Voices From The Past, Armistice 1918: The Last Days of The First World War Told Through Newspaper Reports, Official Documents and the Accounts of Those Who Were There

By Paul Kendall

At 11.00 hours on 11 November 1918, the guns fell silent across the battlefields of Europe. After the deadliest conflict the world had ever seen, peace had finally arrived. Since the withdrawal from the Somme and the repulse at Verdun, the Germans knew they could not win the war and had sought a negotiated end to the fighting. This was rejected by the Allies and the fighting continued until, almost two years later, with its economy on the verge of collapse, Germany had no choice but to accept defeat and seek terms for an armistice.The story of the efforts to bring the war to a conclusion, and those final days and hours of the First World War, are told in the words of the politicians, soldiers and newspaper columnists who were there at the time. From the nervous anxiety of the men on the front line counting down the last few, and in some cases still deadly, minutes, through to the wild celebrations around the world on Armistice Day, renowned historian Paul Kendall relives some of the most emotional scenes ever witnessed through the eyes of those men and women that were there, and had lived, to see the end of the First World War.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Feb 28, 2017
• ISBN: 9781848324657

Paul Kendall

Educated at Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, where he also served as an Honorary Midshipman with the University of London Royal Naval Unit, Paul Kendall is a military historian and author from Kent specializing in the First World War.

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Introduction

The stalemate of trench warfare and the ceaseless slaughter continued into the beginning of 1918 with both Allied and German forces worn down. With the chances of peace being extremely remote, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), continued his strategy to wear down German forces until they surrendered. The Allied campaign of attrition exhausted German forces holding the Western Front, while the blockade enforced by the Royal Navy was succeeding in directly impacting upon the German people, economy and food supplies. Kaiser Wilhelm II and his commanders were concerned that the fatigued Allied forces would eventually be reinforced by American troops and they would eventually exceed the strength of the German Army, providing their enemy with an advantage on the Western Front and the likely prospect of an Allied victory.

The first contingent of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) reached France on 28 June 1917 with the arrival of 28,000 soldiers from 1st Division, but they needed training before they entered the trenches. General John Pershing, commander of the AEF, was insistent that his soldiers would fight as one unit, once they had completed their training. It was estimated that it would take two further years for the AEF in France to train and prepare themselves for war. This would mean that they would not be able to play an effective part until 1919 or 1920. Time was also needed to transport materials, artillery, munitions and equipment from the United States to sustain their operations in France. However, the Allies were at breaking point and could not wait that long. As a temporary measure, it was agreed that American divisions that had completed their training and were deemed competent to enter the trenches would be assimilated among French and British units where needed.

The American 1st Division was the first to complete its training during November 1917 and it was attached to the French 69th Division on the Ansauville sector during January 1918. Its role was primarily defensive, but during February 1918 it came under German poison gas attacks, sustaining casualties of eight killed and seventy-seven wounded. Throughout February and March 1918, both American and German forces launched trench raids on each other’s trenches.

A glimmer of hope appeared for Germany when Russia, after suffering approximately 5 million casualties and crippled by food shortages, was destabilised by two revolutions. The first revolt took place during March 1917, which resulted in the usurpation of Tsar Nicholas II and rule of Russia coming under the control of the democratic Provisional Government. The war continued unsuccessfully for Russia throughout the summer and once the Bolshevik coup toppled the Provisional Government during November 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to end the fighting and requested peace terms from Germany.

When Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, accepting severe German terms to end the war on 3 March 1918, Germany was able to redeploy fifty divisions that were fighting on the Eastern Front and transfer them to the Western Front in France and Belgium. American troops continued to be transported to France and German commanders wanted to exploit the situation, by launching one final campaign to defeat the Allies, before the AEF were trained and ready to enter the fray to launch their own campaigns against German lines. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, German Chief of the General Staff, recalled that in 1918:

France was still a mighty opponent, though she might have bled more than we ourselves. At her side was an English army of many millions, fully equipped, well trained and hardened to war. We had a new enemy, economically the most powerful in the world, an enemy possessing everything required for the hostile operations, reviving the hopes of all our foes and saving them from collapse while preparing mighty forces. It was the United States of America and her advent was perilously near.¹

Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his deputy, General Eric Ludendorff, First Quartermaster General, acted swiftly and devised a plan to launch an offensive, known as the Kaiserschlacht, translated as, the ‘Kaiser’s battle’. Codenamed Operation Michael, its objective was to drive through the British-held lines on the Somme sector. It was hoped that if the British were defeated, the French would surrender. On 21 March 1918, after an intensive artillery bombardment, one million German soldiers attacked British lines on a 50-mile front at 09.35 hours.

The British Fifth Army, commanded by General Hubert Gough, holding the line between St Quentin and Amiens, were unprepared for this assault as German stormtroopers swiftly advanced through the mist and penetrated the British lines. Gough’s line collapsed and his soldiers were forced to withdraw. On the first day of the offensive, the British sustained 38,000 casualties, while the Germans lost 78,000. The Allies were close to defeat and a new strategy was needed to prevent a German victory. At the Doullens Conference held on 26 March 1918, Allied leaders agreed to unify British and French forces by appointing Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch as commander of the Allied Forces. The agreement signed by French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and Lord Alfred Milner, on behalf of the British War Cabinet, decreed that:

General Foch is charged by the British and French governments with co-ordinating the action of Allied Armies on the Western Front. To this end he will come to an understanding with the Commander-in-Chief, who are requested to furnish him with all necessary information.²

This decision was a turning point in the war, because Foch’s new strategy would prevent an Allied defeat. Foch recalled:

Instead of a British battle to cover the Channel ports and a French battle to cover Paris, we would fight an Anglo-French battle to cover Amiens, the connecting link between the two armies.³

Haig supported the decision to appoint Foch as overall commander and made some changes within the British command structure by replacing Gough with General Sir Henry Rawlinson as commander of the remnants of British Fifth Army on 28 March. These exhausted units would eventually be used to re-form the Fourth Army. French troops were sent into the British lines to bolster their depleted strength, which would prevent German forces from advancing. On 4 April, Haig sent three Australian brigades to stem the German tide at Villers Bretonneux. Haig released his ‘backs to the wall’ order on 11 April, in which he wrote:

Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel Ports and destroy the British Army.

In spite of throwing already 106 Divisions into the battle and enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.

We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops. Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our Army under the most trying circumstances.

Many amongst us now are tired. To those I would say that Victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support.

There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.⁴

The Germans continued to push forward their attack, but they became the victims of their own success for their advances were so rapid, they had overstretched their lines of supply to the extent that it was difficult to replenish their advancing waves with fresh troops, arms, munitions and equipment. By the time Haig issued his desperate order to fight to the last man, German forces had lost 239,000 soldiers and commanders had abandoned Operation Michael. The Allies, who were close to defeat, sustained 255,000 casualties. Successive German offensives took place during the spring of 1918. Ludendorff launched Operation Georgette on 7 April in an effort to capture Ypres; on 27 May Operation Blücher-Yorck was launched to establish a bridgehead across the River Aisne. In June, the aim of Operation Gneisenau was to capitalise on ground captured on the Aisne sector westwards. Ludendorff ordered a final offensive to expand eastwards from the Aisne salient in July in an operation named Friedensturm, but the initiative failed and Germany’s last-ditch attempts to defeat the Allies had faltered.

The German penetration into Allied lines had put enormous pressure upon the Allied armies. With great reluctance, General Pershing dispatched temporarily some American divisions that were trained and available to support the Allied armies.

Three weeks after its stint on the Ansauville sector, the American 1st Division was assigned to the First French Army, which was holding the Montdidier sector. It entered the line opposite Cantigny during the evening on 24th/25th April in between the French 45th and 162nd Divisions. German forces became aware that American forces were present and ordered artillery and gas attacks upon their positions in a desperate effort to intimidate and undermine their confidence before they launched an offensive.

At the beginning of May 1918, the German Army still held superior numbers against the Allied divisions on the Western Front, but General Erich Ludendorff was under great pressure to accomplish his prime objective of defeating the BEF in Flanders and winning the war. His armies were suffering from exhaustion and during the Lys Offensive in April 1918 discipline started to deteriorate when some soldiers refused to fight. His main concern was that his numerical advantage had been reducing quite considerably since the intervention of the Americans into the war. Time was on the side of the Allies, and with American support they could potentially deny Germany a victory. By the end of May 1918, the size of the AEF in France had increased to 650,000, but only the American 1st Division was in the line, because General Pershing continued to insist that his force would only carry out offensive operations once fully trained and as a distinct composite force, commanded only by American officers.

The AEF launched its first large-scale attack upon Germany forces when 1st Division captured Cantigny on 28 May 1918 at the cost of approximately 100 casualties. Its success at Cantigny demonstrated to its French and British allies that the AEF was able to conduct operations and to capture ground. It also demonstrated that it could be relied upon to play its role in the war and gave the Allies hope that the strength of the AEF, with its vast numbers, would help to shift the balance of power in the war and would help them to achieve ultimate victory over Germany.

The battle also raised the morale of the American soldiers and gave them experience and confidence. Cantigny was an ominous warning to the Germans, who realised that once the might of the AEF entered the battlefield, the Allies would hold the advantage of having more troops and resources, which would ultimately severely diminish their chance of victory.

Despite his reservations, Pershing had to release further divisions into the frontline to bolster the Allied lines. The American 2nd and 3rd Divisions were given responsibility to defend the line at Belleau Wood and Chateau Thierry a week after the Cantigny operation, and they successfully stopped the German advance upon Paris. On 6 June, 2nd Division, including US Marines, began a month-long battle for Belleau Wood. Their lack of experience was buoyed by their determination and their large numbers augmented the depleted ranks of the French, British and Dominion forces.

The Allies were able to turn the tide of war to their favour during July 1918. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the British Fourth Army, ordered Australian Corps commander General John Monash to launch a small-scale operation at Le Hamel to capture the village and ridge that overlooked their lines east of Villers Bretonneux. They were supported by the US 33rd Division, and this was the first time that American soldiers fought alongside British and Australian troops in a combined operation. During the assault upon Le Hamel on 4 July 1918, General Monash had devised a strategy that enabled Australian and American troops supported by British tanks and aeroplanes to capture this village within ninety-three minutes. Monash had provided Rawlinson with a template for victory that would be deployed on a larger scale at Amiens on 8 August 1918, where the Allies overran the German lines. Ludendorff would declare this to be ‘the black day of the German Army in the history of this war’.⁵ After that day German forces were in retreat, their morale was low, and their ranks comprised inexperienced soldiers, since many of their seasoned troops had already been consumed during the past four years of war.

The BEF had also lost many experienced soldiers during those years. In 1914, the average strength of a division was 13,000 infantry, but by 1918 that figure had been reduced to 8,000. During an Allied War Conference held at Villa Romaine, Versailles, on 7 October 1918, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George explained to Marshal Ferdinand Foch the problem of maintaining British forces with manpower conflicted with the challenge of ensuring that there were sufficient resources at home working in industry to support the war effort during 1918. The minutes recorded:

We had made a very special effort in 1918 to meet the desires of the Marshal, and had scraped up every man we could. We had denuded home defence with the result that General Robertson, the Commander-in-Chief, had sent a written protest, pointing out the risk. The Government had decided to take the risk. We had pulled out men from many essential industries, including the munitions industry. One result was the present coal crisis, and we were not able to furnish our Allies, particularly France, with her full demands. At the present time very strong pressure was being put on the Government to take 50,000 men back from the army for the coal mines. We were short of 20,000,000 tons of coal for munitions and ship building industries. The difficulty was that the miners were about the best soldiers we had, so the army was very reluctant to spare them. This year our casualties would amount to 800,000, and we could only find a total 700,000 drafts. Consequently, by the end of the year the army would be down by 100,000 men. He had reminded Marshal Foch, that we had put boys of 18 into the line and were the only nation who had done this. One result was to reduce the numbers available next year when they normally would have come into the army. Excluding returned wounded men, who might amount to 190,000 men for the whole year, the total number of drafts we had for the navy, army and air service was 300,000 men. Of these, the navy had asked for 50,000. The exigencies of anti-submarine warfare necessitated a great increase in small craft. Most of the patrolling, even to cover the American troops, was done by the British Navy. The Government were pressing the Admiralty to comb out men so that all the 300,000 who were to be called up should be available for the army. Some 50,000 men were required for tanks, and approximately the same number for aeroplanes. If these numbers were met, only 200,000 would be left as drafts for the army. Canada had conscription and could maintain her forces, but this was not the case with Australia, and the Australian divisions would gradually wither away. The only other source of supply for British troops were Ireland. Irish recruits, however, could only be obtained by facing something not far short of civil war. Marshal Foch himself could estimate the value of this source of recruiting, which at the best must be precarious. On these figures it was impossible to maintain the British divisions, and certainly not enough at their present strength.⁶

The French Army was also challenged with replenishing their ranks with fresh troops. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wrote to Marshal Foch on 21 October 1918:

The French and the British Army, without a moment’s respite, have been daily fighting, for the last three months, battles which are using them up at a time when it is impossible for us to reinforce them immediately with fresh effectives. These two Armies are pressing back the enemy with an ardour that excites world-wide admiration.⁷

French–American forces were driving their advance along the Meuse– Argonne sector while British and French forces were pursuing the Germans to the German border. Once the Hindenburg Line had been breached towards the end of September, General Erich Ludendorf realised that they had lost the war and recommended that German politicians seek an Armistice. Once German leaders had declared their serious desire for peace, German soldiers with low morale would soon lose the motivation to continue fighting and there existed growing public support at home for peace. A short space of time elapsed between Germany requesting peace terms based on President Wilson’s fourteen-point plan in early October and 11 November 1918, during which time the German Army collapsed on the Western Front, while the flames of revolution were sweeping across the German nation. The Allies were caught off guard by the rapidity of events. They had engaged in limited discussions on their expectations for peace, but no draft of Armistice terms existed for they did not expect Germany to request an armistice before peace terms could be negotiated. This provided an opportunity to include their prime war objectives within the terms of the Armistice.

Some people were unaware of what an armistice meant and its implications. As the Allies waited for the German response to their terms, a journalist from the Birmingham Gazette pondered upon the meaning of the word ‘armistice’:

One journalist filled up the anxious hours of waiting for news during the weekend by hunting up the correct meaning of ‘armistice’. His investigation showed that the word so spelt comes immediately from the French, and indirectly from Spanish and Italian, and finally of course from Latin. Literally it could be said to mean that ‘arms stand,’ or more intelligibly ‘arms stand still.’ An armistice, according to one authority, leaves the question of war unsettled – ‘it is an interval in war, and supposes a return to it.’⁸

As negotiations continued through October 1918, the Allies continued offensive operations and by the end of the month the German Army was on the brink of capitulation and close to defeat. Haig recognised the importance of maintaining the momentum of the Allied advance and to continue to exert pressure upon the German soldiers that they were pursuing. Haig wrote to Winston Churchill on 3 October:

It is of the highest importance to keep on pressing the enemy at every possible point, because if we allow him any breathing time at all, he will be able to reorganise his forces, to construct new defences, and make new plans, and much of the work of ‘wearing him out’ will have to be started afresh.⁹

By the first week of November 1918, Germany had been broken and with revolution erupting at home, it was ready to agree and sign an armistice.

The aim of this book is to provide an account of events that took place during the final days of the First World War through using personal accounts, letters, official reports and minutes from cabinet meetings and Allied war conferences. The 1914–18 conflict was a world war and the conditions agreed during the Armistice signed on 11 November 1918 had far-reaching consequences across the globe. However, this volume will focus upon the events concerning north-western Europe. The book details the political events that led to the signing of the Armistice, beginning with the German peace initiatives in 1916 and 1917, before chronicling the period during autumn 1918 when the German Government sent serious overtures to the Allies requesting peace. Allied leaders were left with a dilemma for they wanted to end the war, but they wanted peace on their terms. They wanted to impose harsh conditions, but they ran the risk of Germany not agreeing to those terms and continuing the bloodshed of the war, and this book shows the quandary that Allied politicians faced.

As Allied and German leaders discussed peace, the fighting continued unabated during the days before the signing of the Armistice. British, French, Canadian, American, Australian and New Zealand soldiers fought the German Army as they pursued them to the German frontier. The soldiers on the frontline on all sides were aware that the war was drawing to a conclusion and this news would have a drastic effect upon their morale and motivation to continue the fight. This book describes some of the bitter battles fought during the last days of the war and explores the emotions of both Allied and German soldiers as the conflict came to an end. Some soldiers would die knowing that within days the war would be over. Men were thrown into needless battles during the final hours, and many were slaughtered unnecessarily because some units did not get notification of the Armistice and continued fighting after 11.00 hours on 11 November 1918. This book uses sources from Britain, France, America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Germany to detail those violent last days of the First World War and to show how news of the Armistice was received by soldiers and civilians. Here are their voices.

Part I

THE PATH TO PEACE

Chapter 1

German Approaches to Peace 1916–17

The Verdun and Somme campaigns fought during 1916 had a drastic impact upon German forces on the Western Front. The official French war history published in 1916 estimated French losses at Verdun to be 377,231, including 162,308 killed. German losses were estimated at 337,000, including 100,000 killed.

German forces unleashed their Verdun offensive on 21 February and although they captured ground, they became worn down by France’s determination to defend this fortified town, which held significant symbolic national importance to the people of France. General Eric Ludendorff wrote:

Verdun had exacted a very great price in blood. The position of our attacking troops grew more unfavourable. The more ground they gained the deeper they plunged into the wilderness of shell-holes, and apart from actual losses in action, they suffered heavy wastage merely through having to stay in such a spot, not to mention the difficulty of getting up supplies over a wide, desolate area. The French enjoyed a great advantage here, as the proximity of the fortress gave them a certain amount of support. Our attacks dragged on, sapping our strength. The very men who had fought so heroically at Verdun were terrified of this shell-ravaged region. The command had very early declared himself in favour of breaking off the attack.¹

The Somme campaign fought with attrition brought approximately 400,000 British losses, 200,000 French losses and 680,000 German casualties from 1 July to 13 November 1916. The campaign succeeded in wearing down German resolve and they were fearful that if the Allies continued to press forward their advances, they would eventually be fighting on German soil. General Eric Ludendorff realised that the Allies held the advantage over Germany on the Western Front, when he was appointed First Quartermaster-General on 29 August 1916. He recalled:

The longer the war lasted, the more acutely we felt the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in numbers and war material … The equipment of the Entente armies [The allied nations of Britain, France, Russia, and Italy were known as the entente during the First World War] with war material had been carried out on a scale hitherto unknown. The Battle of the Somme showed us every day how great was the advantage of the enemy in this respect.²

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg concurred with Ludendorff’s pessimistic view regarding Allied numerical superiority and agreed that the toll of two campaigns severely impacted upon German forces:

There was no doubt that, at the end of 1916, the position as regards relative numbers between us and our enemies had developed even more to our disadvantage than had been the case at the beginning of the year.³

Hindenburg doubted that German forces on the Western Front would be strong enough to resist Allied offensives in 1917:

On our Western Front we had to expect that in the coming spring our enemies would reappear in the arena in full strength, in spite of the heavy losses they undoubtedly had suffered in the past year.⁴

With the likelihood of further Allied offensives being launched upon German lines and the inability to launch their own offensives in 1917, Ludendorff convinced the German High Command that a defensive strategy should be adopted. To this end, he conceived a plan where he would order the withdrawal of German forces 25 miles across the Somme to newly established defensive positions. Since he admired the works of Richard Wagner, he named the defensive system the Siegfried Stellung, after the principal protagonist from Wagner’s opera The Ring. This line of fortified trenches, deeply excavated concrete dugouts and gun emplacements protected by acres of high density barbed wire entanglements would be known to the British as the Hindenburg Line. Measuring 85 miles, it was built east of Arras and stretched through the village of Bullecourt to positions in the Champagne region near Soissons. By initiating a tactical withdrawal, Ludendorff would shorten the front by 27 miles and free ten infantry divisions to be deployed in reserve to bolster sectors where the enemy was making breakthroughs. Work commenced on building the new defensive line during September 1916 as the Somme campaign was being fought, unbeknown to the Allies. Ludendorff wrote:

These strategic positions had the advantage of shortening the front and economizing men, and their occupation according to plan was prepared. Whatever we should retire on them, and how the positions would be used, was not of course decided in September 1916.⁵

Hindenburg commented:

So it was a case of retreat on the Western Front instead of attack!⁶

As the German Army was preparing to continue the fight on a shorter frontline with the construction of the Hindenburg Line, it became apparent to the German Government in Berlin that it could not win the war it had begun and it was considering negotiating a peace settlement with the Allies with the purpose of ending the fighting in 1916. Prince Maximilian of Baden served on the Headquarters Staff of Fourteenth Army Corps, but during the autumn of 1914 his health deteriorated. After recovery he was involved with the Red Cross, where he focused upon the welfare of prisoners of war. Prince Max wrote:

The campaign of 1916 ended in bitter disillusionment all round. We and our enemies had shed our best blood in streams and neither we nor they had come one step nearer to victory. The word ‘deadlock’ was on every lip. In Germany, too, the impossibility of purely military decision was realised by many in whose presence the words ‘peace of understanding’ could not hitherto have been uttered. People looked to the leading statesmen with a certain insistent expectancy: ‘The forces on either side have obviously reached a condition of rigid equilibrium: the war must become senseless; what are you going to do to end it?’

People – and they were not isolated individuals – came to me in the autumn of 1916 full of a vague anxiety: ‘Things are not going well with the war.’ At the same time I became acquainted with a well-informed and reasoned line of criticism which attacked the essence of our war policy and claimed to prove with weighty arguments that we should lose the war if it went on in this fashion.⁷

The German Government set about drafting a peace note to be sent to the Allies during December 1916. Hindenburg, who was consulted over the wording, recalled:

I considered it my duty in this matter to strive for such a solution that neither the Army nor the Homeland should suffer any injury. Main Headquarters had to co-operate in settling the wording of our peace offer. It was a difficult and thankless task to avoid creating an impression of weakness at home and abroad while giving all provocative expressions a wide berth. I was able to see with what a devout sense of duty to god and man my All-Highest War Lord devoted himself to the solution of the peace problem, and I do not think that he regarded a complete failure of this step as probable. On the other hand, my own confidence in its success was quite small from the outset. Our adversaries had vied with one another in putting forward excessive claims, and it appeared to me out of the question that any of the enemy Governments could and would voluntarily go back on promises which they had made to each other and their peoples. However, this view did not in any way affect my honest intention to co-operate in this work for the good of humanity.⁸

On 12 December 1916, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg delivered a speech at the Reichstag in Berlin, declaring Germany’s desire to open peace negotiations. During the address he read the following peace proposal requesting American diplomats to communicate it to the Allies on its behalf. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg wrote:

Mr Chargé d’Affaires,

The most formidable war known to history has been ravaging for two and a half years in a great part of the world. The catastrophe that the bonds of a common civilisation more than a thousand years old could not stop, strikes mankind in its most precious patrimony; it threatens to bury under its ruin the moral and physical progress on which Europe prided itself at the dawn of the twentieth century. In that strife Germany and her Allies, Austria–Hungary and Turkey, have given proof of their indestructible strength in winning considerable successes at war. Their unshakeable lines resist ceaseless attacks of their enemies’ arms. The recent diversion in the Balkans was speedily and victoriously thwarted. The latest events have demonstrated that a continuation of the War cannot break their resisting power. The general situation much rather justified their hope of fresh successes. It is for the defence of their existence and freedom of their national development that the four Allied Powers were constrained to take up arms. The exploits of their armies have brought no change therein. Not for an instant have they swerved from the conviction that the respect of the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests. They do not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries. Conscious of their military and economic strength and ready to carry on to the end if they must the struggle that is forced upon them, but animated at the same time by the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end, the four Allied Powers propose to enter even now into peace negotiations. They feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward and which would aim to assure the existence, honour, and free development of their peoples would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of lasting peace.

If, notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation the struggle should continue, the four Allied Powers are resolved to carry on to an end, while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history.

The Imperial Government has the honour to ask through your obliging medium, the Government of the United States, to be pleased to transmit the present communication to the Government of the French republic, to the Royal Government of Great Britain, to the Imperial Government of Japan, to the Royal Government of Roumania [sic Romania], to the Imperial Government of Russia, and to the Royal Government of Serbia.

I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr Chargé d’Affaires, the assurance of my high consideration.⁹

There were no terms or conditions that would form a basis for peace and the Allies were not convinced that this was a sincere desire to end the war. The French felt acrimony towards Germany for it had invaded part of its country, many of its towns and villages had been destroyed; and it had lost hundreds of thousands of its men during the fighting. There was remote prospect of the French engaging in peace talks unless Germany surrendered. French Prime Minister Aristide Briand was suspicious of the German peace initiative. In a speech to the French Chamber of Deputies, the legislative assembly of the French Parliament, on 13 December he expressed his reluctance to accept this German peace proposition and feared that it was an attempt to split the Allied coalition. Briand declared:

There is one cry constantly on German lips: ‘We were attacked; we are defending ourselves; we are the victims!’ To this cry I make answer for the hundredth time: ‘No, you are the aggressors; no matter what you might say, the facts are there to prove it. The blood is on your heads. Not on ours.’¹⁰

Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wrote:

The Boches are in a merry mood. They are speaking of peace. Why did they not have this idea when they entered on the campaign, for it is they who declared war?¹¹

The Russian Duma was only interested in talking peace after Germany was defeated. Neutral countries, such as America, encouraged the Allied nations not to reject the peace offer and to engage in negotiations with Germany. The Vatican also advised the Allies to request peace terms from Germany.

David Lloyd George, who had become Prime Minister after Herbert Asquith’s resignation on 6 December 1918, was not convinced that this was a genuine peace proposal. He regarded the German peace note as a contrived manoeuvre to raise morale and maintain support for continuing the war among the German population, who had seen reports of heavy losses on the battlefields and were feeling the effects of deprivation, including food shortages. He also felt that Germany was making an artificial attempt to talk peace to regain some moral ground amongst neutral countries and the civilian population of the nations that opposed it, demonstrating that Germany had offered a chance of peace, but the Allies were prolonging the war by continuing the conflict. Germany still occupied much of Belgium and France, which put it in a strong negotiating position if the Allies accepted its peace offer. Lloyd George wrote:

This was not the language of an enemy suing for peace after a crushing defeat in the field, or of a foe conscious that on the whole the tide was beginning to turn against him, or even an adversary who realised that although he had no fear of being beaten, nevertheless, if the war continued both parties in the end would be ruined. It was rather in the nature of an overture from a Power of unbreakable strength of its armies, boasting of a succession of resounding triumphs against its enemies and of its abilities to hold its own in future against every effort to dislodge its grip on the vast territories it had conquered, but anxious to cast upon its enemies the responsibility for prolonging the War. German statesmanship, which was entirely under military control and direction, had three objects in view when it launched this peace offensive. The first was to reconcile that part of the German population who were beginning to feel that brilliant victories without number brought nothing but heavier burdens, more and more privations, and mounting casualties to the triumphant Fatherland. It was necessary to convince these that ultimate victory was the only alternative to an unsatisfying peace. The second was to persuade neutral countries which were becoming increasingly hostile to Germany and also the people behind the Governments of belligerent countries, that the prolongation of the War was due entirely to the bloodthirsty stubbornness and insatiable ambition of the Allied Governments. The third was to enter into peace negotiations whilst military conditions were more favourable to Germany than to the Allies, the German Armies being quartered in Allied territory and on the whole having beaten off the assaults made on their positions there on every front.¹²

The German press assisted its government to propagate the propaganda by apportioning responsibility for continuing the war upon the Allies if they refused the offer of peace. The Vossische Zeitung proclaimed:

The German proposals rest on the basis of strength and sharpness of our arms. If peace, which we freely offer, is not accepted, we will force peace with the sword and with all the means of land, sea and aerial warfare.¹³

As the Allied governments deliberated how they were to respond, the British press regarded the German initiative with disdain. British newspapers were sceptical about the peace proposal and thought that Germany was opportunistic in taking advantage in the downfall of the Asquith Government and that it was looking for an armistice with the intention of rebuilding its forces strength in preparation for further campaigns. Germany and her allies occupied parts of France, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Russia and Rumania. Britain and her allies were not prepared to concede this ground to Germany as part of a peace settlement and treated the German proposal with contempt. Hindenburg recalled:

On December 12 our readiness to conclude peace was announced to our enemies. Our answer from enemy propaganda, as well as the hostile camps, was only scorn and a rebuff.¹⁴

In Britain, Lord George Curzon, Leader of the House of Lords, encouraged the nation to continue the fight until the end to ensure that future generations would not need to experience such a conflict:

We are not fighting to destroy Germany. Such an idea has never entered into the mind of any thinking human being in this country. But we are fighting to secure that the German spirit shall not crush the free progress of nations and that the armed strength of Germany, augmented and fortified, shall not dominate the future. We are fighting that our grandchildren and our great grandchildren shall not have, in days when we have passed away, to go again through the experience of the years 1914–17. This generation has suffered in order that the next may live. We are ready enough for peace when these guarantees have been secured and these objects attained. Till then we owe to the hundreds of thousands of our fellow countrymen and our Allies, who have shed their blood for us, to be true to the trust of their splendid and uncomplaining sacrifice and to endure to the end.¹⁵

Prince Max recalled:

On 21st December, 1916, President Wilson dispatched his first peace note, in which he called on the belligerent countries to state precise war aims, so that the war might no longer be fought in the dark. On 26 December the German Government courteously declined to state its aims. A direct exchange of ideas between the belligerents, it said, seemed to be the most appropriate method.¹⁶

After consultation among the Allied governments, it was agreed to reject the German offer and on 30 December 1916 the French Government handed to the United States Ambassador in Paris their written response, which was to be conveyed to the German Government. The reply began by rebuking the assertion in the German note that the Allies were responsible for the war and that Germany and her allies were victorious:

The Allied Governments of Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, Portugal and Rumania, united for the defence of the freedom of nations and faithful to their undertakings not to lay down their arms except in common accord, have decided to return a joint offer to the illusory peace proposals which have been addressed to them by the Governments of the enemy Powers through the intermediary the United States, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

As a prelude to any reply, the Allied Powers feel bound to protest strongly against the two material assertions made in the Note from the enemy powers, the one professing to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war, and the other proclaiming the victory of the Central Powers.

The Allies cannot admit a claim which is thus untrue in each particular, and is sufficient alone to render sterile all attempt at negotiations.

The Allied nations have for thirty months been engaged in a war which they have done everything to avoid. They have shown by their actions their devotion to peace. This devotion is as strong today as it was in 1914; and after the violation by Germany of her solemn engagements, Germany’s promise is no sufficient foundation on which to re-establish the peace she broke.

A mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace. The putting forward by the Imperial German Government of a sham proposal, lacking all substance and precision, would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war manoeuvre … In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence the future course of the war and to end it by imposing a German peace.

The object of these overtures is to create dissension in public opinion in Allied countries. But that public opinion has, in spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already given its answer with admirable firmness, and has denounced the empty pretence of the declaration of the enemy Powers.

They have the further object of stiffening public opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her; one and all, already severely tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure and crushed by the supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants.

The endeavour to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral countries whose inhabitants have long since made up their minds where the initial responsibility rests, have recognised existing responsibilities, and are far too enlightened to favour the designs of Germany by abandoning the defence of human freedom.

Finally these overtures attempt to justify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes – submarine warfare, deportations, forced labour and forced enlistment of inhabitants against their own countries and violations of neutrality.

Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but equally conscious of its requirements, the Allied Governments closely united to one another and in perfect sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere.¹⁷

The Allied reply concluded by reiterating Belgium’s plight and the conditions for a peace settlement to be agreed:

Belgium before the war asked for nothing but to live in harmony with all her neighbours. Her King and her Government have but one aim – the re-establishment of peace and justice. But they only desire a peace which would assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees and safeguards for the future.¹⁸

The Germans took offence at the Allied response. Prince Max wrote:

On 30th December the note containing the reply of the Entente to our peace