Oman's Insurgencies: The Sultanate's Struggle for Supremacy

By J. E. Peterson

Oman today is a rapidly modernizing and peaceful country on the fringes of a region in turmoil. It does, however, have a long history of internal strife. In the twentieth century, this strife took the form of two internal conflicts. The Northern Oman or al-Jabal al-Akhdar War of the 1950s was a struggle between the forces of the old tribally based Imamate and the newer Sultanate in the northern part of the country. In the Dhufar War of the 1960s-70s an anti-Sultanate - and later Marxist - front sought secession in the south. J. E. Peterson takes a detailed look at these two wars in the context of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. He surveys Oman's transition from a strictly traditional regime controlling only parts of the country to a modern, inclusive state, particularly in terms of security concerns. Peterson analyses the development of the Sultanate's successful responses to security challenges, especially in the creation and evolution of modern armed forces. 'John Peterson provides the nearest we will perhaps ever see of an official history.' David Benest, The British Army Review 'Peterson does an excellent job of developing the thesis that victory in these counter-insurgencies resulted from the two factors of establishing political legitimacy by meeting the local demands of the population and military efforts, which succeeded largely through British support.' Calvin H. Allen Jr., Middle East Journal

• Language: English
• Publisher: Saqi Books
• Release date: Jan 2, 2013
• ISBN: 9780863567025

Book preview

CHAPTER ONE

The Sultanate and its Challenges

Throughout much of Oman’s history, central government consisted of little more than a respected and accepted authority figure, generally an Ibadi Imam, and a small coterie of religious cum secular officials. While there were armed retainers or shurat at the disposal of the Imam and his walis (representatives in various towns and regions), effective power resided within the tribes. It was the duty of the tribal shaykhs (leaders) to provide armed forces at the command of the Imam when necessary, particularly when Oman was threatened from the outside. But, in practice, the shaykhs were independent and they were most concerned with protecting and advancing their own interests. This often involved inter-tribal conflict. In such cases, the Imam’s role was reduced to that of an arbitrator. When the Imamate degenerated into hereditary dynasties, the focus of such dynasties was generally on maritime enterprise and foreign conquest.

The emergence of the Sultanate, as outlined below, brought little difference. The first of the Al Bu Sa‘id rulers was proclaimed Imam despite having little religious qualification. His successors, even after they moved their capital to the coastal town of Muscat, changed little in the way they governed. Even the most renowned of the Al Bu Sa‘id, Sa‘id bin Sultan, spent most of his energy in building his fleet and extending his control over Zanzibar and the East African littoral. His descendants in Oman, bereft of the African possessions and resources, held on to power only shakily, thanks in large part to British quasi-protection.

As Oman entered the twentieth century, its Sultans, along with their British allies, were constantly aware of the difficulty of maintaining power in the absence of modern armed forces. This was brought into sharp focus by the Battle of Bayt al-Falaj in 1915, in which Indian Army troops stationed in Muscat successfully defended Muscat from invasion. Even though a local levy corps finally replaced these troops in 1921, the small size and lack of capabilities of the new force gave the government very little military potential. Expansion beyond the small garrison force was left to the early 1950s, when the intrusion of external factors was directly responsible for the addition of another two small units. These were enough to allow the Sultanate to regain control of the interior but not sufficient to maintain its control.

Throughout the last century or two, undoubtedly Oman’s closest international friend has been Britain. In addition to direct military assistance, Britain has also provided financial help and political support. Until 1947, Anglo-Omani relations were conducted through India, as British representation in the Gulf was the responsibility of the then-British Government of India. The senior representative was styled the political resident in the Persian Gulf (PRPG), and he made his headquarters in Bushire (Bushehr) on the Persian coast. Under him were a series of political agents stationed along the Arab littoral, including one in Muscat. Because Oman was always independent, the political agent in Muscat also carried the title of consul and thus reported to the Foreign Office in London on some matters. With Indian independence, the PRPG shifted to Bahrain and the chain of command went direct to the Foreign Office in London. Soon after the change of government in Oman in 1970, the British representative in Muscat was upgraded from consul-general to ambassador.

In the 1950s, a mix of factors meshed to produce a volatile situation in Oman. During the second half of the nineteenth century, various attempts had been made to resuscitate the Ibadi Imamate. But efforts to capture Muscat and replace the Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty had foundered because of British opposition. The Imamate was finally restored in 1913, but its writ ran only in the interior while the Sultanate retained control of Muscat and the coast. This bifurcated situation lasted until the death of the respected Imam in 1954. The alliance of his weak successor with external Arab support failed to protect his independence from Sultanate encroachment. While the Imamate never existed again in a real sense after 1955, its supporters continued to solicit pan-Arab support and wage rebellion against Sultanate forces. The Sultan was heavily dependent on British backing, which was reluctantly given amid Britain’s controversial standing in the Arab world after its participation in the 1956 Suez invasion of Egypt. The only way out of the dilemma of protecting an isolationist Sultan against an Arab-backed proto-Imamate movement was to create proper armed forces in Oman. This process was begun in 1958.

These armed forces had hardly brought peace to interior Oman when another dissident movement took shape in the southern province of Dhufar. Annexed to the Al Bu Sa‘id dominions only in the nineteenth century, Dhufar had never been properly integrated into the Sultanate and successive Sultans seemed to regard it as their personal property. An incipient rebellion against petty treatment by the reigning Sultan in the early 1960s morphed into a broader Dhufari nationalist movement a few years later. By the late 1960s, its leadership had been captured by Dhufari Marxists who counted on support from neighbouring South Yemen and the Soviet Union, China, East Germany and Cuba. British support was again required and provided, along with help from Jordan and Iran.

Thus, over the course of the twentieth century, the challenges to the Sultanate’s authority shifted from efforts to re-establish the ‘traditional’ institution of the Ibadi Imamate, to a struggle between the tribal interior and the British-backed Sultanate of the coast, to an insurgent movement more familiar on a world scale: a leftist front against a conservative, Western-supported regime. In the immediate sense, the Sultanate’s survival was assured by military means, as it prevailed in all these minor wars. In a more fundamental sense, however, the Sultanate remains the established regime in Oman because it has adapted to changing circumstances and, particularly in the post-1970 era, both accommodated the material needs of its people and integrated interior with coast and Dhufar with Oman.

Insurgency and Counter-insurgency

The Omani experience in defeating these insurgencies was the result of a combination of local authority, i.e. the Sultan, and persistent yet often restrained British support. The Sultan provided the legitimacy and the rallying point around which a government authority and local armed forces could be established and nurtured. Britain provided the funds, equipment, officers, direct military support on occasion, and Oman’s interface with the outside world. British officers and officials also introduced and employed emerging concepts of counter-insurgency operations to combat changing strategies of insurgency. Consequently, it may be useful to explore some of the relevant concepts.

Guerrilla and Revolutionary Warfare

Guerrilla warfare can be said to have an ancient pedigree. One exhaustive examination of such wars begins with the Scythians, Alexander the Great and Hannibal, and proceeds to trace its progress through the following millennia.1 But the last two centuries witnessed an explosion in and the refinement of the guerrilla strategy, particularly in terms of resisting invaders and opposing colonial regimes. The very name, ‘guerrilla’, points to the employment of such fighting by Spanish insurgents against Napoleonic France. Guerrilla warfare characterized the tactics of Native Americans against Europeans, Cubans against the Spanish in the 1890s, Filipinos against the US in 1899 and Nicaraguans against the US in the 1920s.2

After World War II, there arose a plethora of small wars in which Western powers were involved. Most of these were colonial conflicts or derived from colonial conflicts: Indochina (French), Indonesia (Dutch), Algeria (French) and Vietnam (United States). Others were insurgent movements aimed at replacing sitting governments, with little or no external involvement. The best known of these was the Communist campaign to take over China. But the insurgency led by Fidel Castro in Cuba also resulted in the emergence of Ché Guevara as a revolutionary icon and insurgency theorist.

The mid-twentieth century offered refinement of the strategy and its incorporation into the political principle of ‘revolutionary war’, defined as ‘A form of warfare which enables a small ruthless minority to gain control by force over the people of a country and thereby to seize power by violent and unconstitutional means.’3 The other factor in the transformation of the guerrilla strategy into revolutionary war was the emergence and adoption of Communist ideology. Within this influence, the experience and theories of Mao Tse-Tung provided a widely followed reference and model. The insurgencies following Maoist precepts were naturally mostly Communist in ideology, but the principles were universal and were employed by other nationalist dissident movements.

In the post-World War II era, the Communist takeover of China provided the earliest example of a successful ‘revolutionary war’ strategy. However, the Malayan insurgency of 1948–56, with a Communist front composed of largely ethnic Chinese battling the British and mostly Malayan plantation workers, was defeated by successful British counter-insurgency strategy, notably reliance on effective intelligence, extensive patrolling that hampered guerrilla movements and refuges, and cultivation of popular support with progressive moves towards the granting of Malayan independence. The United States made use of the lessons of the emerging British model of counter-insurgency warfare in the Philippines, but failed to apply them in Vietnam.4

Success in the Sultanate of Oman’s struggles against dissidence or insurgency was largely due to British assistance and involvement. This meant that British strategy and operations in Oman reflected British experience in small wars, particularly following World War II.5 The British mandate in Palestine faced increasing opposition from extremist Jewish groups during the 1930s and especially in and after World War II. The Irgun and the so-called Stern Gang carried out attacks on British troops, assassinated Lord Moyne, the minister of state in Cairo, and bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. A deepening cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism, as well as pressure from US support for the Jewish cause, forced Britain to end the mandate in 1948 and withdraw amid fighting between Jews and Arabs.

In Malaya, post-war British attempts to create a federation balancing Malay interests with those of the Chinese and Indian communities faltered on Malay opposition. By 1948, a Chinese-dominated Communist party, drawing on support from Chinese plantation workers, began a pattern of guerrilla attacks against plantations, military installations and police. Several years of slow buildup of the police and military failed to dent the insurgency, largely because of the employment of conventional tactics against unconventional forces. Eventually, more appropriate tactics were devised: winning the support of the civil population, the mass resettlement of villagers and extensive patrolling by small units of police and military with village militias, including the Special Air Service (SAS). By 1955, the ‘emergency’ had been largely contained although the government’s consolidation phase lasted until 1960.

The origins of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya lay in the grievances of the Kikuyu over ‘stolen land’ worked by the white population. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, some dissident activities began in 1948. The so-called Mau Mau grew increasingly extremist over the following years, but the government seemed ill-prepared to respond effectively. By 1953, more than 10,000 British troops were fighting the insurgency, along with 15,000 police and 20,000 home guards. Their efforts, however, were hampered by the expanse of territory to be contained and the rough forest terrain. A mile-wide ‘prohibited area’ complemented by a 50-mile-long ditch filled with sharpened stakes and barbed wire was established to deny the Mau Mau sanctuary in the Forest Reserves, and the forests were bombed while stringent measures were introduced to control the civil population. Frank Kitson, then a young British officer, introduced ‘pseudo-gangs’ to infiltrate Mau Mau gangs and gain intelligence. Massive sweeps were carried out to capture or kill Mau Mau insurgents, and the capture of the remaining leader effectively ended the war in 1956. Kenyatta was freed in 1961 and became president of an independent republic in 1963.

The Cyprus insurgency began in the early 1930s when Greek Cypriots began opposing British rule and calling for union with Greece. Following World War II, George Grivas organized harassing activities against the British through the EOKA, and the British decision in 1954 to move its Middle East land and air headquarters from Suez to Cyprus, thus indicating its intentions to keep sovereignty over the island, inflamed the situation. The following year, the EOKA organized protests and began attacking police. Negotiations with moderate Greek Cypriots were halted in 1956 when Archbishop Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles, leaving leadership in the hands of the more extreme Grivas. In response, the EOKA stepped up its attacks and the government responded with heavy-handed tactics that alienated much of the population. British security measures were attenuated because of the Suez War that year, allowing the small EOKA forces to expand their activities, while British recruitment of Turkish Cypriots into the police widened the conflict into a Greek-Turkish divide. Two years later, Britain offered sovereignty in return for permanent base rights: Makarios agreed and Grivas was forced to disband the EOKA and relocate to Greece.

Not surprisingly, these wars generated a considerable amount of theorizing about ‘counter-insurgency’ methods, in large part meant to guide British military policy in future conflicts. For Oman, three of the theorists who seem to have had considerable impact on British operational thinking were Robert Thompson, Julian Paget and Frank Kitson.

Thompson’s ideas grew out of his experiences as a field officer and then a staff officer in Malaya during the ‘Emergency’ in the 1950s and later as head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam in the early 1960s. His earlier writings were largely specific to the Vietnam case study, but the third of his books on the subject encompassed explanation of what he termed ‘revolutionary war’ and the role of the Soviet Union and Communist China in promoting it.6

Paget was a serving British officer tasked with developing measures to counter the anti-British groups in Aden in the second half of the 1960s. He had also served in Palestine from 1945 to 1948. The outcome of his researches from earlier conflicts and his experience in Aden was a book titled Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare7.

Kitson had seen action with the British Army in Kenya and Malaya before a War Office appointment involved him in the planning for the 1950s’ operations in Oman. Subsequently, he saw action in Cyprus as well. Although his ideas of ‘counter-insurgency’ warfare took form during his involvement with these wars, their exposition in book form did not appear until the 1970s.8 Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations caused a stir on its publication in 1971. His central thesis was that the British Army had been trained primarily for conventional warfare, whereas most of its operations since World War II had involved small wars. He therefore advocated greater emphasis on counter-insurgency training, and stressed that responsibility for intelligence should rest with the army rather than the police. But since his book appeared at a time when Northern Ireland was becoming particularly troublesome, controversy arose over the application of his ideas to urban unrest rather than colonial or Third World conflicts.9

It will be noted that all of the publications of the above theorists postdate the war in northern Oman, although not necessarily the war in southern Oman. As argued later, the 1950s’ fighting in Oman largely followed a pattern of more conventional warfare – apart from during the final phase in which the Imamate leaders were evicted from their mountain fastness. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that, for reasons that will become apparent later in this book, the war in northern Oman and the war in southern Oman were markedly different in origins and activities, although they did share similar denouements. In addition, there is some conceptual difficulty in categorizing the war in northern Oman as an ‘insurgency’, although that is how it was seen by most parties at the time.

Analysing Insurgencies

It should be obvious that no two small wars are alike. They differ most often in such matters as political situation, degree of external involvement, the causes of rebellion, terrain and conduct of fighting. Nevertheless, the emergence of dissident movements tends to follow set patterns.

An encompassing typology of insurgent movements that have operated during the post-World War II period identifies six types. Secessionist movements seek to withdraw from an entity. Revolutionary insurgent movements seek a new and radically transformed regime along Marxist lines. Restorational movements also desire to replace existing regimes, but instead wish to restore an elitist character to the entity. Reactionary insurgents differ from restorationists by looking back to a golden age as their example. Conservative insurgent movements wish to maintain the existing regime despite the attempts of authorities to change it. Reformist movements are similar to secessionist movements but define their goal more narrowly as autonomy and better treatment within the existing polity.10

The northern Oman war of the 1950s would seem to fall into the reformist or secessionist category. The temptation to add ‘reactionary’ to the description would probably be inaccurate. The goal of the Imamate movement was not to recreate the golden age of the Ibadi Imamate in Oman per se, as sought by more recent Islamist extremists. Rather, its minimal intention was to retain autonomy and semi-independence for the interior of northern Oman under the nominal leadership of a traditional Imam and with strong control by prominent tribal shaykhs. As pointed out earlier, the war can be categorized as an insurgency only after 1955, when the government of the Sultanate established effective control over the interior. The Sultanate’s legitimacy in the interior rested on national and rational grounds and not historical or religious ones. The war in southern Oman during the 1960s and 1970s, however, gradually graduated from the character of a reformist movement to a revolutionary one with Maoist tenets central to its conception.

Mao Tse-tung’s theory of insurgency developed gradually out of the Communist experience of guerrilla war against the KMT government, and many of its tenets reflect the specific requirements and successes of that struggle. The failure of the ‘Autumn Harvest’ urban uprising in 1927 demonstrated to Mao and other Communist leaders the futility of conventional war. Chiang Kai-shek’s subsequent actions to seal off areas of the country and encircle Communist positions forced the Long March of 1934. These reverses were fundamental in developing the concepts of time, space, will and substitution. The time required to rebuild and strengthen the Communist cadres could be acquired by trading space – or territory and freedom of movement – for time. The time gained would enable the will to carry on the fight within the party and the population, and diminish the will of the other side.

The final principle envisaged the substitution of strengths for weaknesses. In Mao’s thinking, guerrilla warfare was only the means to gain the capability to achieve success through conventional warfare and, in order to reach this stage, there had to be a clear political agenda. His strategy envisaged progress through three stages: political organization and terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. Success in stage two, the guerrilla campaign, would be characterized by the development of parallel and hierarchical political and military organization, and advances in recruitment, safe facilities and logistics. Although external support was not a significant part of Maoist theory, in practice revolutions generally depended heavily on external political backing, training, provision of weapons and supplies, sanctuary and sometimes manpower.11

Mao also recognized the importance of terrain in conducting guerrilla warfare. In addition to operations in rural areas, jungles, mountains and swamps were regarded as the most suitable environments.12

The success of these principles in China inspired their emulation by other post-war revolutionaries. Prominent among these were the insurgents in Malaya (1948–60), Burma (1949–55), the Philippines (1946–54), Algeria (1954–62), Angola and Mozambique (1961–74), Rhodesia (1972–80) and of course Dhufar.13 As time passed, however, Maoist insurgencies seemed to lose effectiveness, in part because of lessons learned by counter-insurgency forces.14

Counter-insurgency Strategies

The application of counter-insurgency strategy to defeat these movements has evolved over time. As insurgency concepts develop, so must counter-insurgency theory. While insurgencies were transformed into guerrilla warfare and revolutionary goals, so incumbent authorities were forced to adapt their strategies. It was recognized from an early date that conventional responses to guerrilla activities were useless. But armies tend to be configured to fight conventional wars, and small wars tend to be unglamorous, time-consuming, without clear-cut victories, often politically ambiguous and inexpedient in terms of typical training and organization. It is not surprising, therefore, that armies have traditionally disliked fighting small wars, and that police or gendarmeries have played important roles in such conflicts.15

Undoubtedly the most crucial factor in developing strategies to overcome armed dissidence has been experience in the field. Various writers have commented on the difference between British and American approaches. The British treated the Malayan Emergency, for example, as a local problem requiring the granting of unusual latitude for the local commander and the army and police forces involved. The Kennedy administration, however, came to view insurgencies as one aspect of a Communist grand design. Thus, they formed one part of the global strategic picture and, because the Cold War was seen to have a zero-sum basis, they must be managed centrally from Washington.16 Vietnam, of course, was the principal testing ground for this conception, but also a clear illustration of its failure.

Building on his experience in Malaya, Robert Thompson, the earliest of the theorists mentioned above, elucidated five principles of counter-insurgency. Governments should have a clear political aim, function within the law, establish a coordinated overall plan encompassing both political and military objectives, place emphasis on countering political subversion and secure their base area before conducting a military campaign. Additional points included placing reliance on police above the military and the necessity of operations by small units in order to carry the offensive to the insurgents.17

Writing in the mid-1960s, Julian Paget laid out what he regarded as the essential requirements for counter-insurgency operations. These were: a. civil-military understanding, b. a joint command and control structure, c. good intelligence, d. mobility, and e. training. These dovetailed with conditions that Thompson had observed earlier. Furthermore, Paget stressed that ‘These requirements are different from those in conventional warfare in several ways, and it is not sufficient merely to adapt conventional warfare methods to meet the special conditions of counter-insurgency campaigning.’18

Meanwhile, Frank Kitson emphasized the complementarity of defensive and offensive operations in the framework of a coordinated political and economic plan. He classified defensive operations as ‘those designed to prevent insurgents from disrupting the government’s programme. ... [O]ffensive operations ... are those designed to root out the insurgents themselves.’19 There must be a balance between the two: too little reliance on defensive operations gives insurgents the opportunity to score successes and undermine pro-government morale, while insufficient attention to offensive operations allows insurgent movements to grow and thus require more and more resources to be devoted to quelling the problem. Kitson saw part of the political aspect as countering insurgent propaganda, a difficult act to accomplish given the delicate nature of offensive operations in areas of uncommitted or hostile populations. While defensive operations involve guarding and protecting assets, as well as maintaining law and order, another priority is thwarting insurgent attempts to cultivate support from the population. This involves a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign and a close relationship between civil and military authorities.20

As mentioned above, many of Kitson’s ideas were formed as a result of his observations in Kenya in particular (where he seems to have acquired his insistence on the importance of ‘trackers’), and in Malaya, as well as in northern Oman and later in Cyprus. Operations in Kenya were more dependent on the application of large-scale force and were less successful in accomplishing ‘hearts and minds’ aspects, although some long-term reform was carried out and an accelerated path to independence was instituted.21

But it was Malaya that served as the most important proving ground for theory, and it was there that Thompson’s five principles were developed. These principles were subsequently reformulated in terms of six essential factors contributing to the successful containment of Maoist insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines. These were: 1. the recognition that political action designed to prevent the insurgents gaining popular support should take priority over purely military action; 2. the requirement for complete civil-military cooperation; 3. the need for coordination of intelligence; 4. the separation of the insurgents from the population through the winning of hearts and minds; 5. the appropriate use of military force to support pacification; and 6. lasting political reform to prevent the recurrence of insurgency.22 While other countries slavishly applied the same principles to significantly different circumstances, the British approach was hailed as being flexible in recognizing that different social and economic conditions required alterations in tactics.23

Applicability to Oman

The place of Oman’s wars in this struggle between theories and strategies of insurgency and counter-insurgency can be seen as arising from Oman’s role as both a laboratory for the application of theory to reality and as a case study for refinement of approaches. That the former was less true of the war in northern Oman is due to two factors. First, northern Oman was a relatively early insurgency and more of an ad hoc strategy was required. Second, the circumstances of northern Oman were markedly different from other previous and contemporary small wars: it was not anti-colonial in nature (although this aspect figured in propaganda by the Imamate and its supporters), it was not as comprehensive an insurgency as elsewhere and, most importantly, it depended on no revolutionary (let alone Maoist) ideology.

However, the Dhufar War fitted more squarely into both categories. On the one hand, sufficient time (and experience) had preceded the war for strategies and tactics to be devised and put into action on both sides. On the other hand, the successful prosecution of the war by the Sultanate and the British was hailed as the method by which Maoist insurgents could be defeated. The war formed such a perfect textbook example of how counter-insurgency operations should be formulated that it found a prominent place in the curriculum at the British Army Staff College.

The Emergence of the Sultanate

Oman and its People

Oman has been a Sultanate (i.e. a country ruled by a Sultan) since the Al Bu Sa‘id family became its rulers in the mid-eighteenth century. Sultan Qabus bin Sa‘id Al Sa‘id, the fourteenth in this line, has been ruler since 1970. Coming to the throne shortly after the discovery of oil, Sultan Qabus has set Oman on a path of extensive socio-economic development that has transformed the country and raised the standard of living remarkably.

The country’s total population is slightly more than two and a half million, of which some three-quarters are Omani citizens. The mountainous geography has dictated that Oman is a rural country. Traditionally, most people lived in small towns or villages, where they engaged in subsistence farming or were fishermen along the country’s long coasts. Because Oman is an arid country, cultivation depends on irrigation, which is provided by the extensive system of aflaj (sing., falaj), networks of underground and above-ground water channels, which are present throughout the countryside. This tradition of farming also means that the Bedouin or pastoralist nomads of the deep interior deserts have been marginal to the Omani economy and society, unlike in neighbouring countries in the Gulf.

Still, Omani society is essentially tribal in nature, and tribalism has been a fundamental force in Oman ever since the immigration of Arab tribes from other parts of the Arabian Peninsula in the centuries before Islam. Oman embraced Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and then developed into a stronghold of al-Ibadiyah or Ibadism, one of the first sects to grow out of orthodox or Sunni Islam, in the mid-eighth century AD. These two factors have determined the internal political dynamics of the country for more than a millennium.

Over time, the tribes naturally bifurcated into two opposing confederations, al-Ghafiriyah and al-Hinawiyah. Although it is possible for tribes (or even sections of tribes) to switch allegiances, a rough balance between the two confederations is maintained on the national, regional and local levels. Many towns and villages, for example, are physically divided into two halves, al-‘ulayah (upper) and al-sifalah (lower) in a reflection of their Ghafiri/Hinawi distinction. Struggle between the two confederations, particularly in the times of strong and ambitious confederation leaders, has provided a major influence on Omani politics and internal wars.

Omanis are predominantly Arab and exclusively Muslim. Although the Al Bu Sa‘id ruling family belongs to the Ibadi sect, there are nearly equal numbers of Ibadis and Sunnis amongst the Omani population, in addition to several small Shi‘ah communities. Apart from a few small communities in North Africa, Ibadis are found today only in Oman. They are very close to the Sunnis in doctrine and ritual, with the major difference being in the traditional Ibadi reliance on an elected Imam as the religious and temporal leader of the community. Most Muslims around the world are Sunni, while the largest sect to break away from Sunni Islam was that of the Shi‘ah, which itself subdivided further into a number of sub-sects. The largest of these is that of the Ja‘faris or Twelvers, who constitute a large majority in Iran, a majority in Iraq and Bahrain, and small minorities in all the other Gulf States including Oman. Unlike Ibadism, Shi‘ah Islam differs considerably from Sunni Islam.

While the majority of the population is Arab, smaller communities have also been long present. The largest of these are the Baluch, found mainly along the Gulf of Oman coast and in the capital area. While some Baluchis have emigrated to Oman in recent times from the Baluchistan area of Pakistan and Iran, many have lived in Oman for centuries. The Baluch are Sunni, but there are also three small communities of Ja‘fari Shi‘ah in Oman, principally in the capital area. These are: the Lawatiyah, thought to be mainly of Indian origin, who have resided in Oman for at least three centuries (until recently inside their own walled quarter of Matrah); the Baharinah, a small number of Arab Shi‘ah families traditionally concentrated in Muscat; and the ‘Ajam who, judging from their name, are descendants of Persian immigrants to Oman.

These last groups point to another feature in Oman’s development: the emphasis on maritime trade and expansion. Oman has a long seafaring tradition throughout the Indian Ocean. The connection of Oman with the East African littoral is hundreds of years old, but has been particularly important in the last two centuries, when many Omanis worked and settled in East Africa, especially Zanzibar. Some of them moved freely back and forth between Zanzibar and Oman, while others made East Africa their permanent home and married there. Following the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964 and the appearance of the new regime in Oman in 1970, thousands of ‘Zanzibari’ Omanis returned to Oman. The African features of some Omanis also result from the past existence of slavery in the country.

Geography has been another key determinant shaping the history and society of the country. Oman is a medium-sized country wrapped around the eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, thus making it the eastern frontier of the Arab world. Its long coastline is defined by the Gulf of Oman in the north and the Arabian Sea in the south, both arms of the Indian Ocean, with a small frontage on the Gulf (variously known as the Arabian Gulf or the Persian Gulf ). Much of Oman’s inland boundaries are marked by the great sand desert of al-Rub‘ al-Khali, or the Empty Quarter. This geography helps to explain Oman’s traditional isolation and inward-looking tendency, as well as its greater emphasis on maritime contacts throughout the Indian Ocean than ties to the rest of the Arab world. It also illustrates Oman’s strategic depth in what has latterly become a turbulent part of the world. The Sultanate is fortunate in this sense to enjoy considerable separation by sea and distance from the trouble spots around the Gulf.

A long, dramatic mountain chain, al-Hajar, mirrors the Gulf of Oman coast, curving almost from Ra’s al-Hadd, the easternmost point in Oman, around to the Strait of Hormuz in the north. The majority of people live in the northern part of the country on either side of this mountain chain, while great gravel-plain deserts divide the north from the more sparsely populated southern region of Dhufar.

Oman’s capital is Muscat, once a small town and port ringed by dark, forbidding hills. Now old Muscat is essentially the ceremonial capital, while the government, commerce and inhabitants have spilled out into a larger surrounding region. The resultant conurbation not only embraces Muscat’s twin town of Matrah, site of the country’s principal seaport, but also stretches some 50 kilometres past al-Sib (sometimes spelled Seeb) International Airport along the coast. Near the airport lies the junction with the major roads connecting the capital to the coastal region, to the interior and to the south.

The region of al-Batinah hugs the coastline from Muscat west to the border with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The region consists of a long beach, backed by a nearly contiguous string of towns and villages and their surrounding date-palm gardens, backed by a flat, barren plain that stretches inland to al-Hajar Mountains. This is the most densely populated area of the country, with a high proportion of Baluchis as well as Arabs. Its largest town is Suhar (sometimes spelled Sohar), centuries ago the most important port on the Oman coast. On the inland side of the mountains lies the region of al-Dhahirah, the traditional land bridge between Oman and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. Its people are mostly Arab, and the tribes are roughly half Ibadi and half Sunni. At the western edge of al-Dhahirah lies the important town of al-Buraymi, once the centre of an oasis of nine small villages, but now virtually surrounded by the expanding UAE city of al-‘Ayn. UAE territory also cuts off Oman from its northern Musandam enclave, a sparsely populated and mountainous thumb jutting up into the Strait of Hormuz, the only exit from the Gulf. All of the Gulf’s seaborne oil exports and other shipping must pass through Omani territorial waters.

The heartland of Oman lies on the inland side of al-Hajar Mountains, to the south of al-Dhahirah and southwest of Muscat. The area’s centrality to the concept of Oman is reflected in the fact that it was traditionally known simply as Oman or Oman Proper, but today it is called al-Dakhiliyah (or the Interior). Here are located the country’s most renowned and typical towns, such as Nizwa and Bahla’, and many of the most notable and important tribes. The population of al-Dakhiliyah is Arab and almost entirely Ibadi. Al-Dakhiliyah is neighboured on the east by al-Sharqiyah region, which is also Arab and largely Ibadi, except for the smaller area of Ja‘lan in the far east which is mainly Sunni. Al-Sharqiyah is a region of small villages and is separated from the Arabian Sea by the Wahibah Sands. Sur, the region’s only port, is the traditional link to the outside world, especially East Africa, and an ancient centre of maritime trade, shipbuilding and smuggling.

At the southern end of Oman lies Dhufar, a geographically and culturally distinct region that has been incorporated into Oman only within the last century or so. Close relations have always existed with neighbouring Yemen, and the people of the mountains speak several south Arabian languages. Dhufar’s mountains are the only place in the Arabian Peninsula touched by the Indian Ocean monsoon, and the province was the site of a lengthy insurrection in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the region has become closely integrated with the rest of the Sultanate and its principal city, Salalah, has expanded enormously.24

The Tradition of the Imamate and the Emergence of the Al Bu Sa‘id

The natural tendency of Oman’s tribal organization to work against national unity was overcome by the institution of the Imamate. Ibadism is very close to Sunnism in most respects of dogma and ritual, but an important distinction lies in the Ibadi insistence on an elected Imam who provides both the religious and secular leadership of the community. While in theory, election as Imam was open to any qualified adult male, in practice, successful election depended on the backing of the principal shaykhs (tribal leaders) of one of the tribal confederations and preferably on the backing of both sides. Certain families, noted for their religious learning and competence, tended to produce the majority of Imams. The capital of the state was simply where the Imam resided, generally Nizwa in the central Oman region, but also on occasion at al-Rustaq or another town.

Over the centuries, the Imamate frequently degenerated into dynasties that in turn disintegrated as a result of civil war or foreign invasion. Internal political weakness in the sixteenth century facilitated Portuguese conquest of Oman’s coastal towns, but the subsequent emergence of a strong Imam, Nasir bin Murshid al-Ya‘rubi, enabled the Omanis to evict the Portuguese in the mid-seventeenth century, a process that culminated in the recapture of Muscat in 1650. But the reunification of Oman under Imam Nasir later degenerated into another dynasty, that of al-Ya‘aribah (sing., Ya‘rubi), which eventually split into quarrelling factions.

In the early eighteenth century, the Ya‘rubi Imam Sayf bin Sultan II sought the assistance of Nadir Shah of Persia against a rival. In the end, however, the Persian forces occupied most of Oman’s coastal settlements in the name of Nadir Shah. The resistance was led by Ahmad bin Sa‘id Al Bu Sa‘id, a merchant who was close to Imam Sayf and served as his wali (governor) of Suhar. In return for ousting the Persians from Oman, and after the death of Imam Sayf, Ahmad was elected Imam in about 1744 at al-Rustaq. Eventually, however, his descendants moved their capital to Muscat on the coast and, turning their attention to overseas pursuits and maritime trade, abandoned their claim to rule as Imams. Known at first by the title of Sayyid, by the twentieth century the Al Bu Sa‘id rulers had adopted the title of Sultan.25

In the interior, however, a series of attempts was made to recreate the institution of the Imamate in opposition to the Al Bu Sa‘id. In 1868, a coalition of religious and tribal forces with ‘Azzan bin Qays, a member of a cadet line of the Al Bu Sa‘id, at its head swept into Matrah and Muscat and installed ‘Azzan as Imam. But his reign lasted only three years before he was killed and the main line of the family regained control. Then the redoubtable Shaykh Salih bin ‘Ali al-Harithi, at the head of a Hinawi coalition of tribes, occupied Matrah in 1874 and 1877 and laid siege to Muscat in 1883. In 1895, Shaykh Salih managed to infiltrate his tribal followers into Muscat and gained control of the town, forcing Sultan Faysal bin Turki to flee to Fort al-Jalali, one of the two old Portuguese forts overlooking Muscat’s harbour. The tribes were persuaded to depart two months later after receiving substantial payments.

A more permanent recrudescence of the Imamate took place in March 1913, when the leaders of both the Ghafiri and Hinawi confederations supported the election of Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi. Within months of his election, the garrisons in the forts of the interior were evicted and control of the interior passed out of the hands of the Sultan. Mindful of the events of 1895 and fearing for the safety of Muscat and Matrah, the British Government of India offered Indian Army troops to the Sultan to defend his capital. These troops were eventually replaced by the country’s first formally organized armed forces unit.

The Battle of Bayt al-Falaj in 1915 checked the advance of the tribes on Muscat but it left the interior in the hands of the Imamate, and this de facto division of the country, implicitly recognized by the Agreement of al-Sib in 1920, continued until the 1950s. In the meantime, Sa‘id bin Taymur succeeded his father, Taymur bin Faysal, as Sultan in 1932, and quickly set about restoring the financial health of his state and making plans to reassert his authority over the interior. Essential steps included improvement of his military capabilities. The Batinah Force was formed in Suhar in 1952 to provide a defence against Saudi incursions at al-Buraymi, and then the Muscat and Oman Field Force was formed in 1954 as an escort for the first oil-company expedition into the deep interior. A year later, this force was responsible for the capture of Nizwa, which marked the reunification of Oman.

The story was not yet over, however, as followers of the Imam staged an uprising in 1957 and briefly regained control over much of inner Oman. With British help, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) were established in 1958 to enable the Sultan to reassert his rule, although this was not complete until the mountain fastness of al-Jabal al-Akhdar was recaptured a year later. Attention later shifted to Dhufar, where an insurrection broke out in the early 1960s. The situation steadily grew worse, until Sultan Sa‘id was removed in 1970 by his Sandhurst-educated son, Qabus bin Sa‘id. Still, considerable effort and substantial outside assistance were required to win the war, which was officially declared over at the end of 1975. Of necessity, the SAF had doubled in size, and subsequent years were devoted to expanding and broadening their capabilities to meet a wide variety of threats.

Conflict in Oman Before the Mid-twentieth Century

Conflict of one sort or another has been endemic in Oman for much of its history. Conflict is an essential aspect of tribal autonomy and rivalry, and weak, despotic or non-existent Imams eroded central authority and exacerbated natural centrifugal tendencies. On occasion, external threats to the Omani polity rallied the tribes to put up a combined armed resistance to the invader. These ‘national’ alliances were always ephemeral, however.

Warfare in Oman Before the Twentieth Century

Permanent military forces belonging to a central government were not a prominent feature of Oman’s past.26 The country was loosely organized in a political sense, and as a result hostilities most commonly took place between relatively autonomous tribes. The superior force of the Ibadi Imamate was principally moral in nature, and traditionally the Imams were forbidden standing armies as they were seen as providing a dangerous potential for despotism. The only armed forces in the regular service of the Imam, or at the disposal of his walis (representatives), were a scattering of ‘askaris or shurat, armed retainers who garrisoned the forts and towers and made arrests. In times of threat to the nation, it was necessary for the Imam to call upon the tribal shaykhs to provide levies to help defend Oman. In this way, the Portuguese were repulsed in the sixteenth century and the Persians in the eighteenth.

Until early in the twentieth century, the Al Bu Sa‘id rulers similarly relied on ‘askaris for their routine military needs, and on tribal levies when waging war was required. Tribal levies were generally provided by a small group of tribes sharing the same Ghafiri allegiance. Prominent among these were the Bani ‘Umar and al-Hawasinah, although the Bani Bu Hasan, Bani Bu Ali, Bani Ghafir and al-Shihuh tribes were also relied upon. In addition, rulers were occasionally able to secure assistance from outside powers. For example, Oman provided assistance to the British in crushing the power of the maritime dynasty of al-Qawasim in the lower Gulf at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and a few years later British troops were instrumental in crushing the Bani Bu ‘Ali tribe in Ja‘lan.

Still, tribal levies were fundamentally unsatisfactory. The tribes’ willingness to come to the ruler’s aid often depended on the foe (as, for example, Hinawi tribes naturally would not fight Hinawis). Individual tribesmen were frequently motivated more by the promise of loot than by loyalty, and many times tribal allies simply melted away at the time of battle. On numerous occasions in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Al Bu Sa‘id rulers found themselves at the mercy of hostile tribal forces at the gates of Matrah and Muscat, when they were not actually inside.

As a result, various rulers made attempts to create permanent garrison forces to protect the capital and to free themselves from dependence on fickle tribes. Although some ‘askaris were drawn from friendly tribes, many were mercenaries drawn from what is now Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Baluchistan, as well as from black Africans. A long tradition of recruiting Baluchi mercenaries was apparently begun by the last Ya‘rubi Imam in the early eighteenth century. Imam Ahmad bin Sa‘id Al Bu Sa‘idi maintained a garrison of African slaves for the defence of al-Rustaq and a mounted force of Arabs for mobile use around the country, in addition to the occasional employment of Baluchi mercenaries. His garrison in Muscat was described as being armed with matchlocks, swords and daggers. A bit later, it was said that Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmad (r. 1792–1804) employed about 300 armed slaves and 1,700 Sindi, Baluchi and Arab mercenaries.

At the same time, the long and notable maritime tradition of Oman meant that rulers in the past possessed powerful naval fleets. The Ya‘aribah became renowned for their maritime power. As the Portuguese were driven out of Oman, Ya‘rubi fleets followed them down the East African littoral and successfully besieged the Portuguese forts there. By 1715, the Ya‘rubi fleet consisted of a ship of seventy-four guns, two ships of sixty guns, some more of fifty guns, another eighteen smaller vessels with twelve to thirty-two guns, and some rowing vessels with four to eight guns. Omani naval power was known from the tip of India to the Red Sea and down the African littoral. The Ya‘aribah briefly occupied Bahrain in the Gulf and extended their control to the Kuria Muria Islands (now known as al-Hallaniyat) on the Arabian Sea littoral of the Arabian Peninsula.

The maritime tradition continued under the Al Bu Sa‘id as trading with Ottoman Iraq, Yemen, India and East Africa flourished. By 1775, Imam Ahmad bin Sa‘id had built up a fighting fleet of thirty-four ships, of which four carried forty-four guns and five were frigates of eighteen to twenty-four guns. Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmad (r. 1792–1804) used his fleet to transport some 7,000 troops (2,500 of whom were Persian) to occupy Bahrain on two brief occasions during 1800 to 1802.

The era of Sayyid Sa‘id bin Sultan (r. 1807–56) was particularly noteworthy for his military and naval campaigns, precisely because Sayyid Sa‘id was a vigorous ruler intent on expanding his territory and power. Campaigns were carried out against the Ottomans at Basrah, the Persians at Bandar ‘Abbas, Bahrain and Qatar, defensively against Al Sa‘ud incursions into eastern Arabia, and especially against al-Qawasim of Ra’s al-Khaymah.

In 1820, the British political officer at Qishm, Captain Perronet Thompson, sought to punish the Bani Bu ‘Ali tribe of Ja‘lan for alleged piracy. When a messenger was killed by the tribe, Thompson organized an expedition against the Bani Bu Ali in conjunction with Sayyid Sa‘id. After the expedition’s arrival in Ja‘lan, and following the collapse of negotiations, the combined British and Omani forces attacked Ja‘lan Bani Bu ‘Ali on 6 November 1820 but were routed. Seven British officers, 270 sepoys, and all four guns were lost, while most of Sayyid Sa‘id’s tribal allies (with the exception of al-Hajariyin) fled. The British Government of Bombay, besides judging that Thompson had exceeded his authority in launching the expedition, was forced to avenge the defeat. A stronger expedition was dispatched from India with both British and Indian troops. On 11 February 1821, a Bani Bu ‘Ali attack on the force’s camp near Sur was repulsed. On 2 March, the expedition appeared before Ja‘lan Bani Bu ‘Ali and thoroughly defeated the defenders, inflicting heavy casualties and carrying off many prisoners. Sayyid Sa‘id was only a spectator during this second episode, however.

After 1829, Sayyid Sa‘id turned his attention increasingly to East Africa, which eventually provided the greater share of his income. This policy also emphasized the maritime basis of his power and prosperity. In 1847, he was said to possess about fifteen warships, of which the Shah Alam was the largest with fifty-four guns. The largest ship he ever owned was a ‘Liverpool’ class line-of-battle ship boasting seventy-four guns on two decks.

The death of Sayyid Sa‘id bin Sultan was followed by the dismemberment of Oman and East Africa, and then several decades of competition within the Al Bu Sa‘id for power in Oman. Various claimants, relying upon levies from supporting tribes and occasional assistance from other regional powers, attacked Muscat and other forts across Oman. In 1868, ‘Azzan bin Qays Al Bu Sa‘idi, from the cadet line of Qays bin Ahmad, managed to capture Muscat and ruled much of Oman for three years until being supplanted by Turki bin Sa‘id. Turki attempted to protect his position by hiring Hasawi and Najdi mercenaries.27 But soldiers murdered several merchants, and the Hasawis and Najdis were so hostile to each other that a British warship was sent at one point to prevent war between them. Sayyid Turki’s naval resources had been depleted before he gained the throne when he sold his only corvette at Bombay, and he was dependent on the gift of a steam yacht from the Sultan of Zanzibar for strengthening his control along the coast.

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, Sayyid Faysal bin Turki (r. 1888–1913) employed as many as an estimated 1,000 ‘askaris, with perhaps 300 in Muscat and Matrah. These were armed with rifles and a few artillery pieces mounted in the forts (maintained by Persian gunners), and occasional attempts were made to introduce uniforms, at least in part. Following the near-loss of his capital to besieging tribes in 1895, Sayyid Faysal strengthened the defences of Muscat and Matrah, and added seven 12-pounder guns to Fort al-Mirani and another five to Fort al-Jalali, the two forts overlooking Muscat harbour. He also re-enlisted some forty African palace guards who had served his father, armed his ‘askaris with rifles, and ordered gunpowder and rifle cartridges from England. In 1903, the Government of India assisted Sayyid Faysal in the purchase of a steamship of 300 tons, which enabled him to dispense with the two steam vessels belonging to his father and to reassert his authority at Sur and along al-Batinah, and the Government of India also presented him with two guns to be mounted on the ship.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Muscat’s defences were described as centring on the two forts of al-Mirani and al-Jalali, since the other blockhouses and small towers surrounding the town had been abandoned. The garrisons of the two forts totalled some 200 Baluch and Arabs, of whom one-quarter were private retainers of Sayyid Faysal. Although armed with rifles, they had had no military training, and the old muzzle-loading guns in the forts were capable only of firing salutes. Because of this weakness and the threat emerging once again from the interior, in the years following 1913 the Government of India floated a number of proposals for the establishment of a modern armed force for Sultan Taymur bin Faysal. In 1917, the Sultan briefly sought to raise on his own a new force of blacks and Baluch under a Turkish commandant. In the end, nothing came of these efforts until the Muscat Levy Corps was established in 1921.

The Battle of Bayt al-Falaj and the Muscat Infantry

The spur to the formation of the Sultanate’s first modern armed force was the rallying of the interior tribes in 1913 behind a renewed attempt to recreate the traditional Imamate. Immediate protection for Muscat and Matrah was provided by Britain, through the Government of India. Justification for stationing the Indian Army in Oman was evident following its success in a battle with interior forces just outside Muscat in early 1915. Eventually, to escape the commitment of its troops, the Government of India also found it necessary to provide the means and direction for the formation of Muscat’s first armed force.

The Battle of Bayt al-Falaj

The battle that took place on the hills above Bayt al-Falaj, not far from Muscat, in January 1915 had a significance far beyond its limited scope.28 To begin with, it clearly established the dependence of the Al Bu Sa‘id ruling family on British support for its continued rule. But for the Indian Army troops that defended Muscat during that battle, the Al Bu Sa‘id may well have disappeared and the course of Omani history taken a completely different path.

The battle also confirmed a growing divergence between Muscat and the coast under Al Bu Sa‘id rule, and the tribally based and largely autonomous interior under a resurgent Ibadi Imamate. This division between ‘Muscat’ and ‘Oman’ was formalized by the Agreement of al-Sib in 1920 and lasted until the reabsorption of the interior into the Al Bu Sa‘id Sultanate in 1955. Furthermore, the requirement for Indian Army troops to defend the Sultanate prompted the formation of the first modern armed force in Oman. Finally, the 1915 battle was to be the last viable threat to Muscat. This in itself marked a significant change from some four centuries of fighting in and around the capital area.

In 1856, the death of Sayyid Sa‘id bin Sultan, the Al Bu Sa‘id ruler of Oman and Zanzibar, led to the division of his Arabian and African dominions between two of his sons. As a consequence, the Al Bu Sa‘id split into two branches and the recurring contest between rival claimants within the Oman branch for the control of Muscat ushered in a period of uncertainty and political weakness that lasted into the twentieth century. Sayyid Sa‘id’s successors were weakened by incessant internecine rivalries, and were confronted by a rising tide of religious feeling that combined with a resurgence of tribal power in attempts to reestablish the institution of the Imamate.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the tribal threat was growing increasingly stronger. Sayyid Faysal bin Turki (r. 1888–1913) found himself dependent upon support from the Government of India. An 1895 offensive by a tribal coalition succeeded in capturing all of Matrah and Muscat except for the British Political Agency and the two forts overlooking Muscat harbour. In 1913, a new Imam was elected in the interior and a repeat of the 1895 situation appeared imminent.

British concern over the deteriorating situation in Oman had increased since the siege of 1895, and the imminent outbreak of World War I redoubled awareness of Muscat’s strategic position along the lines of communications between Britain, India and British oil in the Gulf. With the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war, the northern periphery of the Arabian Peninsula was poised to become an active war zone, and Britain was anxious that the conflagration should not envelop friendly Muscat.

The election in May 1913 of Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi was soon followed by the gathering of a tribal army. Nizwa, Izki (also frequently called Ziki) and al-‘Awabi soon fell to Imamate forces. Sayyid Faysal addressed an urgent plea for help to the Government of India on 6 July 1913. On 9 July, 256 men of the 2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry, under the command of Major F. P. S. Dunsford, arrived from Bushire and were stationed at Bayt al-Falaj. Some 250 loyal tribesmen supported the Rajputs.

The outlook at this point looked increasingly bleak. In short order, Sama’il, Bidbid and Nakhl (apart from the fort) fell. But the days of waiting stretched into weeks and then months without the threat to Muscat materializing, although an attack continued to be expected at any time. Reinforcements in the form of the 102nd King Edward’s Own Grenadiers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Edwardes, disembarked at Matrah on 3 September and joined the 2nd Rajputs at Bayt al-Falaj. The old fort was pressed into use for officers’ quarters, stores and a hospital. The soldiers suffered heavily from malaria and because many had to be sent back to depot, the force was well below strength.

In the midst of all these troubles, Sultan Faysal took ill and his condition steadily worsened. He lost consciousness and finally passed away on 4 October 1913. On 8 October, his son Taymur announced his accession as Sultan. The position of the new Sultan was far from enviable. The unreliability of tribal allies cost him the fort at Nakhl and resulted in uprisings at Barka’ and Quriyat, which had to be suppressed by bombardment by British cruisers.

By the end of 1914, the rumours were persistent that forces of the Imamate were gathering strength and preparing for an attack on Muscat. Even before Istanbul entered the war, the Government of India received reports in October and November 1914 that Ottoman propaganda was likely to cause trouble in Oman, and it was believed that Ottoman agents were instigating an attack by the Imam’s forces. Tentative attacks had already taken place on 13 and 24 October. The troops at Muscat were reinforced by an additional 100 rifles of the 102nd Grenadiers from Bushire (Bushehr) on 1 November, followed by six companies of the 95th Russell’s Infantry from Bombay on 17 November.29 This brought the total of Indian Army troops available to approximately 1,000. Tribal levies, drawn from the Bani Bu ‘Ali, Bani ‘Umar, al-Shihuh, al-Na‘im and Bani Yas, added between 250 and 1,000 defenders.

In early January 1915, the long-awaited assault unfolded. The Imam advanced on the 7th to Bidbid with 400 men. Another 300 tribesmen were reported at Mutahaddamat in Wadi ‘Adayy. On the 8th, the village of al-Wutayyah, just down the wadi (watercourse) from Ruwi, was raided, and firing was heard in the nearby hills on the following day. Meanwhile, the Imam advanced with his men to the village of Bawshar, while the principal tribal leader involved, Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salih al-Harithi, gathered another contingent in the nearby village of al-Khuwayr. The two forces merged and advanced to al-Wutayyah and al-Qurm on the 10th. The total number of opposing forces appeared to approach 3,000.

The defences rested mainly on two elements of Indian Army troops, with a total strength of nearly 1,000. The 102nd King Edward’s Own Grenadiers, whose commanding officer, Colonel S. M. Edwardes, was in overall command, were headquartered at Bayt al-Falaj Fort. Colonel Edwardes had placed picquets on the crest of the limestone hills around Wadi Bayt al-Falaj. No. 1 Picquet (manned by twenty-five men and two signallers with a telephone to the fort) overlooked ‘Aqabat al-Wutayyah, a small pass in the hills directly west of the fort. The south side of the pass was covered by a sangar at Knob A and another above it at Knob B, on the crest of the adjacent hill. Farther along this hill, Jabal al-Wutayyah, was the Observation Post (situated on the highest point, at approximately 860 feet in altitude, and containing fifteen men and a telephone to the fort).

To the southeast, and adjoining Jabal al-Wutayyah by means of another small pass, lay Jabal Ruwi. On this hill were situated No. 2 Picquet (overlooking the small pass, with twenty-five men and a signal to the fort) and No. 3 Picquet (overlooking the village of Ruwi, also with twenty-five men and a signal to No. 2). On Blue Hill, just to the north of Bayt al-Falaj Fort, Colonel Edwardes had stationed a British officer with fifteen rifles, a machine gun and a signal to the fort.

Due to widespread sickness in the Grenadiers, Colonel Edwardes was unable to provide defences north of the line between No. 1 Picquet and Blue Hill. He sought assistance from the Sultan, who had recently returned with about 500 men from operations in Quriyat. But these tribesmen, chiefly from the Bani ‘Umar, refused to venture outside the walls of Matrah. A