Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict

By Boaz Atzili

Border fixity—the proscription of foreign conquest and the annexation of homeland territory—has, since World War II, become a powerful norm in world politics. This development has been said to increase stability and peace in international relations. Yet, in a world in which it is unacceptable to challenge international borders by force, sociopolitically weak states remain a significant source of widespread conflict, war, and instability.

In this book, Boaz Atzili argues that the process of state building has long been influenced by external territorial pressures and competition, with the absence of border fixity contributing to the evolution of strong states—and its presence to the survival of weak ones. What results from this norm, he argues, are conditions that make internal conflict and the spillover of interstate war more likely. Using a comparison of historical and contemporary case studies, Atzili sheds light on the relationship between state weakness and conflict. His argument that under some circumstances an international norm that was established to preserve the peace may actually create conditions that are ripe for war is sure to generate debate and shed light on the dynamics of continuing conflict in the twenty-first century.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Release date: Dec 2, 2011
• ISBN: 9780226031378

Book preview

BOAZ ATZILI is assistant professor in the

School of International Service at American University.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

© 2012 by The University of Chicago

All rights reserved. Published 2012.

Printed in the United States of America

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ISBN-13: 978-0-226-03135-4 (cloth)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-03136-1 (paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-03135-7 (cloth)

ISBN-10: 0-226-03136-5 (paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-03137-8 (e-book)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Atzili, Boaz.

Good fences, bad neighbors : border fixity and international conflict / Boaz Atzili.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-03135-4 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-03136-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-03135-7 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-03136-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Boundaries—Political aspects.

2. Nation-building.

I. Title.

JC323.A75 2012

320.1′dc23

2011028475

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI / NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

Good Fences,

Bad Neighbors

BORDER  FIXITY  AND  

INTERNATIONAL  CONFLICT

Boaz Atzili

The University of Chicago Press CHICAGO & LONDON

For Tomer, Carmel, and Orit, with love

CONTENTS

Cover

Copyright

List of Figures

List of Tables

Preface and Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 · The Theory and Practice of Borders

2 · Which Wars Make the State and Which States Make War

3 · Preconditions to State Building: Making the Case for Comparison

4 · State Building and State Weakness before Border Fixity:

Brandenburg-Prussia, Argentina, and Poland-Lithuania

5 · State Building and State Failure in a Fixed-Borders World:

Lebanon, Congo, and Israel

6 · State Weakness and International Conflict in a Fixed-Borders World

7 · Conclusions

Notes

Bibliography

Index

FIGURES

1 Conquests and annexations of homeland territory per state, 1815–2000

2 Conquests and annexations of homeland territory per contiguous dyad, 1820–2000

3 A world of flexible borders: Effects on weak states

4 Effects of border fixity on weak states

5 Border fixity and state building as a continuum

TABLES

1 Case studies

2 Conquests and annexations of homeland territory, 1815–2000

3 Population density at starting points of research

4 Brandenburg-Prussia’s wars, 1640–1740

5 Argentina’s international wars, 1810–80

6 Communal divisions in Lebanon, 1911–32

7 Summary of findings in case studies

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea of researching the effects of normative changes in the way we perceive borders in international conflict came to me gradually, as a puzzle with several seemingly unrelated pieces. The first piece was the realization that armed conflict has been changing dramatically since World War II, in both geographic location and nature. Militarized conflict is concentrated in specific parts of the world, and is more likely to erupt as a civil war or a mix of civil and international war than as a conventional state-against-state confrontation. Many such conflicts emanate from states that are sociopolitically weak. The second piece of the puzzle was new research that showed how forceful territorial changes have become almost obsolete in the last half-century. The last piece was historical research about the enormous effects that international war, and preparation for it, had on the consolidation of the state in early modern Europe and elsewhere. The journey that resulted in this book, then, started with a big question: Could the last two pieces of the puzzle somehow help us understand the first piece? I hope this book is a first step in the right direction toward finding an answer.

This book owes much to a large number of people whose wisdom and advice guided me along the way and enabled me to clarify and improve my own ideas. I will no doubt forget some who, along the way, lent me their counsel. To them I offer my apologies.

I first want to thank my teachers at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I began my academic studies. In particular, I would like to thank Emanuel Adler, who inspired me to think deeply and ignited in me the passion for theoretical thinking in international relations; Arie Kacowictz, who was a great guide through my first steps in the field; and Benny Miller, who introduced me to security studies.

At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Steve Van Evera was a true mentor to me. Steve taught me to always be on the lookout for big questions that are important to the world beyond the walls of academia. His critical eye and persistent support enabled me to reach this point. Ken Oye’s research seminar sowed in me the questions that eventually became this book, and Roger Petersen connected me to the literature and insights of comparative politics. Their contribution to my work has been invaluable. Other faculty at MIT have contributed much needed advice and insights; among them are Suzanne Berger, Kanchan Chandra, Nazli Choucri, Thomas Christensen, Taylor Fravel, Chappell Lawson, Richard Locke, and Barry Posen.

Ultimately, however, the two colleagues to whom I owe the most are Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch and Pat Boyd, both of whom have read many drafts and put up with many long hours of debate. They have provided unfailing support and helped me through the emotional and academic travails of the research and writing process. Many other colleagues were of help in various ways and on various occasions; among them are David Art, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Rachel Gisselquist, Wenkai He, Sarah Lischer, Reo Matsuzaki, John Payne, Jessica Piombo, Jeremy Pressman, Scott Radnitz, Robert Reardon, and Neil Ruiz. This wonderful cohort was by itself a good enough reason to cross the sea and go to graduate school at MIT.

In my two years at the Belfer Center in Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government I benefited from the wisdom of many peers and faculty who applied a well-needed critical eye to my work. In particular, I would like to thank Erica Chenoweth, Udi Eiran, Sean Lynn-Jones, Steve Miller, Steve Walt, and Steve Watts. Along the way many other colleagues have read parts of the book manuscript, either as chapters or as papers in various forms, and have been kind enough to give me their constructive comments. My thanks go to Ericka Albaugh, Naomi Chazan, Ram Erez, Tanisha Fazal, Yoav Gortzak, Peter Hall, Arie Kacowictz, Galia Press-Barnathan, and Jacqueline Whitt.

At my current institution, American University, I have gained from the comments and support of many colleagues, among them Louis Goodman, dean of the School of International Service, and Tamar Gutner, my program chair, as well as Chris Rudolph and Sharon Weiner. To all of them my gratitude is extended. Sonja Madera, Connor Rapkoch, Seb Somers, and Katie Wolicki provided very useful research assistance, which I highly appreciate. And of course, my students are always a source of questioning shaky assumptions and bringing up new ideas. I have also received many helpful comments in conference panels of the American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Studies Association (ISA), and the New Faces in Security Studies conference, as well as in seminars in the Belfer Center and in American University among other places.

This book would also not have been possible without the institutional and financial support of the Department of Political Science and the Center for International Studies at MIT, the Belfer Center at Harvard, and the School of International Service at American University. They have my gratitude for this assistance.

I would like to thank the journal International Security for permission to use some of the material in my article When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict, International Security 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006 / 07), pp. 139–73. I am also thankful, of course, to the University of Chicago Press, and especially to my editor, David Pervin, for giving me this opportunity, supplying helpful ideas, and putting up with the author’s caprices. Two anonymous reviewers greatly improved my manuscript, as did my manuscript editor, Renaldo Migaldi, and I am in debt to them as well.

Lastly, a huge thank-you is owed to my family. My parents, Avraham and Eti Atzili, supported me relentlessly, even when my career choices took me far away from home. My children, Carmel (Melanie) and Tomer, are always a source of motivation. They remind me time and again why we need to strive for a better world. To them I dedicate this book, in the hope that one day it will inspire them to create that better world. My wife and true love, Orit, has always been there for me and has provided endless support. I dedicate this book to her as well, for all the ways in which she already makes this a better world.

Thank you all!

Boaz Atzili

Washington, DC

September 2011

INTRODUCTION

"Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,

That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,

And spills the upper boulders in the sun,

And makes gaps even two can pass abreast."

ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall

Since the end of World War II, a norm of border fixity—a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory—has become prevalent in world politics.¹ The proscribed practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Have fixed borders made international militarized conflict and war less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war,² many observers might assume that the norm of border fixity has made war less common. This book argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as sociopolitically weak states—states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions—are concerned. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which sociopolitically weak states are widespread, international conflict, war, and instability may actually be more common. That good fences could make bad neighbors is bad news, but it is news we might well have to reckon with, and understanding this phenomenon may shed light on the dynamics of continuing conflict in the twenty-first century.

While territoriality and borders received surprisingly little attention in international relations literature up until the 1990s, more recent research has found a very important trend in the way we treat international borders. Conquest and annexation of one’s neighbors’ land, commonplace in the history of the state system, is no longer on the menu of choice for post–World War II leaders and states. A practice that discouraged territorial conquest gradually developed into a strong and institutionalized international norm, which I term border fixity.

This norm, no doubt, has contributed much to international peace and stability in regions such as Europe (except for the Balkans), North America, and South America. I maintain, however, that in regions where states have been sociopolitically weak, such as the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Central America as well as large parts of Asia and the former Soviet Union, the border fixity norm perhaps has had adverse consequences for both domestic and international relations. I posit that this norm is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness, since it deprives the state of key factors that historically have been drivers of state building—namely, territorial threats and territorial opportunities, both of which are henceforth referred to in this book as territorial pressures. In early modern Europe and in the nineteenth-century Americas, territorial pressures played a fundamental role in creating stronger institutions and stronger in-group feelings that in turn furthered the cohe-siveness of states.

In this book the emphasis is put squarely on territorial pressures, rather than on any other threats and opportunities. This is because if territorial issues are more salient than most other issues … then interaction over territory should be different from interaction over other issues.³ Since territories are at the heart of modern national identity, because they have direct impact on the state’s real and perceived power and reputation, because territorial threats tend to be perceived as a menace to the whole and not to select segments of the population, and ultimately because they constitute a threat to the survival of the state, territorial threats have much greater effect on state building than nonterritorial ones. This crucial difference is further discussed in chapter 2.

Today states in the developing world, almost without exception, do not face these territorial pressures, and hence they lack this vital tool for creating strong institutions and internal cohesiveness. Moreover, weak states today are not selected out of the system as they used to be, but continue to survive. In turn, weak and failed states are more likely to become the source of international conflict in a world of fixed borders. This is because the combination of weak states and fixed borders increases the chances of civil strife which often spills across borders by increasing the incidence of cross-border ethnic intervention, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and sometimes war. The perpetuation of weak states also increases the opportunity for other states’ predation. This predation can be economic or political but not territorial, since territorial expansion is beyond the rules of the game in the current system.

Taken separately, each of the relations described above is an important arena for investigation, to which this book contributes new arguments. First, it contributes to the understanding of the perpetuation of state weakness in much of the developing world and the increasing phenomenon of failed and failing states. It argues that the norm of border fixity is an important cause of these worrisome developments. Second, it contributes new observations on the sources of civil conflict, by maintaining that such conflict often results from the combination of state weakness and border fixity. Third, the book contributes to our understanding of the change in the nature of war from a primarily interstate practice to a primarily intrastate or transnational one, as well as our understanding of the change in the geography of war from being more or less evenly spread across the globe to being significantly concentrated within less developed areas. It makes the case that the norms of border fixity and, by extension, state weakness play a major role here too, and it adds to the existing but limited understanding of the causal relations between state weakness and interstate and transnational conflict.

These contributions notwithstanding, however, it is the effect of the border fixity norm on state weakness combined with the role of that weakness in fostering international conflict, rather than each of these phenomena individually, that is the main focus of this research. It is the confluence of these processes—the proposition that a norm which is intended to make the world more peaceful actually, under certain conditions, makes it more prone to conflict—that makes the argument presented here both counterintuitive and theoretically new. The argument that an international norm that promotes fixed borders is a source of many of today’s violent interstate and transnational conflicts is the crux of this book. While I do not argue that border fixity necessarily carries more weight than state weakness in determining international conflict, my theoretical framework, presented more broadly in chapter 2, does give it analytical priority. I chose to do this since border fixity leads to perpetuation and exacerbation of state weakness. It therefore analytically, and sometimes also chronologically, precedes state weakness in the framework. Still, in the end, it is the combination of both these aspects that makes the difference.

In developing the theoretical framework of this book I have, of course, taken advantage of the work of many accomplished scholars. While these works often illuminate parts of the puzzle of border fixity and conflict, none of them present the comprehensive and coherent framework that I am striving to provide here. None has made the argument in its entirety as it appears here; none has connected the dots. For example, Mark Zacher and Tanisha Fazal discuss the existence of the border fixity norm (termed differently),⁴ but both focus on its origins, not its effects. Charles Tilly, Jeffrey Herbst, Robert Bates, Miguel Centeno, and Cameron Thies, among others, explore the bellicist theory about the relations between external conflict and state building,⁵ but they tend to do so within geographic or historical confines. Moreover, the bellicist literature does not differentiate between territorial and nonterritorial wars, and thus largely misses how changes in the norms of borders—and the demise of conquest and annexation that comes with them—influence continued processes of state building and conflict.⁶ This literature, as well, tends to define state weakness or strength only in the institutional sense. Following a more holistic notion of the state⁷ (see chapter 2), I argue here that the ideational facet of the state—its legitimacy, and the identification of the population with the state—are just as important, and sometimes more. The bellicist theory, as well, does not deal with the other side of my equation, namely the relations between weak states in a fixed-borders world and the spillover of conflict. On the other hand, while Kalevi Holsti and Benjamin Miller, as well as Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Shultz, look at how weak states are potentially a source of regional conflict,⁸ they neither relate their arguments to the bellicist theories nor explore in detail the mechanisms through which war in weak states spreads to its neighbors.

Thus, while of great value for the development of my argument, none of these authors integrate all of these elements into one coherent statement showing that the international norm of border fixity may cause more, rather than less, conflict in much of the developing world. Making this argument—which relies on interaction between normative, institutional, and rational variables—is the crux of this work.

In studying the effects of border fixity on conflict I use qualitative methods. The reason for this choice is threefold. First and foremost, I find these methods the best fit to study a phenomenon that as yet has been neither well theorized nor well studied empirically. They allow me to look for data that either has not been looked at systematically or has not been tied to the questions I am asking here. It also allows me to follow the actual causal mechanisms at work, and to analyze them in accordance with the theoretical model suggested. Second, while the concept of border fixity can be reasonably well followed quantitatively,⁹ the same may not be true of state strength, a central component in my formulation—especially if one follows a definition of state strength that emphasizes not only institutional aspects but also legitimacy and identity. Most existing studies use crude proxies such as GDP growth, taxation, or miles of road built,¹⁰ which are important but do not capture the complexity of the phenomenon. More comprehensive datasets and rankings that do exist, such as the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, the Failed States Index, and the State Failure Task Force,¹¹ provide snapshots of (recent) points in time, and are therefore unfit to analyze a long historical process. Third, data on cases prior to 1945, which is crucial for my comparative study, is scarce or absent. The number of cases of territorial conquest and annexation in the post–World War II era is so small that it would be difficult if not impossible to fit a large-n analysis. Dividing such data into dyad-year observations, on the other hand, artificially inflates data that will be overly dependent on a small number of salient (and perhaps deviant) cases.

I use two methods. First, structured focused comparison is a methodology designed to elicit theoretical generalizations from a comparison of several cases. The comparison is focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case … and structured because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that historical case.¹² This book explains, elaborates, and tests the causal mechanism discussed above through a comparative study of four cases of weak states: two in a world in which the border fixity norm is present and two in a world in which the norm is absent. It also compares these cases to two shadow cases, to enhance our understanding of border fixity by examining deviant, hard cases.

The second method used here is process tracing, a methodology designed for focused causal analysis of case studies. To decipher the working of a causal mechanism, one needs to examine closely the process by which it has occurred and to observe congruities and divergences between the theory and the actual empirical process.¹³ This method is especially beneficial for studying and illuminating the working of a causal mechanism that has not been studied before. In studying the relations between state weakness in a fixed-borders world and interstate conflict, I then take a closer look at the two current cases. I strive to observe and identify the process by which the border fixity norm relates to policies and outcomes of relations between these states and their neighbors. Both of these current cases are suited for using the process tracing method because each includes many observation points. That is, each of them has been engaged in long-term relations, including violent conflict, with at least two neighbors.

The cases studied in this book are presented in table 1. The criteria for choosing the cases were based on the countries’ similarities in sociopolitical strength (or rather weakness) and their different settings in terms of prevailing international norms regarding borders. All the states in this study were, at the starting point, weak or very weak. While Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina were part of a world in which international borders were flexible and subject to change, Lebanon and Congo exist in a world in which borders are largely fixed. Because borders in today’s world are by and large fixed, choosing only current cases would not allow me to analyze the effects of changing norms of borders. A research design that compares cases across different eras, by contrast, allows me to examine the effects of the existence or absence of the border fixity norm on domestic and foreign policies, as well as their broader effects on interstate relations.

TABLE 1. Case studies

*Brandenburg-Prussia became the Kingdom of Prussia in 1701. I use both names interchangeably.

**Argentina was called the Réo de la Plata in 1810, then changed to the United Provinces of the Réo de la Plata (or, alternatively, the United Provinces of America), and finally to Argentina. I use the name Argentina in general and the other names when appropriate.

***Congo has been called the Republic of Congo (1960–71), Zaire (1971–97), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997–present). I use the generic term Congo and the other names as appropriate. It should not be confused with the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

In addition, within each group I chose cases that diverge considerably in terms of geography, demography, political background, and economic development so as to maximize the generalizability of the conclusions and allow me to examine some of the prevalent explanations of continuous state weakness in the literature. In particular, this divergence allows me the exploration, in addition to my theory, of the most prominent counter-explanations for the phenomena of states’ strength and weakness.

Granted, differences in historical context make comparison a risky business. Nevertheless, there are some dynamics that hardly change; some forces and incentives affect different polities at different historical times in similar ways. One may argue with some validity that comparing such diverse cases, spread across both time and space, is akin to comparing apples to oranges. But consider the analogy: while apples and oranges are obviously different, they do share some similarities. Both apples and oranges are fruits that grow on trees; both are sweet when ripe and both are round. Moreover, for some purposes a comparison of apples and oranges makes much sense: for instance, when a farmer ponders whether an apple orchard would yield more revenue than an orange grove on a given tract of land, or when a child debates whether to drink apple or orange juice.

The question of the effects of border fixity, I argue, is exactly one in which the comparison of what might otherwise be seen as apples and oranges is called for. For example, the mere fact that seventeenth-century Brandenburg and twentieth-century Congo are compared does not mean that the considerable differences in their historical context are ignored. On the contrary, one of the most important of those differences is the nature of the international environment, borders included—is exactly what I study here, and it makes the comparison an interesting one. To be sure, technological, economic, and normative conditions differ considerably within the range of the four and-a-half centuries that are explored here, and one should not overlook other major historical differences. In chapter 3, therefore, I explore the factors that are featured most prominently in the literature as explanations for the influence of different historical contexts on state weakness and failure. I compare the effects (or lack thereof) of such factors as economic development, demography, and colonialism. I also discuss general conditions such as technological advancement and economic development, which could be argued to make such comparisons potentially moot. Thus I make my case that the different historical context does not by itself explain the profoundly different paths taken by different states if one does not take border fixity into consideration.

I also include in the study a short exploration of two shadow cases: Poland from 1648 to 1795, and Israel from 1920 to 1967. These cases are used to control for the effects of historical eras. Poland is taken as an example of a state that reacted differently to the cues of the very dangerous and territorially flexible environment of early modern Europe. Israel, on the other hand, is one of the few states in the post–World War II era that faced real territorial pressure (and opportunities), including a threat to its survival. These cases, however, are not explored as extensively as the major four cases in the book.

The book proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 will examine the subjects and arguments of existing literature on territories and borders, and the way they relate to relations between states. It will then more specifically analyze the origins, development, and strength of the border fixity norm. Chapter 2 introduces the book’s main theoretical argument. It starts by discussing the concept of the state’s sociopolitical strength, a crucial intervening variable in explaining the different effects of border fixity on different states. It then goes on to theorize the relations between norms regarding international borders and the state’s sociopolitical strength, as well as how the combination of these two variables affects international conflict. In this vein the chapter studies how a flexible border system creates incentives and conditions for the creation of stronger states and how, by contrast, a border-fixity system tends to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness. Lastly, this chapter explores the way in which state weakness in a border-fixity world is likely to result in more international conflict. Chapter 3 then makes the case for a comparison of the four major cases as it examines competing theories of state building, and it shows that neither Brandenburg-Prussia nor Argentina had a significant head start over Lebanon or Congo in state building. In other words, it argues that if the former cases succeeded where the latter failed, it was not because of differing preconditions or historical contexts.

The next three chapters take on the empirical cases. Chapter 4 discusses the strong territorial pressures that resulted in a long, hard, and politically risky process of state building in seventeenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia and, though somewhat on a lesser scale, nineteenth-century Argentina. It also examines how and why similar conditions resulted in the demise of the state in Poland-Lithuania. The analytical decision discussed above regarding the place of border fixity and state weakness in my theoretical framework also informs the structure of the empirical chapters, and dictates that the discussion of Congo and Lebanon is divided between chapter 5 and 6. Chapter 5 analyzes the effects the norm of border fixity has on the strength, or rather weakness, of the state in Lebanon and Congo. It also looks briefly at the atypical case of Israel, trying to examine how the existence of strong territorial pressure, even within a border-fixity world, affects the state’s strength. Chapter 6 turns to the other side of the equation and examines how state weakness in a border-fixity world has become a major source of international conflict. It looks at the process that led to the eruption of internal violence in both Lebanon and Congo, to its spillover across international borders, and to the military intervention of neighboring states. Chapter 7 ties up the loose ends into one coherent explanation of the effects of border fixity on international relations in regions in which most states are sociopolitically weak. It then concludes with contemplation of the theoretical and practical implications of the book’s argument.

Before I proceed, however, a few words of caution are necessary. First, the theory of border fixity is probabilistic rather than deterministic. It claims, for instance, that the norm of border fixity is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness in already weak states—not that it will always do so. It argues that for most weak states, border fixity can be a source of conflict—not that it will necessarily be so. This allows for the possibility that weak states will successfully use other tools of state building, even in the absence of territorial pressures. Strong leadership or existing political culture, for instance, could affect the currents predicted by my theory, although these leaders would have few incentives to do so, and would face formidable obstacles. Second, while the book examines the effects of border fixity on states in a dichotomous way—that is, the border-fixity norm either exists or not; states are either strong or weak—the actual world is of course much more complicated. In terms of state strength, there are probably more gray areas than either black or white. While the dichotomous presentation has been chosen for the sake of simplicity and parsimony, I acknowledge the continuous nature of state strength and international border norms, and partially deal with it in my case studies and in chapter 7. However, for this book’s purpose of developing and testing a new theoretical framework, the nominally strict differentiation is still valid.

CHAPTER ONE

The Theory and Practice of Borders

TERRITORIES AND BORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Territoriality and borders are essential parts of the modern sovereign state and of the state’s international relations.¹ The first section of this chapter surveys the debates on states’ territoriality and borders within and outside the discipline of International Relations (IR), in order to situate this investigation in the context of past and present research. The studies of territory and borders, and especially of different norms that define the way we think about borders, have been developing in recent years, but they still contain significant gaps and leave much to be desired. The aim of this book is to start filling these gaps or, more appropriate to the title, start mending this wall. This chapter first briefly surveys some of most important theoretical and empirical discussions of borders. It then introduces the concept of the border-fixity norm and discusses its development, status, and strength.

Throughout history, many if not most conflicts and agreements between states were about territories and borders: their location or their functions. Historically, territory and border issues are probably the primary cause of wars, as well as agreements, between states. In a fairly consistent way across databases and studies of the modern state-system (since Westphalia in 1648), the finding is that territorial disputes are the most common underlying cause of war and militarized disputes.² Statistical work based on the COW (Correlates of War) project, find that territorial issues are present in more than a quarter of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) while it accounts for more than a half of the wars between 1816 and 1992.³ Working from his own data set, Kalevi Holsti’s findings for the period between 1815 and 1989 are similar.⁴

One may suspect that this could be the case since territorial disputes often occur between contiguous states. These states have both the willingness (more reasons to fight) and opportunity (more tools to fight) for conflict initiation and war, thus making territory somewhat spurious.⁵ Yet research has found that territoriality is a major cause of war even when controlled for contiguity and a host of other possible variables. Territory, moreover, is even more likely to serve as a cause for war initiation when the states in question do not share a border.⁶ In other words, the argument is that territories and borders have some intrinsic value to states that make them more likely to be a source of dispute and war.⁷ As John Vasquez argues, Territory is a peculiarly sensitive area for human collectives. They will fight over it more readily than over any other question, and any issue linked with territory becomes subject to violence and the use of force.⁸

Although this systematic survey of the role territories and borders play in interstate conflicts is rather recent, the notion of centrality of borders to international relations is anything but new. Because of this notion, and because modern IR studies are about interactions (be it diplomacy, trade, war, or other kinds) between political entities enclosed within some territorial boundaries, it is surprising to find how little has been done in this discipline by way of theorizing territorial boundaries. International relations scholars rarely examine how definitions of populations and territories change throughout history and how this change alters the notion of legitimate authority.⁹

To be sure, discussions of specific territorial conflicts abound, but generalizations and theoretical analysis of the system that is built of territorial states, and the nature and function of borders, has been scarce.¹⁰ As one scholar reflects, It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on.¹¹ Or perhaps this neglect is not wholly amazing. One often indeed does not look at the ground on which one walks, or at least does not problematize it. This is usually justified, since one needs a solid basis as a foundation for any endeavor. However, when significant change transforms the nature of that basis, it calls for a serious investigation.

Since the late 1980s, a slow but encouraging development in the writings about territoriality and borders has occurred. This emerging literature may be broadly divided into three categories: theoretical conceptualization of territoriality and borders; discussions of relations between territories and identities; and the study of territorial changes and territorial conflict. Below, I discuss some of the most important works in each of these categories. The emerging literature in all these three categories serves as a basis for identifying and studying the effects of the border-fixity norm.

Territoriality and the Modern State System

The role territoriality plays in modern international relations includes two fundamental components. First is the observation that territoriality, borders, and their relations with populations, are variables rather than constants. Second is the realization that international borders have two dimensions—locations and functions—which are both distinct and related.

The knowledge that territoriality plays a crucial part in the modern world, and that it differs in this respect from previous international orders, is not new. This knowledge, however, has hardly been developed in modern political science. One of the reasons for this lack of interest is the change of focus that the study of relations between territory and politics took at the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. This trend, centered on geopolitics and the writings of Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder,¹² was rooted in the premises that there are certain geographic constants which determine the value and character of land in different regions of the globe, and that countries need to take account of these characteristics in order to be able to prevail in their power struggles with others. Important German scholars at the beginning of the twentieth century and through World War II made geopolitics the centerpiece of their attention but also gave it an additional twist. Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, among others, attempted to create a much more organic view of geography, and mixed it with racial theories. Their political geography, eventually, became an important part of the Nazi propaganda machine.¹³

After the defeat of the Nazis, the study of political geography was discredited in most places,¹⁴ and for a good reason. This