Albuera Eyewitness: Contemporary Accounts of the Battle of Albuera, 16 May 1811

By Guy Dempsey

On 16 May 1811, the small town of Albuera was the setting for one of the Peninsular War’s most bloody and desperate battles. A combined Spanish, British and Portuguese force of more than 30,000 men, under the command of Lord Beresford, stubbornly blocked the march of the French field marshal Soult, who was trying to reach the fortress of Badajoz, twelve miles to the north.

However, after suffering losses of up to 7,000 men during the fighting, Wellington declared that, ‘Another such battle will ruin us’. One British regiment, the 57th Foot, suffered casualties of more than 50 per cent. Similarly, the French fought with enormous tenacity, and sustained almost equally heavy losses. The stories from those who fought in the battle on both sides make for both chilling and inspiring reading.

These contemporaneous accounts include letters, diaries, official correspondence, army records, maps, newspaper reports and memoirs totaling over 100 contemporary accounts of the battle. They range from the comprehensive after-action reports of the British, Portuguese, Spanish and French commanders to casualty and prisoner lists and to recollections of individual soldiers from all the combatant armies.

The purpose of this book is to tell the story of the battle exclusively by way of these primary sources, with English translations for foreign language sources, along with, in each case, a commentary identifying the source and its context.

The heart of the work will be a vast number of first-hand accounts providing astonishing details of the intense fighting including the heroism of the Spanish troops, the massacre of Colborne’s brigade by Polish lancers, Beresford’s near-fatal indecisiveness, and the heroic charge of the Fusilier brigade. This presentation allows readers avid for detailed historical information to draw their own conclusions about how the events of the battle unfolded.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pen and Sword
• Release date: Jul 30, 2023
• ISBN: 9781399066426

Guy Dempsey

GUY DEMPSEY has had a life-long interest in Napoleonic military history, with an emphasis on working with primary sources. He is the author of a number of authoritative works including Albuera 1811: The Bloodiest Battle of the Peninsular War.

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INTRODUCTION

The most enduring question for the study of history is, how can one truly know what happened at a particular moment in the past? The enduring answer (albeit an incomplete answer) is that one must collect and analyse all available evidence about the relevant events in the hope that the key facts can be established beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least by a preponderance of the evidence. History is a set of mysteries that are unravelled using primary source information to determine facts and then using those facts to reach interpretive conclusions about the way events actually transpired.

The purpose of this volume is to present all the currently known significant eyewitness and first-hand accounts of the Battle of Albuera so that each reader will have an opportunity to investigate the story of Albuera for herself or himself and have the experience of sifting through these sources to determine the relevant facts and produce their own version of the Albuera story. It is certainly the case that ‘[t] he soldier on the field of battle . . . knows little of what is going forward save as far as his own individual self or those more immediately surrounding him may be concerned’, but each account written by a combatant contains unique details.1 The challenge is to form a coherent narrative from these shards of information, each of which may be insignificant when viewed in isolation but which together make up a complete story. I wrote my own version of the Albuera story in my book Albuera 1811 – The Bloodiest Battle of the Peninsular War (Barnsley, 2008). I now invite others to take the Albuera challenge and determine their own version of events with the help of these primary sources, which include several that I have discovered since my previous book was written.

The challenge is not an easy one. The Duke of Wellington pointed out the first level of difficulty in a letter responding to a request for him to write an account of the battle of Waterloo:2

Paris, 8th August, 1815

My Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of the 2nd, regarding the battle of Waterloo. The object which you propose to yourself is very difficult of attainment, and, if really attained, is not a little invidious. The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.

Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave occasion for the distinction of others, and perhaps were the cause of material losses; and you cannot write a true history of a battle without including the faults and misbehaviour of part at least of those engaged.

Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform is not a hero; and that, although in the account given of a general action, such as that of Waterloo, many instances of individual heroism must be passed over unrelated, it is better for the general interests to leave those parts of the story untold, than to tell the whole truth.

The words of those who were present at the battle are the foundation stones for this exercise, but different words, like stones, have different weights and attributes. Those written close to the event can be vivid and fresh but can also be inaccurate because of the limits of what any one individual can see or hear, the frailty of human memory or self-censorship to suppress disturbing or scandalous details. Those written long after may be clearer and better composed because the author has had time to collect his thoughts and understand what happened, but time can adversely affect the accuracy of recollections and even cause them to become confused with relevant narratives from other sources. Words written for public consumption as opposed to a private audience can be manipulated for political and military purposes. Consequently, all primary sources in this book must be carefully analysed to make judgments about their accuracy and the reliability of the facts they contain.

The writing skills of each recorder of events are highly relevant to the evaluation of sources, since some writers have a knack for clear presentation of information and others do not, with the latter in particular struggling to express themselves using the flowery and oblique stylistic conventions of the era. Moreover, even the best writers struggle with the inadequacy of words to convey the full range of human experience in the battlefield.

A particularly difficult aspect of the Albuera challenge comes from the fact that no two sources use the same language to describe relevant terrain features and military formations and the vocabulary that is used is often maddeningly imprecise and often susceptible to multiple translations and meanings. In terms of terrain such as the famous ‘heights’ of the Albuera battlefield, the resulting confusion is only partially rectified by reference to modern topographical maps. In terms of descriptions of military formations such as lines and columns and right flanks versus left flanks, it is sometimes impossible to be exactly certain as to what a particular writer may have been trying to describe, although some possible interpretations may be logically excluded.

Another difficulty arises when facts discovered in primary sources conflict with the information contained in later accounts of the battle written by professional historians, who presumably engaged in their own version of the exercise contemplated by this book. However, William Napier, Charles Oman and John Fortescue, just to name the most prominent chroniclers of Albuera, all faced limits on the research they were able to conduct and the materials to which they had access, and all were engaged in writing projects of which the story of Albuera was only a small part. Even more importantly, they were not subject to the discipline of having to cite sources for their most significant conclusions. Their accounts nevertheless have an almost mythic importance for any study of the battle, but persistent and persuasive myths such as those created by Napier’s stirring description of the charge of the Fusilier brigade and Oman’s description of the French advancing in a mixed order (ordre mixte) can be as much an enemy of the truth as actual mistakes of fact.

Even after facts have been established, there can be multiple versions of any historical narrative reflecting multiple points of view. In the case of the Battle of Albuera, there is at least a British version, a French version, a Portuguese version and a Spanish version, as well as numerous individual versions. Each of these versions is theoretically based on the same facts as the other versions, but in different proportions given that an important fact for one version (such as an instance of individual heroism) may not be particularly relevant for another version. No one version can represent the ‘truth’ about the events of that day – that elusive objective can only be approximated by taking all the versions into account.

This collection does not purport to include all the primary written sources for the study of Albuera, just the most important ones that qualify as eyewitness or first-hand accounts. As the term implies, an eyewitness account is a written record of things seen directly by the writer. A first-hand account, however, includes information obtained from other participants that was not observed or created directly by the writer. Most of the accounts in this volume are actually both of these at the same time. For example, a narrative may be an eyewitness account to the extent that the writer is recounting what he saw happen to his own regiment, but would only be a first-hand account with respect to overall casualty figures he mentions, since he could only have obtained those from other participants. The common element is that all the information included in these sources comes from individuals who were present on the battlefield on 16 May.

The preponderance of English sources is not a result of selection bias, just a practical reflection of the fact that the victors of Albuera seem to have been more interested in memorialising the battle than the vanquished since English sources outnumber others by a wide margin. Some readers may be disappointed by the relative lack of Spanish and Portuguese accounts. I share that disappointment, but after countless years of researching the battle with the help of experts from those countries, I have reluctantly concluded that additional sources from those perspectives (especially in the form of individual eyewitness narratives) simply do not exist. It would be great if some future researcher could demonstrate that conclusion is wrong.

There are additional eyewitness and first-hand accounts of the battle sprinkled here and there in the extraordinary set of pamphlets attacking and defending the military reputation of Marshal Beresford that were exchanged between William Napier and Beresford and his defenders in the 1830s, but I have not included them systematically in this volume because most were written long after the event and usually for the express purpose of making or refuting a specific factual point as opposed to reflecting an intent to write an accurate account of the battle.

A couple of recurring points about the sources are worthy of note. First and foremost, almost every source includes information about the relative losses of the combatant forces. This may be in part a reflection of the common view that a defeated army should have greater losses than a victorious army. It may also be a reflection of the fact that the participants in the battle were shocked by the exceptionally high casualty figures for individual units and could not find words better than figures to convey that shock to others. Similarly, almost every account contains some statement of the view that the battle had been fierce and bloody to an unprecedented degree. Finally, the roster of authors of these accounts suggests that junior officers are the most diligent chroniclers of historical events, perhaps because they were better educated than the rank and file and not constrained by military politics from being candid.

One old soldier turned author has stated that combat experience is the sole measure of merit for a work of military history:

To undertake the history of a campaign or to describe a battle, you must have been a participant – you must have smelled the intoxicating aroma of gunpowder, you must have experienced all the emotions of hand-to-hand combat, as well as those resulting from having to passively endure the fire of enemy batteries; finally, you must have slept and eaten on a battlefield littered with corpses!!! Otherwise, however skilful the writer may be, his work will always lack that cachet of authenticity, which cannot be counterfeited.3

Reading this book will not change the personal military status of any reader, but it will give them the raw facts of Albuera through the unfiltered words of actual combatants. And that should be sufficient to enable a reader to address the big questions about the battle:

1. Did Soult know he was seriously outnumbered when he launched his attack?

2. Was Beresford fooled by the French flank attack?

3. Did Blake jeopardise the Allies by failing to respond to the French flank attack?

4. Did the French capture the ‘key’ to the Allied position?

5. What circumstances led to the destruction of Colborne’s brigade by the French cavalry?

6. How many colours were lost by Colborne’s brigade?

7. What tactical formation did the French use for their flank attack?

8. Did Colonel Inglis of the 57th actually urge his men to ‘die hard’?

9. Who ordered the attack by Cole’s division?

10. Did Beresford order a retreat of his army?

11. Did Godinot fail to press his attack?

12. How did the French escape total disaster after the defeat of their reserves?

13. Who ‘won’ the battle?

1Gazzola, Jean, Scenes in the Life of a Soldier of Fortune (London, 1846), p. 110.

2Wellington, Duke of, The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries and France (J. Gurwood, ed.) (13 vols., London, 1838), v. 12, p. 590.

3Mauduit, Hippolyte de, Les derniers jours de la Grande Armée, ou, Souvenirs, documens et correspondance inédite de Napoléon en 1814 et 1815 (2 vols., Paris, 1847–8), v. 2, p. 114.

PART I

1. Strategic Context

1811 was the fourth year of Napoleon’s effort to depose the Bourbon monarchs of Spain and replace them with a new line of royalty starting with his older brother, Joseph. The year began with the French army of Portugal besieging the British and Portuguese armies in the Lines of Torres Vedras around Lisbon and the French Army of the South (Armée du Midi) besieging a Spanish army plus the provisional Spanish government in Cadiz while many other French forces were doing battle elsewhere throughout the land with assorted Spanish regular army and guerilla forces. French Marshal Jean-de-Dieu Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia, commander of the Army of the South, launched an offensive in February 1811 with the Vth Corps of his army to assist the French forces in Portugal. The offensive did not have its intended strategic effect, but it was militarily successful in the short run in that Soult besieged and captured the important border fortress of Badajoz on 10 March after having defeated the Spanish 5th Army under its walls. He then returned to the headquarters of the Army of the South in Seville in Andalusia, leaving a strong garrison in the captured town.

When the French army of Portugal retreated from Lisbon, the Duke of Wellington detached two British divisions and some Portuguese troops from his army to recover Badajoz. Command of this detachment was given to William Carr Beresford, a British general who had been appointed as the commander of the Portuguese army in 1809 with the Portuguese rank of field marshal. After retaking the subsidiary fortresses of Campo Mayor and Olivenza, Beresford moved on to Badajoz. After reaching agreement on coordination with Captain General Don Francisco Xavier Castaños, commanding the remains of the Spanish 5th Army, and Lieutenant General Don Joaquín Blake, commanding units of the Spanish 4th Army detached from the garrison of Cadiz to reinforce Castaños, Beresford began a siege of the fortress on 8 May.

Soult, however, was unwilling to lose Badajoz without a fight. He accordingly organised a relief force consisting of the Vth Corps and some other available units of the Army of the South and he left Seville on 9 May, moving swiftly towards the threatened town. Wellington had given Beresford detailed instructions for conducting his campaign, but left him discretion to fight or retreat if the French advanced to relieve the Badajoz garrison. After multiple meetings with Castaños and Blake on 14 May, Beresford decided that the Allies had a sufficient numerical superiority to meet the French in battle. He accordingly ordered the dismantling of the siege works and a concentration of all the Allied forces at Albuera on 15 May to confront Soult’s advance.

2. Chronology of Events, Early 1811

11 March 1811 Badajoz surrenders to Marshal Soult

25 March Beresford captures Campo Mayor

15 April Olivenza surrenders to General Cole

22 April Beresford and Wellington reconnoitre Badajoz

23 April Wellington (1) authorises Beresford to fight at Albuera, and (2) proposes plan for cooperation between Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese forces

8 May Castaños agrees to cooperate and allows Beresford to command the joint force

8 May Beresford commences siege of Badajoz

9 May Soult leaves Seville with relief force

12 May Beresford learns of Soult’s advance and orders dismantling of siege works

13 May Soult’s relief force makes contact with French Vth Corps

14 May Beresford meets with Castaños and Blake at Valverde and they agree to offer battle at Albuera

15 May Bulk of Anglo-Portuguese forces arrive at Albuera and are joined at night by Spanish forces

3. Chronology of Events, Thursday, 16 May

(All times are approximate)

2:00 a.m. Cole’s division leaves Badajoz for Albuera

3:20 a.m. Opposing forces stand to arms on opposite sides of the Albuera River

4:20 a.m. Dawn

6:00 a.m. Opposing forces stand down; Spanish forces complete alignment

8:00 a.m. French infantry arrives from Santa Marta; Cole’s division arrives from Badajoz

9:00 a.m. French begin advance towards Albuera

10:00 a.m. French advance against the Allied right flank

11:00 a.m. French Vth Corps attacks Spanish position

11:30 a.m. Colborne’s brigade attacks flank of French Vth Corps

12:00 noon French cavalry routs Colborne’s brigade

12:30 p.m. Musketry duel between French Vth Corps and Hoghton’s brigade

1:00 p.m. Beresford orders a withdrawal; Cole attacks French flank

1:30 p.m. Werlé’s brigade attacks Cole

2:00 p.m. Alten reoccupies Albuera

3:00 p.m. French artillery and cavalry cover French retreat

4:00 p.m. End of combat

PART II

ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ACCOUNTS

A. Command and Staff Accounts

1. Beresford’s Dispatch

The official Anglo-Portuguese account of the battle was published in The Times of London on 4 June 1811. We know that the original version of Beresford’s dispatch was significantly more negative in tone and was rejected by the Duke of Wellington, but no copy of that first version has survived.1

Albuera, 18th May, 1811

My Lord,

I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your Lordship that the Allied army, united here under my orders, obtained, on the 16th instant, after a most sanguinary contest, a complete victory over that of the enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult; and I shall proceed to relate to your Lordship the circumstances.

In a former report I have informed your Lordship of the advance of Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our united forces, rather than, by looking to two objects at once, to risk the loss of both.

Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the relief of Badajoz; and for this purpose he had drawn considerable numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, and also, I believe, from the French army of the centre. Having thus completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th instant, with a corps then estimated at 15,000 or 16,000 men, and was joined on descending into Extremadura by the corps under General Latour-Maubourg, stated to be 5,000 men.

His Excellency General Blake, as soon as he learned of the advance of Marshal Soult, in strict conformity to the plan proposed by your Lordship, proceeded to form his junction with the corps under my orders, and arrived at Valverde in person on the 14th instant, where, having consulted with his Excellency and General Castaños, it was determined to meet the enemy and to give him battle.

On finding the determination of the enemy to relieve Badajoz, I had broken up from before that place, and marched the infantry to the position in front of Valverde, except the division of Major General the Hon. G.L. Cole, which, with 2,000 Spanish troops, I left to cover the removal of our stores.

The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Marta by the cavalry of General Blake; that of General Castaños, under the Conde de Penne-Villemur, had been always with it.

As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz entirely open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got, in this widely open country) at this place, thus standing directly between the enemy and Badajoz.

The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th instant. The corps of General Blake, though making a forced march to effect it, only joined in the night, and could not be placed in its position till the morning of the 16th instant; when General Cole’s division, with the Spanish brigade under Don Carlos de España, also joined, and a little before the commencement of the action. Our cavalry had been forced on the morning of the 15th instant to retire from Santa Marta, and joined here.

In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. The next morning our disposition for receiving the enemy was made, being formed in two lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde, though your Lordship is aware that the whole face of this country is everywhere passable for all arms. General Blake’s corps was on the right in two lines; its left, on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major General the Hon. William Stewart’s division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where commenced the right of Major General Hamilton’s division, which closed the left of the line. General Cole’s division, with one brigade of General Hamilton’s, formed the second line of the British and Portuguese army.

The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack. At 8 o’clock he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right; and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to us a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera. During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right; and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and to cut us off from Valverde.

Major General Cole’s division was therefore ordered to form an oblique line to the rear of our right, with his own right thrown back; and the intention of the enemy to attack our right becoming evident, I requested General Blake to form part of his first line, and all his second, to that front, which was done.

The enemy commenced his attack at 9 o’clock, not ceasing at the same time to menace our left; and after a strong and gallant resistance of the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been formed. Meanwhile the division of Major General the Hon. William Stewart had been brought up to support them, and that of Major General Hamilton brought to the left of the Spanish line, and formed in contiguous close columns of battalions, to be moveable in any direction. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under Brig. General Otway, remained at some distance on the left of this, to check any attempt of the enemy below the village.

As the heights the enemy had gained, raked and entirely commanded our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble one was made by the division of General Stewart, headed by that gallant Officer.

Nearly at the beginning of the enemy’s attack a heavy storm of rain came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern anything distinctly. This, with the nature of the ground, had been extremely favourable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in his subsequent attack.

The right brigade of General Stewart’s division, under Lieut. Colonel Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant manner; and finding that the enemy’s column could not be shaken by fire, proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; and, while in the act of charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry), which the thickness of the atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed (and which was, besides, mistaken by those of the brigade, when discovered, for Spanish cavalry, and therefore not fired upon), turned it; and, being thus attacked unexpectedly in the rear, was unfortunately broken, and suffered immensely. The 31st regiment, being the left one of the brigade, alone escaped this charge, and, under the command of Major L’Estrange, kept its ground until the arrival of the 3rd brigade, under Major General Hoghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously gallant; and that of the 2nd brigade, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby, was not less so. Major General Hoghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds.

Though the enemy’s principal attack was on this point of the right, he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner by Major General Baron Alten, and the light infantry brigade of the German Legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, conspicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major General Hamilton’s division had been brought up there; and he was left to direct the defence of that point, whilst the enemy’s attack continued on our right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the defence of this place.

The enemy’s cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had endeavoured to turn it; but, by the able manoeuvres of Major General the Hon. William Lumley, commanding the Allied cavalry, though vastly inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavours were foiled. Major General Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy’s left, and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the brigades of General Stewart’s division, to force the enemy to abandon his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve. Here the Fusilier brigade particularly distinguished itself.

He was pursued by the Allies to a considerable distance, and as far as I thought it prudent, with his immense superiority of cavalry; and I contented myself with seeing him driven across the Albuera.

I have every reason to speak favourably of the manner in which our artillery was served, and fought; and Major Hartman, commanding the British, and Major Dickson, commanding the Portuguese, and the Officers and men, are entitled to my thanks. The four guns of the horse artillery, commanded by Captain Lefebvre, did great execution on the enemy’s cavalry; and one brigade of Spanish artillery (the only one in the field) I saw equally gallantly and well served. We lost in the misfortune which occurred to the brigade commanded by Lieut. Colonel Colborne (whom General Stewart reports to have acted, and was then acting, in a most noble manner, leading on the brigade in admirable order) one howitzer, which the enemy, before the arrival of the gallant General Hoghton’s brigade,2 had time to carry off with 200 or 300 prisoners of that brigade. After he had been beaten from this his principal attack he still continued that near the village, on which he never could make any impression, or cross the rivulet, though I had been obliged to bring a very great proportion of the troops from it, to support the principal point of attack; but the enemy seeing his main attack defeated, relaxed in his attempt there also. The Portuguese division of Major General Hamilton in every instance evinced the utmost steadiness and courage, and manoeuvred equally well with the British.

Brig. General Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, belonging to General Cole’s division, had an opportunity of distinguishing itself when marching in line across the plain, by repulsing, with the utmost steadiness, a charge of the enemy’s cavalry.

It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valour shown on this severely contested day; but there never were troops that more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honour of their respective countries. I have not been able to particularise the Spanish divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were particularly engaged, because I am not acquainted with their denominations or names; but I have great pleasure in saying that their behaviour was most gallant and honourable: and though, from the superior number and weight of the enemy’s force, that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good order to support their allies; and I doubt not his Excellency General Blake will do ample justice on this head, by making honourable mention of the deserving.

The battle commenced at 9 o’clock, and continued without interruption till 2 in the afternoon, when, the enemy having been driven over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading and skirmishing. It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops; but every individual most nobly did his duty, which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th regiment, were lying as they had fought in ranks, and every wound was in front. Major General the Hon. William Stewart most particularly distinguished himself, and conduced much to the honour of the day; he received two contusions, but would not quit the field. Major General the Hon. G.L. Cole is also entitled to every praise; and I have to regret being deprived for some time of his services by the wound he has received. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby, commanding the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, and Major L’Estrange, 31st regiment, deserve to be particularly mentioned; and nothing could exceed the conduct and gallantry of Colonel Inglis at the head of his regiment. To Major General the Hon. William Lumley, for the very able manner in which he opposed the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and foiled him in his object, I am particularly indebted. To Major General Hamilton, who commanded on the left during the severe attack upon our right, I am also much indebted; and the Portuguese brigades of Brig. Generals Fonseca and Archibald Campbell deserve to be mentioned. To Major General Alten, and to the excellent brigade under his orders, I have much praise to give; and it is with great pleasure I assure your Lordship that the good and gallant conduct of every corps, and of every person, was in proportion to the opportunity that offered for distinguishing themselves. I know not an individual who did not do his duty. I have, I fear, to regret the loss to the service of Colonel Collins, commanding a Portuguese brigade, his leg having been carried off by a cannon shot. He is an Officer of great merit; and I deeply lament the death of Major General Hoghton, and of those two promising Officers, Lieut. Colonel Sir William Myers and Lieut. Colonel Duckworth. It is most pleasing to me to inform your Lordship, not only of the steady and gallant conduct of our allies, the Spanish troops under his Excellency General Blake, but also to assure you that the most perfect harmony has subsisted between us; and that General Blake not only conformed in all things to the general line proposed by your Lordship, but in the details; and in whatever I suggested to his Excellency I received the most immediate and cordial assent and co-operation; nothing was omitted on his part to ensure the success of our united efforts; and during the battle he most essentially, by his experience, knowledge, and zeal, contributed to its fortunate result.

His Excellency the Captain General Castaños, who had united the few troops he had in a state to be brought into the field to those of General Blake, and placed them under his orders, assisted in person in the field; and not only on this, but on all occasions, I am much indebted to General Castaños, who is ever beforehand in giving whatever can be beneficial to the success of the common cause.

Though I unfortunately cannot point out the corps, or many of the individuals of the Spanish troops, that distinguished themselves, yet I will not omit to mention the names of General Ballesteros, whose gallantry was most conspicuous, as of the corps he had under his command; and the same of General Zayas and of Don Carlos de España. The Spanish cavalry have behaved extremely well; and the Conde de Penne-Villemur is particularly deserving to be mentioned.

I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day: it is very severe; and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under his Excellency General Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about 2,000 dead, and we have taken from 900 to 1,000 prisoners. He has had five Generals killed and wounded: of the former, Generals of Division, Werlé and Pépin; and Gazan and two others amongst the latter. His force was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not think he displayed less than from 20,000 to 22,000 infantry, and he certainly had 4,000 cavalry, with a numerous and heavy artillery. His overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and, with his artillery, saved his infantry after its rout.

He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, but occupying it in position; and on this morning, or rather during the night, commenced his retreat on the road he came, towards Seville, and has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on the ground he had retired to, and to whom we are administering what assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy; but in that arm he is too powerful for us to attempt anything against him in the plains he is traversing.

Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from our opposition to the attempts of the enemy; and, whilst he has been forced to abandon the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult harangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed army, and, what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a diminished reputation.

In enumerating the services received from the Officers of my own staff, I must particularly call your Lordship’s attention to those of Brig. General d’Urban, Quarter Master General to the Portuguese army; and which I cannot sufficiently praise, though I can appreciate. On all occasions I have felt the benefits of his talents and services, and more particularly on this, where they very essentially contributed to the success of the day: and I cannot here omit the name of Lieut. Colonel Hardinge, Deputy Quarter Master General to the Portuguese troops, whose talents and exertions deserve my thanks. To Brig. General Mozinho, Adjutant General of the Portuguese army, and to Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General to the united British and Portuguese force, and to Brig. General Lemos, and to the Officers of my own personal staff, I am indebted for their assistance.

To the services of Lieut. Colonel Arbuthnot (Major in His Majesty’s service) I am also much indebted; and he is the bearer of this to your Lordship, and is fully enabled to give you any further information you may desire, and is most deserving of any favour your Lordship may be pleased to recommend him for to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W.C. Beresford,

P.S. Major General Hamilton’s division, and Brig. General Madden’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, march tomorrow morning to reinvest Badajoz on the south side of the Guadiana.

2. Beresford Comment on Blake

During his long pamphlet war with Peninsular War historian William Napier, Beresford made numerous statements about events of the day, but the reliability of many of them is suspect because Beresford’s primary purpose in writing the pamphlets was to refute statements made by Napier, not to provide his own coherent account of the battle. One exception is the following factual passage, which describes the interaction between Beresford and Blake when the Marshal ordered the Spaniards to form a new battle line to receive the French flank attack.3 Napier alleged that Blake insubordinately disputed the order, but that does not appear to have been the case. Equally intriguing is the statement that Blake and Beresford had no further contact during the battle.

No one can know better than Colonel Napier, that the Spanish armies were not precisely in the same state of discipline as the English, nor, like them, supplied at all times with every requisite, and ready to march at the tap of the drum. So far was I from perceiving any arrogance in General Blake, that I did not even observe any want of cordiality in that officer; and the delay which occurred may very easily be accounted for on any one of the