The Self, the Lord, and the Other according to Paul and Epictetus: The Theological Significance of Reflexive Language

By Michael J. Gorman

This study explores the relationship between the individual person (the self), the divine, and other people in the writings of the apostle Paul and the Roman Stoic Epictetus. It does so by examining self-involving actions expressed with reflexive pronouns (myself, yourself, etc.) in various kinds of sentences: for example, "Examine yourself" and "You do not belong to yourself." After situating the topic within the fields of linguistics and ancient Greek, the study then examines the reflexive constructions in Epictetus's Discourses, showing that reflexive texts express fundamental aspects of his ethic of rational self-interest in imitation of the indwelling rational deity. Next, the investigation examines the 109 reflexive constructions in Paul, providing an exegesis of each reflexive text and then synthesizing the results. Paul's reflexive phrases are essential statements of his theology and ethics, expressing an interconnected narrative Christology, narrative apostolic identity, and narrative ethic. Most importantly, the study finds that for Epictetus, concern for others is a rational means to self-realization, whereas for Paul, concern for others is a community ethic grounded in the story of the indwelling Christ and is the antithesis of self-interest.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Cascade Books
• Release date: Mar 29, 2023
• ISBN: 9781666795295

Michael J. Gorman

 Michael J. Gorman holds the Raymond E. Brown Chair in Biblical Studies and Theology at St. Mary's Seminary & University in Baltimore, Maryland, where he has taught since 1991. A highly regarded New Testament scholar, he has also written Cruciformity, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, Becoming the Gospel, and Apostle of the Crucified Lord, among other significant works.

Book preview

Introduction

Paul and the Reflexive

Reflexive pronouns are pronouns that refer back to the subject of the sentence in which they are found. They occur in many languages, their function being to help give expression to reflexive, or self-involving, actions.¹ These actions can be the most mundane (e.g., I am washing myself) or the most philosophically profound (e.g., Know thyself). The apostle Paul, who wrote in a language that made ample use of reflexive pronouns, naturally spoke and wrote using reflexives. To date, however, no study of the reflexive pronoun or of reflexive constructions in Paul has been produced. The basic purpose of this study is to analyze the use and meaning—the syntax and semantics—of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases in Paul’s writings in order to discover their significance in his individual letters and in his theology and ethics as a whole. This analysis will be conducted in light of relevant aspects of linguistics and in conjunction with a similar analysis of the function of the reflexive in the writings of the first-century Stoic Epictetus.

Because the reflexive pronoun does not immediately appear to have much theological (or even linguistic) significance, some rationale for this investigation is needed. The purposes of this chapter, and their corresponding sections, are: (A) to introduce Paul’s usage of reflexive pronouns and phrases; (B) to indicate briefly what some interpreters of Paul have said about self-involving actions in Paul’s thought; (C) to review previous research on various aspects of Paul’s language and thought that has touched on, but not developed in detail, the significance of reflexive constructions in Paul; (D) to summarize sections A through C as indicators of the need for the present study; and (E) to sketch the purpose, plan, and thesis of the study.

A. Paul’s Use of the Reflexive Pronoun

There are 109 occurrences of the reflexive pronoun in the undisputed letters of Paul.² In itself, this is hardly a remarkable fact. More important, however, are certain aspects of these occurrences: the significant constructions in which they are found; the presence of these constructions in central Pauline texts; and the existence of clusters of reflexive constructions in various contexts.

Paul uses many kinds of reflexive constructions, some of which had long histories of use, histories from which Paul borrows and to which he contributes. Two examples will illustrate this. First is the phrase paradidonai heauton, which was a term for self-surrender or self-delivery into hostile hands or deadly circumstances.³ Paul uses this term to describe Christ’s death, connecting it, paradoxically, to Christ’s love (Gal 2:20). Second is the phrase to heautou (and variant forms), which Paul employs four times (1 Cor 10:24, 13:5; Phil 2:4, 21). As a popular term, the phrase meant one’s own interests. Another important use of this phrase, within various philosophical traditions, was to express people’s inalienable rights or possessions, or their essential human qualities.⁴ Paul’s use and interpretation of these and other phrases are worthy of study for the history of the Greek language, for the history of ideas related to these phrases, and for the analysis of Paul’s thought itself.

Even a cursory glance at a concordance reveals that reflexive pronoun constructions occur in central Pauline texts. Note the following groups of texts:

(1) a. our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave himself (tou dontos heauton) for our sins. (Gal 1:4)

b. Christ Jesus, who . . . emptied himself (heauton ekenōsen), taking the form of a servant . . . and . . . humbled himself (etapeinōsen heauton), and became obedient to death—death on a cross. (Phil 2:7–8)

c. For Christ did not please himself (ouch heautō ēresen); but, as it is written, The reproaches of those who reproached you fell on me. (Rom 15:3)

(2) a. And he died for all so that those who live might no longer live for themselves (mēketi heautois zōsin but for him who died and was raised on their behalf. (2 Cor 5:15)

b. You are not your own (ouk este heautōn); you were bought at great price. Therefore glorify God in your body. (1 Cor 6:19)

c. Present yourselves (parastēsate heautous) to God as people alive from the dead. (Rom 6:13)

(3) a. Love does not seek its own (ou zētei ta heautēs) (1 Cor 13:5)

b. Let no one seek his or her own interest (mēdeis to heautou zēteitō) but that of the other person (alla to tou heterou). (1 Cor 10:24)

c. Not that we are sufficient in ourselves (aph’ heautōn) to consider anything as coming from ourselves (ex heautōn), but our sufficiency is from God. (2 Cor 3:5)

Each of these texts expresses fundamental elements of Paul’s thought, together covering wide areas of it, including his Christology (group 1), anthropology or soteriology (group 2),⁵ and Christian ethics and ministry (group 3).

Also to be noted is the fact that in some contexts Paul uses several reflexive constructions, sometimes from more than one of the above groups. The most striking example of this phenomenon of reflexive clusters is Phil 2, where there are six reflexive constructions. One observes five reflexive pronouns in verses 1–12: two in the Christ-hymn (vv. 7, 8: heauton ekenōsen; etapeinōsen heauton); two in the preceding exhortation (vv. 3, 4: allēlous hēgoumenoi hyperechontas heautōn; mē ta heautōn hekastos skopountes); and one in the following exhortation (v. 12: tēn heautou sōtērian katergazesthe). Not far away, in verse 21, is another reflexive pronoun in a construction parallel to the one in verse 4 (hoi pantes gar ta heautōn zētousin). These six phrases express two christological affirmations and four ethical exhortations (two of which employ ta heautōn). An example of a series of reflexives in a longer passage can be found in 1 Cor 8:1—11:1, which has reflexives in two ethical exhortations (10:24, 29) and two ethical examples (9:19; 10:33), all of which anticipate the later description of love as not self-seeking (13:5).

Thus in Paul one finds reflexive constructions at the center of various dimensions of his theology and grouped together in the concrete development of his thought in specific situations. The notions of self-giving, self-emptying, self-oriented living, self-seeking, and self-sufficiency are some of the concepts expressed in these phrases. Moreover, there appear to be some interconnections among these various phrases and concepts in the different theological categories that stimulate their being brought together in certain contexts. For instance, it is difficult not to notice the parallels between Christ’s self-humbling and self-giving and the Christian’s negation of self-seeking.

B. Paul and Self-Involving Actions

1. Paul and Reflexive Actions

Interpreters of Paul have often recognized the role of self-involving, or reflexive, actions in the theological areas mentioned above: Christology, anthropology/soteriology, and ethics/ministry. Furthermore, they have often noticed the similarities in language that express these dimensions of Paul’s thought. Representative of this recognition of parallels within Paul’s theology and ethics is Victor Furnish’s analysis of the dynamic of indicative and imperative in Paul, found in his Theology and Ethics in Paul.⁶

Furnish devotes a section of his book to Paul’s notion of faith as obedience in love:

It has been demonstrated in many different ways that Paul regards faith’s obedience as a radical surrender of one’s self to God, a giving of one’s self to belong to him as a slave belongs to his master. The same categories are employed when he describes the character of Christian love. It is a radical giving up of one’s self and a radical being given over into the service of others [emphasis his]. Standing fast in the freedom which Christ’s death and resurrection have bestowed means nothing else than freedom from one’s self and for others. [He then cites Gal

5

:

13

.] . . . The nature of Christian love matches that of faith itself. This is seen best of all in

1

Cor

13

:

4

ff.: love means the giving of one’s self, the abandonment of all private claims, privileges, and boasts, and constructive concern for others. . . . Love is . . . the power of God present within [a person] . . . turning him from the concerns of self to the concern for others.⁷

In this passage Furnish summarizes the similarity in Paul’s language—Paul employs the same categories—between discussions of the fundamental relation of the Christian to God and discussions of the character of Christian love and freedom. In other words, the significant similarity between Paul’s language of religious existence (his anthropological or soteriological language), and his ethical language shows an integral relationship between these two aspects of Paul’s thought.

In addition to parallels between Paul’s ethics and his anthropology, Furnish also notes the connection of Paul’s ethics to his Christology:

Specifically, the Christian’s love is to have the character of Christ’s own. He is love’s encouragement and incentive (Phil.

2

:

1

RSV). . . . It is also significant that this admonition [i.e., Let each of us please his neighbor for his good, to build him up, Rom

15

:

2

] is grounded in Christ’s own obedient, others-regarding love: For Christ did not please himself but became a servant [diakonos]" (vss.

3

,

8

)."⁸

These interconnections have long been recognized and have spawned a significant discussion about the role of Christology in Paul’s ethics, centering on the existence (or non-existence) and meaning of an imitatio Christi motif in Paul.

In Furnish’s treatment of the issue of imitatio Christi in Paul,⁹ Furnish discusses a number of passages that seem to include the imitatio theme, concluding that they are all bound together by two themes: (1) the need for humble, selfless service; and (2) obedience as conformity to Christ’s suffering and death in the giving of one’s self over to the service of others.¹⁰ Moreover, observes Furnish, the specific quality to be emulated is not a trait of the earthly Jesus but "the humble, giving, obedient love of the crucified and resurrected Lord, for Paul sees the meaning of love (both what God gives and asks) revealed first of all in the grand humiliation of Christ’s incarnation and death.¹¹ Thus for Paul, according to Furnish, God’s decisive redemptive deed" consists in God’s giving of the Son and the Son’s giving of himself, and these are the fundamental ground and model of love.

Furnish’s discussions of faith as obedience in love and the imitatio Christi theme in Paul demonstrate the parallels of language and interconnection of thought in Paul’s anthropology, Christology, and ethics. Faith/obedience is the surrender of and release from the self; love is the giving-up and giving-over to others of the self; freedom is freedom from the self for others; and love is grounded in Christ’s own acts of self-surrender, self-sacrifice, and concern for others. The significance of Furnish’s discussion, however, lies not merely in his observations of parallels between Paul’s theology and ethics, but especially in his recognition of the prominence of similar self-involving actions at the intersections of Paul’s theology and ethics.¹²

2. Reflexive Actions and the Reflexive Pronoun

The similarities and relationships Furnish discerns between different aspects of Paul’s thought are similarities in the role of the self (either Christ’s or the Christian’s). In the course of his discussions of faith as obedience in love, Furnish repeatedly uses English expressions containing reflexive pronouns or the word self.¹³ He does not, however, ever mention or quote the Greek reflexive pronoun in the texts he refers to or quotes. This absence is quite remarkable when one realizes that of the approximately twenty-five texts mentioned on the three pages¹⁴ from which the quotations above are taken, all but about six have a reflexive pronoun in the text or its immediate context.

As perceptive and convincing as Furnish’s analysis of statements regarding the self may be, he fails to discern a recurring linguistic phenomenon that is a significant element of those statements. Furnish’s contention, that various semantic or theological domains contain similar and related notions of self-surrender and self-giving, must therefore be supplemented with the observation that these similarities and relationships consistently find expression in reflexive constructions. Thus Furnish has correctly noted the role of self-involving, or reflexive, action in Paul, but he has missed the centrality of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases to the expression of that reflexive action.

This oversight is not completely surprising, since pronouns are not conspicuous or semantically weighty linguistic units. Since, however, they are so essential to these central statements of Paul’s thought, one might assume that other scholars have observed and analyzed this phenomenon.

C. The Overlooked Reflexive Pronoun and Phrases

There are several kinds of works in which one might expect to find an analysis of the reflexive pronoun and/or reflexive phrases in Paul: in a theology of Paul; in a study of one of the three theological categories noted above (Christology, anthropology, or ethics) in which reflexives figure prominently; in a commentary on one of Paul’s letters, perhaps in an excursus; or in a more general study of NT syntax or philology with a section on Paul. One searches in all of these works, however, in vain.

1. Paul’s Theology and Anthropology

In the standard theologies of Paul (and in the sections on Paul in New Testament theologies), there appears to be no treatment of the reflexive pronoun, reflexive phrases, or reflexive actions.¹⁵ Even in those theologies that devote special attention to Paul’s anthropology, and thus his view of the self, one finds only the slightest mention of the reflexive. The chief example of this is Bultmann’s work on Paul.

Bultmann organizes his treatment of Paul according to Paul’s anthropology (two parts: people before and people under faith), beginning his discussion with an examination of Paul’s anthropological concepts or terms¹⁶: sōma; psychē, pneuma, and zōē; nous and syneidēsis; and kardia.¹⁷ Bultmann’s basic thesis is that a person is a living unity,¹⁸ and argues that for Paul certain terms, such as body, soul, and spirit, often mean the self, a person in his or her essence and totality, rather than merely aspects of a person’s being.¹⁹ Thus, Bultmann notes, Paul can sometimes replace sōma, psychē, and pneuma with an appropriate personal or reflexive pronoun.²⁰

More specifically, Bultmann understands Paul to use sōma to mean that self from whom he [a person], as subject, distinguishes himself, the self with whom he can deal as the object of his own conduct, and also the self whom he can perceive as subjected to an occurrence that springs from a will other than its own.²¹ The word sōma expresses Paul’s view of human existence as the having of a relationship to one’s self.²² This use of sōma with respect to a person’s being able to control himself and be the object of his own action is demonstrated in passages that employ verbal constructions with either sōma or the reflexive pronoun as the direct object.²³

Given Bultmann’s attention to the Pauline terms for self and to their importance in Paul’s theology, it is curious that Bultmann does not further examine Paul’s use of the reflexive pronoun. Instead, he sees the reflexive pronoun simply as a substitute for anthropological terms that indicates that those anthropological terms sometimes mean the self or whole person. Apparently Bultmann saw no other anthropological or theological significance in the reflexive per se. Nor, apparently, did he perceive that the numerous occurrences of the plural form of the reflexive in Paul suggests that Paul often views the individual as part of a community.²⁴

Bultmann’s approach to the reflexive is typical of other studies in Pauline anthropology in two ways. First, the reflexive is not considered one of the anthropological terms;²⁵ and second, the reflexive is viewed as a synonym for certain substantive anthropological terms, thus proving either that the term in question means the whole person²⁶ or, alternately, that the reflexive means not the whole person but simply the body.²⁷ Thus attention to the reflexive itself has been neglected.

2. Paul’s Christology

Studies in Pauline Christology and pre-Pauline traditions have frequently drawn attention to the presence of reflexive pronouns in christological formulae and hymns, particularly formulae employing the verb [para]didōmi²⁸ and the Christ-hymn in Phil 2:6–11. The chief issues in both cases have been the background (especially the possibility of relations to Isa 53), authorship, development, and uses (pre-Pauline and Pauline) of the texts.

The [para]didōmi formulae were categorized by Jeremias into three syntactical categories: (1) active verb + direct object; (2) passive verb; (3) active verb + reflexive direct object.²⁹ These categories are generally recognized, so debate has centered on the developments in Christology that led to the various kinds of formulae, with only passing attention given to the significance of the reflexive dimension of the formulae.³⁰

In a lengthy article, Gabriella Berényi devotes considerable attention to category (3) above. She cites pagan, Jewish, and NT uses of paradidōmi, both non-reflexive and reflexive, to interpret Gal 2:20. She argues that the reflexive use of paradidōmi in Gal 2:20 is not a pre-Pauline formula but Paul’s unique expression of Christ’s self-surrender to hostile forces as an act of love for others.³¹ Although Berényi argues that this reflexive formulation is representative of Paul’s general concern with the self and his particular concern, in context, with the paradoxical relations between self-denial and self-affirmation, she does not pursue the connection between this reflexive text and other reflexive constructions in Paul that express his Christology or ethics.

Of all the Pauline reflexive constructions, those in Phil 2 have probably received the most systematic analysis, but primarily in the context of Philippians, without in-depth consideration of their relationship to other Pauline texts with reflexive constructions.³² Discussions of the reflexive pronouns in verses 7–8 have focused on two issues. One issue is the meaning of the two phrases heauton ekenōsen and etapeinōsen heauton: what is their background, and to what aspect of Christ’s (or Jesus’) ministry do they refer? The other issue is the relationship of these phrases to the exhortations that precede and follow the hymn, which also use reflexives (2:3–4, 12, 21). Some studies have pointed to the similarities between the language of the hymn, the language and ideas of the rest of Philippians, and Paul’s thought generally, thus re-opening the question of Pauline authorship, but none of these has developed the interconnections of reflexive constructions.³³

Whether Paul inherited or composed the reflexive formulae about Christ’s self-giving and the hymn about Christ’s self-emptying, they are clearly important aspects of his Christology. Thus far, however, there appears to be no systematic analysis of the relationships among these christological reflexives and between them and other reflexive constructions in Paul.³⁴

3. Paul’s Ethics

Like the work of Furnish, most studies of Paul’s ethics recognize the centrality of language about the self and self-involving actions in Paul’s parenesis. Nevertheless—also like Furnish’s book—these studies have normally stated their findings in general terms without describing the specific function of reflexive constructions in Paul’s ethics.³⁵ Paul’s ethic is, of course, one of love and concern for neighbor in addition to (rather than?) love and concern for self. But how, specifically, does this ethic come to expression?

A significant exception to this tendency to generalize is Hans Dieter Betz' analysis of mimēsis in Paul.³⁶ In discussing 1 Cor 10–11, Rom 15, Phil 2, and other passages, Betz shows the similarities in reflexive expressions between Paul’s descriptions of Christ’s actions, Paul’s own self-description as an example for others, and Paul’s ethical instruction.³⁷ Betz does not, however, give attention to the origin or meaning of the reflexive phrases per se, nor does he develop the interconnections between various reflexive phrases. Rather, he stresses Paul’s notion of mimēsis as a cultic experience of conformity to Christ’s death, which is a result of being in Christ (rather than strictly ethical imitation) and which shapes Paul’s understanding of concepts such as love, freedom, and slavery.³⁸ Since the reflexive phrases are so prominent in the texts Betz examines, a study of the role of reflexive phrases in these texts would add further specificity to our understanding of Paul’s central ethical concerns.

Another important exception to the generalizing of Paul’s ethic is a brief comment from Michel Bouttier. In an article on 1 Cor 8–10, Bouttier notes that the contrast between seeking the advantage of the many (ta tōn pollōn) and seeking one’s own advantage (ta emautou or ta heautou) is une note fondamentale du paulinisme.³⁹ Bouttier does not, however, develop this point or trace the contrast throughout Paul’s letters. Once again, it appears that important insights into the reflexive modes of expressions of Paul’s thought need further elaboration.

4. Commentaries

It would be impossible to examine every single commentary written on Paul’s letters in search of a treatment of the reflexive pronoun or reflexive constructions. But the following generalization can be made about a large number of commentaries consulted, all of which have no such treatment: most commentators who even make note of the presence of a reflexive pronoun in a Pauline text either include a brief syntactical comment about it or list other ancient texts (from Paul and/or outside the NT) in which similar language is found. The latter is especially true of christological or ethical texts in Paul.⁴⁰ Surprisingly, however, some commentaries that are extremely historical in orientation, perhaps to the point of being guilty of parallelomania—such as Conzelmann’s commentary on 1 Corinthians—do not allude to similar reflexive texts in writers other than Paul.⁴¹ Other such commentaries pay close attention to ancient concepts related to the reflexive, such as self-sacrifice, without discussing the language in which these concepts are expressed.⁴²

The chief exception to this generalization is the phenomenon of commentaries on Philippians, which, as noted above, have been obligated to examine the reflexive constructions in the hymn in Phil 2. This work, however, has been in the interest of understanding the particular phrases in Phil 2, not in Paul’s overall use of reflexive expressions.

5. Works in Grammar and Philology

On Paul’s particular use of the reflexive pronoun nothing has been published to date. As one would expect, however, every Greek grammar treats the reflexive pronoun, sometimes in detail, but largely only in terms of its etymology and basic syntax, and almost always within a completely traditional linguistic framework. Curiously, journals devoted to the technical linguistic aspects of biblical studies, such as The Bible Translator, have yet to publish an article on the reflexive.

Lexicons are of no more help. The article on heautou in BAGD is very deficient, focusing almost exclusively on prepositional phrases.⁴³ The exegetical dictionary edited by Balz and Schneider has more comprehensive, though still brief, discussions of emautou and heautou.⁴⁴

A somewhat better situation prevails in The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, which is organized by semantic field, or English (originally German) key-words.⁴⁵ There is no entry for self or related terms in the dictionary, but the index of transliterated Greek terms does include the third-person reflexive heautos [sic], though not the second- or first-person form. The twenty-one references given lead the reader to quotations of biblical texts containing reflexive pronouns, but there is no detailed discussion of the reflexive pronoun or reflexive constructions. The English index has an entry for self, which refers the reader to the standard anthropological terms and to verbs that can take reflexive objects, but the reflexive pronoun occurs basically without comment.⁴⁶

From the introduction to TDNT, one might expect an article on the reflexive pronoun, since the main purpose of the work is to discuss every word in the NT with any religious or theological significance, including many prepositions and even some numerals.⁴⁷ In fact, however, there is no article on the reflexive pronoun, nor on idios, with which it is sometimes synonymous. The reflexives do not even appear in the index of Greek words in TWNT or TDNT. The TDNT English index does not list the word self, and although the TWNT index of German words includes das Selbst, it refers the reader to five places in Schweizer’s article on psychē where he equates this term with the self or whole person.⁴⁸ Of the many references in the Scripture index to key passages in Paul with reflexive pronouns, only a handful even note the presence of a reflexive, much less grant it any semantic value.

Looking elsewhere in TDNT where one might expect discussion of the reflexive is only slightly more fruitful. Jeremias draws some attention to the reflexive in his discussion of [para]didōmi formulae.⁴⁹ Also mentioned, in the article on pherō by Konrad Weiss, is the ancient issue of the relationship between the private and the common good (symphoros) that sometimes comes to expression in reflexive constructions.⁵⁰ Weiss cites several of these and briefly notes Paul’s use of symphoros, but he does not point out the reflexive constructions themselves. TDNT’s only significant comment on the semantic value of the reflexive pronoun, as far as a thorough search has revealed, is in Hermann W. Beyer’s article on heteros, where he briefly mentions the contrast between this word and the reflexive pronoun as expressions for the neighbor and the self as objects of ethical concern.⁵¹

Since the standard lexical works have, by and large, overlooked the reflexive pronoun, it is no surprise that other studies in NT, which depend in so many ways on these fundamental lexical tools, have also bypassed the reflexive pronoun. Beyer’s brief comment in TDNT, however, forms an interesting parallel to Bouttier’s statement in his work on 1 Cor 8–10: the fundamental Pauline contrast between concern for self and concern for others is expressed with the assistance of a reflexive phrase.

6. Summary

Although a number of different kinds of studies of various dimensions of Paul’s language and theology suggest that reflexive constructions are an integral part of the apostle’s way of expressing himself, these suggestions have not been developed in a systematic way. Parallel ideas and expressions within Paul’s letters, as well as in other ancient writings, have been noted in general ways but have not been carefully traced throughout Paul’s letters. From all indications, this is a noteworthy lacuna in the interpretation of Paul.

D. The Need for this Study

Several factors indicate that the lack of a comprehensive study of Paul’s use of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases needs to be corrected. First of all, reflexive pronouns and reflexive constructions give expression to ideas about the self and self-involving actions, which are of deep concern to Paul. Furthermore, many of the 109 occurrences of the reflexive in Paul are in texts of great theological and ethical significance to the apostle. In addition, there are clusters of interrelated reflexive pronoun constructions in the same context. And finally, an apparent interconnectedness exists among reflexive constructions used to express the various dimensions of Paul’s thought. In light of these factors, this linguistic phenomenon merits attention in order to understand Paul more clearly and precisely.

Already one scholar has attempted to analyze the meaning of reflexive pronouns in some Greek philosophers, especially Plato.⁵² Although this effort is marred by serious methodological problems,⁵³ it is a significant beginning and suggests that attention to a writer’s use of the reflexive pronoun is an important aspect of understanding that writer.

E. The Purpose, Plan, and Thesis of this Study

The purpose of the present study is to analyze the syntax and semantics of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases in Paul’s writings. Such a detailed study of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases in Paul’s letters ought to aid the interpreter of Paul to (1) describe the role of the self in the various categories of Paul’s theology and ethics; and (2) state, with greater precision and clarity than has previously been done, the parallels and relationships between the various categories of Paul’s thought—christological, anthropological, and ethical—as they involve the self.

As a means of situating Paul’s use of reflexive constructions in a broader historical and philosophical context, this investigation will also examine the use and meaning of the reflexive pronoun in the Discourses of the Stoic Epictetus. There are at least four reasons for selecting Epictetus. First, flourishing in the second half of the first century CE, he was a near-contemporary of Paul, a moralist with similar concerns living and thinking in the same general cultural and philosophical climate. Second, Epictetus is a basic source of our knowledge of first-century Stoicism, especially Greek (as opposed to Latin) Stoicism;⁵⁴ as a chief representative of the later Stoics, Epictetus expresses a significant alternative to Christian thought and life as it was found in Paul and his communities. Third, there are acknowledged similarities between Paul and the Stoics, particularly between Paul and Epictetus.⁵⁵ If Paul borrowed some of his parenetic form and content from the Stoics,⁵⁶ and if he manifests other similarities to them, it is important to analyze carefully similarities and differences between him and a significant Stoic from his era. Finally, Epictetus, like Paul, makes frequent use of reflexive constructions, often in passages that express the central ideas of his philosophy and ethics, including his thoughts on self-interest, self-sufficiency, and self-emancipation.⁵⁷ Furthermore, as in Paul’s letters, there are also clusters of reflexive pronouns in important passages.

Thus the present study is an investigation of the usage and meaning of the reflexive pronoun in its various inflectional forms, especially in certain recurring linguistic patterns in Epictetus (Part Two) and Paul (Part Three; the two are compared in Part Four). The danger of isolating a linguistic item of very general application and attributing great semantic and theological value to it, out of context and apart from word-combinations in which it is found, has been correctly noted and criticized by James Barr.⁵⁸ Barr also notes that in studies such as this one the interpreter must move methodically and carefully from linguistic detail to theological thought; this is precisely the goal of the present study.⁵⁹ This is, therefore, a study in syntax and semantics: the relationships between words and the meaning conveyed by those words-in-relationship in particular contexts. The basic questions being raised are the following: (1) How do Epictetus and Paul use reflexive pronouns (syntax)? (2) What is the meaning of the various constructions and texts in which they are found (semantics in a narrow sense)? and (3) What philosophical, theological, and ethical convictions, especially concerning the self and self-involving actions, do these texts express (semantics in a wider sense)? To answer these questions properly it will first be necessary to situate this investigation in its larger linguistic and historical context (Part One).

Although the answers to the questions raised above are complex, the following chapters will demonstrate one main point. The fundamental thesis of this study is that the reflexive pronoun is an important item in the vocabulary of both Epictetus and Paul, and reflexive phrases are essential, central statements of their theology, anthropology, and ethics. One cannot fully understand the writings and thought of either author without due attention to the concepts expressed in the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases. Furthermore, in both Epictetus’s and Paul’s writings, reflexive constructions reveal crucial interconnections between various aspects of the writers’ thought. For Paul in particular, the relationship between indicative and imperative is greatly clarified through attention to Paul’s reflexive phrases. Moreover, some very significant differences, as well as similarities, between Epictetus and Paul are manifested in these reflexive constructions.

1

. Reflexive pronouns can, of course, be either singular or plural. Throughout this study, therefore, the term self-involving (which refers to people) can be interchanged with subject-involving (which refers to a linguistic item); that is, the subject or self referred to in a reflexive phrase may be an individual, a group of individuals, or a group understood as a single entity. [The original study did not explicitly provide a more in-depth interpretation of the term self. As noted in the preface, I would propose a basic, generic definition such as that offered by Naomi Quinn (Self,

362

) and used in Pauline studies by Fredrick Carr: the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, psychologically, socially, and culturally, cited repeatedly in Carr, Being and Becoming.]

2

. The letters of undisputed Pauline authorship that are the basis of this study are Romans,

1

–

2

Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians,

1

Thessalonians, and Philemon.

3

. LSJ, s.v. paradidōmi.

4

. See, e.g., Plato and Epictetus.

5

. In this study the term anthropology refers to the study and description of that which is common to and essential about human beings, including especially their fundamental relation to God.

6

. That Furnish, who published Theology and Ethics in Paul more than twenty years ago [at the time of the original project] (

1968

), is still an appropriate dialogue partner for discussing the relationship between theology and ethics in Paul is demonstrated by Allen Verhey’s recent work on New Testament ethics (Verhey, Great Reversal), in which Verhey refers to Furnish more than to any other Pauline scholar. Of sixty notes in Verhey’s section on Paul, thirteen have references to Furnish, including nine to Theology and Ethics in Paul. Furnish is also one of the chief dialogue partners in Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul. Furnish is also consistently appealed to by Ernst Käsemann in his discussion of Rom

6

:

12

–

23

and the relation of indicative to imperative included in that discussion (Commentary on Romans,

172

–

85

). Thus the comment of Richard Hays is appropriate: "The best general discussion of this problem [i.e., the relation between Paul’s ethic and his gospel/theology] remains that of V. P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Christology and Ethics in Galatians,"

268

n

1

). [As many early respondents to Engberg-Pedersen’s Paul and the Stoics observed, one of his most important contributions—no matter one’s overall assessment of the book—was the attempt to bring together the indicative and the imperative in both the Stoics and Paul. This was one of my own most basic interests, in the original project, as well. In Paul, the Stoics, and Body of Christ, Michelle Lee appropriates the indicative-imperative schema from Furnish and sees it operating in Paul in a way similar to its role in Stoicism (

6

–

7

). For the Stoics, according to Lee, this entailed the relationship between physics and ethics, between principles (or doctrine) and precepts (

24

,

77

–

83

). The fundamental principle (doctrine, indicative), she contends, is that all humans are part of one great body, which is also god/God/the gods; this is the key to social ethics (

83

–

102

): the inherent unity of humanity and its unity with the gods (

83

). As we will see in this book, certain structural (as well as specific) similarities between the Stoics—specifically Epictetus—and Paul exist, but so do radical differences.]

7

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

204

–

5

. [Engberg-Pedersen calls Gal

5

:

13

a version of Paul’s maxim in Phil

2

:

4

(Paul and the Stoics,

160

).]

8

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

204

–

6

. Similarly: Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

304

–

5

; Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul,

102

–

3

; Birger Gerhardsson, Ethos of the Bible,

72

–

76

; and many others.

9

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

218

–

24

.

10

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

223

.

11

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

223

. Furnish here refers to Rom

5

:

6

ff.,

2

Cor

8

:

9

, and Phil

2

:

6

ff. Cf. also his comments on Phil

2

, where he states that the character of the believers’ obedience discussed on either side of the Christ-hymn has the character of Christ’s own obedience in his incarnation and death, which have become an "incentive of love [

2

:

1

, RSV]" (

218

). Cf. J. L. Houlden, Ethics and the New Testament,

26

: "[Paul] urges generosity and humility not because they are desirable as virtues but because they are attributes of Christ in his saving act for men (II Cor. viii,

9

; Phil. ii,

1

–

11

). Humility and mutual love are duties which follow straight from membership in Christ’s body, the Church. . . . Above all, the moral impulse finds its deepest source in Christ’s death."

12

. Others have noted these interconnections. See, e.g., Houlden, (New Testament and Ethics,

26

): "[B]aptism ‘into Christ’ brings about the destruction of the believer’s orientation to sin [anthropology]. It is a wholesale acceptance of Christ’s cross [Christology]—and a dedication to the self-giving that is consistent with it (Rom. vi,

6

–

8

; Gal. v,

24

) [ethics]"; and, similarly, Keck (Paul and His Letters,

89

), who notes especially in connection with Romans

6

that Paul’s ethics is intimately linked with Christology and soteriology, for trust/faith in God, and the attendant life in Christ and in the Spirit, transfers the self to another domain, where Christ is the norm because he is the Lord. (Keck’s use of soteriology here is basically parallel to anthropology as used in the present discussion, i.e., referring to a person’s fundamental relation to God [see n

5

above].)

13

. In the lines from Theology and Ethics in Paul quoted above, he uses these terms seven times.

14

. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

204

–

6

.

15

. See, e.g., the theologies of Paul by Beker (Paul the Apostle), Ridderbos (Paul), and Whiteley (Theology of St. Paul); and the New Testament theologies by Bultmann (Theology of the New Testament), Goppelt (Theology of the New Testament, vol.

2

), Kümmel (Theology of the New Testament According to its Major Witnesses), and Ladd ( Theology of the New Testament). [The situation, as far as I can tell, has not changed. See, e.g., Dunn, Theology of the Apostle Paul; Schnelle, Apostle Paul; Wolter, Paul; Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God. Of course, all of these works recognize reflexive phrases or ideas here and there, but not as a coherent subject.]

16

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

191

–

92

.

17

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

192

–

226

.

18

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

209

.

19

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

194

–

97

,

204

,

206

.

20

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

194

,

206

.

21

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

196

.

22

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

203

.

23

. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament,

2

:

196

.

24

. The importance of the plural form of the reflexive in Paul will become clear in the discussions of the Pauline texts below. On Bultmann’s failure generally to perceive Paul’s emphasis on the individual within communal and even cosmic contexts, see Käsemann, On Paul’s Anthropology, especially

10

,

17

–

31

; and Käsemann, On the Subject of Primitive Apocalyptic.

25

. Each of the following works has sections or chapters on Paul’s anthropological terms, but none has a section on the reflexive: Gutbrod, Die paulinische Anthropologie,

31

–

99

(nous, syneidēsis, kardia, psychē, pneuma, melē, esō and exō anthrōpos, sōma); Mehl-Koehnlein, L’homme selon l'apôtre Paul (sōma, sarx, psychē, nous); Stacey, The Pauline View of Man in Relation to its Judaic and Hellenistic Background,

121

–

214

(chapters on soul, spirit, natural and spiritual, flesh, spirit and flesh, body, heart, mind, conscience, the inward man); Kümmel, Das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament,

23

(Paul’s terms for the inner person include psychē, nous, noēma, pneuma, syneidēsis, dianoia, splanchna, phrenes); Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms (chapters on sarx, pneuma tou anthrōpou, sōma, kardia, nous, psychē, esō/exō anthrōpos, and syneidēsis); Whiteley, Theology of St. Paul,

41

–

44

(sarx, sōma, pneuma, kardia, nous, syneidēsis, psychē, esō anthrōpos). [Again, the situation does not appear to have changed.]

26

. E.g., Whiteley, Theology of St. Paul,

41

–

44

; Stacey, Pauline View,

183

; and Robinson, Body,

18

–

19

,

28

–

29

. Robinson says that even sarx is sometimes simply periphrasis for a personal pronoun and can also substitute for the reflexive (

28

–

29

).

27

. Gundry, SŌMA in Biblical Theology, with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology. Gundry pays particular attention to occurrences of sōma that could possibly be interchanged with personal or reflexive pronouns, but he does not deal with those pronouns per se. Gundry’s basic argument is that (

1

) actual parallels between sōma and the personal or reflexive pronoun do not expand the meaning of sōma to whole person rather than body but instead restrict the meaning of the pronoun (

29

–

33

); and (

2

) uses of the word sōma without a parallel pronoun should not, therefore, be understood to mean whole person (

34

–

80

).

28

. E.g., Gal

1

:

4

;

2

:

20

; cf.

1

Tim

2

:

6

; Titus

2

:

14

; Eph

5

:

2

,

25

.

29

. TDNT

5

:

710

, s.v. pais theou.

30

. The most thorough treatment of the formulae is Klaus Wengst, Christologische Formeln und Lieder des Urchristentums. Wengst (

55

–

61

) argues that the reflexive stage of the formula, with the Son as subject, is an evolution from the non-reflexive stage with God as subject, but he says little about the reflexive per se. For a critique of Wengst see Gabriella Berényi, "Gal

2

,

20

: a Pre-Pauline or a Pauline Text?"

31

. "Gal

2

,

20

: a Pre-Pauline or a Pauline Text?"

32

. For the immense bibliography related to the hymn in Phil

2

, see Martin, Carmen Christi: Philippians

2

:

5

–

11

in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early Christian Worship, xiii–xxxix and

320

–

42

; Hawthorne, Philippians,

71

–

75

. [For more recent bibliographies, see Gordley, New Testament Christological Hymns,

79

–

110

; Fewster, Philippians ‘Christ Hymn’; Nimmo and Johnson, Kenosis.]

33

. See, e.g., Pollard, Integrity of Philippians; Hooker, "Philippians

2

,

6

–

11

; and Hurtado, Jesus as Lordly Example in Philippians

2

:

5

–

11

." [It is certainly the case, however, that commentators and other interpreters of Philippians have noted the parallels between

2

:

3

–

4

and

2

:

6

–

8

, including the parallel reflexive constructions.]

34

. [Once again, this is not to say that connections have never been noted, just that they have not been systematically and comprehensively explored.]

35

. See, e.g., the quotations above, n

11

and n

12

, which echo Furnish. Similarly, in the standard studies of imitatio Christi and imitatio Pauli, parallel ideas in Paul’s Christology and ethics are treated without specific treatment of parallel phrases. See, e.g., Tinsley, Imitation of God in Christ, ch.

9

; and de Boer, Imitation of Paul, especially

154

–

69

.

36

. Betz, Nachfolge und Nachahmung Jesu Christi im Neuen Testament,

137

–

89

.

37

. Betz, Nachfolge und Nachahmung, especially

159

–

63

,

166

–

68

.

38

. Betz, Nachfolge und Nachahmung, especially

160

–

86

. [It will be evident in the following pages, and even more so in my subsequent work, that I agree completely with Betz’s main point here: participation in Christ is the key that both unlocks and expresses so much of Paul’s ethic, or spirituality (lived experience).]

39

. Bouttier, "

1

Co

8

–

10

considéré du point de vue de son unité,"

216

.

40

. E.g., Cranfield, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,

1

:

265

,

379

, with syntactical comments on Rom

5

:

8

and

8

:

3

; Käsemann, Romans,

372

, noting secular parallels to Rom

14

:

7

; Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians,

110

, with secular parallels to Phil

2

:

4

; and Furnish, II Corinthians,

222

–

23

, with both secular parallels and syntax noted.

41

. Hans Conzelmann refers the reader only to parallel texts in Paul in his discussions of

6

:

19

,

10

:

24

, and

13

:

5

(

1

Corinthians,

113

,

176

,

224

).

42

. See especially Betz,

2

Corinthians

8

–

9

,

46

–

49

, where he discusses

2

Cor

8

:

5

in the context of ancient theories and practices of self-sacrifice and dedication, but does not note linguistic patterns.

43

. It does not even mention the phrase ta heautou.

44

. Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. The entry for seautou is simply a concordance to the word.

45

. Colin Brown, New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology.

46

. Similarly, the index has entries for nearly one hundred hyphenated words beginning with self-, many of which also lead to quotations of reflexive constructions.

47

. TDNT

1

:vii.

48

. TWNT

10

:

327

(index). Stauffer’s discussion of the so-called "anthropological egō" in Paul, however, does not refer to the reflexive (TDNT

2

:

356

–

62

, s.v. egō).

49

. TDNT

5

:

707

, s.v. pais theou.

50

. TDNT

9

:

69

–

73

, s.v. pherō, ktl.

51

. TDNT

2

:

704

, s.v. heteros.

52

. Gantar, Zur Verinnerlichung der Reflexivpronomina in der griechischen philosophischen Sprache.

53

. See the critique of Gantar’s article in Part One, chapter

2

(

64–65

).

54

. The extant writings of Musonius Rufus, who was Epictetus’s teacher and more nearly contemporary with Paul, are very meagre in comparison to the preserved Discourses of Epictetus.

55

. See, e.g., Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul,

44

–

51

; Bultmann, Der stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe; and Stanley Stowers, Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans,

53

–

58

,

84

–

93

, et passim. Although Stowers demonstrated errors in Bultmann’s understanding of the nature of the diatribe and its function in Paul, Stowers, Bultmann, and nearly all other scholars have noted the many similarities in form and content between Epictetus and Paul. [One significant more recent scholar whose wide-ranging work in this area we will discuss at various points is Troels Engberg-Pedersen. We will also briefly consider the contributions of such scholars as Runar Thorsteinsson and Timothy Brookins.]

56

. So both Bultmann and Stowers.

57

. [Richard Sorabji hints at the significance of reflexive constructions in his essay Epictetus on proairesis and Self,

89

–

90

. Sorabji, however, rather oddly interprets reflexive constructions as seemingly suggesting that Epictetus actually posits more than one self, or at least different aspects of the same self. See also the comment of Gretchen Reydams-Schils: On the level of language, the ‘self’ is evident in the Roman Stoics’ extensive use of reflexive pronouns (Roman Stoics,

15

; cf.

25

). The index to A. A. Long’s standard work Epictetus lists the following topics in the index: self, as volition; self-discipline; self-examination; self-interest (nine entries); self-love; self-ownership and one’s own (thirteen entries); self-preservation; and self-respect.]

58

. The Semantics of Biblical Language,

231

, where Barr is especially critical of TWNT articles on adverbs, prepositions, and pronouns, including Stauffer’s previously mentioned article on egō.

59

. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language,

235

. As a detailed linguistic analysis of the reflexive pronoun per se, this study is designed as a necessary supplement to other investigations, especially studies of the traditional Pauline anthropological terms, and does not claim to provide an exhaustive theological or conceptual analysis of Paul’s view of the self. As a detailed linguistic analysis of reflexive phrases, carefully leading to a conceptual analysis of Paul’s perspectives on specifically self-involving actions, this study is much more complete, since such actions are usually expressed in reflexive phrases. In both cases there is clearly a close relationship between linguistic detail and theological thought, but this relationship must be explored and then stated very carefully.

Part One

The Syntax and Semantics of the Reflexive Pronoun and Reflexive Phrases

Introduction

The purpose of Part One is to set the detailed discussion of texts in Epictetus and Paul (Parts Two through Four) in a larger theoretical and historical linguistic framework. This part is divided into three chapters.

Chapter 1 will first consider certain general principles of syntax and semantics and then the syntax and semantics of the reflexive pronoun as a universal linguistic phenomenon. This chapter will necessarily be selective and eclectic, focusing on certain developments in modern linguistics that affect the present study.

Chapter 2 will examine the form, syntax, and semantics of the reflexive pronoun in classical and Hellenistic Greek. This will be a brief survey rather than an extensive investigation (though the latter has not yet been conducted in the light of modern linguistics and merits its own, separate study). The chapter will also survey previous studies of the reflexive in particular Greek authors, pointing out both the contributions and the lacunae in these studies.

Chapter 3 will then present an appropriate method for analyzing the syntax and semantics of the reflexive pronoun and reflexive phrases in Epictetus and Paul. This method will have already become apparent in light of observations and arguments made in chapters 1 and 2.

Chapter 1

The Syntax and Semantics of the Reflexive

General Principles and Specific Issues

The modern science of linguistics is, unfortunately, relatively unknown to many biblical exegetes. This chapter discusses selected developments in the field of linguistics that affect the interpretation of biblical texts generally (section A) and reflexive constructions in particular (section B). It thus provides the theoretical foundation, as well as some practical linguistic tools, for the remainder of the study.

A. General Principles of Syntax and Semantics

1. Diachronic and Synchronic Analysis

a. The Distinction; the Priority of Synchronic Analysis

The father of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, first made the distinction between diachronic and synchronic linguistics as the two fundamental (but also fundamentally different) aspects of the science of language.⁶⁰ Diachronic linguistics or language analysis is concerned with language across time—its growth and development. Synchronic linguistics is concerned with language within a given period, during which a language is more or less static. For the study of a particular document or literary corpus and its use of language, the synchronic approach must be predominant, for normally a writer uses only one language system—the one in existence during his or her lifetime—and does not think, speak, or write in a systematic reconstruction of the development of that language over time.⁶¹

Modern linguistics has almost unanimously accepted, therefore, the priority of synchronic over diachronic analysis for purposes of determining the meaning of a text, or semantics.⁶² This priority applies not only to vocabulary but also to syntax.⁶³ The usage of a syntactical construction in Paul, for example, must be understood primarily in light of its general use in the first century (or the Hellenistic period as a whole), not with reference to classical Greek.

b. The Role of Diachronic Analysis

This emphasis on the synchronic approach does not, however, totally eliminate the need for diachronic analysis.⁶⁴ From a theoretical point of view, John Lyons argues for granting a limited role to diachronics in the description of a language, since it is possible that the descriptive rules one formulates may

reflect particular historical processes in the development of the language. If so this is an important fact about the structure of language. But it does not affect the general principle of the priority of the synchronic, since the native speakers of a particular language are able to learn and apply the 'rules’ of their language without drawing upon any historical knowledge.⁶⁵

In other words, some diachronic developments help explain certain synchronic facts.⁶⁶ Diachronics can also assist synchronics by showing how a word or construction has changed over time and therefore cannot mean in one author what it meant in an author from an earlier or later time.⁶⁷ A careful combination of diachronics with synchronics is therefore necessary.⁶⁸

In addition to the general principle of diachronics assisting synchronics, there are also specific situations in which historical linguistics is critical. In the case of some lexical or syntactical elements of a language there may be relatively little evidence for their usage from the period in the history of the language that is being studied. In such a case diachronics can provide important clues for the interpretation of those elements of the language.⁶⁹ A similar situation exists with respect to certain stock phrases, idioms, technical terms, and expressions from well-known historical sources, such as holy writings. These items in a language have a tendency toward specialization or semantic restriction, and also an inherent conservative tendency to retain this specialized sense. Both tendencies make the study of the history of these kinds of items an integral part of their interpretation.⁷⁰ Another category of items, formal or literary elements, also demands diachronic investigation. Depending on education and general background, a writer may use words and constructions characteristic of a formal or literary style. For Hellenistic Greek writers, this style is of course classical Greek, and classical usage that is generally obsolete sometimes appears in Hellenistic writings.

These three categories of linguistic elements—rare, inherently static, and formal or literary—can be used with or without significant deliberation on the part of a writer or speaker. In either case, however, proper interpretation of a particular discourse necessitates a diachronic as well as a synchronic perspective on the particular element.

Thus it will be important for this study, for example, to know how the use of the reflexive pronoun had changed from classical to Hellenistic times, for Hellenistic usage is understandable (to an outside investigator) only in light of historical developments. This knowledge of historical developments can help the interpreter understand why Paul and Epictetus use certain constructions and what meaning they intend to convey when using them. Moreover, this historical knowledge can guard the interpreter from reading into their usage of reflexive constructions, meanings those constructions would normally have had in earlier centuries but had largely lost by the first century. For example, the usage and force of heautou as a reflexive possessive and of idios changed significantly from classical to Hellenistic times, and the presence or absence of these items in certain contexts may be significant in light of these changes.⁷¹

Also important to this study is the use of certain reflexive constructions not only in writers contemporary with Paul and Epictetus, but also in classical writers and the LXX. One example of this is the term ta heautou (sometimes singular to heautou). This phrase seems to have been a common idiom, perhaps with fairly uniform and understandable usage but also amenable to becoming a technical term with various meanings in differing religious or philosophical traditions. Historical knowledge of its usage is therefore important.

c. Summary

In summary, then, while this study grants priority to synchronics, diachronics plays an important, if largely supportive, role. Hellenistic usage of the reflexive pronoun is the primary context in which to situate Paul’s and Epictetus’s usage. The history of Greek reflexives may, however, have an important impact on the interpretation of their usage.

2. Words, Context, and Meaning

a. The Priority of Contextual Relationships for Meaning

By far the most important development in semantics in this century has been the principle that meaning is not to be found primarily in words but in relationships between words and in the larger linguistic units that embody these relationships.⁷² These larger units include constructions, sentences, paragraphs, discourses, literary works, and even an author’s entire literary corpus.⁷³ This principle may be referred to as the priority of contextual relationships (rather than individual words) for meaning.⁷⁴

This principle was developed and stated independently both by linguistic semanticists such as Ullmann and Lyons and by philosophers such as Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein wrote that only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning.⁷⁵ Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach to semantics has two fundamental elements. First is his notion of language-games, in which linguistic items have meaning in relationship to one another within the framework of a particular context and the rules it establishes. Related to this is his operational definition of meaning: For a large class of cases . . . the meaning of a word is its use in the language.⁷⁶

Despite differences in approach and emphasis, Ullmann, Lyons, and Wittgenstein all point to the principle of the priority of contextual relationships for meaning. This may now be stated in two parts, first generally and then more specifically:

1) Context is meaning-determinative. The primary determinant of the meaning of a word or construction in a specific location is neither its etymology or history, nor the sum total of all of its possible meanings,⁷⁷ nor even any one of its contemporary uses; rather, the primary determinant of meaning is context.

2) Meaning is found in relationships. The meaning of a linguistic item (from word to discourse) is not simply the sum total of its individual constituents but is found in many relationships, both obvious and hidden, between words, constructions, and sentences.

1) Context as Meaning-determinative

To be sure, as the previous section on synchronics and diachronics has emphasized, any consideration of context includes the historical situation and, to a lesser extent, the historical development of a language.⁷⁸ These dimensions of context provide general contours for the meaning of words and constructions: most vocabulary items are linked to a more or less stable semantic core without which communication would be unimaginable.⁷⁹ A significant difference exists, however, between an item’s conceptual or denotative meaning (i.e., the semantic core or dictionary meaning) and its discourse reference⁸⁰ or connotative and functional meaning in context.⁸¹

This distinction holds true not only for words but also for syntactical constructions and phrases, which are both word-combinations. Although speakers and writers are often quite limited in the ways they can arrange words meaningfully, this broad grammatical context does not determine with any precision the meaning of a particular construction. Meaning derives from the context of the writer’s entire corpus, the specific document, and especially the immediate literary context.⁸² The variety of possible interpretations of almost any Greek genitive construction, for example, indicates the necessity of applying even a radical formulation of this principle of contextual relations to syntactical constructions: a word [or, in this case, construction] does not have a meaning without a context, it only has possibilities of meaning.⁸³ Every word and every construction has a particular meaning and function in each particular context. As Wittgenstein wrote: The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of the tools in a tool-box.⁸⁴

2) Meaning in Relationships

The principle of the priority of context does not eliminate the importance of individual words and constructions. The function, however, of a specific word in a phrase or a phrase in a paragraph is different from its semantic core and even from its meaning⁸⁵ as an individual word or phrase in context. As J. P. Louw writes, meaning operates on different levels: on the levels of the word, the sentence, and the whole context.⁸⁶ Fundamentally, however, semantics is concerned with more than simply the meaning of words.⁸⁷ Indeed, meaning is not even merely a product of the additions of the supposed individual meanings of the separate words constituting a sentence.⁸⁸ Rather, meaning depends on the relations among words (or their combinations), and their grammatical structure . . . [and] the situation of the utterance.⁸⁹

Structural linguists distinguish two basic types of such relationships, syntagmatic and paradigmatic.⁹⁰ Syntagmatic (or linear or combinatory) relations refers to the relations between linguistic units that combine to form contexts. Paradigmatic (or contrasting) relations refers to the relationships among members of a set of items that are grammatically substitutable for one another and may therefore occupy the same linguistic context.⁹¹

An axiom of contemporary semantics is that both kinds of relationships are crucial elements in the meaning of any linguistic unit: "Linguistic units have no validity