Small State Irregular Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic Utility of Security Sector Assistance

By Marius Kristiansen

From a Norwegian perspective, and by focusing on the Special Operations Forces component within the Norwegian Armed Forces, this book provides a scholar-practitioner’s perspective on how to increase the strategic utility of different types of military efforts in an SSA context. The overarching project encompasses a wide range of elements for understanding the contemporary security environment and, in particular, how the military component fits into the strategic picture within an international context for small states. It shows that small states must be aware of the different limitations for existing strategic options for the various actors involved. It also outlines the strategic utility of potential niche capabilities, and how elements within the Norwegian Armed Forces can take on a strategic, enabling role for Norway, bilateral partners, and even coalitions in future conflicts. Small State Irregular Warfare in the Twenty-First Century serves as both a guide and a handbook on how small states might utilize SSA as an instrument of national power to meet national strategic objectives. 

• Language: English
• Publisher: Outskirts Press
• Release date: Aug 23, 2023
• ISBN: 9781977266262

Marius Kristiansen

Marius Kristiansen is an active-duty Norwegian Army officer whose military service began in the Norwegian Navy. Throughout his career he has served several deployments in Southeast Asia, Sahel, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. He has served as an exchange officer to the United States Special Operations Command. Kristiansen holds a PhD in Political Science and Strategy, an MSc in Defence Analysis—Irregular Warfare, a BA in Land Warfare and Military Leadership, and an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism Studies. He received his military education from the Norwegian Military Academy, the U.S. Marine Corps University, and the U.S. Air University. He was a 2022 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and is a 2023 Non-Resident Fellow at the U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Special Operations University. Kristiansen is one of the founding members of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem.no.

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Small State Irregular Warfare in the Twenty-First Century

Strategic Utility of Security Sector Assistance

All Rights Reserved.

Copyright © 2023 Marius Kristiansen

Foreword and Introduction: Njål Hoem

v4.0

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Abstract

The content of this book directs specific attention to the following research question: How can small states achieve the highest yield from their Security Sector Assistance (SSA) efforts? From a Norwegian perspective, and by focusing on the Special Operations Forces (SOF) component within the Norwegian Armed forces, this book provides a scholar-practitioner’s perspective on how to increase the strategic utility of different types of military efforts in an SSA context. The overarching project, which this book is both part and the conclusion of, encompasses a wide range of relevant elements for understanding the contemporary security environment, particularly how the military component fits into the strategic picture within an international context for small states. Because SSA is a difficult task and choices must be made for both big and small states, this book shows that small states must be aware of the different limitations of existing strategic options for the various actors involved. Further, this book outlines and explains the strategic utility of potential niche capabilities and how elements within the Norwegian armed forces can take on a strategic enabling role for Norway, bilateral partners, and even coalitions in future conflicts. Finally, by addressing attention toward 10 different subresearch questions, this book aims to serve as both a guide and a handbook that elevates the level of knowledge on how small states might utilize SSA as an instrument of national power to meet national strategic objectives.

Small states can gain a disproportionate advantage that allows them to punch above their own weight if they nurture SSA correctly within their own systems through the following actions:

appreciating strategy at all levels in the civilian-military bureaucracy;

using both a prescriptive and descriptive approach to analysis;

being aware of the necessity for dialogue between the military’s strategic leadership and political decision-makers and the fact that the different actors within this particular unequal dialogue have distinctly different roles, responsibilities, and authorities;

taking the time to think critically and strategically;

being creative within reasonable and realistic limits;

being aware of the value of local commitment, ownership, and alignment;

appreciating the value of actually understanding the complex, adaptive, and wicked problem set SSA represents, and then, in particular, the mechanisms related to absorptive capacity;

adhering to the principles of long-term commitment and vertical implementation, and the fact that there exist specific skills, traits, and knowledge that are more effective for conducting an indirect effort compared to a direct (action) effort; and

acknowledging that niche capabilities exist that only specific small states can generate (or that they do so more effectively than others).

Keywords: Security Sector Assistance (SSA); Unconventional Warfare (UW); Military Assistance (MA); Security Force Assistance (SFA); Security Sector Reform (SSR); Unequal Dialogue; Strategy; Military Strategy; Critical Thinking; Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF); Military Doctrine; Complex Problem Solving; Absorptive Capacity; Strategic Utility

Table of Contents

Abstract

1.0: Foreword and Introduction

2.0: What Is the Relationship between Political Science, Power, and Strategy?

2.1: Strategy—What Is It Actually?

The Levels of Strategy

Different Approaches to the Use of Strategy

The Relationship between the Politician and the Instruments of National Power

2.2: Military Strategy—The History and the Theoretical Foundation

Why Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri de Jomini?

Carl von Clausewitz—The Mentor and the Strategic Officer

Antoine-Henri de Jomini—The Practical and Strategic Instructor

2.3: Military Strategy and the Levels of War

Military Strategy Represented on the Different Levels

2.4: Strategy as a Problem-Solving Process—Deliberate, Emergent, and Design Approach

2.5: Military Strategy—Planning, Programming, and Execution

3.0: Security Sector Assistance (SSA)

3.1: The World We Live In and the Applicability of SSA

3.2: The Conflict Spectrum and SSA

3.3: Strategy—Ends, Ways, and Means

3.4: Doctrine, Guidance, and Norwegian Advisory Experience

3.5: Understanding the Comprehensive Challenge Is Key

3.6: Principles of Effective SSA

Long-Term Perspective

Vertical Implementation

Challenges and Necessary Preconditions

3.7: Small States Versus Big States—NORSOF as an Example

3.8: Future Norwegian Niches

3.9: Concluding Remarks

Bibliography

List of Figures

Figure 1: The Policy Continuum

Figure 2: National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane

Figure 3: The DIMEFIL Framework of National Instruments of Power

Figure 4: DIMEFIL Framework Used as a Method

Figure 5: Differences Between Small States/Power and Great Powers

Figure 6: The Vertical Continuum of War

Figure 7: National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War

Figure 8: Relationship between Strategic Thinking and Strategic Planning

Figure 9: NATO’s Cyclic Depiction of the Spectrum of Conflict

Figure 10: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Depiction of the Conflict Continuum

Figure 11: The Spectrum of SSA Options for Small States

Figure 12: The Military as a Spear

Figure 13: Adrian Wolfberg’s Model of the Evaluation Process of Absorptive Capacity

1.0

Foreword and Introduction

By Njål Hoem.

On the 24th of February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The war that began with the 2014 annexation of Crimea escalated to a profound crisis and what the NATO Secretary General described as a full-on war in Europe.¹ Yet, only six months earlier, in August 2021, world eyes were focused elsewhere. The evacuation of Kabul marked the end of an era. Twenty years of NATO and partner engagement had ended.

The military discourse that had gradually shifted toward Great Power Competition (GPC) in the last few years suddenly accelerated. There is no denying that our reality has changed. GPC is our current defining security paradigm. The concern is less terrorism and more near-peer and peer-state threats. The pivot is justified. The rule-based world order that has marked the post-cold war era is increasingly being challenged by states willing to utilize all instruments of power (IoP) to establish different premises for state interactions. Russia, China, and others are systematically attempting to chip away at the very foundations of the world order as we know it.

In response, the West attempts to shore up the onslaught—in all domains. For Western policymakers and the armed forces, this has been no short of an awakening. The perception of Western military invincibility, demonstrated with gusto in the first Iraq war (1991) and cemented through the global campaigns in the following decades, is fading. Faced with a competent near-peer adversary where we cannot overwhelm our opponents as we have previously done in the Middle East, it would be ill-advised to mistake the tactical overmatch from the global war on terror (GWOT) with operational and strategic capability.

The consensus seems to be that this time around, we cannot fake it till we make it. This is a wise assertion. The West cannot solve the problems of the current GPC as we did GWOT. It is hard to say how GPC will end,² but failing more than likely entails war. In the proper sense of the word, indeed, GPC includes war. War and warfare, if not an acceptable manner of state interaction, are at least back on the table as a likely and expected form of conducting international relations. Look to Ukraine.

For Western armed forces who have gradually been submerged in the (tactical) demands of GWOT, the morning after has proven painful. We have discovered that the last 20 years have left us with an inheritance consisting of insufficient or irrelevant resources, equipment, competencies, and routines to face a more competent threat. This has led to a reorientation of Western armed forces. We have realized that the others have already started the competition while we are merely qualifying. This has profound implications for Special Operations Forces (SOF), the rock stars of GWOT. As policymakers are rummaging through their toolboxes to ensure they are well equipped, SOF is scrambling to ensure the continuity of their perceived strategic value. More than one policymaker, strategist, and think tank question the relative strategic utility of SOF in our current security paradigm.

Thus, SOF refocuses on the high end. Regional competency, rapid (re-)action, contested environments, new capabilities, and combined joint integration are topics at the top of the list. It makes sense. SOF needs to be complementary and force multiplying in a new context. And SOF has, in most eyes, moved from being the supported to the supporting. This is an unpleasant reality . . . and a catalyst for rapid and profound change.

We should be careful, though, not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. The experiences and capabilities built over the last 20 years are not useless. The question is, rather, how these experiences can be put to best use. The out-of-area-operations of the post-cold war era have allowed us to get better acquainted with the utility of the military IoP and its limitations and strengths. The last few years have only served to increase that knowledge. Seen together, the cumulative experiences moving from post-cold war to GPC have expanded our understanding of the strategic utility of military force. We should be well equipped to see how the different IoPs tie together, complement, and undermine each other. Their concerted utilization across domains, time, and space is the very essence of modern competition.

At a time when the relevancy of military power is peaking, we should, however, remind ourselves that military force is only a means to an end . . . a political end. While competition might harden, and confrontation and conflict will ensue, GPC entails much more. The state of competition is the new normal. And, it will continue to be for the foreseeable future. High-end warfighting is likely to remain an anomaly. And between maintaining the status quo and existential war, a plethora of political and strategic goals must also be supported. This is the competition continuum.

This book does not answer the question of optimizing military force’s utility across the competition continuum. However, it offers valuable insights into how we can understand our contemporary strategic environment and an approach to how the military component can offer strategic utility. The author’s extensive experience in the field, combined with thorough research, allows a unique perspective on the strategic utility of security sector assistance (SSA). Furthermore, looking at the contemporary security environment from a small-state perspective offers a welcomed perspective to a field of research dominated by the great powers.

The book takes us from an in-depth discussion on strategy, through an exemplary description of the IoPs and their application, to the core differences between small states and great powers. Through the framework of ends—ways—means, Kristiansen creates an in-depth understanding of the differences between small states and great powers. Of course, that differences exist is not in itself novel, but how this will and should inform strategic decisions is both interesting and educational.

Small states should not be considered (by themselves or any others) to be helpless bystanders on the international stage. They may not have the might to force their agenda on the international community. Still, plenty of other (and indirect) mechanisms allow them to influence the outcome of even GPC. This, however, is perhaps a more complicated and delicate task than for the great powers. Thus, small states must be more cognizant of how they utilize their IoPs and for what purpose.

Doing so purposefully requires an in-depth understanding of strategy. This is a term too often used without proper reflection. As Kristiansen offers in this book, a full appreciation of the term allows for a better understanding of the relationship between policy, strategy, and the means to achieve the desired ends. Only by fully comprehending these mutual relationships is it possible to identify the actual utility of military force.

The width and variety of the author’s research leading up to this volume (ranging from counterterrorism and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes,³ via the joint forces’ utility in crises response operations,⁴ through cyber warfare,⁵ to diversity in military organizations⁶) also helps to offer a nuanced perspective on key modern strategic and military problem sets. As a result, Kristiansen is not merely offering a rehash of commonly accepted truths, but he offers genuinely new perspectives in a persuading manner.

Having set the stage, Kristiansen moves on to the core topic of the book: SSA. While addressing the core topic, Kristiansen points out several of the most critical elements from the prior in-depth discussion on strategy—making it possible to read all chapters of this volume stand alone if someone prefers to do that.

The purpose of the book is to elevate knowledge and close potential gaps between the practitioner, academia, civilian society, military leaders, and political leadership on SSA. The discussion creates the foundation for a better understanding of the relationship between strategy and the use of the military instrument in future conflicts from a small-state perspective—specifically when a strategic (military) option involves SSA.

Building on the Norwegian experience, in particular, the importance and impact of niche capabilities for small states is well explained. Focusing on key capabilities can allow small elements to take on a strategic enabling role for their own nation, bilateral partners, and even coalitions in future conflicts.

The way the book has been structured and detailed, it serves both as an overarching guide and a specific handbook that elevates the level of knowledge on how small states might utilize security sector assistance as an instrument of national power to meet national strategic objectives.

Building on the research questions from his dissertation, Kristiansen successfully outlines how to approach SSA in a comprehensive fashion to obtain the highest yields from the effort put in. The research questions he directs attention toward in this book are:

What represents effective SSA?

Does a Norwegian doctrine for SSA exist?

Does a strategy where SSA is viewed as a unique solution exist?

Can a small state rely on deliberate strategies while conducting SSA, or does SSA demand dynamic and adaptive strategies?

How can small states achieve the highest yield from their SSA efforts, and what represents relevant and effective SSA for small states?

How should small states approach military operations at the tactical and operational level to achieve desired political and strategic end states when doing SSA?

Do small states possess strategic enabling roles in SSA, and what roles can Norway potentially fill in this regard?

What are relevant metrics to construct, communicate, operationalize, and measure the effectiveness of strategies for small-state SSA efforts?

Is there a specific spectrum of SSA activities for small states?

Is there a difference between and potential limit to what small states can achieve in SSA-operations compared to large states?

Some may ask whether this book is relevant in our current security paradigm. And some may argue that although it offers qualitative insights, it is less relevant in our current security paradigm. This book is relevant. And highly so. Its lessons are not dated but offer insights that have never been more relevant.

Firstly, the fundamental logic in this book is understanding strategy and how this ties to successfully applying the instruments of power. As the great military historian Azar Gat points out, we must understand why our adversaries act as they do. In our current environment, e.g., understanding the duality of the so-called Russian security dilemma is critical if we are to apply our means with any effect.

Similarly, the role of small states is quite solidified in the international arena. As Kristiansen points out, small states are small players, but they can still be important players. Punching above one’s own weight, however, is even more demanding. That is why fully comprehending the security environment is essential and why small states must be continuously cognizant of what the larger players aim to achieve (and how and why). Understanding the other actors and the playing field allows actors (big and small) with wit and guile to navigate their own strategic successes.

The problem for small states, of course, is that they are largely dictated by the resources they have available. Every effort counts. Small states cannot afford to waste resources that do not offer a strategic yield. Larger states can, and great powers seem to do so with impunity. This is one of the reasons SSA offers a strategic opportunity for small states. SSA allows small states to partake in efforts (together