Law in Postcolonial Africa at once educates and is enjoyable to read as it records not only all corners of highly contested perspectives, but it also provides a picture of this young scholar’s agile legal and philosophical mind. It is not the book’s judgement that a modern nation-state is better than the communal system prevailing before colonialism. In fact, the former could be seen as a deformation of the latter. Instead, given the reality of colonialisation and modernising transformation therein, a modern nation-state must come to terms and apply IHRs regimes, just as it has already adopted capitalist social organising and constitution-based systems of justice, which could also be described as historically Western.

Professor Jok Madut Jok

Syracuse, New York, 2022

Preface

The mainstay in the dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism in the context of the African debate on human rights has, to a greater extent, been about the stark material distinction between the socio-politico-economic structures of Western and African societies. According to the proponents of relativism, this distinction is predicated on three main observations. The first observation is that while the human individual is the fundamental unit of socio-politico-economic organisation in a Western society, on the one hand, the community is, on the other hand, the fundamental unit of the socio-politico-economic organisation in a typical African society. The second observation is that the concept of rights, not duties, defines how an individual relates to society in the West. Third, and finally, relativists note that the process by which legal rights are secured in the West is through adversarial adjudication, not reconciliation, rehabilitation or repentance. Accordingly, since the international human rights (IHRs) regime establishes structures that operate to protect the interests of a sacralised human individual, IHRs standards, as currently constituted, are fundamentally incompatible with African communal value systems.¹

In these circumstances, African relativists view the universality of human rights standards as an imperialist or imposition of normative Western moral values on post-colonial African societies. This also implies that, regarding the African debate on human rights, the controversy surrounding the alleged or actual cultural differences between Africa and the West is not just about the content, but also the scope and, thus, the basis for arriving at universality, having regard to the global cultural heterogeneity.

One must, however, hasten to add that Africa’s adoption of Western socio-economic-political organisation in the form of modern nation-state and capitalist industry has posed a significant governance challenge to postcolonial African societies. Indeed, since gaining independence from European colonial powers in the mid-twentieth century, many African countries have had to grapple, in their unique circumstances, with the projects of state and nation building. State building involves efforts to buttress the capacities of public institutions to effectively deliver their constitutional functions. Nation building, similarly, involves strengthening the capacity of public institutions and bringing together many ethnic nationalities – especially in the context of formerly colonised societies – that were cobbled together during colonialism to form a modern state. Each of these nations or communities must now strive to build a nation of nations – a multi-ethnic state. A multi-ethnic society that fails to build an inclusive nation is more susceptible to adverse pressures, both internal and external. Such pressures tend to manifest themselves in the form of economic underdevelopment and/or political instability.

To build a more viable state, therefore, a postcolonial state must conform to, and integrate itself into, the cosmopolitan or conventual governance structure that takes the model of the bureaucratic modern nation-state and capitalist industry. In this endeavour, many former colonies must synchronously strive to undertake the projects of state building and nation building. This bifurcated approach is often an arduous task, especially for non-Western societies on which the model of the nation-state – along with its associated assortment of statecraft – was colonially imposed.

The system of modern nation-state and capitalist industry departs markedly from the prototypical precolonial African model of governance, which largely hinged on community. For societies that must transition from communally based systems to the cosmopolitan structures bequeathed to them by colonial powers, this task is even more challenging in another sense: they must strike a delicate balance between accepting the Western model of governance, on the one hand, and the retention of the traditional system of governance, on the other. It stands to reason that building a viable African state must be anchored on three interrelated ideas – namely, normative indigenous structures and values; prevailing cosmopolitan/conventional structures; and evolving standards of moral decency. This conceptualisation may provide an illuminating perspective on why several postcolonial African states have often faced a significant challenge against the forces of traditionalism, permissiveness and progressive ideology, all of which create a synergy for a rift between tradition and modernisation.²

This book, as such, examines the intersection between law and nation/state building, specifically from the perspective of universalism versus cultural relativism in the African context of the debate on human rights. The salient thematic issue in the dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism in IHRs discourse generally, and the African debate on human rights specifically is whether IHRs standards, as currently constituted, are universal, as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments. Indeed, in 1966, the United Nations promulgated the two main IHRs conventions; namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On the ratification of these instruments by the UN General Assembly in 1976, the world seemed set on a path to a more universal regime of human rights, having pinned its hope on the conviction that a universal human rights regime would provide the community of sovereign states with both legal teeth and political language with which to censure any state conduct deemed inimical to the established standards of IHRs. Yet, since the promulgation of these twin international covenants, the world has had as many reasons to celebrate the achievements and efficacy as it has less optimism about the progress in the IHRs regime’s ability to inform state conduct. Part of the problem lies in the relativist challenge to the original presumption that IHRs standards were unarguably universal.

In examining, in perspective, the state of IHRs law in postcolonial Africa, this book seeks to advance three interrelated claims. First, contrary to the conventional relativist view that postcolonial African societies are structurally communal, it contends that the vicissitudes that have taken place in Africa since at least the onset of colonial rule have deformed and transformed precolonial or precapitalist African societies into modern bureaucratic nation-states. On this account, the book advances a claim that IHRs standards are suitable for application to postcolonial Africa, pursuant to the modified modernisation theory. Second, the book also claims that the extant pleadings for cultural relativism and the consequential rejection of universality by many scholars and political leaders in Africa is as much fixated on the relevance and significance of precapitalist African societies as it is based on a reified assumption about the respective roles of the human individual and the community. A more precise question in this regard is: who is the legitimate repository of rights and legal protection in postcolonial Africa – is it the human individual, the community or both? The book strives to answer this question. Finally, the book proffers a justification for the universality of human rights from the perspectives of legal and moral foundations of human rights. In so doing, it maintains that as currently constituted, IHRs standards are suitable for application to postcolonial Africa due largely to the global evolution towards the systems of modern nation-state and free market industry. The twin systems of nation-state and capitalist industry are quintessential aspects of state modernisation.

In summary, the book approaches the universalism versus cultural relativism debate in Africa from both practical and theoretical perspectives. Practically, it argues that the exogenous and endogenous pressures that Africa has experienced in the past two centuries has structurally and socially deformed or transformed postcolonial African societies into modern nation-states and capitalist societies. This has resulted in Africa having to adopt human rights as both a prophylactic and a remedial response to the standard threats that organically arise from the assortment associated with state modernisation. The book further claims that a more compelling justification for universality lies in construing human rights as ‘sui generis universal legal and moral rights’. This contention serves to overcome the limitations of the postcolonial minimalist morality theories which tend to under-prescribe both the scope and validity of IHRs by reason of reference to specific cultural, philosophical and political justifications – particularly the Western traditions.

As used throughout the book, ‘Africa’ does not connote cultural, political and socio-economic homogeneity among all countries that make up the African continent. That is because Africa is a continent of fifty-four countries, each of which is teaming with culturally, religiously, ethnically and even racially diverse communities. A generalisation as to uniformity among these countries would treat Africa as a monolith and would, thus, be inadequate. For exegetical purposes, however, it is plausible to contend that almost all Tropical (Sub-Saharan) African countries practically share striking similarities that plausibly permit one to make a reasonable generalisation about Tropical Africa vis-à-vis other countries or cultural traditions. In this book, therefore, a reference to ‘Africa’ connotes Tropical Africa.

Finally, the writing of this book was inspired by what one may refer to as a situation of state-induced mass atrocities under several authoritarian governments in many parts of the African continent. However, the author is of the view that the manifestations of the immense human suffering witnessed in many countries on the continent could be cured if Africa subscribes fully to the ideals of the IHRs regime. In addition, the author contends that the debate about the structural nature of modern African communities is oblivious to the endogenous and exogenous forces such as creed, globalisation and migration, among others. These forces have transformed or deformed the socio-politico-economic structures of postcolonial African societies, resulting in most Africans now having to define themselves based on several parameters such as cultural (ethnic) identities, political persuasions, professional affiliations, economic or social class, and religious identities, among others.

The second defect of the standard arguments for cultural relativism in Africa is that it assumes that an individual’s worldview and sense of value judgement are solely products of communal values. This assumption is problematic because, while an individual’s worldview may be strongly influenced by their cultural milieux or social upbringing, he or she may well subscribe to an intersecting set of ideals and values among which culture is just one. Such ideals may oblige him or her to pay allegiance to a variety of interest groups – each with a different set of ideals and values. These values may be as important as, or even more important than, cultural beliefs. For instance, an individual may uphold political persuasions that are as strong as their cultural ties, religious affiliations or economic interests. Contrary to the main relativist claim, therefore, culture is not the only determinant of an individual’s value judgement, but rather one among many.

The essentialisation of the human rights debate in Africa from the viewpoint of culture, therefore, not only overlooks the effects of other ideals on an individual’s sense of moral judgements, it also ignores the fact that cultures are internally heterogeneous. In fact, differences within a single cultural tradition may be as striking as those between different traditions.³ For instance, a Catholic in South Africa might hold as strong a view on same-sex marriage as a Catholic in the United Kingdom, even though the two individuals belong to different traditions or cultures in an anthropological sense.

It is the author’s hope that this book has proffered new perspectives, at least to the African debate on human rights, having highlighted not only major limitations in the relativist arguments against the universality of human rights standards but also having sought to engender a paradigm shift in the debate from the seemingly fixed and abstract conceptions of Western versus African cultures towards a more realistic analysis, and, hence, an understanding of human rights as both a prophylactic and a remedial response to standard injuries that inhere in modernisation.

Acknowledgements

While all the errors and omissions in this book are solely my responsibility, its completion would have not come to pass but for the unwavering support, patience, constructive criticism and guidance of many scholars, some of whose names this acknowledgement note may have inadvertently passed over.

Atop those who honoured, inspired and prodded me to write this book was my former supervisor, Professor Sharry J. Aiken of Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada. Professor Aiken was the first to ask me, following the successful defence of my doctoral thesis, to enrich the thesis further and transform it into a book. Doing so, she advised, would make this study accessible to many people around the world, including political leaders, scholars and policymakers in Africa. As a supervisor then, Professor Aiken would often go above and beyond duty to provide me with both moral and material support. Without her undivided attention, guidance and belief in me, my doctoral thesis – the progenitor of this book – would have been difficult extremely, if not almost impossible. There were moments when I thought of quitting altogether. But for Professor Aiken’s immense knowledge, encouragement and constructive guidance, I was able to pull through just in time. I could not imagine a more inspiring and motivational supporter than Professor Aiken.

I am also grateful for the keen support of Professor Joshua Karton, the former associate dean of the graduate programme at Queen’s University’s School of Law. Professor Karton was undeniably as gracious and instrumental in shaping and redefining the quality of this book as was Professor Noah Weisbord, who always listened and gave me his wise counsel. Professor Weisbord was often able to respond to the drafts of this work in a timely fashion.

I am also indebted to my family and friends for always believing in me and my ability to break barriers. Without their inspiration, my academic story would have unfolded differently. I am particularly grateful to my ailing mother, NYanayul Aywel Legnayang. She had to make do with my absence for more than a decade especially when I was engrossed by the world of books in Canada. No amount of appreciation can be fully due to one’s parents from a truly grateful child.

For all those whose names I have inadvertently omitted, I am indebted to every one of you. I humbly beg your gracious pardon at this point for failing to acknowledge you. It is my hope that another opportunity will avail itself, at which point I pledge to pay my debts in full.

Figure

Figure 2.1 Venn diagram illustrating cultural relativism versus universalism

List of Abbreviations

AAA American Anthropological Association

ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

CIL Customary International Law

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

EU European Union

GBV Gender-based violence

FGM Female genital mutilation, female genital modification

FGS Female genital surgery

HCP Harmful cultural practices

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IBHR International Bill of Human Rights

IHRs International human rights

R2P Responsibility to protect

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

1

Universalism versus Cultural Relativism in the African Debate on International Human Rights

1.1 Introduction

While recent studies suggest that the overall level of mass political violence in Africa has been on the decline since 2000,¹ the continent has also seen a burgeoning of state-induced mass atrocities, especially against identifiable social, ethnic and/or religious communities. This situation is partly attributable to the recession of democracy and the corresponding rise of authoritarian governments on the continent.²

Seen in a historical context, however, the propensity for states to engineer political violence against their own subjects is no novelty. States are the primary and systematic violators of human rights. Indeed, in certain circumstances, governments may deploy human rights violations as an instrument of state policy.³ This state of affairs is clearly manifest in Africa, where several authoritarian governments have hitherto displayed wanton disregard for the human rights of their own subjects. The magnitudes of mass political violence seen in Rwanda, Liberia, the Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, most recently, South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea Conakry, Mali and the Central African Republic, among others, exemplify this tragedy, which depicts and bespeaks of a continent in turmoil. In fact, it was partly against the backdrop of these state-induced horrors around the world that inspired Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen to develop the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’,⁴ an idea from which the United Nations General Assembly would ultimately formulate the normative principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). The adoption of R2P followed the 2001 release of the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which stressed the need for a balance between the international community’s obligation to protect victims of state violence and the right of every state to enjoy a relative latitude from external interference in its domestic affairs.⁵

This book postulates that Africa has the potential to mitigate the intensity of state-induced mass atrocities by subscribing to the established international human rights (IHRs) standards. As set out later in this chapter and more broadly in Chapter 3, IHRs standards operate as both a prophylactic and remedial response to the standard threats that organically arise from the systems of bureaucratic modern nationstate and free market.⁶ Inherent in the nation-state and free-market systems is a concentration of political and economic power as well as relegation of human security to the central authority more than it ever was under the traditional systems of communal leadership. This state power, authority or sovereignty crystallises in the form of public institutions that enable the state to exercise an exclusive dominion over the subjects and resources within the frontiers of its jurisdiction. The exercise of sovereign power, however, infringes on the dignity of the subjects, those for whom the nation-state, as a product of social contract, is designed to protect.⁷ It follows that, since Africa appears to have adopted, almost irreversibly, the Western models of nation-state and free market, a re-evaluation as to the relationship between the resultant socio-politico-economic structures and the rights and freedoms of citizens is necessary.

This book, thus, maintains that the socio-economic and political transformations or ‘deformations’ of precolonial African structures, especially during colonial rule, have fundamentally altered the relationship between the ordinary African people and their governments. Consequently, the indignities that inhere in the systems of modern nation-state and capitalist industry cannot be remedied by means of traditional mechanisms (e.g., communal consensus, collective decisions, respect for elders and loyalty to communal authority), which were effective in bygone eras, but by means of human rights.⁸ That is because the human rights model operates both as a prophylactic and effective remedy against the organic injuries of modernity.⁹ This book contends, therefore, that the most effective means for remedying the standard threats induced by modernity consists in adopting IHRs standards in postcolonial Africa.¹⁰

By subscribing to the current IHRs standards as a means for mitigating the excesses of the exercise of state power and the oppressive socio-economic conditions of free-market industry, this book does not suggest that one must endorse the validity of these Western models. Rather, it makes a case for the universality of IHRs standards because Africa’s adoption of these models is almost irreversible and is, therefore, a fait accompli. That this situation is a fait accompli and, hence, almost irreversible, is manifest by the lack of debate on the need for a return to precolonial or merrie African societal structures.

1.2 The Problem Statement and Conceptual Framework

This book strives to advance three interrelated arguments for the universality of human rights standards. First, contrary to the conventional relativist contention that African societies are structurally corporate or