The Bloody Path to Valkyrie: How Duty, Faith, and Honor Inspired the German Resistance 1933 - 1946

By Bryan J. Powers

Many great writers and historians have written about the failed Valkyrie plot and the Germans who led the operation. Historians and authors Peter Hoffman, Michael Baigent, Richard Dargie, and Nigel Jones have all written extensively on the events of Valkyrie and the failed 1944 plot, focusing much of their efforts on the iron will of Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg. The general theme following these works are that the German Resistance, while undoubtedly guided by strong personalities, lacked the dedicated support of the German High Command and the Western Allies. Furthermore, most historical works written on the German Resistance focus on the development of a resistance cadre developed in 1942 and 1943 among Wehrmacht officers on the Eastern Front. However, The Bloody Path to Valkyrie demonstrates that the core members of the German Resistance began their clandestine conspiracy in the mid-1930s, long before the tide of war turned against the Wehrmacht forces along the Eastern Front. More importantly, despite decades of misunderstanding, the German Resistance was anything but defeatist German officials and military officers looking to shift blame for the atrocities their nation committed. This story works to connect a fragment picture of how many of the men and women of the German Resistance were so driven by their faith in God or their own conscience that they were compelled to action despite all the inherent fears of discovery, and the shame and recognition of their own culpability to such crimes. For many of these men and women, their greatest fear and the basis of their actions was not failure in their mission or punishment for their associated crimes, but the shame of knowing they had a chance to do something to remove the world of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis… and failed to try.
Bryan Powers has family who saw the conflict from both sides of the European theater and was motivated to write about the sacrifice of the German Resistance. Through his maternal grandparents, he was able to see and hear what life was like under the Nazi oppression as children, and how fear was used against anyone who resisted the Nazis authorities. These small stories of war, death, and fear were but a fraction of what an entire continent was subjected to. The retelling of this story of the German Resistance, through the eyes of a few of the war's survivors, is an attempt to honor those that resisted till the Bitter End.

• Language: English
• Publisher: BookBaby
• Release date: Aug 31, 2023
• ISBN: 9798350920925

Book preview

Prologue

The attempted assassination and coup of 20 July 1944 of the Nazi Regime under Adolf Hitler was nothing more than a blip on the radar during a war which was in scale greater than anything ever seen. For decades historians and researchers have speculated whether the coup had been successful might the outcome of the war have changed. The story that follows delves deeper and examines the role of the Western Allies and their lack of support to German Resistance movements through the eyes of three of its surviving members, and two Americans, Klemen von Klemperer and Allen Dulles. Through examination of well documented Office of Strategic Services (OSS) memoirs, official correspondence, and firsthand memoirs of the surviving members of the German Resistance, this story will show a clear connection between the Allied intelligence services, primarily based in Switzerland which had the opportunity and ability to directly support several coup attempts.¹,²,³,⁴

Despite the Allied propaganda at the time and public knowledge of the events, the German Resistance was not comprised of desperate and opportunistic Wehrmacht commanders at the end of a losing war, but an organized resistance going back years before the first shots were fired. It is the goal of my work to examine this connection as a humbling intelligence failure in an otherwise successful Allied strategy and detail the foreign policy decisions of the Allied administrations whose lack of foresight and at times prejudice led to numerous lost opportunities which may have changed the outcome of the war.

Many great writers and historians have written about the failed Valkyrie plot and the Germans which led the operation. Historians, military enthusisasts and authors alike have all written extensively on the events of Valkyrie and the failed 1944 plot and focused much of their efforts on the iron will of Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg. The general theme following these works are that the German Opposition while undoubtedly guided by strong personalities, lacked the dedicated support of the German High Command and the Western Allies. Furthermore, most historical works written on the German Resistance focus on the development of a resistance cadre developed in 1942 and 1943 among Wehrmacht officers on the Eastern Front. In this book however I have endeveoured to discuss how the core members of the German Resistance began their clandestine conspiracy in the mid-1930s long before the tide of war turned against the Wehrmacht forces along the Eastern Front. More importantly, despite decades of misunderstanding, the German Resistance was anything but defeatist German officials and military officers looking to shift blame for the atrocities their nation committed. This story will demonstrate how for many of the men and women of the German Resistance, their faith in God weighed on them so heavily that they were compelled to action despite all the inherent fears of discovery, and the shame and recognition of their own culpability to such crimes. For many of these men and women their greatest fear, and ultimately the basis of their actions, was not failure in their mission, punishment for their associated crimes, but the shame of knowing they had a chance to do something to remove the world of Hitler and the Nazis and failed to attempt.

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1 Fabian Von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler: Der Widerstand: Dissent and Resistance in the Third Reich (Westview Press; Boulder, CO, 1994).

2 Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End (Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston, MA, 1947).

3 Neal N. Petersen, From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945 (Penn State University Press; 1 edition, University Park, PA, 2008).

4 Allen Dulles, Germany’s Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistance (Da Capo Press; Boston, MA, 2000).

Chapter 1

Introduction

World War II is in many ways the center piece of historical writing in the world of international affairs today. Even if one views the war beginning with the rise of the Nazis and Imperial Japan in the early 1930s it still holds a relatively small time period in human history given how much attraction it has from the casual readers to renowned historians. The war itself had many definitive turning points and at some the very freedoms of mankind were at stake. The events discussed in this thesis were largely overlooked by history as a small failure in a war filled with disappointments. On 20 July 1944, a single bomb exploded deep in the woods of Poland, once Eastern Prussia, wounding several and killing only a few. Far too few for the men who set the bomb. This attack was part of a desperate plot to assassinate none other than the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler, leader of the Nazi Third Reich and some of his senior staff in order to overthrow the regime. Over 78 years have passed since this fateful day and for most readers they will never understand just how much opportunity was lost on that single day in 1944. This explosion while small and insignificant compared to the burning world in which it existed, would stand out as a violent reminder of the hidden resistance and disgruntlement of honorable men and women within the Third Reich.

The attack was conducted by a secret organization deeply embedded within the Nazi Party, Wehrmacht, and other prominent political aristocracy within the German establishment with the attempt to assume control over the Nazi war machine and seek favorable terms for a negotiated peace with the Western Allies. The explosion was ultimately unsuccessful, and while the conspirators successfully launched what became Operation Valkyrie initially, consisting of the seizure of Berlin and the arrest of many Schutzstaffel (SS) and Nazi leaders, the failure to eliminate Hitler in the attack crushed any chance of success. ⁵ Hitler, the Nazi Party and SS leaders were able to quickly establish communications and maintain the chain of command loyal to the party. Most of the Valkyrie plotters were captured, interrogated, tried and executed following the failed July 1944 attempt. A fateful and tragic end for those who had tried for years to receive international recognition and support for their endevours, some who went so far as to meet directly with the senior Allied leaders before the war began.

One of the conspirators Fabian Schlabrendorff, meet directly with Winston Churchill, and many other British officials to seek their support for the coup before the war ever began.⁶ Fabian certainly was not alone in these attempts. Members of the German Resistance had established ties to the British and United States government as early as 1937 and where continually rebuffed. The Allies either meet their warnings with skepticism or otherwise were so intent on a domestic policy of appeasement that every warning fell upon deaf ears. Given the possibility that had the 1944 assassination attempt been successful it may have helped to end the war ten months earlier, the lack of documented support by the Western Allies is if nothing else a severe lack of foresight and at worst a wasted opportunity costing millions of lives. Consider this concept in more modern terms. The forewarnings that were provided by the German Resistance to the British, Dutch, Americans, and French during the war would be as if the same number of people had reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) of the plot to conduct the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Despite such wanrings, the FBI had simply ignored them allowing the attack to occur and ensuring two decades of war. In both situations had someone only taken the word of those trying to help prevent disaster the outcomes would have been drastically different and the world itself might look very different today.

With more than seventy years having passed since the events of 20 July 1944, review of historical literature, memoirs and declassified documents demonstrate that the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) were deeply rooted in covert operations in Europe. Furthermore, that the two organizations could have used their resources and intelligence to support the assassination plot, changing what was the last ditch failed effort of the dying soul of Germany, into an event which could have saved millions of lives. However, readers should also consider that in the backdrop of all the Resistance plans to assassinate Hitler a world war was still ongoing, and the bloody conflict was a constant roadblock to success. So this story will begin by setting the scene of rumors of war and war itself leading up to the Valkyrie. As such we can hope to put ourselves into the mindset of the conspirators so that way we might feel their fear, sorrow, enthusiasm, and regrets. More importantly their desire to act, or otherwise why they failed to do so sooner.

While Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg was certainly the man of the hour in July 1944, and the most recognizable actor in this plot, this story will focus on the efforts by the Resistance members such as Hans Bernd Gisevius, Fabian Schlabrendorff, and American OSS Agent Allen Dulles. Gisevius was a Gestapo investigator, later employed in the Abwehr (German Military Intelligence), who along with several prominent German military and political officials attempted as early as 1933 to expose the tyranny of the Nazis. Gisevius later worked to pass intelligence to the Western Allies, specifically Allen Dulles, in hopes they would receive the desperately needed support of the Roosevelt and Churchill Administrations. Whereas Schlabrendorff worked within the Wehrmacht and had extensive ties to the military arm of the Resistance, deeply rooted in the actions which were undertaken by the Wehrmacht members.

These intricate stories of intrigue and lives of duplicity are both frustratingly desperate and frighteningly courageous. The German Resistance did not fear death so much as they did failure in their plot. However, even in failure, the mental and psychological injuries sustained during the attack broke the once perceived psychological prowess of the Fuehrer and left a deeply mistrustful and mentally unstable dictator in its wake. As a result of his weakened state Hitler was never again the strategic mastermind of the previous six years of war. Inherently this allowed the Allies to exploit his tactical blunders and bring about the downfall of the Thousand Year Reich.

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5 Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death: The German Resistance to Hitler, 1933–1945 (Holt Paperbacks; New York, NY, 1997), 219.

6 Michael Baigent and Leigh Richard, Secret Germany: Stauffenberg & the True Story of Operation Valkyrie (Skyhorse Publishing; New York, NY, second edition, 2008).

Chapter 2

Acknowledgement of Great Works

Over the past seventy-five years many outstanding works and literature have been written about the two topics contained in this thesis: the history and exploits of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and the events of the 20 July 1944 assassination plot. Historians, authors, and Resistance survivors, Peter Hoffman, Ian Kershaw, Philipp von Boeselager, Florence Fehrenbach, Jerome Fehrenbach, Nigel Jones, Pierre Galante, Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, all wrote independent works on the 20 July 1944 plot. Each work is just as thrilling as the next in telling this fascinating story. Without taking away from the importance or the substance of the works themselves two themes become strikingly clear. Many historians refer to the plot as the General’s Plot against Hitler which is factually false. The plot itself and those who were members of the Resistance came from all ranks and backgrounds, and in truth did not jump into action until junior and mid-grade Wehrmacht officers became part of the coup and grasped the reins of destiny. Secondly, most authors do not discuss or detail the relationship between the Resistance and the Western Allies and the little to no support they received in the relationship.

Richard Harris Smith wrote OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency, which provided valuable insight into separate plots to assassinate Hitler prior to Operation Valkyrie, which ironically had more assistance or interaction with the Allies; be it OSS or SOE, than the plotters of the 20 July 1944 bombing. Throughout his work Smith details just how deeply the Western Allies knew full and well of Resistance groups and failed either through intended policy or theoretical misgivings to support their initiatives. Smith’s work provides the necessary starting point for any researcher to find additional works on OSS support to Resistance. It should also be stated that Smith received much criticism and scrutiny from his former colleagues in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who felt that he had misrepresented the agency in an overly critical analysis of the agency’s history and evolution from the OSS.⁷ Yet in the world of intelligence it is vital to critique past operations for lessons learned in an arena where mistakes mean lives lost.

Allen Dulles’ Germany’s Underground, The Plots to Kill Hitler and End the War, originally published in 1947; undoubtedly saw most of the documentation proving his exploits remaining classified. Mr. Dulles’ insight into the Resistance members, the organization itself, the disorganized nature of the plot, and U.S. policy towards Nazi and post-war Germany were incredibly helpful to the research of this story.⁸ Neal Peterson through extensive research documented the war time intelligence reports of Dulles stationed in Bern, Switzerland in his work From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945. His exemplary work in researching the intelligence reports documented in the U.S. National Archives unquestionably proved the extensive ties of the OSS to Resistance. Furthermore, these dispatches illuminated the desire of the OSS in European stations to seek guidance on American policy towards supporting, either directly or indirectly, the efforts of the Resistance, while providing valuable warnings of Resistance planning.⁹

The written works of two Resistance members who survived the Nazi purge following the failure of the 20 July 1944 plot were instrumental in establishing this story. Fabian von Schlabrendorff who wrote The Secret War Against Hitler: Der Widerstand: Dissent and Resistance in the Third Reich, and Hans Bernd Gisevius who wrote To the Bitter End. These works, originally written in their native German language, and translated for international readers, are instrumental for any reader to see the desperation and moral compass of the Resistance from within. While these men and women worked as part of the greater Resistance, their movements and actions were part of independent measures and cells of the organization which while working towards a common goal differed in understanding and acknowledgement of one another. Many have criticized the disorganization of the Resistance failing to realize the security measures taken by the group to prevent exposure and infiltration by Nazi agents. Schlabrendorff was one of the main conspirators in the Valkyrie plot and managed to survive his captors despite terrible tortured and interrogation following the attack. Without a doubt this tale breaks down the planning, execution and outcome to the failed assassination attempt in vivid detail.¹⁰

Gisevius was a member of the Resistance established in Germany and Prussia as early as the early 1930s. Establishing continuous contact with the OSS office in Bern, Switzerland beginning in 1943, he and other Resistance members proved instrumental in helping Allied investigators in the Nuremberg trials, providing witness testimony and written evidence of Nazi crimes. This is an addition to his prolonged attempts throughout the war to receive allied support in multiple assassination attempts against Hitler. Some modern historians and writers have attempted to call into question the integrity of Gisevius’s writing as apologetic and intentionally misguided to have a more forgivable demeanor towards some of the Resistance members with ties to the Holocaust and the Nazi Party. Specifically, in relation to Arthur Nebe, another indirect member of the Resistance. Nebe, having been a major figure in Himmler’s SS empire as Head of the Kriminalpolizei (Criminal Police) and later having belonged to Einsatzgruppen – B, the murderous genocide squads sent out to kill Jews, Gypsies and others deemed undesirable by the Nazi Regime.

In 1966, Gisevius wrote Wo ist Nebe? (or translated as Where is Nebe?). An account describing the revelations of Nebe at the Nuremberg trials and Gisevius own interpretation of events, published by Droemer Zurich, Switzerland. Gisevius received much praise from Allen Dulles, and in no short order owes his life to the work of Dulles and his assistant Gero von Gaevernitz. Dulles and Gaevernitz smuggled visa documents to Gisevius in hiding following the failure of Valkyrie, enabling his escape from Germany and ultimately the hang man’s noose during the follow-on Nazi purge.¹¹

While many more written sources and historical works were used in the effort to retell this story, these five works established the foundation of rebuilding the fear, duplicity, and desperation of the lives which surrounded the Resistance. While each reader’s viewpoint may differ on the interpretation or the opinions of the writers the facts are undeniable that the Western Allies were very aware of the actions of the Resistance. Unfortunately, this reality did not transfer to action or support and thus left the Resistance to face the brunt of their decision to stand for the desperate revitalization of a German conscience.

The work contained within this book are my thoughts and interpretations alone based on the events which are more than three quarters of a century past. They are not intended to change the narrative of the events, nor to sway the facts which are irrefutable. Many of the Resistance members were part of the Nazi war machine and revealed in its battlefield victories; but a few were not and placed their faith in God and stood by their principles withdrawing from the regime. Together they formed the Resistance often pulled from separate strings, with alternating agenda and concepts. Despite these relationships, their struggle is one which cannot be forgotten, and all of its corruption, sacrifice, and internal strife are lessons for the future. However only through examination of critical events in the past can one hope to learn from mistakes as individuals and as a society, so the evils of the past are not rebirthed in the future.

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7 Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Lyons Press; 1st edition, Guilford, CT, 2005).

8 Allen Dulles, Germany’s Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistance (Da Capo Press; Boston, MA, 2000).

9 Neal N. Petersen, From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945 (Penn State University Press; 1 edition, University Park, PA, 2008).

10 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler: Der Widerstand: Dissent and Resistance in the Third Reich (Westview Press; Boulder, CO, 1994).

11 Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1947).

Chapter 3

The Illusion of German Invincibility

By the time of the Valkrie plot of 1944 the geo-political nature of World War II looked very different than it had begun with the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The Wehrmacht no longer had undeniable control of Fortress Europe and had seen systematic and strategic defeats in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and throughout the Eastern Front. Hitler’s debacle in sending his forces against the Red Army in 1941 was without a doubt one of two of the worst military stratagems of the war. Declaring war on the United States following the Pearl Harbor attacks was the other. Yet, it was hardly surprising that Hitler made any of the decisions he did during the war. Hitler’s decision to declare war against Soviet Russia, America, England and France, while allying Germany with Japan and Italy were written as an ideological blueprint in his autobiography Mein Kampf. Hitler had always planned to expand Germany to the East for his desire for Lebensraum, or living space for the Volk or communal people of the nation.¹² Hitler took time in his autobiography to depict what he saw as the decadence and hypocrisy of World War 1 alliances which had left Germany defeated, alone, and humiliated following the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler in no short order declared should he ever rise to power all would be considered enemies of the states ranging from the French, British, Russian, Japanese and Czech, Jews, and the Catholic Church.¹³,¹⁴

Many Germans, especially veterans of the Great War (World War I) were swayed by Hitler’s arguments placing blame on the stab in the back theory and naturally sided with Hitler and the Nazis. Examination of the poor economic situation of the German republic following their defeat in the Great War served as catalysts for many German people flocking to a leader promising work and profit. Some historians have stated that the German people did not suffer in the events of WWI, nor following the Treaty of Versailles as much as German propaganda attempted to display during the rise of the Nazi party. ¹⁵

Arguably the historians are correct in stating that Germany did not suffer as much regarding than in comparison to France and England, its cities were not attacked, destroyed or otherwise occupied by enemy forces. However, Germany, is second only to Russia in the overall number of casualties sustained during the Great War with 7,142,558, killed missing, or wounded.¹⁶ Consider this in terms of how many have been affected by all of the sons, fathers, and brothers which did not return, and therefore did not contribute to reconstruction, labor force, or could not reproduce a new generations. This was also a large force which could not be used to train or supplement the German Wehrmacht during the Nazi rise. In the years after the end of the Great War, Germany has been described as a torrent of water without a river to contain it and going in all directions.

There were 33 political parties in the nation all vying for power and in the chaos the people screamed for control and stability. This desire for control and stability was deeply rooted in German society which was built upon rules, laws, and the desire to follow them both.¹⁷ Grudgingly historians must admit Hitler successfully garnered large worker’s unions and societal reforms in terms of economic sense which were said to contribute to massive decline in German unemployment and poverty in the 1930s. The Arbeitbeschaffung or work-creation system enabled the German economy to establish jobs and the Reichsautobahnen.¹⁸ While the infamous Autobahn undoubtedly added thousands of jobs across the nation it also provided a dual purpose to allow for the rapid deployment of German military units along wide corridors of the country. Above all else, Hitler cared little for changing social norms which did not support a militaristic nation. He envisioned a war in which he could fold Europe under the Nazi banner and geared the economic arena towards its support rather than education, science, religion, or medicine.

Regarding social norms, most would agree that there was nothing normal with the Nazi regime’s use of its society. Germany certainly included all ages and genders into its work force, including military and law enforcement agencies. Many of the administrative positions at the German High Command, Nazi offices, and concentration camps were run or managed by women, not to exclude the women married to Nazi elite who went along with their husband’s willful participation in atrocities and war.¹⁹ Ironically many of these women would be nicknamed Hitler’s Furies for their active roles in wartime atrocities. Germany and Soviet Russia were the first nations to actively pursue child soldiers for roles in combat or combat support. Nazi Germany established the Hitler Youth in 1933 and quickly demonstrated its preparedness not only to utilize children in war, but also the ability to look towards the future of a militaristic state raising soldiers from adolescence to adulthood with Nazi ideals.²⁰ This was not out of the common for the German’s either when considering the use of the Wandervogel in November 1918; a group consisting of thousands of German youth, which were sent to the Western Front just before the German surrender and were ultimately massacred in battle.²¹ Sadly this would replay itself again when the Hitler Youth was ordered to participate in the final battles of the war including the defense of Berlin in 1945.

Hitler was simply unable to understand the realism of battle, thinking only of his racial hatred and limited understanding of economic affairs. Examination into the works by Wagenfuhr of the Statistiche Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Office) whose manuscript on the German war economy provided in detail German war time surveys on allied bombing campaigns as well as the output and function of German industry. Wagenfuhr claimed that the characteristic feature of the German economy in 1939 and 1940 was business as usual in the peace-like war economy.²²,²³ Ultimately any realistic economic approaches to a multi-front war, and the inherent massive and extravagant nature of German economic armament under Hitler and the Nazi party, were non-existent. This is in addition to the ridiculous and tragic use of thousands of German soldiers, police and civilians dedicated to the Final Solution, which including hunting down and arresting millions of innocent civilians, concentration camp security, maintenance, motor transportation and train rails. From a purely statistical and non-emotion or unmoral point of view this was a shortsighted decision which took thousands of soldiers and police off the battlefield. Hitler certainly had no issues with ordering or condoning children and women to serve in militaristic roles but failed to properly utilize the full potential of German society to support an already exasperated economy.

Italy remains an enigma for many researchers because of the poor choice of chosen ally by Hitler and the Nazis. Mussolini certainly sported a massive Army on paper, but the uncoordinated nature of the Italian military was a direct result of the lack of higher command joint strategy and planning. Unlike their German allies, the Italaian High Command (Comando Supremo) was highly inefficient and unable to achieve the strategic successes of their German counterparts. This often led to the military commanders conducting operations at will without oversight or strategic goals in mind. Italy’s failed invasion of Ethiopia in in the 1930s is a great exemplar of this disadvantage. Mussolini and his commanders should have foreseen the need for change but jumped into the expansive nature of World War II as Hitler’s sidekicks with little renovation in their military forces or economic industry. Additionally, the Italian war efforts were always focused on the wrong locations and never in line with greater Axis-European strategy, which was usually reliant on Hitler’s grand fantasies. This is not to say that Mussolini himself was any different in his delusion of grandeur when considering Italy was unable to effectively win any campaigns in the Balkans or Africa, yet still dreamt of rebuilding the Roman Empire under fascist rule.²⁴

The Italian premature invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 is one such example. Italy’s feeling of marginalization that came from having been left out of the Polish invasion, forced German troops to jump into the conflict without proper operational planning when the Italian Army failed to meet its tactical goals. As such there was never a deep level of respect between the armies of the two Axis nations. This translated to a general distrust of German troops which were stationed in Italy or conducting joint operations with the Italian military in Africa and the Balkans. By 1943, the stationing of German troops in Northern Italy left many Italians to view them as occupiers; incidentally this included many Italians of which had never truly accepted fascism in the nation and slowly turned away from Mussolini and the Nazis.²⁵ Mussolini for all his pomp and circumstance could never have achieved total utilization of this military and economic national capabilities given the lack of unification in the nation itself.

France was not unlike its Italian adversary. The nation was never able to utilize its vast populations, military, or economic power. The German invasion in 1940 destroyed any illusion of unified resistance. In just a few weeks of fighting the Germans were able to reach Paris and force France’s capitulation. While the French soldiers who resisted were certainly brave, the French High Command was still lost in its belief that the coming war would be very much like the prolonged trench conflict of the Great War. As such no formal measures were taken to prepare the nation, especially the people or the economy for war. Ironically, the same could be said for the Wehrmacht as it prepared for the Soviet invasion in 1941. A U.S. State Department telegram from Stockholm on 27 July 1941,