Broken Government: Bridging the Partisan Divide

By Larry J. Sabato

In an increasingly polarized political environment, the first year of the new president’s term will be especially challenging. With a fresh mandate, however, the first year also offers opportunities that may never come again. The First Year Project is a fascinating initiative by the Miller Center of the University of Virginia that brings together top scholars on the American presidency and experienced officials to explore the first twelve months of past administrations, and draw practical lessons from that history, as we inaugurate a new president in January 2017.

This project is the basis for a new series of digital shorts published as Miller Center Studies on the Presidency. Presented as specially priced collections published exclusively in an ebook format, these timely examinations recognize the experiences of past presidents as an invaluable resource that can edify and instruct the incoming president.

Contributors: Alan Taylor, University of Virginia * Gary Gallagher, University of Virginia * Bruce Katz, Brookings Institution * Kyle Kondik, UVA Center for Politics * Carolyn Dewar, Tom Dohrmann, Andrew Erdmann, Ryan Harper, and Junal Modi, McKinsey & Company

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of Virginia Press
• Release date: Feb 1, 2019
• ISBN: 9780813940205

Book preview

MILLER CENTER STUDIES ON THE PRESIDENCY

MARC J. SELVERSTONE, EDITOR

Miller Center Studies on the Presidency is a series of original works that draw on the Miller Center’s scholarly programs to shed light on the American presidency past and present.

THE FIRST YEAR PROJECT

Broken Government

Bridging the Partisan Divide

Edited by William J. Antholis and Larry J. Sabato

University of Virginia Press

Charlottesville and London

Contents

Introduction

William J. Antholis

Peaceful Transfer: Thomas Jefferson Was the First President to Wrest Power from an Opposing Party

Alan Taylor

The Worst First Year: Abraham Lincoln Had a Singular Focus in His First Year—Restoring the Union

Gary W. Gallagher

Go Local: Help Cities Pursue the New American Localism to Break Partisan Gridlock

Bruce J. Katz

Scenario Planning: Gaming Out the Partisan Alignments between the Next President and Congress

Kyle Kondik

The POTUS as CEO-TUS: Lessons That CEOs Can Teach a New President

Carolyn Dewar, Tom Dohrmann, Andrew Erdmann, Ryan Harper, and Kunal Modi

Contributors

Notes

Introduction

William J. Antholis

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s legislative grand slam over his first one hundred days in office—during which he enacted such pillars of the New Deal as the Glass-Steagall financial reforms, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Civilian Conservation Corps—has led his successors to similarly swing for the fences in their first at-bats.

Even Donald Trump, a president without precedent, has tried to hit like FDR: during the campaign, then candidate Trump promised to introduce ten legislative acts by day 100, covering tax reform, energy, infrastructure, immigration, child care, and health care, among other areas.

Recent presidential history, however, teaches us that the first one hundred days of a presidency is too short a time span to measure success. That is particularly the case as partisan gridlock and parliamentary procedures have caused the legislative traffic between the White House and Congress to grind to a halt.

In that setting, the first year is a better benchmark.

President Lyndon Johnson, a former Senate majority leader, believed that presidents had more than one hundred days but not more than one year to accomplish their legislative goals.

You’ve got to give it all you can that first year. . . . Doesn’t matter what kind of majority you come in with. You’ve got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves.

President Johnson understood the key window provided by the first year, and he kept his eyes on the prize: legislation. To get this done, the thirty-sixth president might tell the forty-fifth president to be clear-eyed regarding what can be achieved. For Johnson, a mandate was a function of two things: presidential popularity (Trump’s remains unusually low) and the size of his party’s majority in Congress (Trump is in relatively strong shape there).

Popularity and legislative advantage are often at their peak on Inauguration Day. After that, things generally start to go downhill. For all presidents, looming midterm elections mean that congressional action in the second year is always shadowed by fear of the ballot. The first year is of the essence.

Johnson had advantages Trump does not. For example, the Texan began 1965 with a 70 percent public approval rating and substantial Democratic representation in the House and Senate—295 seats in the House and sixty-eight seats in the Senate. As a result, LBJ had a monumental year in 1965, passing major laws on voting rights, Medicare and Medicaid, immigration, and education. But by 1966, the Democrats had lost seven governorships, seven Senate seats, and more than forty House seats. A leakage of political capital can happen quickly. Trump is in a far less dominant position than Johnson was, but Republicans do control Congress.

Three other presidents—Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—also provide lessons for Trump, though somewhat different ones. Like LBJ, all three enjoyed majorities in both houses of Congress and achieved lasting success in their first year.

President Obama started 2009 with a 62 percent approval rating and used big Democratic majorities alone to pass an agenda featuring economic recovery, auto company bailouts, banking reform, and (just after the first-year mark) the Affordable Care Act. He spent political capital, and paid a price: by the time the November 2010 elections were over, the Democrats had lost six Senate seats and sixty-three House seats—including the House majority, which the party has not yet reclaimed. Alternatively, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush found a way to work