The History of Strategic Thought

By Philip Goodall

The book is a study of those who controlled war and thought about war, such as Frederick the Great with his observation, "What is the good of experience if you do not reflect". The analysis continues with a study of Napoleon, the Great War and World War II with the unexpected cessation with the dropping of two atomic bombs.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris UK
• Release date: Jul 18, 2014
• ISBN: 9781499087611

Philip Goodall

Cadets at the Royal Air Force College training to be pilots were required to write a thesis, and my study was titled, ‘The History of Strategic Thought’. On my graduation in April 1953, I was awarded the Royal United Service Institute Award for the thesis. I was trained to fly on piston-engined aircraft and on graduation was trained to fly jet aircraft, specifically the Meteor, the first RAF jet-powered aircraft. I then flew the Canberra followed by the first ‘V’ bomber, the Valiant. Following a period as a staff officer returned to flying and commanded 27 Squadron flying the Vulcan Mk 2. I was seconded to the US Air Force and served at the Headquarters of Strategic Air Command, where the Western world nuclear deterrent was planned. I returned to the United Kingdom and served at the Headquarters of Strike Command with responsibility for producing the RAF nuclear plans.

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Copyright © 2014 by Philip Goodall.

Library of Congress Control Number:     2014911661

ISBN:                  Hardcover                        978-1-4990-8759-8

                            Softcover                          978-1-4990-8760-4

                            eBook                               978-1-4990-8761-1

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CONTENTS

Chapter 1   What Is Strategy?

Chapter 2   Historical Background to Strategy

Chapter 3   The Napoleonic Era

Chapter 4   Napoleon Interpreted

Chapter 5   The Strategical Relapse

Chapter 6   Strategical Theories Prior to the Great War 1914

Chapter 7   The Great War

Chapter 8   Air Power

Chapter 9   The World War

Chapter 10   What Next?

Bibliography

CHAPTER 1

What Is Strategy?

What is the good of experience if you do not reflect?

(Frederick the Great)

What Is Strategy?

The word ‘strategy’ comes from the Greek and means ‘The Art of the General’. There has always been, and still exists, doubt as to the exact meaning of strategy, and this doubt has caused dissension of opinion as to the limits of military command and government in the time of war, occasionally with serious consequences.

With the French Revolution and the development of small, permanent armies, the meaning of strategy changed. Clausewitz defined strategy as follows:

‘The art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of the war. In other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each.’

This definition intruded upon government responsibility and gave to strategy certain powers, which should be subject to political objectives. Clausewitz also conveyed the idea that battle was the means to the strategical aim, but his less-profound disciples confused the means with the end and concluded that in war, the final aim was a decisive battle. This is the line of thought that was developed by Foch, Dragomiroff, and Grandmaison.

Von Moltke’s definition fixes the responsibility of the military commander to the government and thus gives strategy a more precise meaning.

‘The practical adaptation of the means placed at a General’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view.’

The general is given his means and his objective; if he disapproves, or thinks his means inadequate, he may decline the post. The government, if dissatisfied, may change the commander. Hamely, in his book, Operations of War, gives a good, British, down-to-earth definition of the aim of strategy:

‘It is the object of strategy to direct the movements of an army so that, when decisive collisions occur, it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage. If two armies advance towards each other till they meet, both equally covering their own communications and equally ready to concentrate for action, it is evident that strategy has no share in the result, for all that has been done is to bring them face to face, and leave to force, or tactical skill, to decide the issue. But when the movements of one of the armies have been so directed as to increase the chances in its favour by forcing the enemy either to engage at a disadvantage, or to abandon territory under penalty of worse disaster, there is proof of a power which differs from the mere ability to fight.’

Thus, it has been established that strategy is the means by which the commander shall ‘encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage.’ The commander has to work within certain limits; he is given the aim in view and knows the resources at his disposal, and his object is to achieve victory.

There often exists doubt as to the lower limits of strategy—the borderline where strategy ends and tactics begins. The definition given by Liddell Hart is both clear and precise:

‘When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and control of such direct action are termed tactics.’

The aim of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance by the enemy by means other than fighting. With mobility and surprise, sudden concentrations of force may be achieved, the enemy’s supplies and communications can be threatened, the enemy’s forces may be split, and with rapid change of front, the enemy can be misled. Such are the tools of strategy—the active measures which defeat and muddle the enemy forces. It is possible, also, to achieve these results by misleading and muddling the opposing general. Stonewall Jackson realised the advantage gained by deceiving the enemy command when he said, ‘Mystify, mislead and surprise.’ With the distraction of a commander’s mind comes the dislocation of his forces; for example, we note that Caesar’s plans varied according to his estimation of the mind of the general he was fighting. Because he realised Pompey’s weakness of decision and lack of adventurous spirit, Caesar took risks he dared not have made against a more able general.

We have seen from the historical viewpoint what strategy meant, its limitations, and the means whereby its aims were achieved, but modern military problems are much more complicated than those of historical times. Today, however clear the aim, its achievement is bedevilled by a multitude of economic and other factors, which were of little or no importance, or did not exist, in earlier times.

Liddell Hart distinguishes ‘grand strategy’ from strategy. He writes, ‘Strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning the war; grand strategy must take a longer view, for its problem is the winning of the peace.’ In the last war, the method of invading Japan was a military matter, but the dropping of two atom bombs was a political decision. In his book, British Strategy, Major General Sir F. Maurice quotes, ‘Field Service Regulations: A nation must protect its vital interests. To do this it may have to impose its will upon another nation. It endeavours to achieve this object by employing part or all the means of persuasion at its command. These means include diplomacy, economic interest and influence applied in the form of financial and commercial restrictions and, in the last resort, the use of armed forces at sea, or on land, or in the air. The armed forces are only one of several means employed; in a struggle for national existence it is by the simultaneous and combined use of all its means of persuasion that a nation achieves its object: The subjugation of the opponent’s will.’ From this, Maurice draws his conclusion:

‘Strategy should then be defined anew to meet our broadened views of what the conduct of war entails, as: the art of applying national power to achieve the object of war. Strategy in general, as so defined, comprises political, naval, military and air strategy.’

This definition does not encroach upon the interpretation of grand strategy, but it certainly oversteps the earlier accepted view. The important strategical decisions of today, the use of atom bombs, the possible abolition of combined operations and landing such as ‘Overlord’, the concentration of effort on to heavy bombers (I assume that these are the present strategical trends, whether or not they actually are of no importance in the argument) are no longer decisions made by the man trained in military affairs, but are matters decided upon by politicians, often men with no military background and no military training. There is, of course, the chiefs of staffs sub-committee which advises the prime minister, but the operative word is ‘advises’. The present concerns of the forces are matters such as the arming of fighters, cooperation between infantry and the fighter-pilot, the best depths from which submarines should fire torpedoes, and so on. These are tactical problems. It appears, in fact, that strategic decisions are no longer in the hands of the trained military man; his job is merely the execution of political-strategical decisions made by the politicians, and he may only function independently in the relatively minor field of tactics.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Background to Strategy

Read and re-read the campaigns of Alexander,

Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,

Eugene, and Frederick; take them for your model:

that is the only way of being a great captain,

to obtain the secret of the art of war.

(Napoleon)

Historical Background to Strategy

New sciences are almost invariably discovered accidently. The famous story of James Watt watching the kettle is known to every schoolboy. So also does every schoolboy realise the first principles of self-defence: if a big boy hits him, he runs and thus avoids further bruises; if a smaller boy insults him, he chases and punishes him.

Since all men inherit this trait, it must form part of the psychological make-up of the general. The first known generals led their armies without much prior study, thought a few obviously with great consideration of the task ahead. These few laid the foundations of the science, or art, of strategy. Many of the principles which we accept automatically today were once the original ideas of soldiers. Thus, any review of modern strategy must at least glance at the unknowing founders of this ‘greatest of all arts’.

In a brief look, at military history, one fact is clearly self-evident: the generals with the largest armies did not always win. This shows quite obviously that there is more in war than military strength. Taking a closer look at history, the reasons for the success of generals seem to fall into three classes:

a)   Superior forces, both in men and equipment. These are very largely the strategically unimportant wars of domination and colonisation.

b)   Superior arms and equipment. Often the result of being one stage ahead of the adversary. An obvious example of the success of the English longbowmen at Crécy. This has great strategic and—even more important—tactical considerations.

c)   The ‘art of the general’.

Although the means of strategy change and develop, with consequent progress in the physical sphere, in the psychological sphere, it is of no more value to talk of the evolution of strategy than it is to talk of the evolution of painting. The history of strategy is an arid waste illumined by the genius of occasional masters for playing upon the minds of their opponents. To understand, we must study these ‘occasional masters’, and in so doing, follow possibly the greatest of all generals, Napoleon, who wrote, ‘Read and re-read the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick; take them for your model: that is the only way of being a great captain, to obtain the secret of the art of war.’

The Greek Wars

The most natural starting point for a survey is the first ‘Great War’ in European history—the Great Persian War. We cannot expect much guidance from a period when strategy was in its infancy, but at the same time, we must realise the limitations for the scope of strategy in ancient warfare.

In 481 BC, Xerxes led a large Persian Army to invade Greece. Because of its magnitude, he took the direct approach, which was along the coast, in order that he might be protected and supplied by his formidable fleet. Themistocles, the leader of the Greek Navy, with treacherous messages of pretended surrender, enticed the Persian fleet into narrow straits where its superiority of numbers was useless and then attached on both flanks, destroying the fleet.

It is worth noting that the use of strategic mobility for an indirect approach was realised and exploited much earlier in sea than in land warfare. The natural reason is that only in a late stage of development did armies come to depend upon lines of communications for their supply. Fleets, however, were made use of to operate against the sea-borne communications—or means of supply—of a hostile country, and once this conception was established, it was natural to apply it as a means to a naval end, that is, a military end at sea.

With the passing of the Persian menace, Athens rose to a supremacy and retained her ascendency until the Peloponnesian War, 431-404 BC. In the first phase of the war, Pericles refused battle and wore down the enemy by devastating raids. This form of war came to be called ‘Periclean Strategy’. Eventually, the Athenians were forced to fight by an attack on their dominion of Chaldicica, but they were finally defeated by a blockade.

Lysander skilfully manoeuvred his fleet to the Dardanelles and awaited the Pontic grain shops, ‘the life interest of Athens’. The Athenian fleet rushed to the rescue and, by a ruse, were captured with hardly a blow.

With the fall of Athens, Sparta assumed the ascendency, only to lose it to the skill of one man, Epaminondas, who was possibly the most original military genius in history. He laid the foundations of tactics, strategy, and grand strategy, on which subsequent masters have built. Even his structural designs have survived; a slight elaboration of one of them, for instance, became famous as Frederick’s ‘oblique order’. By avoiding war with Sparta, Epaminondas gained time to build up an army with which, though a smaller force, he eventually defeated Sparta at Leuctra by a masterly tactical move. When, later, he led a united army against Sparta, his three converging columns advanced through Sparta’s hitherto unchallenged domain, united a few miles from the city, which he sidestepped, and attacked in the rear. Although first unaware, Sparta’s strong fortifications enabled her to resist, but Epaminondas, who did not wish for a costly and lengthy siege, united the overrun lands into a friendly state and returned home a bloodless victor.

Twenty years after the death of Epaminondas, Macedon had become supreme in Greece, led by Philip, a student of the ‘father of strategy’, and a master of the indirect approach. He was possibly the first to turn topographical obstacles into strategic advantage, and he overran Greece, but it is possibly his son, Alexander the Great, who is more famous. Alexander was born into triumph and victory; he has justifiable faith in his war machine and his ability to handle it, and this saw no need to dislocate his adversaries’ strategic balance. His later campaigns on the Indian border show his undoubted ability, but it is as a master of war policy and tactics that he has his place in military history.

The Roman Wars

The Romans are famous for their great military tradition, and it is undoubtedly a well-earned fame. In this country, the lasting signs of their occupation have tended to focus attention on the Romans, especially the efficiency of their communications, and efficiency which has still not been equalled.

The ride of Rome into the prime position in the Mediterranean was a result of the second Punic War—the struggle between Rome and